NMOP Working Group T. Hu
Internet-Draft CMCC
Intended status: Standards Track L. M. Contreras
Expires: 16 April 2026 Telefonica
Q. Wu
Huawei
N. Davis
Ciena
C. Feng
13 October 2025
A YANG Data Model for Network Incident Management
draft-ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang-06
Abstract
A network incident refers to an unexpected interruption of a network
service, degradation of a network service quality, or sub-health of a
network service. Different data sources including alarms, metrics,
and other anomaly information can be aggregated into a few of network
incidents through data correlation analysis and the service impact
analysis.
This document defines a YANG Module for the network incident
lifecycle management. This YANG module is meant to provide a
standard way to report, diagnose, and help resolve network incidents
for the sake of network service health and probable cause analysis.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 April 2026.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Conventions and Definitions
3. Sample Use Cases
3.1. Incident-Based Trouble Tickets Dispatching
3.2. Incident Derivation from L3VPN Services Unavailability
3.3. Multi-layer Fault Demarcation
4. Network Incident Management Architecture
4.1. Interworking with Alarm Management
4.2. Interworking with SAIN
4.3. Relationship with RFC8969
4.4. Relationship with Trace Context
5. Functional Interface Requirements between the Client and the
Server
5.1. Incident Identification
5.2. Incident Diagnosis
5.3. Incident Resolution
6. Incident Data Model Concepts
6.1. Identifying the Incident Instance
6.2. The Incident Lifecycle
6.2.1. Network Incident Instance Lifecycle
6.2.2. Operator Incident Lifecycle
7. Incident Data Model Design
7.1. Overview
7.2. Incident Notifications
7.3. Incident Acknowledge
7.4. Incident Diagnose
7.5. Incident Resolution
7.6. RPC Failure
8. Network Incident Management YANG Module
9. Security Considerations
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. The "IETF XML" Registry
10.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry
Acknowledgements
References
Normative References
Informative References
Appendix A. Examples of Network Incident Format Representation
A.1. Network Incident Correlated with Specific Network Topology
and the Network Service
A.2. Network Incident Correlated with Trouble Tickets
A.3. Intent Based Networking with Incident Diagnosis Task List
A.4. Multi-Domain Fault Demarcation with Network Incident
Management
A.5. Service Complaint triggered Network Diagnosis
Appendix B. Changes between Revisions
Contributors
Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
[RFC8969] defines a framework for Automating Service and Network
Management with YANG [RFC7950] to full life cycle network management.
A set of YANG data models have already been developed in IETF for
network performance monitoring and fault monitoring, e.g., a YANG
data model for alarm management [RFC8632] defines a standard
interface for alarm management. A data model for Network and VPN
Service Performance Monitoring [RFC9375] defines a standard interface
for network performance management. In addition, distributed tracing
mechanism defined in [W3C-Trace-Context] can be used to analyze and
debug operations, such as configuration transactions, across multiple
distributed systems.
However, these YANG data models for network maintenance are based on
specific data source information and manage alarms and performance
metrics data separately at different layers in various different
management systems. In addition, the frequency and quantity of
alarms and performance metrics data reported to Operating Support
System (OSS) are increased dramatically (in many cases multiple
orders of magnitude) with the growth of service types and complexity
and greatly overwhelm OSS platforms [TMF724A]; with existing known
dependency relation between metric, alarm and events at each layer
(e.g., packet layer or optical layer), it is possible to compress
series of alarms (see Section 3.5.3 of [RFC8632] ) into fewer network
incidents and there are many solutions in the market today that
essentially do this to some degree. However, conventional solutions
such as data compression are time-consuming and labor-intensive,
usually rely on maintenance engineers' experience for data analysis,
which, in many cases, result in low processing efficiency, inaccurate
probable cause identification and duplicated tickets. It is also
difficult to assess the impact of alarms, performance metrics and
other anomaly data on network services without known relation across
layers of the network topology data or the relation with other
network topology data.
To address these challenges, a network wide incident-centric solution
is specified to establish the dependency relation with both network
service and network topology at various different layers, which not
only can be used at a specific layer in one domain but also can be
used to span across layers for multi-layer network troubleshooting.
A network incident refers to an undesired occurrence such as an
unexpected interruption of a network service, degradation of a
network service quality, or sub-health of a network service
[I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology][TMF724A]. Different data sources
including alarms, metrics, and other anomaly information can be
aggregated into one or a few of network incidents irrespective of the
layer through correlation analysis and the service impact analysis.
For example, if the protocol-related interface fails to work
properly, large amount of alarms may be reported to upper layer
management system. Although a lot of network services may be
affected by the interface, only one aggregated network incident
pertaining to the abnormal interface will be reported. A network
incident may also be raised through the analysis of some network
performance metrics, for example, as described in SAIN [RFC9417],
network services can be decomposed to several sub-services, specific
metrics are monitored for each sub- service. Therefore symptoms will
occur if services/sub-services are unhealthy (after analyzing
metrics), in addition, these symptoms may give rise to a network
incident when it causes degradation of the network services.
In addition, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)
are key technologies in the processing of large amounts of data with
complex data correlations (see Section 6.1 of
[I-D.irtf-nmrg-ai-challenges] ). For example, Neural Network
Algorithm or Hierarchy Aggregation Algorithm can be used to replace
manual alarm data correlation. Through online and offline self-
learning, these algorithms can be continuously optimized to improve
the efficiency of fault diagnosis.
This document defines a YANG data model for network incident
lifecycle management, which improves troubleshooting efficiency, and
improves network automation [RFC8969] with RPC operations in this
YANG module.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The following terms are defined in [RFC8632],
[RFC9543],[I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology] and are not redefined here:
* alarm
* resource
* event
* problem
* incident
* anomaly
* cause
* SLA (Service Level Agreement)
* SLO (Service Level Objective)
The following terms are defined in this document:
Service impact analysis: A process that uses algorithmic techniques
(e.g., machine learning, automated reasoning, conformance
checking, graph traversal, among others) to evaluate whether the
network service has been impacted by the network incident and map
network incident to one or a set of network service, which can
reduce massive fault/alarms reporting, speed up troubleshooting,
and assure network service performance and availability.
Incident management: Lifecycle management of network incidents,
including network incident identification, reporting,
acknowledgement, diagnosis, and resolution. Different from the
traditional fault management, it take various different data
sources including alarms, metrics, and other anomaly information
and aggregate them into one or a few network incidents
irrespective of layer through correlation analysis and the service
impact analysis. One fault on the network device can cause
multiple network incidents, e.g., multiple service offerings that
are dependent on that device will go down and others may suffer
increased latency as redundant routes become more congested. A
network incident might impact one or a set of network services.
The network incident can also been seen as customer incident
[TMF724A] when service SLA [RFC9543] associated with one specific
network service and network incident has been affected. How
customer incident is translated from the network incident is
beyond scope of this document.
Incident management system: An entity which implements network
incident management. It includes (but not limited to) incident
server and incident client.
Incident server: An entity which is responsible for detecting and
reporting one network incident, performing network incident
diagnosis, resolution and prediction, etc.
Incident client: An entity which can manage network incidents. For
example, it can receive network incident notifications, query the
information of network incidents, instruct an incident management
server to diagnose, help resolve, etc.
Incident handler: An entity which can receive network incident
notification, store and query the information of network incidents
for data analysis. It has no control on incident server.
Probable root cause: If removing a factor completely resolves the
ongoing incident (specifically, regarding network outage or
service impairments and their associated subsequent failures and
symptoms) and prevents the problem from recurring, then such
factor is considered as a probable root cause of a problem.
Since one Fault may give rise to another Fault or Problem, a
probable root cause is commonly meant to describe the original
event or combination of circumstances that is the foundation of
all related Faults.
Conversely, a causal factor is a contributing action that
influences the outcome of the incident or event but is not the
probable cause.
3. Sample Use Cases
3.1. Incident-Based Trouble Tickets Dispatching
Usually, the dispatching of trouble tickets in a network is mostly
based on alarms data analysis and needs to involve operators'
maintenance engineers. These operators' maintenance engineers are
responsible to monitor and detect and correlate some alarms, e.g.,
that alarms at both endpoints of a specific tunnel or at both optical
and IP layers which are associated with the same network fault.
Therefore, they can correlate these alarms to the same trouble
ticket, which is in the low automation. If there are more alarms,
then the human costs for network maintenance are increased
accordingly.
Some operators preconfigure accept-lists and adopt some coarse
granularity data correlation rules for the alarm management. This
approach seems to improve fault management automation. However, some
trouble tickets might be missed if the filtering conditions are too
restrictive. If the filtering conditions are not restrictive, it
might end up with multiple trouble tickets being dispatched to the
same network fault. It is hard to achieve a perfect balance between
the network management automation and duplicated trouble tickets
under the conventional working situations.
With the help of the network incident management, massive alarms can
be aggregated into a few network incidents based on service impact
analysis, so the number of trouble tickets will be reduced. At the
same time, the efficiency of network troubleshooting can be largely
improved, which address the pain point of traditional trouble ticket
dispatching.
3.2. Incident Derivation from L3VPN Services Unavailability
The Service Attachment Points (SAPs) defined in [RFC9408] represent
the network reference points where network services can be delivered
or are being delivered to customers.
SLOs [RFC9543] can be used to characterize the ability of a
particular set of nodes to communicate according to certain
measurable expectations [I-D.ietf-ippm-pam]. For example, an SLA
might state that any given SLO applies to at least a certain
percentage of packets, allowing for a certain level of packet loss
and exceeding packet delay threshold to take place. For example, an
SLA might establish a multi-tiered SLO of end-to-end latency as
follows:
* Not to exceed 30 ms for any packet.
* Not to exceed 25 ms for 99.999% of packets.
* Not to exceed 20 ms for 99% of packets.
This SLA information can be bound with two SAPs or multiple SAPs
defined in [RFC9408], so that the service orchestration layer can use
these interfaces to commit the delivery of a service on specific
point-to-point service topology or point to multi-point topology.
When specific levels of a threshold of an SLO is violated, a specific
network incident or customer incident [TMF724A], associated with,
let's say L3VPN service will be derived.
3.3. Multi-layer Fault Demarcation
When a fault occurs in a network that contains both packet-layer
devices and optical-layer devices, it may cause correlative faults in
both layers, i.e., packet layer and optical layer. Specifically,
faults propagation could be classified into three typical types.
First, faults occuring at a packet-layer device might further cause
fault (e.g., Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) client fault) at
an optical-layer device. Second, faults occuring at an optical-layer
device might further cause fault (e.g., Layer 3 link down) at a
packet- layer device. Third, faults occuring at the inter-layer link
between a packet-layer device and an optical-layer device might
further cause faults at both devices. Multiple operation teams are
usually needed to first analyze huge amount of alarms (triggered by
the above mentioned faults) from single network layer (either packet
layer or optical layer) independently, then cooperate to locate the
probable root cause through manually analyzing multi-layer topology
data and service data, thus fault demarcation becomes more complex
and time-consuming in multi-layer scenario than in single-layer
scenario.
With the help of network incident management, the management systems
first automatically analyze probable root cause of the alarms at each
layer and report corresponding network incidents to the multi-layer,
multi-domain management system, then such management system
comprehensively analyzes the topology relationship and service
relationship between the probable root causes of both layers. The
inner relationship among the alarms will be identified and finally
the probable root cause will be located among multiple layers. By
cooperating with the integrated Optical time-domain reflectometer
(OTDR) within the network device, we can determine the target optical
exchange station before site visits. Therefore, the overall fault
demarcation process is simplified and automated, the analyze result
could be reported and visualized in time. In this case, operation
teams only have to confirm the analyzing result and dispatch site
engineers to perform relative maintenance actions (e.g., splice
fiber) based on the probable root cause.
4. Network Incident Management Architecture
+------------------------------------------+
| |
| Incident Client |
| |
| |
+------------+---------+---------+---------+
^ | | |
|Incident |Incident |Incident |Incident
|Report |Ack |Diagnose |Resolve
| | | |
| V V V
+--+----------------------------------------+
| |
| |
| Incident Server |
| |
| |
| |
| |
+-------------------------------+-----------+
^ ^Abnormal ^Network Performance
|Alarm |Operations |Metrics
|Report |Report |/Telemetry
| | V
+----------+-------+------------------------------------+
| |
| Network in the Autonomous Domain |
| |
+-------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: Network Incident Management Architecture
Figure 1 illustrates the network incident management architecture.
Two key components for the incident management are incident client
and incident server.
Incident server can be deployed in network operation platforms,
network analytic platforms, controllers [RFC8969] and provides
functionalities such as network incident identification, report,
diagnosis, resolution, or querying for network incident lifecycle
management.
Incident client can be deployed either in the same network operation
platforms, network analytic platforms, controllers as the incident
server within a single domain, or at the upper layer network
operation platforms, network analytic platforms or controllers
(i.e.,multi-domain controllers) , to invoke the functionalities
provided by incident server to meet the business requirements of
fault management. The entire network incident lifecycle management
can be independent from or not under control of the network OSS or
other business system of operators.
A typical workflow of network incident management is as follows:
* Some alarm report or abnormal operations, network performance
metrics are reported from the network. Incident server receives
these alarms/abnormal operations/metrics and try to analyze the
correlation of them, e.g., generate a symptom if some metrics are
evaluated as unhealthy, the probable root cause can be detected
based on the correlation analysis. If a network incident is
identified, the "incident report" notification will be reported to
the incident client. The impact of network services will be
further analyzed and will update the network incident if the
network service is impacted.
* Incident client receives the network incident from "incident
report" notification raised by incident server, and acknowledge it
with "incident ack" rpc operation. Client may further invoke the
"incident diagnose" rpc to diagnose this network incident to find
the probable root causes.
* If the probable root causes have been found, the incident client
can resolve this network incident by invoking the 'incident
resolve' rpc operation, dispatching a ticket or using other
network functions (routing calculation, configuration, etc.)
4.1. Interworking with Alarm Management
+-----------------------------+
| OSS |
| +--------+ +-----------+ |
| |Alarm | | Incident | |
| |handler | | handler | |
| +--------+ +-----------+ |
+---^---------------^---------+
| |
|alarm |incident
+---|---------------|---------+
| | controller | |
| | | |
|+--+----+ +-----------+ |
||Alarm | | Incident | |
||process+----->| Process | |
|| |alarm | | |
|+-------+ +-----------+ |
| ^ ^ |
+---|--------------|----------+
|alarm | metrics/trace/etc.
| |
+-------+--------------+---------------+
| |
| Network in the Autonomous Domain |
| |
+--------------------------------------+
Figure 2: Interworking with Alarm Management
A YANG model for the alarm management [RFC8632] defines a standard
interface to manage the lifecycle of alarms. Alarms represent the
undesirable state of network resources [I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology],
alarm data model also defines the probable root causes and impacted
services fields, but there may lack sufficient information to
determine them in lower layer system (mainly in devices level), so
alarms do not always tell the status of network services or
necessarily point to the probable root causes of problems. As
described in [RFC8632], alarm management act as a starting point for
high-level fault management. While network incident management often
works at the network level, so it is possible to have enough
information to perform correlation and service impact analysis.
Alarms can work as one of data sources of network incident management
and may be aggregated into few network incidents by correlation
analysis, network service impact and probable root causes may be
determined during incident process.
Network Incident also contains some related alarms, if needed users
can query the information of alarms by alarm management interface
[RFC8632]. In some cases, e.g., cutover scenario, incident server
may use alarm management interface [RFC8632] to shelve some alarms.
Alarm management may keep the original process, alarms are reported
from network to network controller or network analytic platform and
then reported to upper layer system (e.g., the alarm handler within
the OSS).
Similarly, the network incident is reported from the network to the
network controller or network analytic platform and then reported to
the upper layer system (e.g., incident handler within the OSS).
Upper layer system may store these network incidents and provide the
information for fault analysis (e.g., deeper customer incident
analysis based on network incident).
Different from alarm management, incident process within the
controller comprising both incident client and incident sever
functionalities provides not only network incident reporting but also
diagnosis and resolution functions, it's possible to support self-
healing and may be helpful for single-domain closed-loop control.
Incident management is not a substitute for alarm management.
Instead, they can work together to implement fault management.
4.2. Interworking with SAIN
SAIN [RFC9417] defines an architecture of network service assurance.
+----------------+
|Incident handler|
+----------------+
^
|incident
+-------+--------+
|Incident process|
+----------------+
^
|symptoms
+-------+--------+
| SAIN |
| |
+----------------+
^
|metrics
+-------------+-------------------+
| |
|Network in the Autonomous Domain |
| |
+---------------------------------+
Figure 3: Interworking with SAIN
A network service can be decomposed into some sub-services, and some
metrics can be monitored for sub-services. For example, a tunnel
service can be decomposed into some peer tunnel interface sub-
services and IP connectivity sub-service. If some metrics are
evaluated to indicate unhealthy for specific sub-service, some
symptoms will be present. Incident process comprising both incident
client and incident server functionalities may identify the network
incident based on symptoms, and then report it to incident handler
within the Operation Support System (OSS). So, SAIN can be one way
to identify network incident, services, sub-services and metrics can
be preconfigured via APIs defined by service assurance YANG model
[RFC9418] and the network incident will be reported if symptoms match
certain condition or characteristic considered as an indication of a
problem or potential problem.
4.3. Relationship with RFC8969
[RFC8969] defines a framework for network automation using YANG, this
framework breaks down YANG modules into three layers, service layer,
network layer and device layer, and contains service deployment,
service optimization/assurance, and service diagnosis. Network
incident works at the network layer and aggregates alarms, metrics
and other information from device layer, it's helpful to provide
service assurance. And the network incident diagnosis may be one way
of service diagnosis.
4.4. Relationship with Trace Context
W3C defines a common trace context [W3C-Trace-Context] for
distributed system tracing, [I-D.ietf-netconf-trace-ctx-extension]
defines a netconf extension for [W3C-Trace-Context] and
[I-D.ietf-netconf-configuration-tracing] defines a mechanism for
configuration tracing. If some errors occur when services are
deploying, it's very easy to identify these errors by distributed
system tracing, and a network incident should be reported.
5. Functional Interface Requirements between the Client and the Server
5.1. Incident Identification
As depicted in Figure 4, multiple alarms, metrics, or hybrid can be
aggregated into a network incident after analysis.
+--------------+
+--| Incident1 |
| +--+-----------+
| | +-----------+
| +--+ alarm1 |
| | +-----------+
| |
| | +-----------+
| +--+ alarm2 |
| | +-----------+
| |
| | +-----------+
| +--+ alarm3 |
| +-----------+
| +--------------+
+--| Incident2 |
| +--+-----------+
| | +-----------+
| +--+ metric1 |
| | +-----------+
| | +-----------+
| +--+ metric2 |
| +-----------+
|
| +--------------+
+--| Incident3 |
+--+-----------+
| +-----------+
+--+ alarm1 |
| +-----------+
|
| +-----------+
+--| metric1 |
+-----------+
Figure 4: Incident Identification
The network incident management server MUST be capable of identifying
network incidents. Multiple alarms, metrics and other information
are reported to incident server, and the server must analyze it and
find out the correlations of them, if the correlation match the
network incident rules, network incident will be identified, and
reported to the client. If the network incident is repeated many
times, the problem needs to be raised. Service impact analysis
SHOULD be performed if a network incident is identified, and the
content of network incident SHOULD be updated if impacted network
services are detected.
AI/ML may be used to identify the network incident. Expert system
and online learning can help AI to identify the correlation of
alarms, metrics and other information by time-base correlation
algorithm, topology-based correlation algorithm, etc. For example,
if the interface is down, then many protocol alarms will be reported,
AI will think these alarms have some correlations. These new
correlations will be put into the knowledge base, and the network
incident will be identified faster according to knowledge base next
time.
+----------------------+
| |
| Orchestrator |
| |
+----+-----------------+
^VPN A Unavailable
|
+---+----------------+
| |
| Controller |
| |
| |
+-+-+------------+---+
^ ^ ^
IGP | |Interface |IGP Peer
Down | |Down | Abnormal
| | |
VPN A | | |
+-----------+-+------------+------------------------+
| \ +---+ ++-++ +-+-+ +---+ /|
| \ | | | | | | | | / |
| \|PE1+-------| P1+X--------|P2 +--------|PE2|/ |
| +---+ +---+ +---+ +---+ |
+---------------------------------------------------+
Figure 5: Example 1 of Network Incident Identification
As described in Figure 5, vpn a is deployed from PE1 to PE2, if a
interface of P1 is going down, many alarms are triggered, such as
interface down, igp down, and igp peer abnormal from P2.
These alarms are aggregated and analyzed by the controller/incident
server, and then the network incident 'vpn unavailable' is triggered
by the controller/incident server. If the network incident 'vpn
unavailable' is repeated, the problem can be raised.
Note that incident server within the controller can rely on data
correlation technology such as service impact analysis and data
analytic component to evaluate the real effect on the relevant
service and understand whether lower level or device level network
anomaly, e.g., igp down, has impact on the service.
+----------------------+
| |
| Orchestrator |
| |
+----+-----------------+
^VPN A Degradation
|
+-------+------------+
| |
| controller |
| |
| |
+--+------------+----+
^ ^
|Packet |Path Delay
|Loss |
| |
VPN A | |
+-------------------+------------+-------------------+
| \ +---+ ++-++ +-+-+ +---+ / |
| \ | | | | | | | | / |
| \|PE1+-------|P1 +---------|P2 +--------|PE2|/ |
| +---+ +---+ +---+ +---+ |
+----------------------------------------------------+
Figure 6: Example 2 of Network Incident Identification
As described in Figure 6, controller collect the network metrics from
network elements, it finds the packet loss of P1 and the path delay
of P2 exceed the thresholds, a network incident 'VPN A degradation'
may be triggered after the service impact analysis.
5.2. Incident Diagnosis
After a network incident is reported to the network incident client,
the incident client MAY diagnose the incident to determine the
probable root cause. Some diagnosis operations may affect the
running network services. The incident client can choose not to
perform that diagnosis operation after determining the impact is not
trivial. The incident server can also perform self-diagnosis.
However, the self-diagnosis MUST not affect the running network
services. Possible diagnosis methods include link reachability
detection, link quality detection, alarm/log analysis, and short-term
fine-grained monitoring of network quality metrics, etc.
5.3. Incident Resolution
After the probable root cause is diagnosed, the incident client MAY
resolve the network incident. The incident client MAY choose resolve
the network incident by invoking other functions, such as routing
calculation function, configuration function, dispatching a ticket or
asking the server to resolve it. Generally, the incident client
would attempt to directly resolve the probable cause. If the
probable root cause cannot be resolved, an alternative solution
SHOULD be required. For example, if a network incident caused by a
physical component failure, it cannot be automatically resolved, the
standby link can be used to bypass the faulty component.
Incident server will monitor the status of the network incident, if
the faults are fixed, the incident server will update the status of
network incident to 'cleared', and report the updated network
incident to the client.
Network incident resolution may affect the running network services.
The client can choose not to perform those operations after
determining the impact is not trivial.
6. Incident Data Model Concepts
6.1. Identifying the Incident Instance
An incident id is used as an identifier of an incident instance, if
an incident instance is identified, a new incident ID is created.
The incident id MUST be unique in the whole system.
6.2. The Incident Lifecycle
The network incident model clearly separates network incident
instance lifecycle from operator incident lifecycle.
o Network incident instance lifecycle: The network incident
instrumentation that control network incident raised, updated and
cleared.
o Operator incident lifecycle: Operators acting upon the network
incident with rpcs like acknowledged, diagnosed and resolved.
6.2.1. Network Incident Instance Lifecycle
From a network incident instance perspective, a network incident can
have the following lifecycle: 'raised', 'updated', 'cleared'. When a
network incident instance is first generated, the status is 'raised'.
If the status changes after the network incident instance is
generated, (for example, self-diagnosis, diagnosis command issued by
the client, or any other condition causes the status to change but
does not reach the 'cleared' level.) , the status changes to
'updated'. When a network incident is successfully resolved, the
status changes to 'cleared'.
6.2.2. Operator Incident Lifecycle
Operators can act upon network incident with network incident rpcs.
From an operator perspective, the lifecycle of a network incident
instance includes 'acknowledged', 'diagnosed', and 'resolved'.
When a network incident instance is generated, the operator SHOULD
acknowledge the network incident with 'incident-acknowledge' rpc.
And then the operator attempts to diagnose the network incident with
'incident-diagnose' rpc (for example, find out the probable root
cause and affected components). Diagnosis is not mandatory. If the
probable root cause and affected components are known when the
network incident is generated, diagnosis is not required. After
locating the probable root cause and affected components, operator
can try to resolve the network incident by invoking 'incident-
resolve' rpc.
7. Incident Data Model Design
7.1. Overview
There is one YANG module in the "ietf-incident" model, which defines
technology independent abstraction of network incident construct for
alarm, log, performance metrics, etc. The information reported in
the network incident include probable root cause, priority, impact,
suggestion, etc.
At the top of "ietf-incident" module is the Network Incident.
Network incident is represented as a list and indexed by "incident-
id". Each Network Incident is associated with a network service
instance, domain and sources. Under sources, there is one or more
sources. Each source corresponds to node defined in the network
topology model and network resource in the network device, e.g.,
interface. In addition, "ietf-incident" supports one general
notification to report network incident state changes and three rpcs
to manage the network incidents.
module: ietf-incident
+--ro incidents
+--ro incident* [name type incident-id]
+--ro incident-no uint64
+--ro name string
+--ro type identityref
+--ro incident-id? string
+--ro service-instance* string
+--ro domain identityref
+--ro priority incident-priority
+--ro status? enumeration
+--ro ack-status? enumeration
+--ro category identityref
+--ro detail? string
+--ro resolve-advice? String
+--ro sources
...
+--ro probable-causes
...
+--ro probable-events
...
+--ro events
...
+--ro raise-time? yang:date-and-time
+--ro occur-time? yang:date-and-time
+--ro clear-time? yang:date-and-time
+--ro ack-time? yang:date-and-time
+--ro last-updated? yang:date-and-time
rpcs:
+---x incident-acknowledge
...
+---x incident-diagnose
...
+---x incident-resolve
notifications:
+---n incident-notification
+--ro incident-no?
-> /inc:incidents/inc:incident/inc:incident-no
...
+--ro time? yang:date-and-time
7.2. Incident Notifications
notifications:
+---n incident-notification
+--ro incident-no?
-> /inc:incidents/inc:incident/inc:incident-no
+--ro name? string
+--ro type? identityref
+--ro incident-id? string
+--ro service-instance* string
+--ro domain? identityref
+--ro priority? int:incident-priority
+--ro status? enumeration
+--ro ack-status? enumeration
+--ro category? identityref
+--ro detail? string
+--ro resolve-advice? string
+--ro sources
| +--ro source* [node-ref]
| +--ro node-ref leafref
| +--ro network-ref? -> /nw:networks/network/network-id
| +--ro resource* [name]
| +--ro name al:resource
+--ro probable-causes
| +--ro probable-cause* [node-ref]
| +--ro node-ref leafref
| +--ro network-ref? -> /nw:networks/network/network-id
| +--ro resource* [name]
| | +--ro name al:resource
| | +--ro cause-name? string
| | +--ro detail? string
| +--ro cause-name? string
| +--ro detail? string
+--ro probable-events
| +--ro probable-event* [type event-id]
| +--ro type -> ../../../events/event/type
| +--ro event-id leafref
+--ro events
| +--ro event* [type event-id]
| +--ro type enumeration
| +--ro event-id string
| +--ro (event-type-info)?
| +--:(alarm)
| | +--ro alarm
| | +--ro resource? leafref
| | +--ro alarm-type-id? leafref
| | +--ro alarm-type-qualifier? leafref
+--ro time? yang:date-and-time
A general notification, incident-notification, is provided here.
When a network incident instance is identified, the notification will
be sent. After a notification is generated, if the incident server
performs self diagnosis or the incident client uses the interfaces
provided by the incident server to deliver diagnosis and resolution
actions, the notification update behavior is triggered, for example,
the probable root cause objects and affected objects are updated.
When a network incident is successfully resolved, the status of the
network incident would be set to 'cleared'.
7.3. Incident Acknowledge
+---x incident-acknowledge
| +---w input
| | +---w incident-no*
| | -> /inc:incidents/inc:incident/inc:incident-no
After an incident is generated, updated, or cleared, the operator
needs to confirm the incident to ensure that the client knows the
incident.
In some scenarios where automatic diagnosis and resolution are
supported, the status of an incident may be updated multiple times or
even automatically resolved. Therefore the incident-acknowledge rpc
can confirm multiple incidents at a time.
7.4. Incident Diagnose
+---x incident-diagnose
| +---w input
| | +---w incident-no*
| | -> /inc:incidents/inc:incident/inc:incident-no
After a network incident is generated, network incident diagnose rpc
can be used to diagnose the network incident and locate the probable
root causes. On demand Diagnosis can be performed on some detection
tasks, such as bfd detection, flow detection, telemetry collection,
short-term threshold alarm, configuration error check, or test packet
injection.
After the on demand diagnosis is performed sucessfully, a separate
network incident update notification will be triggered to report the
latest status of the network incident asynchronously.
7.5. Incident Resolution
+---x incident-resolve
+---w input
| +---w incident-no*
| -> /inc:incidents/inc:incident/inc:incident-no
After the probable root causes and impacts are determined, incident-
resolve rpc can be used to resolve the incident (if the server can
resolve it). How to resolve an incident instance is out of the scope
of this document.
Network incident resolve rpc allows multiple network incident
instances to be resolved at a time. If a network incident instance
is successfully resolved, a separate notification will be triggered
to update the network incident status to 'cleared'. If the network
incident content is changed during this process, a notification
update will be triggered.
7.6. RPC Failure
If the RPC fails, the RPC error response MUST indicate the reason for
the failure. The structures defined in this document MUST encode
specific errors and be inserted in the error response to indicate the
reason for the failure.
The tree diagram [RFC8340] for structures are defined as follows:
structure incident-acknowledge-error-info:
+-- incident-acknowledge-error-info
+-- incident-no? uint64
+-- reason? identityref
+-- description? string
structure incident-diagnose-error-info:
+-- incident-diagnose-error-info
+-- incident-no? uint64
+-- reason? identityref
+-- description? string
structure incident-resolve-error-info:
+-- incident-resolve-error-info
+-- incident-no? uint64
+-- reason? identityref
+-- description? string
Valid errors that can occur for each structure defined in this
doucment are described as follows:
incident-acknowledge-error-info
-----------------------------------
repeated-acknowledge
incident-diagnose-error-info
-----------------------------------
probable-cause-unlocated
permission-denied
operation-timeout
resource-unavailable
incident-resolve-error-info
-----------------------------------
probable-cause-unresolved
permission-denied
operation-timeout
resource-unavailable
8. Network Incident Management YANG Module
This module imports types defined in [RFC6991], [RFC8345],
[RFC8632],[RFC8791].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-incident@2025-09-16.yang"
module ietf-incident {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-incident";
prefix inc;
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-alarms {
prefix al;
reference
"RFC 8632: A YANG Data Model for Alarm Management";
}
import ietf-network {
prefix nw;
reference
"RFC 8345: A YANG Data Model for Network Topologies";
}
import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
prefix sx;
reference
"RFC 8791: YANG Data Structure Extensions";
}
organization
"IETF NMOP Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/nmop/>;
WG List: <mailto:nmop@ietf.org>
Author: Chong Feng
<mailto:fengchongllly@gmail.com>
Author: Tong Hu
<mailto:hutong@cmhi.chinamobile.com>
Author: Luis Miguel Contreras Murillo
<mailto:luismiguel.contrerasmurillo@telefonica.com>
Author : Qin Wu
<mailto:bill.wu@huawei.com>
Author: Nigel Davis
<mailto:ndavis@ciena.com>";
description
"This module defines the interfaces for incident management
lifecycle.
This module is intended for the following use cases:
* incident lifecycle management:
- incident report: report incident instance to client
when an incident instance is detected.
- incident acknowledge: acknowledge an incident instance.
- incident diagnose: diagnose an incident instance.
- incident resolve: resolve an incident instance.
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); ; see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here. ";
revision 2025-09-16 {
description
"Merge incident yang with incident type yang
and fix broken ref.";
reference
"RFC XXX: YANG module for network incident management.";
}
// Identities
identity incident-domain {
description
"The abstract identity to indicate the domain of
an incident.";
}
identity single-domain {
base incident-domain;
description
"Single domain.";
}
identity access {
base single-domain;
description
"access domain.";
}
identity ran {
base access;
description
"Radio access network domain.";
}
identity transport {
base single-domain;
description
"Transport domain.";
}
identity otn {
base transport;
description
"Optical transport network domain.";
reference
“RFC9376: Applicability of GMPLS for beyond 100 Gbit/s Optical Transport Network”;
}
identity ip {
base single-domain;
description
"Ip domain.";
reference
"RFC1136: Administrative Domains and Routing Domains A Model for Routing in the Internet";
}
identity ptn {
base ip;
description
"Packet transport network domain.";
reference
“RFC6373: MPLS Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) Control Plane Framework”;
}
identity cross-domain {
base incident-domain;
description
"Cross domain.";
}
identity incident-category {
description
"The abstract identity for incident category.";
}
identity device {
base incident-category;
description
"Device category.";
reference
“RFC8348: A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management”;
}
identity power-environment {
base device;
description
"Power environment category.";
reference
“RFC8348: A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management”;
}
identity device-hardware {
base device;
description
"Device hardware category.";
reference
“RFC8348: A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management”;
}
identity device-software {
base device;
description
"Device software category";
reference
“RFC8348: A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management”;
}
identity line-card {
base device-hardware;
description
"Line card category.";
reference
“RFC8348: A YANG Data Model for Hardware Management”;
}
identity maintenance {
base incident-category;
description
"Maintenance category.";
}
identity network {
base incident-category;
description
"Network category.";
}
identity protocol {
base incident-category;
description
"Protocol category.";
}
identity overlay {
base incident-category;
description
"Overlay category";
}
identity vm {
base incident-category;
description
"VM category.";
}
identity event-type {
description
"The abstract identity for Event type";
reference
“RFCXXXX: Some Key Terms for Network Fault and Problem Management”;
}
identity alarm {
base event-type;
description
"Alarm event type.";
reference
“RFC8632: A YANG Data Model for Alarm Management”;
}
identity notif {
base event-type;
description
"Notification event type.";
reference
"RFC5277:NETCONF Event Notifications";
}
identity log {
base event-type;
description
"Log event type.";
reference
"RFC5424: The Syslog Protocol";
identity kpi {
base event-type;
description
"KPI event type.";
reference
"RFC2330: Framework for IP Performance Metrics";
}
identity unknown {
base event-type;
description
"Unknown event type.";
}
identity incident-class {
description
"The abstract identity for Incident category.";
}
identity problem {
base incident-class;
description
"It indicates the class of the incident is a problem
(i.e.,cause of the incident) for example an interface
fails to work.";
reference
“RFCXXXX: Some Key Terms for Network Fault and Problem Management”;
}
identity sla-violation {
base incident-class;
description
"It indicates the class of the incident is a sla
violation, for example high CPU rate may cause
a fault in the future.";
}
identity acknowledge-error {
description
"Base identity for the problem found while attempting
to fulfill an 'incident-acknowledge' RPC request.";
}
identity diagnose-error {
description
"Base identity for the problem found while attempting
to fulfill an 'incident-diagnose' RPC request.";
}
identity resolve-error {
description
"Base identity for the problem found while attempting
to fulfill an 'incident-resolve' RPC request.";
}
identity repeated-acknowledge {
base acknowledge-error;
description
"The incident referred to has already been acknowledged.";
}
identity probable-cause-unlocated {
base diagnose-error;
description
"Fail to locate the probable causes when performing the
diagnosis operation. The detailed reason MUST be included
in the 'description'.";
}
identity probable-cause-unresolved {
base resolve-error;
description
"Fail to resolve the probable causes when performing the
resolution operation. The detailed reason MUST be included
in the 'description'";
}
identity permission-denied {
base diagnose-error;
base resolve-error;
description
"The permission required for performing specific
detection/resolution task is not granted.";
}
identity operation-timeout {
base diagnose-error;
base resolve-error;
description
"The diagnosis/resolution time exceeds the preset time.";
}
identity resource-unavailable {
base diagnose-error;
base resolve-error;
description
"The resource is unavailable to perform
the diagnosis/resolution operation.";
}
identity cause-name {
description
"Base identity for the cause name.";
}
// Typedefs
typedef incident-priority {
type enumeration {
enum critical {
description
"The incident MUST be handled immediately.";
}
enum high {
description
"The incident should be handled as soon as
possible.";
}
enum medium {
description
"Network services are not affected, or the
services are slightly affected,but corrective
measures need to be taken.";
}
enum low {
description
"Potential or imminent service-affecting
incidents are detected,but services are
not affected currently.";
}
}
description
"Define the priority of incident.";
}
typedef incident-ref {
type leafref {
path "/inc:incidents/inc:incident/inc:incident-no";
}
description
"Reference a network incident.";
}
// Groupings
grouping probable-cause-info {
description
"The information of probable cause.";
leaf cause-name {
type identityref {
base cause-name;
}
description
"The name of cause.";
}
leaf detail {
type string;
description
"The detail information of the cause.";
}
}
grouping resources-info {
description
"The grouping which defines the network
resources of a node.";
uses nw:node-ref;
list resource {
key "name";
description
"The resources of a network node.";
leaf name {
type al:resource;
description
"Network resource name.";
}
}
}
grouping incident-time-info {
description
"The grouping defines incident time information.";
leaf raise-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The time when an incident instance is raised.";
}
leaf occur-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The time when an incident instance occurs.
It's the occur time of the first event during
incident detection.";
}
leaf clear-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The time when an incident instance is
resolved.";
}
leaf ack-time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The time when an incident instance is
acknowledged.";
}
leaf last-updated {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"The latest time when an incident instance is
updated";
}
}
grouping incident-info {
description
"The grouping defines the information of an
incident.";
leaf name {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The name of an incident.";
}
leaf type {
type identityref {
base incident-class;
}
mandatory true;
description
"The type of an incident.";
}
leaf incident-id {
type string;
description
"The unique qualifier of an incident instance type.
This leaf is used when the 'type' leaf cannot
uniquely identify the incident instance type. Normally,
this is not the case, and this leaf is the empty string.";
}
leaf-list service-instance {
type string;
description
"The related network service instances of
the incident instance.";
}
leaf domain {
type identityref {
base incident-domain;
}
mandatory true;
description
"The domain of an incident.";
}
leaf priority {
type incident-priority;
mandatory true;
description
"The priority of an incident instance.";
}
leaf status {
type enumeration {
enum raised {
description
"An incident instance is raised.";
}
enum updated {
description
"The information of an incident instance
is updated.";
}
enum cleared {
description
"An incident is cleared.";
}
}
default "raised";
description
"The status of an incident instance.";
}
leaf ack-status {
type enumeration {
enum acknowledged {
description
"The incident has been acknowledged by user.";
}
enum unacknowledged {
description
"The incident hasn't been acknowledged.";
}
}
default "unacknowledged";
description
"The acknowledge status of an incident.";
}
leaf category {
type identityref {
base incident-category;
}
mandatory true;
description
"The category of an incident.";
}
leaf detail {
type string;
description
"Detailed information of this incident.";
}
leaf resolve-advice {
type string;
description
"The advice to resolve this incident.";
}
container sources {
description
"The source components.";
list source {
key "node-ref";
min-elements 1;
description
"The source components of incident.";
uses resources-info;
}
}
container probable-causes {
description
"The probable cause objects.";
list probable-cause {
key "node-ref";
description
"The probable causes of incident.";
uses resources-info {
augment "resource" {
description
"Augment probable cause information.";
//if probable cause object is a resource of a node
uses probable-cause-info;
}
}
//if probable cause object is a node
uses probable-cause-info;
}
}
container probable-events {
description
"The probable cause related events of the incident.";
list probable-event {
key "type event-id";
description
"The probable cause related event of the incident.";
leaf type {
type leafref {
path "../../../events/event/type";
}
description
"The event type.";
}
leaf event-id {
type leafref {
path "../../../events/event[type = current()/../type]"
+ "/event-id";
}
description
"The event identifier, such as uuid,
sequence number, etc.";
}
}
}
container events {
description
"Related events.";
list event {
key "type event-id";
description
"Related events.";
leaf type {
type identityref {
base event-type;
}
description
"Event type.";
}
leaf event-id {
type string;
description
"The event identifier, such as uuid,
sequence number, etc.";
}
choice event-type-info {
description
"Event type information.";
case alarm {
when "derived-from-or-self(type, 'alarm')" {
description
"Only applies when type is alarm.";
}
container alarm {
description
"Alarm type event.";
leaf resource {
type leafref {
path "/al:alarms/al:alarm-list/al:alarm"
+ "/al:resource";
}
description
"Network resource.";
reference
"RFC 8632: A YANG Data Model for Alarm
Management";
}
leaf alarm-type-id {
type leafref {
path "/al:alarms/al:alarm-list/al:alarm"
+ "[al:resource = current()/../resource]"
+ "/al:alarm-type-id";
}
description
"Alarm type id";
reference
"RFC 8632: A YANG Data Model for Alarm
Management";
}
leaf alarm-type-qualifier {
type leafref {
path "/al:alarms/al:alarm-list/al:alarm"
+ "[al:resource = current()/../resource]"
+ "[al:alarm-type-id = current()/.."
+ "/alarm-type-id]/al:alarm-type-qualifier";
}
description
"Alarm type qualifier";
reference
"RFC 8632: A YANG Data Model for Alarm
Management";
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
// RPCs
rpc incident-acknowledge {
description
"This rpc can be used to acknowledge the specified
incidents.";
input {
leaf-list incident-no {
type incident-ref;
description
"The identifier of an incident instance.";
}
}
}
rpc incident-diagnose {
description
"This rpc can be used to diagnose the specified
incidents. The result of diagnosis will be reported
by incident notification.";
input {
leaf-list incident-no {
type incident-ref;
description
"The identifier of an incident instance.";
}
}
}
rpc incident-resolve {
description
"This rpc can be used to resolve the specified
incidents. The result of resolution will be reported
by incident notification.";
input {
leaf-list incident-no {
type incident-ref;
description
"The identifier of an incident instance.";
}
}
}
sx:structure incident-acknowledge-error-info {
container incident-acknowledge-error-info {
description
"This structure data MAY be inserted in the RPC error
response to indicate the reason for the
incident acknowledge failure.";
leaf incident-no {
type uint64;
description
"Indicates the incident identifier that
fails the operation.";
}
leaf reason {
type identityref {
base acknowledge-error;
}
description
"Indicates the reason why the operation is failed.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"Indicates the detailed description about the failure.";
}
}
}
sx:structure incident-diagnose-error-info {
container incident-diagnose-error-info {
description
"This structure data MAY be inserted in the RPC error
response to indicate the reason for the
incident diagnose failure.";
leaf incident-no {
type uint64;
description
"Indicates the incident identifier that
fails the operation.";
}
leaf reason {
type identityref {
base diagnose-error;
}
description
"Indicates the reason why the operation is failed.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"Indicates the detailed description about the failure.";
}
}
}
sx:structure incident-resolve-error-info {
container incident-resolve-error-info {
description
"This structure data MAY be inserted in the RPC error
response to indicate the reason for the
incident resolution failure.";
leaf incident-no {
type uint64;
description
"Indicates the incident identifier that
fails the operation.";
}
leaf reason {
type identityref {
base resolve-error;
}
description
"Indicates the reason why the operation is failed.";
}
leaf description {
type string;
description
"Indicates the detailed description about the failure.";
}
}
}
// Notifications
notification incident-notification {
description
"Incident notification. It will be triggered when
the incident is raised, updated or cleared.";
leaf incident-no {
type incident-ref;
description
"The identifier of an incident instance.";
}
uses incident-info;
leaf time {
type yang:date-and-time;
description
"Occuring time of an incident instance.";
}
}
// Data definitions
container incidents {
config false;
description
"The information of incidents.";
list incident {
key "name type incident-id";
description
"The information of incident.";
leaf incident-no {
type uint64;
mandatory true;
description
"The unique sequence number of the incident instance.";
}
uses incident-info;
uses incident-time-info;
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
9. Security Considerations
The YANG modules specified in this document defines a data model that
is designed to be accessed via YANG-based management protocols, such
as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. These YANG-based
management protocols (1) have to use a secure transport layer (e.g.,
SSH [RFC4252], TLS [RFC8446], and QUIC [RFC9000]) and (2) have to use
mutual authentication.
The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) [RFC8341]
provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
RESTCONF protocol operations and content.
Some of the readable data nodes in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
'/incidents/incident': This list specifies the network incident
entries. Unauthorized read access of this list can allow intruders
to access network incident information and potentially get a picture
of the broken state of the network. Intruders may exploit the
vulnerabilities of the network to lead to further negative impact on
the network. Care must be taken to ensure that this list are
accessed only by authorized users.
Some of the RPC operations in this YANG module may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control access to these operations. These are the
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
"incident-diagnose": This RPC operation performs network incident
diagnosis and probable root cause locating. If a malicious or buggy
client performs an unexpectedly large number of this operation, the
result might be an excessive use of system resources
[I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology] on the server side as well as network
resources. Servers MUST ensure they have sufficient resources to
fulfill this request; otherwise, they MUST reject the request using
RPC errors defined in section 7.6.
"incident-resolve": This RPC operation is used to resolve the network
incident. If a malicious or buggy client performs an unexpectedly
large number of this operation, the result might be an excessive use
of system resources on the server side as well as network resources.
Servers MUST ensure they have sufficient resources to fulfill this
request; otherwise, they MUST reject the request without compromise
on security of data-at-rest in the server.
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. The "IETF XML" Registry
IANA is requested to register the following URI in the "ns" registry
within the "IETF XML Registry" group [RFC3688]:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-incident
Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A, the requested URIs are XML namespaces.
10.2. The "YANG Module Names" Registry
IANA is requested to register the following YANG module in the "YANG
Module Names" registry [RFC6020] within the "YANG Parameters"
registry group.
Name: ietf-incident
Maintained by IANA? N
Namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-incident
Prefix: inc
Reference: RFC XXXX
// RFC Ed.: replace XXXX and remove this comment
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Mohamed Boucadair, Robert Wilton,
Benoit Claise, Oscar Gonzalez de Dios, Adrian Farrel, Mahesh
Jethanandani, Balazs Lengyel, Dhruv Dhody,Bo Wu, Qiufang Ma, Haomian
Zheng, YuanYao，Wei Wang, Peng Liu, Zongpeng Du, Zhengqiang Li, Andrew
Liu , Joe Clark, Roland Scott, Alex Huang Feng, Kai Gao, Jensen
Zhang, Ziyang Xing, Mingshuang Jin, Aihua Guo, Zhidong Yin, Guoxiang
Liu, Kaichun Wu for their valuable comments and great input to this
work.
References
Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3688>.
[RFC4252] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, DOI 10.17487/RFC4252,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4252>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6020>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6241>.
[RFC6991] Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., "Common YANG Data Types",
RFC 6991, DOI 10.17487/RFC6991, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6991>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF
Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8040>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8341] Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "Network Configuration
Access Control Model", STD 91, RFC 8341,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8341, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8341>.
[RFC8345] Clemm, A., Medved, J., Varga, R., Bahadur, N.,
Ananthakrishnan, H., and X. Liu, "A YANG Data Model for
Network Topologies", RFC 8345, DOI 10.17487/RFC8345, March
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8345>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC8632] Vallin, S. and M. Bjorklund, "A YANG Data Model for Alarm
Management", RFC 8632, DOI 10.17487/RFC8632, September
2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8632>.
[RFC8791] Bierman, A., Björklund, M., and K. Watsen, "YANG Data
Structure Extensions", RFC 8791, DOI 10.17487/RFC8791,
June 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8791>.
[RFC8969] Wu, Q., Ed., Boucadair, M., Ed., Lopez, D., Xie, C., and
L. Geng, "A Framework for Automating Service and Network
Management with YANG", RFC 8969, DOI 10.17487/RFC8969,
January 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8969>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.
Informative References
[BERT] "BERT (language model)", n.d.,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BERT_(language_model)>.
[I-D.ietf-ippm-pam]
Mirsky, G., Halpern, J. M., Min, X., Clemm, A., Strassner,
J., and J. François, "Precision Availability Metrics for
Services Governed by Service Level Objectives (SLOs)",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-ippm-pam-09,
1 December 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-ippm-pam-09>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-configuration-tracing]
Quilbeuf, J., Claise, B., Graf, T., Lopez, D., and S.
Qiong, "External Trace ID for Configuration Tracing", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-
configuration-tracing-05, 18 March 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
configuration-tracing-05>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trace-ctx-extension]
Gagliano, R., Larsson, K., and J. Lindblad, "NETCONF
Extension to support Trace Context propagation", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trace-ctx-
extension-04, 3 March 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-
trace-ctx-extension-04>.
[I-D.ietf-nmop-terminology]
Davis, N., Farrel, A., Graf, T., Wu, Q., and C. Yu, "Some
Key Terms for Network Fault and Problem Management", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-nmop-terminology-
23, 18 August 2025,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nmop-
terminology-23>.
[I-D.irtf-nmrg-ai-challenges]
François, J., Clemm, A., Papadimitriou, D., Fernandes, S.,
and S. Schneider, "Research Challenges in Coupling
Artificial Intelligence and Network Management", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-nmrg-ai-challenges-
05, 18 March 2025, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-irtf-nmrg-ai-challenges-05>.
[ITU-T-G-7710]
"ITU-T G.7710/Y.1701 - Common equipment management
function requirements", 2020,
<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-G.7710>.
[ITU-T-X-733]
"ITU-T X.733 - Information technology - Open Systems
Interconnection - Systems Management - Alarm reporting
function", 1999, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.733/fr>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language",
RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7950>.
[RFC9375] Wu, B., Ed., Wu, Q., Ed., Boucadair, M., Ed., Gonzalez de
Dios, O., and B. Wen, "A YANG Data Model for Network and
VPN Service Performance Monitoring", RFC 9375,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9375, April 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9375>.
[RFC9408] Boucadair, M., Ed., Gonzalez de Dios, O., Barguil, S., Wu,
Q., and V. Lopez, "A YANG Network Data Model for Service
Attachment Points (SAPs)", RFC 9408, DOI 10.17487/RFC9408,
June 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9408>.
[RFC9417] Claise, B., Quilbeuf, J., Lopez, D., Voyer, D., and T.
Arumugam, "Service Assurance for Intent-Based Networking
Architecture", RFC 9417, DOI 10.17487/RFC9417, July 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9417>.
[RFC9418] Claise, B., Quilbeuf, J., Lucente, P., Fasano, P., and T.
Arumugam, "A YANG Data Model for Service Assurance",
RFC 9418, DOI 10.17487/RFC9418, July 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9418>.
[RFC9543] Farrel, A., Ed., Drake, J., Ed., Rokui, R., Homma, S.,
Makhijani, K., Contreras, L., and J. Tantsura, "A
Framework for Network Slices in Networks Built from IETF
Technologies", RFC 9543, DOI 10.17487/RFC9543, March 2024,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9543>.
[TMF724A] "Incident Management API Profile v1.0.0", 2023,
<https://www.tmforum.org/resources/standard/tmf724a-
incident-management-api-profile-v1-0-0/>.
[W3C-Trace-Context]
"W3C Recommendation on Trace Context", 2021,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/2021/REC-trace-context-
1-20211123/>.
Appendix A. Examples of Network Incident Format Representation
A.1. Network Incident Correlated with Specific Network Topology and the
Network Service
In this example, we show a nework incident that are associated with
the service-instance "optical-svc-A", the node ‘D1’, the network
topology ‘L2-Topo’ and the domain ‘FAN’. The probable root cause is
also analysed.
{
"incident-no": 56433218,
"incident-id": "line fault",
"service-instance": ["optical-svc-A"],
"domain": "FAN",
"priority": "critical",
"occur-time": "2026-03-10T04:01:12Z",
"clear-time": "2026-03-10T06:01:12Z",
"ack-time": "2026-03-10T05:01:12Z",
"last-updated": "2026-03-10T05:31:12Z",
"status": "unacknowledged-and-uncleared",
"category": "Line",
"source": [
{
"node-ref": "example:D1",
"network-ref": "example:L2-topo",
"resource": [
{
"name": "7985e01a-5aad-11ea-b214-286ed488cf99"
}
]
}
],
"probable-causes": [
{
"name": "Feeder fiber great loss change",
"detail-information": "The connector of the optical fiber
is contaminated, Or the optical fiber is bent too much.",
"probable-cause": {
"network-ref": "example:L2-topo",
"node-ref": "example:D1",
"resource": [
{
"name": "7985e01a-5aad-11ea-b214-286ed488cf99",
"cause-name": "ltp",
"detail": "Frame=0, Slot=6, Subslot=65535, Port=7,
ODF= ODF001, Level1Splitter= splitter0025"
}
]
}
}
],
"probable-event": [
{
"event-id": "8921834",
"type": "alarm"
}
],
"events": [
{
"even-id": "8921832",
"type": "alarm"
},
{
"even-id": "8921833",
"type": "alarm"
},
{
"even-id": "8921834",
"type": "alarm"
}
]
}
A.2. Network Incident Correlated with Trouble Tickets
In this document, the objective of the incident management is to
identify probable causes and reduce duplicated ticket amounts.
Traditionally, troubleshooting ticket is created upon critical alert
is received,e.g., due to excessive BGP flaps on a particular device
by the OSS system. Such troubleshooting ticket will trigger network
incident management in the network controller. Therefore normally
trouble shooting tickets and network incident are managed by the OSS
and the network controller respectively. However Network
troubleshooting is sometimes complicated and requires data gathering
and analysis from many different tools from the controllers,
therefore correlation between troubleshooting ticket and network
incident becomes necessary.
+------------------------------------------------+
|OSS +---------------------------------------+ |
| | Ticket System | |
| +----------------+----------------------+ |
| |1.Ticket |
| | Creation |
| +----------------V----------------------+ |
| | Incident Handler | |
| +------+-------+------------+---------^-+ |
+-----------+-------+------------+---------+-----+
2.Incident 3.Incident 4. Incident |5.Incident
Ack with Diagnosis Resolve |Update
Ticket-no with with |Notification
| Ticket-no Ticket-no |with Ticket-no
+-----------+-------+------------+---------+-----+
|Controller | | | | |
| +-------V-------V------------V---------+-+ |
| | Incident Process | |
| +----------------------------------------+ |
+------------------------------------------------+
Figure 7: Correlation with troubleshooting tickets
In order to manage the correlation between network incidents and
trouble tickets in the YANG data model, three rpcs to manage the
network incidents and one notification to report on network incident
state changes defined in "ietf-incident" module can be further
extended to include "ticket-no" attribute so that such correlation
can be carried in the incident update notification and report the
upper layer OSS system. Such correlation can be used by the incident
handler in the upper layer OSS system for further fault demarcation,
e.g., identify whether the fault is on the user side or on the
network side.
rpcs:
+---x incident-acknowledge
| +---w input
| +---w incident-no* incident-ref
| +---w ticket-no? string
+---x incident-diagnose
| +---w input
| | +---w incident-no* incident-ref
| | +---w ticket-no? string
| +--ro output
| | +--ro task-id? string
+---x incident-resolve
| +---w input
| +---w incident-no* incident-ref
| +---w ticket-no? string
notifications:
+---n incident-notification
| +--ro incident-no? incident-ref
| +--ro ticket-no? string
+--
…
A.3. Intent Based Networking with Incident Diagnosis Task List
In this document, incident-diagnosis RPC defined in in "ietf-
incident" module can be used to identify probable root causes; and an
incident update notification can be triggered to report the diagnosis
status if successful.
In some case, workflows may span a long duration or involve multiple
steps task. In such case, intent based networking concept can be
used to support such multiple step task and provide more detailed
network diagnosis information.
+------------------------------------------------+
| OSS |
| +---------------------------------------+ |
| | Incident Handler | |
| +------+-----------^-----------+--------+ |
+-----------+-----------+-----------+------------+
Diagnosis Diagnosis NETCONF
Task Creation Task <get-config>
RPC Notification |
+-----------+-----------+-----------+------------+
|Controller | | | |
| +-------V-----------------------V--------+ |
| | Incident Process | |
| +----------------------------------------+ |
+------------------------------------------------+
To do so, the new "diagnosis task creation" RPC can be further
defined to support "task-id" attribute in the output parameters and
other auxiliary attributes in the input parameters. such RPC can be
used to return task-id from the controller. The controller is
responsbile for task-id allocation and maintaining task-id list.
+---x diagnose-task-creation
| +---w input
| | +---w incident-no? string
| | +---w ticket-no? string
| | +---w occur-time? yang:date-and-time
| | +---w context? string
| | +---w related-events
| | | +---w probable-event* []
| | | +---w type? -> ../../../events/event/type
| | | +---w event-id? -> ../../../events/event[type = current()/../type]/event-id
| | +---w related-objects
| | +---w source* [node-ref]
| | +---w node-ref -> /nw:networks/network[nw:network-id=current()/../network-ref]/node/node-id
| | +---w network-ref? -> /nw:networks/network/network-id
| | +---w resource* [name]
| | +---w name al:resource
| +--ro output
| +--ro task-id? string
"ietf-incident" module can be further extended to include "incident-
diagnosis-task" list with the following diagnosis information:
• The current status (e.g., created, diagnosing, diagnosed, finished)
of each diagnosis task.
• Task start time, end time, diagnosis result (succeeded, failed),
failure description, etc.
• probable root causes, probable events, repair recommendations, etc.
so that OSS system can use NETCONF <get-config> operation to look up
the diagnosis task detailed information based on such module
extension.
augment /inc:incidents/inc:incident:
+--ro incident-diagnosis-tasks
| +--ro incident-diagnosis-task* [task-id]
| +--ro task-id? String
| +--ro incident-no* incident-ref
| +--ro ticket-no? string
| +--ro start-time? yang:date-and-time
| +--ro end-time? yang:date-and-time
| +--ro task-state? enumeration
| +--ro diagnosis-result? enumeration
| +--ro diagnosis-result-description? String
| +--ro probable-causes leafref //List <RootCause>
…
| +--ro probable-events leafref //List <Event>
…
| +-- ro repair-advices
| +-- ro state enumeration // Incident states such as Creation, Update, Clear
…
In addition, the new Diagnosis Task Notification can be defined to
support Diagnosis Task related attributes reporting.
+---n task-notification
| +--ro task-id? string
| +--ro incident-no? string
| +--ro ticket-no? string
| +--ro start-time? yang:date-and-time
| +--ro end-time? yang:date-and-time
| +--ro task-state? task-state
| +--ro diagnosis-result? diagnosis-result
| +--ro diagnosis-result-description? string
| +--ro probable-causes
| | +--ro probable-cause* []
| | +--ro node-ref? -> /nw:networks/network[nw:network-id=current()/../network-ref]/node/node-id
| | +--ro network-ref? -> /nw:networks/network/network-id
| | +--ro resource* [name]
| | | +--ro name al:resource
| | | +--ro cause-name? identityref
| | | +--ro detail? string
| | +--ro cause-name? identityref
| | +--ro detail? string
| +--ro probable-events
| | +--ro probable-event* []
| | +--ro type? -> ../../../events/event/type
| | +--ro event-id? -> ../../../events/event[type = current()/../type]/event-id
| +--ro repair-advices? string
| +--ro incident-status? incident-status-value
So that the controller can send diagnosis task notification to the
OSS system upon diagnosis task completes and outputs repair
suggestion.
A.4. Multi-Domain Fault Demarcation with Network Incident Management
Take multi-domain fault demarcation as an example, when both base
station incident in the RAN network and Network Link incident in the
IP network are received and base station incident from user side
results from network incident in other domains, the OSS system is
unable to find network side problem simply based on base station
incident. Therefore incident diagnosis RPC will be invoked with IP
address of Base station and incident start time as input and sent to
the network controller. The network controller can use network
diagnosis related intent based interface to find the corresponding
network side port according to the base station IP address, and then
further associated with transmission path (current path, historical
path) to the base station and current and historical network
performance, netowrk resources, and incident status data, to diagnose
the probable root cause of the network incident and provide repair
suggestions.
+------------------------------------------------+
|OSS +------------------------------------------+|
| | Incident Handler || Diagnosis
| +----^------------------------^------+-----+| Key Parameters
+---------+------------------------|------|------+ {
Incident | | ticket-no, String
| | | incident-no, String
Update | Incident Incident occur-time, yang:date-and-time
Notification | Update Diagnosis context? String
| | Notification | related-events? leafref //List <Event>
| | | related-objects? leafref //List <ResourceObject>
+---------------+ | | | ....
| +-----------+ | | +-----|------+--+ }
| | Incident | | | | +---+------V+ |
| | Process | | | | | Incident | |
| +-----------+ | | | Process | |
| RAN Controller| | | +-----------+ |
+---------------+ | | IP Controller |
| +---------------+
|
RAN Autonomous Domain | IP Autonomous Domain
|
Figure 8: Multi-Domain Fault Demarcation
A.5. Service Complaint triggered Network Diagnosis
Customer
Complaint
| on Service
| Degradation
+-----------------V-----------------------+
|OSS +-----------------------------------+|
| | Incident Handler ||
| +------------^------^---------------+|
+-----------------+------+----------------+
Diagnosis Incident | |Incident Update
Key Parameters: Diagnosis| | Notification
{ +-----|------+--+
incident-no, | +---V------|+ |
ticket-no, | | Incident | |
occur-time, | | Process | |
context?, | | | |
related-events?, | | | |
related-objects?, | | | |
... | +-----------+ |
| IP Controller |
} +---------------+
IP Autonomous Domain
Figure 9: Service Complaint triggered Network Diagnosis
Similarly, in case of service degradation for a lease line service
recieving from the customer, the OSS system can request network
diagnosis at the network side conducted by the network controller.
The network controller can use network diagnosis related intent based
interface to find the corresponding network side port based on the
dedicated line service, and then further associate the transmission
path (current path, historical path) and current and historical
network performance, network resources, and incident status data to
diagnose the probable root cause of the fault and provide repair
suggestions.
Appendix B. Changes between Revisions
v05 - v06
* Fix Yanglint issue in the YANG data model.
* Align with RFC8407bis section 3.8.3.1 IANA template.
* Align with YANG Module Security Considerations template.
* Probable Root Cause Definition Polishing.
* Tree diagram update for RPC error construct
* Break down A.3 into 3 sections covering 3 examples.
v04 - v05
* Replace probable cause with probable root cause based on Adrian
and Benoit's suggestion.
* Address editorial comments raised by Aitken Paul.
* YANG Model editorial changes based on Aitken Paul's comments.
v03 - v04
* Remove constraint of using machine learning for service impact
analysis and replace machine learning with algorithmic techniques.
* Replace root cause with probable cause based on IETF 122 NMOP
Session Discussion.
* Add two ITU-T references for probable cause definition in the
terminologies section.
* Add Lionel Tailhardat from Orange as new contributors based on his
input.
* Add two new examples in the Appendix to explore correlation
between troubleshooting ticket and incident management and intent
based network diagonisis interaction.
v02 - v03
* Cross-checking terminology across NMOP drafts based on Adrian's
comments.
* Align with the Terminology draft based on Thomas's comments.
* Clarify the relation between the Network Incident, and Customer
Incident.
* Add service impact analysis term and its definition.
* Clarify the relation between fault, problem, incident, service.
* Other Editorial changes.
v01 - v02
* Clarify the relation between fault, incident and problem.
* Clarify the relation between fault management and incident
management.
* Add clarification text to make draft focus on network level
incident management, not be tied with OSS or under the control of
OSS.
* Other Editorial changes.
v00 - v01
* Clarify the relationship between incident-no and incident-id.
* Fix Tree Diagram to align with YANG module code change.
* Add json example in the appendix.
* Add failure handling process for rpc error.
* Clarify the relationship between events and cause.
* Clarify synchronous nature of these RPCs.
* Clarify the relationship between inter-layer and inter-domain.
* Refer to terminology draft for terminology alignment.
* Fix pyang compilation issue and yang lint issue.
* Fix Broken ref by using node-ref defined in RFC8345.
* Update YANG data model based on issues raised in issue tracker of
the github.
* Shorten the list of authors to 5 based on chairs' comment and move
additional authors to top 3 contributors.
* Merge ietf-incident-type.yang into ietf-incident.yang
* Fix enumeration on leaf type
* Clarify the scope in the abstract and introduction and make the
scope focus on YANG data model
* Provide text around figure 5 to clarify how the incident server
know the real effect on the relevant services.
* Other editorial changes.
v00 (draft-ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang)
* Change draft name from draft-feng-opsawg-incident-management into
draft-feng-nmop-netwrok-incident-yang
* Change title into A YANG Data Model for Network Incident
Management
* open issues is tracked in https://github.com/billwuqin/network-
incident/issues
v03 - v04 (draft-feng-opsawg-incident-management)
* Update incident defintion based on TMF incident API profile
specification.
* Update use case on Multi-layer Fault Demarcation based on side
meeting discussion and IETF 119 session discussion.
* Update section 5.1 to explain how network incident is generated
based on other factors.
* Add one new use cases on Security Events noise reduction based on
Situation Awareness.
* Other Editorial changes.
v02 - v03 (draft-feng-opsawg-incident-management)
* Add one new use cases on Incident Generation.
* Add reference to Precision Availability Metric defined in IPPM PAM
WG document.
v01 - v02
* A few Editorial change to YANG data models in section 8.
* Add some text to the model design overview.
* Revise sample use cases section to focus on two key use cases.
* Motivation and goal clarification in the introduction section.
v00 - v01 (draft-feng-opsawg-incident-management)
* Modify the introduction.
* Rename incident agent to incident server.
* Add the interworking with alarm management.
* Add the interworking with SAIN.
* Add the relationship with RFC8969.
* Add the relationship with observation timestamp and trace context.
* Clarify the incident identification process.
* Modify the work flow of incident diagnosis and resolution.
* Remove identities and typedefs from ietf-incident YANG module, and
create a new YANG module called ietf-incident-types.
* Modify ietf-incident YANG module, for example, modify incident-
diagnose rpc and incident-resolve rpc.
Contributors
Lionel Tailhardat
Orange
Email: lionel.tailhardat@orange.com
Thomas Graf
Swisscom
Switzerland
Email: thomas.graf@swisscom.com
Zhenqiang Li
CMCC
Email: li_zhenqiang@hotmail.com
Yanlei Zheng
China Unicom
Email: zhengyanlei@chinaunicom.cn
Yunbin Xu
CAICT
Email: xuyunbin@caict.ac.cn
Xing Zhao
CAICT
Email: zhaoxing@caict.ac.cn
Chaode Yu
Huawei
Email: yuchaode@huawei.com
Authors' Addresses
Tong Hu
CMCC
Building A01, 1600 Yuhangtang Road, Wuchang Street, Yuhang District
Hangzhou
311121
China
Email: hutong@cmhi.chinamobile.com
Luis M. Contreras
Telefonica
Madrid
Spain
Email: luismiguel.contrerasmurillo@telefonica.com
Qin Wu
Huawei
101 Software Avenue, Yuhua District
Nanjing
210012
China
Email: bill.wu@huawei.com
Nigel Davis
Ciena
Email: ndavis@ciena.com
Chong Feng
Email: fengchongllly@gmail.com
Datatracker
draft-ietf-nmop-network-incident-yang-06
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
| Document | Document type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Active".
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| Authors | Tong Hu , Luis M. Contreras , Qin Wu , Nigel Davis , Chong Feng | ||
| Replaces |
draft-feng-nmop-network-incident-yang draft-feng-opsawg-incident-management |
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| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion |