OPSEC                                                     E. Vyncke, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     Cisco
Intended status: Informational                           K. Chittimaneni
Expires: May 6, 2020                                              WeWork
                                                                 M. Kaeo
                                                    Double Shot Security
                                                                  E. Rey
                                                        November 3, 2019

         Operational Security Considerations for IPv6 Networks


   Knowledge and experience on how to operate IPv4 securely is
   available: whether it is the Internet or an enterprise internal
   network.  However, IPv6 presents some new security challenges.  RFC
   4942 describes the security issues in the protocol but network
   managers also need a more practical, operations-minded document to
   enumerate advantages and/or disadvantages of certain choices.

   This document analyzes the operational security issues in several
   places of a network (enterprises, service providers and residential
   users) and proposes technical and procedural mitigations techniques.
   Some very specific places of a network such as the Internet of Things
   are not discussed in this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 6, 2020.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Generic Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Addressing Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  Use of ULAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.2.  Point-to-Point Links  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.3.  Loopback Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.4.  Statically Configured Addresses . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       2.1.5.  Temporary Addresses - Privacy Extensions for SLAAC  .   6
       2.1.6.  DHCP/DNS Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.7.  Using a /64 per host  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       2.1.8.  Privacy consideration of Addresses  . . . . . . . . .   7
     2.2.  Extension Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       2.2.1.  Order and Repetition of Extension Headers . . . . . .   8
       2.2.2.  Hop-by-Hop Options Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.2.3.  Fragment Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.2.4.  IP Security Extension Header  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     2.3.  Link-Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
       2.3.1.  ND/RA Rate Limiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.3.2.  RA/NA Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       2.3.3.  Securing DHCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.3.4.  3GPP Link-Layer Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       2.3.5.  SeND and CGA  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     2.4.  Control Plane Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       2.4.1.  Control Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.4.2.  Management Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       2.4.3.  Packet Exceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     2.5.  Routing Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       2.5.1.  Authenticating Neighbors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       2.5.2.  Securing Routing Updates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       2.5.3.  Route Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

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     2.6.  Logging/Monitoring  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
       2.6.1.  Data Sources  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
       2.6.2.  Use of Collected Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
       2.6.3.  Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     2.7.  Transition/Coexistence Technologies . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       2.7.1.  Dual Stack  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
       2.7.2.  Encapsulation Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
       2.7.3.  Translation Mechanisms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  32
     2.8.  General Device Hardening  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  34
   3.  Enterprises Specific Security Considerations  . . . . . . . .  35
     3.1.  External Security Considerations: . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
     3.2.  Internal Security Considerations: . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
   4.  Service Providers Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . .  36
     4.1.  BGP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
       4.1.1.  Remote Triggered Black Hole Filtering . . . . . . . .  37
     4.2.  Transition/Coexistence Mechanism  . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
     4.3.  Lawful Intercept  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  37
   5.  Residential Users Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . .  37
   6.  Further Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  38
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  39
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51

1.  Introduction

   Running an IPv6 network is new for most operators not only because
   they are not yet used to large scale IPv6 networks but also because
   there are subtle differences between IPv4 and IPv6 especially with
   respect to security.  For example, all layer-2 interactions are now
   done using Neighbor Discovery Protocol [RFC4861] rather than using
   Address Resolution Protocol [RFC0826].

   IPv6 networks are deployed using a variety of techniques, each of
   which have their own specific security concerns.

   This document complements [RFC4942] by listing all security issues
   when operating a network utilizing varying transition technologies
   and updating it with that have been standardized since 2007.  It also
   provides more recent operational deployment experiences where

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1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Generic Security Considerations

2.1.  Addressing Architecture

   IPv6 address allocations and overall architecture are an important
   part of securing IPv6.  Initial designs, even if intended to be
   temporary, tend to last much longer than expected.  Although
   initially IPv6 was thought to make renumbering easy, in practice it
   may be extremely difficult to renumber without a proper IP Addresses
   Management (IPAM) system.

   A key task for a successful IPv6 deployment is to prepare an
   addressing plan.  Because an abundance of address space available,
   structuring an address plan around both services and geographic
   locations allow address space to become a basis for more structured
   security policies to permit or deny services between geographic

   A common question is whether companies should use Provider
   Independent (PI) vs Provider Allocated (PA) space [RFC7381], but from
   a security perspective there is little difference.  However, one
   aspect to keep in mind is who has administrative ownership of the
   address space and who is technically responsible if/when there is a
   need to enforce restrictions on routability of the space e.g. due to
   malicious criminal activity originating from it.

   In [RFC7934], it is recommended that IPv6 network deployments provide
   multiple IPv6 addresses from each prefix to general-purpose hosts and
   it specifically does not recommend limiting a host to only one IPv6
   address per prefix.  It also recommends that the network give the
   host the ability to use new addresses without requiring explicit
   requests (for example by using SLAAC).  Having multiple IPv6
   addresses per interface is a major change compared to the unique IPv4
   address per interface; especially for audits (see section

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2.1.1.  Use of ULAs

   Unique Local Addresses (ULAs) [RFC4193] are intended for scenarios
   where interfaces are not globally reachable, despite being routed
   within a domain.  They formally have global scope, but [RFC4193]
   specifies that they must be filtered out at domain boundaries.  ULAs
   are different from [RFC1918] addresses and have different use cases.
   One use of ULA is described in [RFC4864].

2.1.2.  Point-to-Point Links

   [RFC6164] in section 5.1 specifies the rationale of using /127 for
   inter-router point-to-point links; a /127 prevents the ping-pong
   attack between routers not implementing correctly [RFC4443] and also
   prevents a DoS attack on the neighbor cache.  The previous
   recommendation of [RFC3627] has been obsoleted and marked Historic by

   Some environments are also using link-local addressing for point-to-
   point links.  While this practice could further reduce the attack
   surface against infrastructure devices, the operational disadvantages
   need also to be carefully considered; see also [RFC7404].

2.1.3.  Loopback Addresses

   Many operators reserve a /64 block for all loopback addresses in
   their infrastructure and allocate a /128 out of this reserved /64
   prefix for each loopback interface.  This practice allows for an easy
   to write Access Control List (ACL) to enforce a security policy about
   those loopback addresses.

2.1.4.  Statically Configured Addresses

   When considering how to assign statically configured addresses, it is
   necessary to take into consideration the effectiveness of perimeter
   security in a given environment.  There is a trade-off between ease
   of operation (where some portions of the IPv6 address could be easily
   recognizable for operational debugging and troubleshooting) versus
   the risk of trivial scanning used for reconnaissance.  [SCANNING]
   shows that there are scientifically based mechanisms that make
   scanning for IPv6 reachable nodes more feasible than expected; see
   also [RFC7707].  The use of well-known IPv6 addresses (such as
   ff02::1 for all link-local nodes) or the use of commonly repeated
   addresses could make it easy to figure out which devices are name
   servers, routers or other critical devices; even a simple traceroute
   will expose most of the routers on a path.  There are many scanning
   techniques possible and operators should not rely on the 'impossible
   to find because my address is random' paradigm, even if it is common

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   practice to have the statically configured addresses randomly
   distributed across /64 subnets and to always use DNS.

   While in some environments obfuscating addresses could be considered
   an added benefit, it does not preclude that perimeter rules are
   actively enforced and that statically configured addresses follow
   some logical allocation scheme for ease of operation (as simplicity
   always helps security).  Typical deployments will have a mix of
   static and non-static addresses.

2.1.5.  Temporary Addresses - Privacy Extensions for SLAAC

   Historically stateless address autoconfiguration (SLAAC) relied on an
   automatically generated 64-bit interface identifier (IID) based on
   the EUI-64 MAC address, which together with the /64 prefix makes up
   the globally unique IPv6 address.  The EUI-64 address is generated
   from the 48-bit stable MAC address.  [RFC8064] recommends against the
   use of EUI-64 addresses and it must be noted that most host operating
   systems do not use EUI-64 addresses anymore and rely on either
   [RFC4941] or [RFC8064].

   Randomly generating an interface ID, as described in [RFC4941], is
   part of SLAAC with so-called privacy extension addresses and is used
   to address some privacy concerns.  Privacy extension addresses a.k.a.
   temporary addresses may help to mitigate the correlation of
   activities of a node within the same network, and may also reduce the
   attack exposure window.

   Using [RFC4941] privacy extension addresses might prevent the
   operator from building host specific access control lists (ACLs).
   The [RFC4941] privacy extension addresses could also be used to
   obfuscate some malevolent activities and specific user attribution/
   accountability procedures should be put in place as described in
   Section 2.6.

   [RFC8064] specifies another way to generate an address while still
   keeping the same IID for each network prefix; this allows SLAAC nodes
   to always have the same stable IPv6 address on a specific network
   while having different IPv6 address on different networks.

   In some specific use cases where user accountability is more
   important than user privacy, network operators may consider disabling
   SLAAC and relying only on DHCPv6; but, not all operating systems
   support DHCPv6 so some hosts will not get any IPv6 connectivity.
   Disabling SLAAC and privacy extensions addresses can be done for most
   operating systems by sending RA messages with a hint to get addresses
   via DHCPv6 by setting the M-bit but also disabling SLAAC by resetting
   all A-bits in all prefix information options.  However, attackers

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   could still find ways to bypass this mechanism if not enforced at the
   switch/ router level.

   However, in scenarios where anonymity is a strong desire (protecting
   user privacy is more important than user attribution), privacy
   extension addresses should be used.  When [RFC8064] is available, the
   stable privacy address is probably a good balance between privacy
   (among different networks) and security/user attribution (within a

2.1.6.  DHCP/DNS Considerations

   Many environments use DHCPv6 to provision addresses and other
   parameters in order to ensure audit-ability and traceability (see
   Section  A main security concern is the ability to detect
   and counteract against rogue DHCP servers (Section 2.3.3).  It must
   be noted that as opposed to DHCPv4, DHCPv6 can lease several IPv6
   addresses per client and the lease is not bound to the link-layer
   address of the client but to the DHCP Unique ID (DUID) of the client
   that is not always bound to the client link-layer address.

   While there are no fundamental differences with IPv4 and IPv6
   security concerns about DNS, there are specific consideration in
   DNS64 [RFC6147] environments that need to be understood.
   Specifically, the interactions and the potential of interference with
   DNSSEC implementation need to be understood - these are pointed out
   in more detail in Section

2.1.7.  Using a /64 per host

   An interesting approach is using a /64 per host as proposed in
   [RFC8273].  This allows for easier user attribution (typically based
   on the host MAC address) as its /64 prefix is stable even if
   applications within the host can change their IPv6 address within
   this /64.

2.1.8.  Privacy consideration of Addresses

   Beside the security aspects of IPv6 addresses, there are also privacy
   considerations: mainly because they are of global scope and visible
   globally.  [RFC7721] goes in more details about the privacy
   considerations of IPv6 addresses by comparing the manually
   configured, DHCPv6 or SLAAC.

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2.2.  Extension Headers

   The extension headers are an important difference between IPv4 and
   IPv6.  In IPv4-based packets, it's trivial to find the upper layer
   protocol type and protocol header, while in IPv6 it is more complex
   since the extension header chain must be parsed completely.  The IANA
   has closed the existing empty "Next Header Types" registry to new
   entries and is redirecting its users to a new "IPv6 Extension Header
   Types" registry per [RFC7045].

   They have also become a very controversial topic since forwarding
   nodes that discard packets containing extension headers are known to
   cause connectivity failures and deployment problems [RFC7872].
   Understanding the role of varying extension headers is important and
   this section enumerates the ones that need careful consideration.

   A clarification on how intermediate nodes should handle packets with
   existing or future extension headers is found in [RFC7045].  The
   uniform TLV format to be used for defining future extension headers
   is described in [RFC6564].

   It must also be noted that there is no indication in the packet
   whether the Next Protocol field points to an extension header or to a
   transport header.  This may confuse some filtering rules.

   There is work in progress at the IETF about filtering rules for those
   extension headers: [I-D.ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering] for transit

2.2.1.  Order and Repetition of Extension Headers

   While [RFC8200] recommends the order and the maximum repetition of
   extension headers, there are still IPv6 implementations at the time
   of writing this document which support a non-recommended order of
   headers (such as ESP before routing) or an illegal repetition of
   headers (such as multiple routing headers).  The same applies for
   options contained in the extension headers (see
   [I-D.kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-parsing]).  In some cases, it has led to
   nodes crashing when receiving or forwarding wrongly formatted

   A firewall or edge device should be used to enforce the recommended
   order and number of occurrences of extension headers.

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2.2.2.  Hop-by-Hop Options Header

   The hop-by-hop options header, when present in an IPv6 packet, forces
   all nodes in the path to inspect this header in the original IPv6
   specification [RFC2460].  This enables denial of service attacks as
   most, if not all, routers cannot process this kind of packets in
   hardware but have to 'punt' this packet for software processing.
   Section 4.3 of the current Internet Standard for IPv6, [RFC8200], has
   taken this attack vector into account and made the processing of hop-
   by-hop options header by intermediate routers optional.

2.2.3.  Fragment Header

   The fragment header is used by the source (and only the source) when
   it has to fragment packets.  [RFC7112] and section 4.5 of [RFC8200]
   explain why it is important that:

      firewall and security devices should drop first fragments that do
      not contain the entire ipv6 header chain (including the transport-
      layer header);

      destination nodes should discard first fragments that do not
      contain the entire ipv6 header chain (including the transport-
      layer header).

   If those requirements are not met, stateless filtering could be
   bypassed by a hostile party.  [RFC6980] applies a stricter rule to
   NDP by enforcing the drop of fragmented NDP packets.  [RFC7113]
   describes how RA-guard function described in [RFC6105] should behave
   in presence of fragmented RA packets.

2.2.4.  IP Security Extension Header

   The IPsec [RFC4301] [RFC4301] extension headers (AH [RFC4302] and ESP
   [RFC4303]) are required if IPsec is to be utilized for network level
   security functionality.

2.3.  Link-Layer Security

   IPv6 relies heavily on the Neighbor Discovery protocol (NDP)
   [RFC4861] to perform a variety of link operations such as discovering
   other nodes on the link, resolving their link-layer addresses, and
   finding routers on the link.  If not secured, NDP is vulnerable to
   various attacks such as router/neighbor message spoofing, redirect
   attacks, Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) DoS attacks, etc.  Many of
   these security threats to NDP have been documented in IPv6 ND Trust
   Models and Threats [RFC3756] and in [RFC6583].

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2.3.1.  ND/RA Rate Limiting

   Neighbor Discovery (ND) can be vulnerable to denial of service (DoS)
   attacks; for example, when a router is forced to perform address
   resolution for a large number of unassigned addresses.  This can keep
   new devices from joining the network or render the last hop router
   ineffective due to high CPU usage.  Easy mitigative steps include
   rate limiting Neighbor Solicitations, restricting the amount of state
   reserved for unresolved solicitations, and clever cache/timer

   [RFC6583] discusses the potential for DoS in detail and suggests
   implementation improvements and operational mitigation techniques
   that may be used to mitigate or alleviate the impact of such attacks.
   Here are some feasible mitigation options that can be employed by
   network operators today:

   o  Ingress filtering of unused addresses by ACL.  These require
      static configuration of the addresses; for example, allocating the
      addresses out of a /120 and using a specific ACL to only allow
      traffic to this /120 (of course, the actual hosts are configured
      with a /64 prefix for the link).

   o  Tuning of NDP process (where supported).

   o  Using /127 on point-to-point link per [RFC6164].

   o  Using link-local addresses only on links where there are only
      routers see [RFC7404]

   Additionally, IPv6 ND uses multicast extensively for signaling
   messages on the local link to avoid broadcast messages for on-the-
   wire efficiency.  However, this has some side effects on wireless
   networks, such as a negative impact on battery life of smartphones
   and other battery-operated devices that are connected to such
   networks.  The following drafts are actively discussing methods to
   rate limit RAs and other ND messages on wireless networks in order to
   address this issue:

   o  [I-D.thubert-savi-ra-throttler]

   o  [I-D.chakrabarti-nordmark-6man-efficient-nd]

2.3.2.  RA/NA Filtering

   Router Advertisement spoofing is a well-known attack vector and has
   been extensively documented.  The presence of rogue RAs, either
   intentional or malicious, can cause partial or complete failure of

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   operation of hosts on an IPv6 link.  For example, a host can select
   an incorrect router address which can be used as a man-in-the-middle
   (MITM) attack or can assume wrong prefixes to be used for stateless
   address configuration (SLAAC).  [RFC6104] summarizes the scenarios in
   which rogue RAs may be observed and presents a list of possible
   solutions to the problem.  [RFC6105] (RA-Guard) describes a solution
   framework for the rogue RA problem where network segments are
   designed around switching devices that are capable of identifying
   invalid RAs and blocking them before the attack packets actually
   reach the target nodes.

   However, several evasion techniques that circumvent the protection
   provided by RA-Guard have surfaced.  A key challenge to this
   mitigation technique is introduced by IPv6 fragmentation.  An
   attacker can conceal the attack by fragmenting his packets into
   multiple fragments such that the switching device that is responsible
   for blocking invalid RAs cannot find all the necessary information to
   perform packet filtering in the same packet.  [RFC7113] describes
   such evasion techniques, and provides advice to RA-Guard implementers
   such that the aforementioned evasion vectors can be eliminated.

   Given that the IPv6 Fragmentation Header can be leveraged to
   circumvent current implementations of RA-Guard, [RFC6980] updates
   [RFC4861] such that use of the IPv6 Fragmentation Header is forbidden
   in all Neighbor Discovery messages except "Certification Path
   Advertisement", thus allowing for simple and effective measures to
   counter Neighbor Discovery attacks.

   The Source Address Validation Improvements (SAVI) working group has
   worked on other ways to mitigate the effects of such attacks.
   [RFC7513] helps in creating bindings between a DHCPv4 [RFC2131]
   /DHCPv6 [RFC8415] assigned source IP address and a binding anchor
   [RFC7039] on a SAVI device.  Also, [RFC6620] describes how to glean
   similar bindings when DHCP is not used.  The bindings can be used to
   filter packets generated on the local link with forged source IP

   It is still recommended that RA-Guard and SAVI be employed as a first
   line of defense against common attack vectors including misconfigured
   hosts.  This line of defense is most effective when incomplete
   fragments are dropped by routers and switches as described in
   Section 2.2.3.  The generated log should also be analyzed to act on

   A drastic technique to prevent all NDP attacks is based on isolation
   of all hosts with specific configurations.  Hosts (i.e. all nodes
   that are not routers) are unable to send data-link layer frames to
   other hosts, therefore, no host to host attacks can happen.  This

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   specific set-up can be established on some switches or wireless
   access points.  Of course, this is not always easily feasible when
   hosts need to communicate with other hosts.

2.3.3.  Securing DHCP

   Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6), as detailed in
   [RFC8415], enables DHCP servers to pass configuration parameters such
   as IPv6 network addresses and other configuration information to IPv6
   nodes.  DHCP plays an important role in most large networks by
   providing robust stateful configuration and in the context of
   automated system provisioning.

   The two most common threats to DHCP clients come from malicious
   (a.k.a. rogue) or unintentionally misconfigured DHCP servers.  A
   malicious DHCP server is established with the intent of providing
   incorrect configuration information to the client to cause a denial
   of service attack or to mount a-man-in-the-middle attack.  While
   unintentional, a misconfigured DHCP server can have the same impact.
   Additional threats against DHCP are discussed in the security
   considerations section of [RFC8415].

   [RFC7610], DHCPv6-Shield, specifies a mechanism for protecting
   connected DHCPv6 clients against rogue DHCPv6 servers.  This
   mechanism is based on DHCPv6 packet-filtering at the layer-2 device;
   the administrator specifies the interfaces connected to DHCPv6
   servers.  Furthermore, extension headers could be leveraged to bypass
   DHCPv6-Shield unless [RFC7112] is enforced.

   It is recommended to use DHCPv6-Shield and to analyze the
   corresponding log messages.

2.3.4.  3GPP Link-Layer Security

   The 3GPP link is a point-to-point like link that has no link-layer
   address.  This implies there can only be an end host (the mobile
   hand-set) and the first-hop router (i.e., a GPRS Gateway Support Node
   (GGSN) or a Packet Gateway (PGW)) on that link.  The GGSN/PGW never
   configures a non link-local address on the link using the advertised
   /64 prefix on it.  The advertised prefix must not be used for on-link
   determination.  There is no need for an address resolution on the
   3GPP link, since there are no link-layer addresses.  Furthermore, the
   GGSN/PGW assigns a prefix that is unique within each 3GPP link that
   uses IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration.  This avoids the
   necessity to perform DAD at the network level for every address built
   by the mobile host.  The GGSN/PGW always provides an IID to the
   cellular host for the purpose of configuring the link-local address
   and ensures the uniqueness of the IID on the link (i.e., no

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   collisions between its own link-local address and the mobile host's

   The 3GPP link model itself mitigates most of the known NDP-related
   Denial-of-Service attacks.  In practice, the GGSN/PGW only needs to
   route all traffic to the mobile host that falls under the prefix
   assigned to it.  As there is also a single host on the 3GPP link,
   there is no need to defend that IPv6 address.

   See Section 5 of [RFC6459] for a more detailed discussion on the 3GPP
   link model, NDP on it and the address configuration details.  In some
   mobile network, DHCPv6 and DHCP-PD are also used.

2.3.5.  SeND and CGA

   SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SeND), as described in [RFC3971], is a
   mechanism that was designed to secure ND messages.  This approach
   involves the use of new NDP options to carry public key based
   signatures.  Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA), as
   described in [RFC3972], are used to ensure that the sender of a
   Neighbor Discovery message is the actual "owner" of the claimed IPv6
   address.  A new NDP option, the CGA option, was introduced and is
   used to carry the public key and associated parameters.  Another NDP
   option, the RSA Signature option, is used to protect all messages
   relating to neighbor and Router discovery.

   SeND protects against:

   o  Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing

   o  Neighbor Unreachability Detection Failure

   o  Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack

   o  Router Solicitation and Advertisement Attacks

   o  Replay Attacks

   o  Neighbor Discovery DoS Attacks

   SeND does NOT:

   o  Protect statically configured addresses

   o  Protect addresses configured using fixed identifiers (i.e.  EUI-

   o  Provide confidentiality for NDP communications

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   o  Compensate for an unsecured link - SEND does not require that the
      addresses on the link and Neighbor Advertisements correspond

   However, at this time and over a decade since their original
   specifications, CGA and SeND do not have wide support from generic
   operating systems; hence, their usefulness is limited and should not
   be relied upon.

2.4.  Control Plane Security

   [RFC6192] defines the router control plane.  This definition is
   repeated here for the reader's convenience.  Please note that the
   definition is completely protocol-version agnostic (most of this
   section applies to IPv6 in the same way as to IPv4).

   Modern router architecture design maintains a strict separation of
   forwarding and router control plane hardware and software.  The
   router control plane supports routing and management functions.  It
   is generally described as the router architecture hardware and
   software components for handling packets destined to the device
   itself as well as building and sending packets originated locally on
   the device.  The forwarding plane is typically described as the
   router architecture hardware and software components responsible for
   receiving a packet on an incoming interface, performing a lookup to
   identify the packet's IP next hop and determine the best outgoing
   interface towards the destination, and forwarding the packet out
   through the appropriate outgoing interface.

   While the forwarding plane is usually implemented in high-speed
   hardware, the control plane is implemented by a generic processor
   (named router processor RP) and cannot process packets at a high
   rate.  Hence, this processor can be attacked by flooding its input
   queue with more packets than it can process.  The control plane
   processor is then unable to process valid control packets and the
   router can lose OSPF or BGP adjacencies which can cause a severe
   network disruption.

   The mitigation techniques are:

   o  To drop non-legit control packet before they are queued to the RP
      (this can be done by a forwarding plane ACL) and

   o  To rate limit the remaining packets to a rate that the RP can
      sustain.  Protocol specific protection should also be done (for
      example, a spoofed OSPFv3 packet could trigger the execution of
      the Dijkstra algorithm, therefore, the number of Dijsktra
      execution should be also rate limited).

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   This section will consider several classes of control packets:

   o  Control protocols: routing protocols: such as OSPFv3, BGP and by
      extension Neighbor Discovery and ICMP

   o  Management protocols: SSH, SNMP, IPfix, etc

   o  Packet exceptions: which are normal data packets which requires a
      specific processing such as generating a packet-too-big ICMP
      message or having the hop-by-hop options header.

2.4.1.  Control Protocols

   This class includes OSPFv3, BGP, NDP, ICMP.

   An ingress ACL to be applied on all the router interfaces should be
   configured such as:

   o  drop OSPFv3 (identified by Next-Header being 89) and RIPng
      (identified by UDP port 521) packets from a non link-local address

   o  allow BGP (identified by TCP port 179) packets from all BGP
      neighbors and drop the others

   o  allow all ICMP packets (transit and to the router interfaces)

   Note: dropping OSPFv3 packets which are authenticated by IPsec could
   be impossible on some routers whose ACL are unable to parse the IPsec
   ESP or AH extension headers.

   Rate limiting of the valid packets should be done.  The exact
   configuration will depend on the available resources of the router
   (CPU, TCAM, ...).

2.4.2.  Management Protocols

   This class includes: SSH, SNMP, syslog, NTP, etc.

   An ingress ACL to be applied on all the router interfaces (or at
   ingress interfaces of the security perimeter or by using specific
   features of the platform) should be configured such as:

   o  Drop packets destined to the routers except those belonging to
      protocols which are used (for example, permit TCP 22 and drop all
      when only SSH is used);

   o  Drop packets where the source does not match the security policy,
      for example if SSH connections should only be originated from the

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      NOC, then the ACL should permit TCP port 22 packets only from the
      NOC prefix.

   Rate limiting of the valid packets should be done.  The exact
   configuration will depend on the available resources of the router.

2.4.3.  Packet Exceptions

   This class covers multiple cases where a data plane packet is punted
   to the route processor because it requires specific processing:

   o  generation of an ICMP packet-too-big message when a data plane
      packet cannot be forwarded because it is too large;

   o  generation of an ICMP hop-limit-expired message when a data plane
      packet cannot be forwarded because its hop-limit field has reached

   o  generation of an ICMP destination-unreachable message when a data
      plane packet cannot be forwarded for any reason;

   o  processing of the hop-by-hop options header, new implementations
      follow section 4.3 of [RFC8200] where this processing is optional;

   o  or more specific to some router implementation: an oversized
      extension header chain which cannot be processed by the hardware
      and force the packet to be punted to the generic router CPU.

   On some routers, not everything can be done by the specialized data
   plane hardware which requires some packets to be 'punted' to the
   generic RP.  This could include for example the processing of a long
   extension header chain in order to apply an ACL based on layer 4
   information.  [RFC6980] and more generally [RFC7112] highlights the
   security implications of oversized extension header chains on routers
   and updates the original IPv6 specifications, [RFC2460], such that
   the first fragment of a packet is required to contain the entire IPv6
   header chain.  Those changes are incorporated in the IPv6 standard

   An ingress ACL cannot mitigate a control plane attack using these
   packet exceptions.  The only protection for the RP is to limit the
   rate of those packet exceptions forwarded to the RP, this means that
   some data plane packets will be dropped without any ICMP messages
   back to the source which may cause Path MTU holes.

   In addition to limiting the rate of data plane packets queued to the
   RP, it is also important to limit the generation rate of ICMP
   messages.  Both the save the RP and also to prevent an amplification

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   attack using the router as a reflector.  It is worth noting that some
   platforms implement this rate-limiting in hardware.  Of course, a
   consequence of not generating an ICMP message will break some IPv6
   mechanisms such as Path MTU discovery or a simple traceroute.

2.5.  Routing Security

   Routing security in general can be broadly divided into three

   1.  Authenticating neighbors/peers

   2.  Securing routing updates between peers

   3.  Route filtering

   [RFC7454] covers these sections specifically for BGP in detail.

   [RFC5082] is also applicable to IPv6 and can ensure that routing
   protocol packets are coming from the local network; it must also be
   noted that in IPv6 all interior gateway protocols use link-local

2.5.1.  Authenticating Neighbors

   A basic element of routing is the process of forming adjacencies,
   neighbor, or peering relationships with other routers.  From a
   security perspective, it is very important to establish such
   relationships only with routers and/or administrative domains that
   one trusts.  A traditional approach has been to use MD5 HMAC, which
   allows routers to authenticate each other prior to establishing a
   routing relationship.

   OSPFv3 can rely on IPsec to fulfill the authentication function.
   However, it should be noted that IPsec support is not standard on all
   routing platforms.  In some cases, this requires specialized hardware
   that offloads crypto over to dedicated ASICs or enhanced software
   images (both of which often come with added financial cost) to
   provide such functionality.  An added detail is to determine whether
   OSPFv3 IPsec implementations use AH or ESP-Null for integrity
   protection.  In early implementations all OSPFv3 IPsec configurations
   relied on AH since the details weren't specified in [RFC5340].
   However, the document which specifically describes how IPsec should
   be implemented for OSPFv3 [RFC4552] specifically states that ESP-Null
   MUST and AH MAY be implemented since it follows the overall IPsec
   standards wordings.  OSPFv3 can also use normal ESP to encrypt the
   OSPFv3 payload to hide the routing information.

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   [RFC7166] changes OSPFv3 reliance on IPsec by appending an
   authentication trailer to the end of the OSPFv3 packets; it does not
   specifically authenticate the specific originator of an OSPFv3
   packet; rather, it allows a router to confirm that the packet has
   been issued by a router that had access to the shared authentication

   With all authentication mechanisms, operators should confirm that
   implementations can support re-keying mechanisms that do not cause
   outages.  There have been instances where any re-keying cause outages
   and therefore, the tradeoff between utilizing this functionality
   needs to be weighed against the protection it provides.

   As for IPv4, it is recommended to enable a routing protocol only on
   interface where it is required.

2.5.2.  Securing Routing Updates

   IPv6 initially mandated the provisioning of IPsec capability in all
   nodes.  However, in the updated IPv6 Nodes Requirement standard
   [RFC8504] is a 'SHOULD' and not a 'MUST' implement.  Theoretically it
   is possible that communication between two IPv6 nodes, especially
   routers exchanging routing information be encrypted using IPsec.  In
   practice however, deploying IPsec is not always feasible given
   hardware and software limitations of various platforms deployed, it
   has also an operational cost as described in the earlier section.

2.5.3.  Route Filtering

   Route filtering policies will be different depending on whether they
   pertain to edge route filtering vs internal route filtering.  At a
   minimum, IPv6 routing policy as it pertains to routing between
   different administrative domains should aim to maintain parity with
   IPv4 from a policy perspective e.g.,

   o  Filter internal-use, non-globally routable IPv6 addresses at the

   o  Discard routes for bogon and reserved space (see [CYMRU] and

   o  Configure ingress route filters that validate route origin, prefix
      ownership, etc. through the use of various routing databases,
      e.g., RADB.  There is additional work being done in this area to
      formally validate the origin ASs of BGP announcements in [RFC8210]

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   Some good recommendations for filtering can be found from Team CYMRU
   at [CYMRU].  [RFC7454] is another valuable resource of guidance in
   this space.

   A valid routing table can also be used apply network ingress
   filtering (see [RFC2827]).

2.6.  Logging/Monitoring

   In order to perform forensic research in case of a security incident
   or to detect abnormal behaviors, network operators should log
   multiple pieces of information.

   This logging should include:

   o  logs of all applications using the network (including user space
      and kernel space) when available (for example web servers);

   o  data from IP Flow Information Export [RFC7011] also known as

   o  data from various SNMP MIB [RFC4293];

   o  historical data of Neighbour Cache entries;

   o  stateful DHCPv6 [RFC8415] lease cache, especially when a relay
      agent [RFC6221] is used;

   o  Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) [RFC7039] events,
      especially the binding of an IPv6 address to a MAC address and a
      specific switch or router interface;

   o  RADIUS [RFC2866] accounting records.

   Please note that there are privacy issues or regulations related to
   how those logs are collected, kept and safely discarded.  Operators
   are urged to check their country legislation (e.g.  GDPR in the
   European Union).

   All those pieces of information can be used for:

   o  forensic (Section investigations such as who did what and

   o  correlation (Section which IP addresses were used by a
      specific node (assuming the use of privacy extensions addresses

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   o  inventory (Section which IPv6 nodes are on my network?

   o  abnormal behavior detection (Section unusual traffic
      patterns are often the symptoms of an abnormal behavior which is
      in turn a potential attack (denial of services, network scan, a
      node being part of a botnet, ...)

2.6.1.  Data Sources

   This section lists the most important sources of data that are useful
   for operational security.  Logs of Applications

   Those logs are usually text files where the remote IPv6 address is
   stored in all characters (not binary).  This can complicate the
   processing since one IPv6 address, for example 2001:db8::1 can be
   written in multiple ways such as:

   o  2001:DB8::1 (in uppercase)

   o  2001:0db8::0001 (with leading 0)

   o  and many other ways including the reverse DNS mapping into a FQDN
      (which should not be trusted).

   [RFC5952] explains this problem in detail and recommends the use of a
   single canonical format.  This document recommends the use of
   canonical format [RFC5952] for IPv6 addresses in all possible cases.
   If the existing application cannot log under the canonical format,
   then it is recommended to use an external program in order to
   canonicalize all IPv6 addresses.

   For example, this perl script can be used:

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   #!/usr/bin/perl -w
   use strict ;
   use warnings ;
   use Socket ;
   use Socket6 ;

   my (@words, $word, $binary_address) ;

   ## go through the file one line at a time
   while (my $line = <STDIN>) {
     chomp $line;
     foreach my $word (split /[\s+]/, $line) {
       $binary_address = inet_pton AF_INET6, $word ;
       if ($binary_address) {
         print inet_ntop AF_INET6, $binary_address ;
       } else {
         print $word ;
       print " " ;
     print "\n" ;

   <CODE ENDS>  IP Flow Information Export by IPv6 Routers

   IPfix [RFC7012] defines some data elements that are useful for

   o  in section 5.4 (IP Header fields): nextHeaderIPv6 and

   o  in section 5.6 (Sub-IP fields) sourceMacAddress.

   Moreover, IPfix is very efficient in terms of data handling and
   transport.  It can also aggregate flows by a key such as
   sourceMacAddress in order to have aggregated data associated with a
   specific sourceMacAddress.  This memo recommends the use of IPfix and
   aggregation on nextHeaderIPv6, sourceIPv6Address and

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   RFC 4293 [RFC4293] defines a Management Information Base (MIB) for
   the two address families of IP.  This memo recommends the use of:

   o  ipIfStatsTable table which collects traffic counters per

   o  ipNetToPhysicalTable table which is the content of the Neighbor
      cache, i.e. the mapping between IPv6 and data-link layer
      addresses.  Neighbor Cache of IPv6 Routers

   The neighbor cache of routers contains all mappings between IPv6
   addresses and data-link layer addresses.  There are multiple ways to
   collect the current entries in the Neighbor Cache, notably but not
   limited to:

   o  the SNMP MIB (Section as explained above;

   o  using streaming telemetry or NETCONF [RFC6241] to collect the
      operational state of the neighbor cache;

   o  also by connecting over a secure management channel (such as SSH)
      and explicitly requesting a neighbor cache dump via the Command
      Line Interface or another monitoring mechanism.

   The neighbor cache is highly dynamic as mappings are added when a new
   IPv6 address appears on the network (could be quite often with
   privacy extension addresses [RFC4941] or when they are removed when
   the state goes from UNREACH to removed (the default time for a
   removal per Neighbor Unreachability Detection [RFC4861] algorithm is
   38 seconds for a typical host such as Windows 7).  This means that
   the content of the neighbor cache must periodically be fetched at an
   interval which does not exhaust the router resources and still
   provides valuable information (suggested value is 30 seconds but to
   be checked in the actual set-up) and stored for later use.

   This is an important source of information because it is trivial (on
   a switch not using the SAVI [RFC7039] algorithm) to defeat the
   mapping between data-link layer address and IPv6 address.  Let us
   rephrase the previous statement: having access to the current and
   past content of the neighbor cache has a paramount value for forensic
   and audit trail.

   When using one /64 per host (Section 2.1.7) or DHCP-PD, it is
   sufficient to keep the history of the allocated prefixes when

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   combined with strict source address prefix enforcement on the routers
   and layer-2 switches to prevent IPv6 spoofing.  Stateful DHCPv6 Lease

   In some networks, IPv6 addresses/prefixes are managed by a stateful
   DHCPv6 server [RFC8415] that leases IPv6 addresses/prefixes to
   clients.  It is indeed quite similar to DHCP for IPv4 so it can be
   tempting to use this DHCP lease file to discover the mapping between
   IPv6 addresses/prefixes and data-link layer addresses as it was
   usually done in the IPv4 era.

   It is not so easy in the IPv6 era because not all nodes will use
   DHCPv6 (there are nodes which can only do stateless
   autoconfiguration) but also because DHCPv6 clients are identified not
   by their hardware-client address as in IPv4 but by a DHCP Unique ID
   (DUID) which can have several formats: some being the data-link layer
   address, some being data-link layer address prepended with time
   information or even an opaque number which is useless for operation
   security.  Moreover, when the DUID is based on the data-link address,
   this address can be of any interface of the client (such as the
   wireless interface while the client actually uses its wired interface
   to connect to the network).

   If a lightweight DHCP relay agent [RFC6221] is used in the layer-2
   switches, then the DHCP server also receives the Interface-ID
   information which could be saved in order to identify the interface
   of the switches which received a specific leased IPv6 address.  Also,
   if a 'normal' (not lightweight) relay agent adds the data-link layer
   address in the option for Relay Agent Remote-ID [RFC4649] or
   [RFC6939], then the DHCPv6 server can keep track of the data-link and
   leased IPv6 addresses.

   In short, the DHCPv6 lease file is less interesting than in the IPv4
   era.  If possible, it is recommended to use DHCPv6 servers that keep
   the relayed data-link layer address in addition to the DUID in the
   lease file as those servers have the equivalent information to IPv4
   DHCP servers.

   The mapping between data-link layer address and the IPv6 address can
   be secured by using switches implementing the SAVI [RFC7513]
   algorithms.  Of course, this also requires that data-link layer
   address is protected by using layer-2 mechanism such as

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   For interfaces where the user is authenticated via a RADIUS [RFC2866]
   server, and if RADIUS accounting is enabled, then the RADIUS server
   receives accounting Acct-Status-Type records at the start and at the
   end of the connection which include all IPv6 (and IPv4) addresses
   used by the user.  This technique can be used notably for Wi-Fi
   networks with Wi-Fi Protected Address (WPA) or any other IEEE 802.1X
   [IEEE-802.1X] wired interface on an Ethernet switch.  Other Data Sources

   There are other data sources that must be kept as in the IPv4

   o  historical mapping of IPv6 addresses to users of remote access

   o  historical mapping of MAC address to switch interface in a wired

2.6.2.  Use of Collected Data

   This section leverages the data collected as described before
   (Section 2.6.1) in order to achieve several security benefits.
   Section 9.1 of [RFC7934] contains more details about host tracking.  Forensic and User Accountability

   The forensic use case is when the network operator must locate an
   IPv6 address that was present in the network at a certain time or is
   still currently in the network.

   To locate an IPv6 address in an enterprise network where the operator
   has control over all resources, the source of information can be, in
   decreasing order, neighbor cache, DHCP lease file.  Then, the
   procedure is:

   1.  based on the IPv6 prefix of the IPv6 address, find the router(s)
       which is(are) used to reach this prefix (assuming that anti-
       spoofing mechanisms are used);

   2.  based on this limited set of routers, on the incident time and on
       the IPv6 address, retrieve the data-link address from live
       neighbor cache, from the historical data of the neighbor cache or
       from SAVI events, or retrieve the data-link address from the DHCP
       lease file (Section;

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   3.  based on the data-link layer address, look-up on which switch
       interface was this data-link layer address.  In the case of
       wireless LAN with RADIUS accounting (see Section, the
       RADIUS log has the mapping between the user identification and
       the MAC address.  If a Configuration Management Data Base (CMDB)
       is used, then it can be used to map the data-link layer address
       to a switch port.

   At the end of the process, the interface the host originating
   malicious activity or the username which was abused for malicious
   activity has been determined.

   To identify the subscriber of an IPv6 address in a residential
   Internet Service Provider, the starting point is the DHCP-PD leased
   prefix covering the IPv6 address; this prefix can often be linked to
   a subscriber via the RADIUS log.  Alternatively, the Forwarding
   Information Base of the CMTS or BNG indicates the CPE of the
   subscriber and the RADIUS log can be used to retrieve the actual

   More generally, a mix of the above techniques can be used in most if
   not all networks.  Inventory

   RFC 7707 [RFC7707] is about the difficulties for an attacker to scan
   an IPv6 network due to the vast number of IPv6 addresses per link
   (and why in some case it can still be done).  While the huge
   addressing space can sometime be perceived as a 'protection', it also
   make the inventory task difficult in an IPv6 network while it was
   trivial to do in an IPv4 network (a simple enumeration of all IPv4
   addresses, followed by a ping and a TCP/UDP port scan).  Getting an
   inventory of all connected devices is of prime importance for a
   secure operation of a network.

   There are many ways to do an inventory of an IPv6 network.

   The first technique is to use the IPfix information and extract the
   list of all IPv6 source addresses to find all IPv6 nodes that sent
   packets through a router.  This is very efficient but alas will not
   discover silent node that never transmitted such packets.  Also, it
   must be noted that link-local addresses will never be discovered by
   this means.

   The second way is again to use the collected neighbor cache content
   to find all IPv6 addresses in the cache.  This process will also
   discover all link-local addresses.  See Section

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   Another way works only for local network, it consists in sending a
   ICMP ECHO_REQUEST to the link-local multicast address ff02::1 which
   is all IPv6 nodes on the network.  All nodes should reply to this
   ECHO_REQUEST per [RFC4443].

   Other techniques involve obtaining data from DNS, parsing log files,
   leveraging service discovery such as mDNS [RFC6762] and [RFC6763].

   Enumerating DNS zones, especially looking at reverse DNS records and
   CNAMES, is another common method employed by various tools.  As
   already mentioned in [RFC7707], this allows an attacker to prune the
   IPv6 reverse DNS tree, and hence enumerate it in a feasible time.
   Furthermore, authoritative servers that allow zone transfers (AXFR)
   may be a further information source.  Correlation

   In an IPv4 network, it is easy to correlate multiple logs, for
   example to find events related to a specific IPv4 address.  A simple
   Unix grep command was enough to scan through multiple text-based
   files and extract all lines relevant to a specific IPv4 address.

   In an IPv6 network, this is slightly more difficult because different
   character strings can express the same IPv6 address.  Therefore, the
   simple Unix grep command cannot be used.  Moreover, an IPv6 node can
   have multiple IPv6 addresses.

   In order to do correlation in IPv6-related logs, it is advised to
   have all logs in a format with only canonical IPv6 addresses.  Then,
   the neighbor cache current (or historical) data set must be searched
   to find the data-link layer address of the IPv6 address.  Then, the
   current and historical neighbor cache data sets must be searched for
   all IPv6 addresses associated to this data-link layer address: this
   is the search set.  The last step is to search in all log files
   (containing only IPv6 address in canonical format) for any IPv6
   addresses in the search set.

   Moreover, [RFC7934] recommends using multiple IPv6 addresses per
   prefix, so, the correlation must also be done among those multiple
   IPv6 addresses, for example by discovering in the NDP cache
   (Section all IPv6 addresses associated with the same MAC
   address and interface.  Abnormal Behavior Detection

   Abnormal behaviors (such as network scanning, spamming, denial of
   service) can be detected in the same way as in an IPv4 network

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   o  sudden increase of traffic detected by interface counter (SNMP) or
      by aggregated traffic from IPfix records [RFC7012];

   o  change of traffic pattern (number of connection per second, number
      of connection per host...) with the use of IPfix [RFC7012]

2.6.3.  Summary

   While some data sources (IPfix, MIB, switch CAM tables, logs, ...)
   used in IPv4 are also used in the secure operation of an IPv6
   network, the DHCPv6 lease file is less reliable and the neighbor
   cache is of prime importance.

   The fact that there are multiple ways to express in a character
   string the same IPv6 address renders the use of filters mandatory
   when correlation must be done.

2.7.  Transition/Coexistence Technologies

   As it is expected that some networks will not run in a pure IPv6-only
   way, the different transition mechanisms must be deployed and
   operated in a secure way.  This section proposes operational
   guidelines for the most known and deployed transition techniques.

2.7.1.  Dual Stack

   Dual stack is often the first deployment choice for network
   operators.  Dual stacking the network offers some advantages over
   other transition mechanisms.  Firstly, the impact on existing IPv4
   operations is reduced.  Secondly, in the absence of tunnels or
   address translation, the IPv4 and IPv6 traffics are native (easier to
   observe and secure) and should have the same network processing
   (network path, quality of service, ...).  Dual stack enables a
   gradual turn off of the IPv4 operations when the IPv6 network is
   ready for prime time.  On the other hand, the operators have to
   manage two network stacks with the added complexities.

   From an operational security perspective, this now means that you
   have twice the exposure.  One needs to think about protecting both
   protocols now.  At a minimum, the IPv6 portion of a dual stacked
   network should maintain parity with IPv4 from a security policy point
   of view.  Typically, the following methods are employed to protect
   IPv4 networks at the edge or security perimeter:

   o  ACLs to permit or deny traffic;

   o  Firewalls with stateful packet inspection.

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   It is recommended that these ACLs and/or firewalls be additionally
   configured to protect IPv6 communications.  The enforced IPv6
   security must be congruent with the IPv4 security policy, else the
   attacker will use the protocol version having the more relax security
   policy.  Maintaining the congruence between security policies can be
   challenging (especially over time); it is recommended to use a
   firewall or an ACL manager that is dual-stack, i.e., a system that
   can apply a single ACL entry to a mixed group of IPv4 and IPv6

   Also, given the end-to-end connectivity that IPv6 provides, it is
   recommended that hosts be fortified against threats.  General device
   hardening guidelines are provided in Section 2.8.

   For many years, all host operating systems have IPv6 enabled by
   default, so, it is possible even in an 'IPv4-only' network to attack
   layer-2 adjacent victims over their IPv6 link-local address or over a
   global IPv6 address when the attacker provides rogue RAs or a rogue
   DHCPv6 service.

2.7.2.  Encapsulation Mechanisms

   There are many tunnels used for specific use cases.  Except when
   protected by IPsec [RFC4301], all those tunnels have a couple of
   security issues as described in RFC 6169 [RFC6169];

   o  tunnel injection: a malevolent person knowing a few pieces of
      information (for example the tunnel endpoints and the used
      protocol) can forge a packet which looks like a legit and valid
      encapsulated packet that will gladly be accepted by the
      destination tunnel endpoint, this is a specific case of spoofing;

   o  traffic interception: no confidentiality is provided by the tunnel
      protocols (without the use of IPsec or alternative encryption
      methods), therefore anybody on the tunnel path can intercept the
      traffic and have access to the clear-text IPv6 packet; combined
      with the absence of authentication, a man in the middle attack can
      also be mounted;

   o  service theft: as there is no authorization, even a non-authorized
      user can use a tunnel relay for free (this is a specific case of
      tunnel injection);

   o  reflection attack: another specific use case of tunnel injection
      where the attacker injects packets with an IPv4 destination
      address not matching the IPv6 address causing the first tunnel
      endpoint to re-encapsulate the packet to the destination... Hence,

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      the final IPv4 destination will not see the original IPv4 address
      but only one IPv4 address of the relay router.

   o  bypassing security policy: if a firewall or an IPS is on the path
      of the tunnel, then it may neither inspect nor detect an
      malevolent IPv6 traffic contained in the tunnel.

   To mitigate the bypassing of security policies, it is recommended to
   block all default configuration tunnels by denying IPv4 packets

   o  IP protocol 41: this will block ISATAP (Section, 6to4
      (Section, 6rd (Section as well as 6in4
      (Section tunnels;

   o  IP protocol 47: this will block GRE (Section tunnels;

   o  UDP protocol 3544: this will block the default encapsulation of
      Teredo (Section tunnels.  Teredo is now mostly never used
      and it is no more automated in most environment, so, it is less of
      a threat, however, special consideration must be taken in case of
      devices with older or non-updated operating systems may be
      present, which by default were running Teredo.

   Ingress filtering [RFC2827] should also be applied on all tunnel
   endpoints if applicable to prevent IPv6 address spoofing.

   As several of the tunnel techniques share the same encapsulation
   (i.e.  IPv4 protocol 41) and embed the IPv4 address in the IPv6
   address, there are a set of well-known looping attacks described in
   RFC 6324 [RFC6324], this RFC also proposes mitigation techniques.  Site-to-Site Static Tunnels

   Site-to-site static tunnels are described in RFC 2529 [RFC2529] and
   in GRE [RFC2784].  As the IPv4 endpoints are statically configured
   and are not dynamic they are slightly more secure (bi-directional
   service theft is mostly impossible) but traffic interception and
   tunnel injection are still possible.  Therefore, the use of IPsec
   [RFC4301] in transport mode and protecting the encapsulated IPv4
   packets is recommended for those tunnels.  Alternatively, IPsec in
   tunnel mode can be used to transport IPv6 traffic over a non-trusted
   IPv4 network.

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   ISATAP tunnels [RFC5214] are mainly used within a single
   administrative domain and to connect a single IPv6 host to the IPv6
   network.  This often implies that those systems are usually managed
   by a single entity; therefore, audit trail and strict anti-spoofing
   are usually possible and this raises the overall security.

   Special care must be taken to avoid looping attack by implementing
   the measures of RFC 6324 [RFC6324] and of [RFC6964].

   IPsec [RFC4301] in transport or tunnel mode can be used to secure the
   IPv4 ISATAP traffic to provide IPv6 traffic confidentiality and
   prevent service theft.  6rd

   While 6rd tunnels share the same encapsulation as 6to4 tunnels
   (Section, they are designed to be used within a single SP
   domain, in other words they are deployed in a more constrained
   environment than 6to4 tunnels and have little security issues except
   lack of confidentiality.  The security considerations (Section 12) of
   [RFC5969] describes how to secure the 6rd tunnels.

   IPsec [RFC4301] for the transported IPv6 traffic can be used if
   confidentiality is important.  6PE, 6VPE, and LDPv6

   Organizations using MPLS in their core can also use 6PE [RFC4798] and
   6VPE [RFC4659] to enable IPv6 access over MPLS.  As 6PE and 6VPE are
   really similar to BGP/MPLS IP VPN described in [RFC4364], the
   security of these networks is also similar to the one described in
   [RFC4381].  It relies on:

   o  Address space, routing and traffic separation with the help of
      VRFs (only applicable to 6VPE);

   o  Hiding the IPv4 core, hence removing all attacks against

   o  Securing the routing protocol between CE and PE; in the case of
      6PE and 6VPE, link-local addresses (see [RFC7404]) can be used and
      as these addresses cannot be reached from outside of the link, the
      security of 6PE and 6VPE is even higher than the IPv4 BGP/MPLS IP

   LDPv6 itself does not induce new risks, see also [RFC7552].

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Internet-Draft                 OPsec IPv6                  November 2019  DS-Lite

   DS-lite is also a translation mechanism and is therefore analyzed
   further (Section in this document.  Mapping of Address and Port

   With the encapsulation and translation versions of mapping of Address
   and Port (MAP-E [RFC7597] and MAP-T [RFC7599]), the access network is
   purely an IPv6 network and MAP protocols are used to give IPv4 hosts
   on the subscriber network access to IPv4 hosts on the Internet.  The
   subscriber router does stateful operations in order to map all
   internal IPv4 addresses and layer-4 ports to the IPv4 address and the
   set of layer-4 ports received through MAP configuration process.  The
   SP equipment always does stateless operations (either decapsulation
   or stateless translation).  Therefore, as opposed to Section
   there is no state-exhaustion DoS attack against the SP equipment
   because there is no state and there is no operation caused by a new
   layer-4 connection (no logging operation).

   The SP MAP equipment should implement all the security considerations
   of [RFC7597]; notably, ensuring that the mapping of the IPv4 address
   and port are consistent with the configuration.  As MAP has a
   predictable IPv4 address and port mapping, the audit logs are easier
   to manage.  6to4

   6to4 tunnels [RFC3056] require a public routable IPv4 address in
   order to work correctly.  They can be used to provide either one IPv6
   host connectivity to the IPv6 Internet or multiple IPv6 networks
   connectivity to the IPv6 Internet.  The 6to4 relay was historically
   the anycast address defined in [RFC3068] which has been deprecated by
   [RFC7526] and is no more used by recent Operating Systems.  Some
   security considerations are explained in [RFC3964].

   [RFC6343] points out that if an operator provides well-managed
   servers and relays for 6to4, non-encapsulated IPv6 packets will pass
   through well- defined points (the native IPv6 interfaces of those
   servers and relays) at which security mechanisms may be applied.
   Client usage of 6to4 by default is now discouraged, and significant
   precautions are needed to avoid operational problems.  Teredo

   Teredo tunnels [RFC4380] are mainly used in a residential environment
   because Teredo easily traverses an IPv4 NAPT device thanks to its UDP
   encapsulation.  Teredo tunnels connect a single host to the IPv6

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   Internet.  Teredo shares the same issues as other tunnels: no
   authentication, no confidentiality, possible spoofing and reflection

   IPsec [RFC4301] for the transported IPv6 traffic is recommended.

   The biggest threat to Teredo is probably for IPv4-only network as
   Teredo has been designed to easily traverse IPV4 NAT-PT devices which
   are quite often co-located with a stateful firewall.  Therefore, if
   the stateful IPv4 firewall allows unrestricted UDP outbound and
   accept the return UDP traffic, then Teredo actually punches a hole in
   this firewall for all IPv6 traffic to the Internet and from the
   Internet.  While host policies can be deployed to block Teredo in an
   IPv4-only network in order to avoid this firewall bypass, it would be
   enough to block all UDP outbound traffic at the IPv4 firewall if
   deemed possible (of course, at least port 53 should be left open for
   DNS traffic).

   Teredo is now mostly never used and no more enabled by default in
   most environment, so, it is less of a threat, however, special
   consideration must be taken in case of devices with older or non-
   updated operating systems may be present, which by default were
   running Teredo.

2.7.3.  Translation Mechanisms

   Translation mechanisms between IPv4 and IPv6 networks are alternate
   coexistence strategies while networks transition to IPv6.  While a
   framework is described in [RFC6144] the specific security
   considerations are documented in each individual mechanism.  For the
   most part they specifically mention interference with IPsec or DNSSEC
   deployments, how to mitigate spoofed traffic and what some effective
   filtering strategies may be.

   While not really a transition mechanism to IPv6, this section also
   includes the discussion about the use of heavy IPv4 to IPv4 network
   address and port translation to prolong the life of IPv4-only
   network.  Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN)

   Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN), also called NAT444 CGN or Large Scale NAT
   (LSN) or SP NAT is described in [RFC6264] and is utilized as an
   interim measure to prolong the use of IPv4 in a large service
   provider network until the provider can deploy and effective IPv6
   solution.  [RFC6598] requested a specific IANA allocated /10 IPv4
   address block to be used as address space shared by all access
   networks using CGN.  This has been allocated as

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   Section 13 of [RFC6269] lists some specific security-related issues
   caused by large scale address sharing.  The Security Considerations
   section of [RFC6598] also lists some specific mitigation techniques
   for potential misuse of shared address space.  Some Law Enforcement
   Agencies have identified CGN as impeding their cyber-crime
   investigations (for example Europol press release on CGN
   [europol-cgn]).  Many translation techniques (NAT64, DS-lite, ...)
   have the same security issues as CGN when one part of the connection
   is IPv4-only.

   [RFC6302] has recommendations for Internet-facing servers to also log
   the source TCP or UDP ports of incoming connections in an attempt to
   help identify the users behind such a CGN.

   [RFC7422] suggests the use of deterministic address mapping in order
   to reduce logging requirements for CGN.  The idea is to have an
   algorithm mapping back and forth the internal subscriber to public
   ports.  NAT64/DNS64 and 464XLAT

   Stateful NAT64 translation [RFC6146] allows IPv6-only clients to
   contact IPv4 servers using unicast UDP, TCP, or ICMP.  It can be used
   in conjunction with DNS64 [RFC6147], a mechanism which synthesizes
   AAAA records from existing A records.  There is also a stateless
   NAT64 [RFC7915] which is similar for the security aspects with the
   added benefit of being stateless, so, less prone to a state
   exhaustion attack.

   The Security Consideration sections of [RFC6146] and [RFC6147] list
   the comprehensive issues.  A specific issue with the use of NAT64 is
   that it will interfere with most IPsec deployments unless UDP
   encapsulation is used.  DNSSEC has an impact on DNS64 see section 3.1
   of [RFC7050].

   Another translation mechanism relying on a combination of stateful
   and stateless translation, 464XLAT [RFC6877], can be used to do host
   local translation from IPv4 to IPv6 and a network provider
   translation from IPv6 to IPv4, i.e., giving IPv4-only application
   access to IPv4-only server over an IPv6-only network. 464XLAT shares
   the same security considerations as NAT64 and DNS64, however it can
   be used without DNS64, avoiding the DNSSEC implications.  DS-Lite

   Dual-Stack Lite (DS-Lite) [RFC6333] is a transition technique that
   enables a service provider to share IPv4 addresses among customers by

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   combining two well-known technologies: IP in IP (IPv4-in-IPv6) and
   Network Address and Port Translation (NAPT).

   Security considerations with respect to DS-Lite mainly revolve around
   logging data, preventing DoS attacks from rogue devices (as the
   Address Family Translation Router, AFTR [RFC6333] function is
   stateful) and restricting service offered by the AFTR only to
   registered customers.

   Section 11 of [RFC6333] describes important security issues
   associated with this technology.

2.8.  General Device Hardening

   There are many environments which rely on the network infrastructure
   to disallow malicious traffic to get access to critical hosts.  In
   new IPv6 deployments it has been common to see IPv6 traffic enabled
   but none of the typical access control mechanisms enabled for IPv6
   device access.  With the possibility of network device configuration
   mistakes and the growth of IPv6 in the overall Internet it is
   important to ensure that all individual devices are hardened against
   miscreant behavior.

   The following guidelines should be used to ensure appropriate
   hardening of the host, be it an individual computer or router,
   firewall, load-balancer, server, etc. device.

   o  Restrict access to the device to authorized individuals

   o  Monitor and audit access to the device

   o  Turn off any unused services on the end node

   o  Understand which IPv6 addresses are being used to source traffic
      and change defaults if necessary

   o  Use cryptographically protected protocols for device management if
      possible (SCP, SNMPv3, SSH, TLS, etc.)

   o  Use host firewall capabilities to control traffic that gets
      processed by upper layer protocols

   o  Use virus scanners to detect malicious programs

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3.  Enterprises Specific Security Considerations

   Enterprises generally have robust network security policies in place
   to protect existing IPv4 networks.  These policies have been
   distilled from years of experiential knowledge of securing IPv4
   networks.  At the very least, it is recommended that enterprise
   networks have parity between their security policies for both
   protocol versions.  This section also applies to the enterprise part
   of all ISP, i.e., the part of the network where the ISP employees are

   Security considerations in the enterprise can be broadly categorized
   into two sections - External and Internal.

3.1.  External Security Considerations:

   The external aspect deals with providing security at the edge or
   perimeter of the enterprise network where it meets the service
   providers network.  This is commonly achieved by enforcing a security
   policy either by implementing dedicated firewalls with stateful
   packet inspection or a router with ACLs.  A common default IPv4
   policy on firewalls that could easily be ported to IPv6 is to allow
   all traffic outbound while only allowing specific traffic, such as
   established sessions, inbound (see also [RFC6092]).  Here are a few
   more things that could enhance the default policy:

   o  Filter internal-use IPv6 addresses at the perimeter

   o  Discard packets from and to bogon and reserved space, see also
      [CYMRU] and [RFC8190]

   o  Accept certain ICMPv6 messages to allow proper operation of ND and
      PMTUD, see also [RFC4890] or [REY_PF] for hosts

   o  Filter specific extension headers by accepting only the required
      ones (white list approach) such as ESP, AH (not forgetting the
      required transport layers: ICMP, TCP, UDP, ...), where possible at
      the edge and possibly inside the perimeter; see also

   o  Filter packets having an illegal IPv6 headers chain at the
      perimeter (and if possible, inside the network as well), see
      Section 2.2

   o  Filter unneeded services at the perimeter

   o  Implement ingress and egress anti-spoofing in the forwarding and
      control planes

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   o  Implement appropriate rate-limiters and control-plane policers

3.2.  Internal Security Considerations:

   The internal aspect deals with providing security inside the
   perimeter of the network, including the end host.  The most
   significant concerns here are related to Neighbor Discovery.  At the
   network level, it is recommended that all security considerations
   discussed in Section 2.3 be reviewed carefully and the
   recommendations be considered in-depth as well.

   As mentioned in Section 2.6.2, care must be taken when running
   automated IPv6-in-IP4 tunnels.

   When site-to-site VPNs are used it should be kept in mind that, given
   the global scope of IPv6 global addresses as opposed to the common
   use of IPv4 private address space [RFC1918], sites might be able to
   communicate with each other over the Internet even when the VPN
   mechanism is not available and hence no traffic encryption is
   performed and traffic could be injected from the Internet into the
   site, see [WEBER_VPN].  It is recommended to filter at the Internet
   connection(s) packets having a source or destination address
   belonging to the site internal prefix(es); this should be done for
   ingress and egress traffic.

   Hosts need to be hardened directly through security policy to protect
   against security threats.  The host firewall default capabilities
   have to be clearly understood.  In some cases, 3rd party firewalls
   have no IPv6 support whereas the native firewall installed by default
   has IPv6 support.  General device hardening guidelines are provided
   in xxref target="device"/>

   It should also be noted that many hosts still use IPv4 for
   transporting logs for RADIUS, TACACS+, SYSLOG, etc.  Operators cannot
   rely on an IPv6-only security policy to secure such protocols that
   are still using IP4.

4.  Service Providers Security Considerations

4.1.  BGP

   The threats and mitigation techniques are identical between IPv4 and
   IPv6.  Broadly speaking they are:

   o  Authenticating the TCP session;

   o  TTL security (which becomes hop-limit security in IPv6) as

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   o  bogon AS filtering;

   o  Prefix filtering.

   These are explained in more detail in Section 2.5.  Also, the
   recommendations of [RFC7454] should be considered.

4.1.1.  Remote Triggered Black Hole Filtering

   RTBH [RFC5635] works identically in IPv4 and IPv6.  IANA has
   allocated the 100::/64 prefix to be used as the discard prefix

4.2.  Transition/Coexistence Mechanism

   SP will typically use transition mechanisms such as 6rd, 6PE, MAP,
   NAT64 which have been analyzed in the transition and coexistence i
   (Section 2.7).

4.3.  Lawful Intercept

   The Lawful Intercept requirements are similar for IPv6 and IPv4
   architectures and will be subject to the laws enforced in varying
   geographic regions.  The local issues with each jurisdiction can make
   this challenging and both corporate legal and privacy personnel
   should be involved in discussions pertaining to what information gets
   logged and what the logging retention policies will be.

   The target of interception will usually be a residential subscriber
   (e.g. his/her PPP session or physical line or CPE MAC address).  With
   the absence of IPv6 NAT on the CPE, IPv6 has the possibility to allow
   for intercepting the traffic from a single host (a /128 target)
   rather than the whole set of hosts of a subscriber (which could be a
   /48, a /60 or /64).

   In contrast, in mobile environments, since the 3GPP specifications
   allocate a /64 per device, it may be sufficient to intercept traffic
   from the /64 rather than specific /128's (since each time the device
   powers up it gets a new IID).

   A sample architecture which was written for informational purposes is
   found in [RFC3924].

5.  Residential Users Security Considerations

   The IETF Homenet working group is working on how IPv6 residential
   network should be done; this obviously includes operational security
   considerations; but this is still work in progress.

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   Some residential users have less experience and knowledge about
   security or networking.  As most of the recent hosts, smartphones,
   tablets have all IPv6 enabled by default, IPv6 security is important
   for those users.  Even with an IPv4-only ISP, those users can get
   IPv6 Internet access with the help of Teredo tunnels.  Several peer-
   to-peer programs support IPv6 and those programs can initiate a
   Teredo tunnel through the IPv4 residential gateway, with the
   consequence of making the internal host reachable from any IPv6 host
   on the Internet.  It is therefore recommended that all host security
   products (including personal firewalls) are configured with a dual-
   stack security policy.

   If the residential CPE has IPv6 connectivity, [RFC7084] defines the
   requirements of an IPv6 CPE and does not take position on the debate
   of default IPv6 security policy as defined in [RFC6092]:

   o  outbound only: allowing all internally initiated connections and
      block all externally initiated ones, which is a common default
      security policy enforced by IPv4 Residential Gateway doing NAT-PT
      but it also breaks the end-to-end reachability promise of IPv6.
      [RFC6092] lists several recommendations to design such a CPE;

   o  open/transparent: allowing all internally and externally initiated
      connections, therefore restoring the end-to-end nature of the
      Internet for the IPv6 traffic but having a different security
      policy for IPv6 than for IPv4.

   [RFC6092] REC-49 states that a choice must be given to the user to
   select one of those two policies.

   There is also an alternate solution which has been deployed notably
   by Swisscom: open to all outbound and inbound connections at the
   exception of a handful of TCP and UDP ports known as vulnerable.

6.  Further Reading

   There are several documents that describe in more details the
   security of an IPv6 network; these documents are not written by the
   IETF and some of them are dated but are listed here for your

   1.  Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6 [NIST]

   2.  North American IPv6 Task Force Technology Report - IPv6 Security
       Technology Paper [NAv6TF_Security]

   3.  IPv6 Security [IPv6_Security_Book]

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7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank the following people for their useful
   comments: Mikael Abrahamsson, Fred Baker, Mustafa Suha Botsali, Brian
   Carpenter, Tim Chown, Lorenzo Colitti, Markus de Bruen, Tobias
   Fiebig, Fernando Gont, Jeffry Handal, Lee Howard, Panos Kampanakis,
   Erik Kline, Jouni Korhonen, Warren Kumari, Mark Lentczner, Jen
   Linkova (and her detailed review), Gyan S.  Mishra, Jordi Palet, Bob
   Sleigh, Donal Smith, Tarko Tikan, Ole Troan, Bernie Volz (by
   alphabetical order).

8.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

9.  Security Considerations

   This memo attempts to give an overview of security considerations of
   operating an IPv6 network both in an IPv6-only network and in
   utilizing the most widely deployed IPv4/IPv6 coexistence strategies.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8200]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,

10.2.  Informative References

   [CYMRU]    "Packet Filter and Route Filter Recommendation for IPv6 at
              xSP routers", <http://www.team-

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              October 2017,

              Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., Thubert, P., and M.
              Wasserman, "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Optimizations for
              Wired and Wireless Networks", draft-chakrabarti-nordmark-
              6man-efficient-nd-07 (work in progress), February 2015.

              Gont, F. and W. LIU, "Recommendations on the Filtering of
              IPv6 Packets Containing IPv6 Extension Headers", draft-
              ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-06 (work in progress), July

              Kampanakis, P., "Implementation Guidelines for parsing
              IPv6 Extension Headers", draft-kampanakis-6man-ipv6-eh-
              parsing-01 (work in progress), August 2014.

              Thubert, P., "Throttling RAs on constrained interfaces",
              draft-thubert-savi-ra-throttler-01 (work in progress),
              June 2012.

              IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area
              networks - Port-Based Network Access Control", IEEE Std
              802.1X-2010, February 2010.

              Hogg, S. and E. Vyncke, "IPv6 Security",
              ISBN 1-58705-594-5, Publisher CiscoPress, December 2008.

              Kaeo, M., Green, D., Bound, J., and Y. Pouffary, "North
              American IPv6 Task Force Technology Report - IPv6 Security
              Technology Paper", 2006,

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Internet-Draft                 OPsec IPv6                  November 2019

   [NIST]     Frankel, S., Graveman, R., Pearce, J., and M. Rooks,
              "Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6", 2010,

   [REY_PF]   Rey, E., "Local Packet Filtering with IPv6", July 2017,

   [RFC0826]  Plummer, D., "An Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
              Converting Network Protocol Addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
              Address for Transmission on Ethernet Hardware", STD 37,
              RFC 826, DOI 10.17487/RFC0826, November 1982,

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
              and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,

   [RFC2131]  Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
              RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,

   [RFC2460]  Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
              (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, DOI 10.17487/RFC2460,
              December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2460>.

   [RFC2529]  Carpenter, B. and C. Jung, "Transmission of IPv6 over IPv4
              Domains without Explicit Tunnels", RFC 2529,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2529, March 1999,

   [RFC2784]  Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
              Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)", RFC 2784,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2784, March 2000,

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
              May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.

   [RFC2866]  Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2866, June 2000,

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   [RFC3056]  Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
              via IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, DOI 10.17487/RFC3056, February
              2001, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3056>.

   [RFC3068]  Huitema, C., "An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers",
              RFC 3068, DOI 10.17487/RFC3068, June 2001,

   [RFC3627]  Savola, P., "Use of /127 Prefix Length Between Routers
              Considered Harmful", RFC 3627, DOI 10.17487/RFC3627,
              September 2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3627>.

   [RFC3756]  Nikander, P., Ed., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6
              Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats",
              RFC 3756, DOI 10.17487/RFC3756, May 2004,

   [RFC3924]  Baker, F., Foster, B., and C. Sharp, "Cisco Architecture
              for Lawful Intercept in IP Networks", RFC 3924,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3924, October 2004,

   [RFC3964]  Savola, P. and C. Patel, "Security Considerations for
              6to4", RFC 3964, DOI 10.17487/RFC3964, December 2004,

   [RFC3971]  Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
              "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005,

   [RFC3972]  Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
              RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005,

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,

   [RFC4293]  Routhier, S., Ed., "Management Information Base for the
              Internet Protocol (IP)", RFC 4293, DOI 10.17487/RFC4293,
              April 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4293>.

   [RFC4301]  Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
              Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
              December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.

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   [RFC4302]  Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", RFC 4302,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4302, December 2005,

   [RFC4303]  Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
              RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,

   [RFC4364]  Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
              Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>.

   [RFC4380]  Huitema, C., "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
              Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4380, February 2006,

   [RFC4381]  Behringer, M., "Analysis of the Security of BGP/MPLS IP
              Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4381,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4381, February 2006,

   [RFC4443]  Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, Ed., "Internet
              Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
              Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 89,
              RFC 4443, DOI 10.17487/RFC4443, March 2006,

   [RFC4552]  Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality
              for OSPFv3", RFC 4552, DOI 10.17487/RFC4552, June 2006,

   [RFC4649]  Volz, B., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
              (DHCPv6) Relay Agent Remote-ID Option", RFC 4649,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4649, August 2006,

   [RFC4659]  De Clercq, J., Ooms, D., Carugi, M., and F. Le Faucheur,
              "BGP-MPLS IP Virtual Private Network (VPN) Extension for
              IPv6 VPN", RFC 4659, DOI 10.17487/RFC4659, September 2006,

   [RFC4798]  De Clercq, J., Ooms, D., Prevost, S., and F. Le Faucheur,
              "Connecting IPv6 Islands over IPv4 MPLS Using IPv6
              Provider Edge Routers (6PE)", RFC 4798,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4798, February 2007,

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   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,

   [RFC4864]  Van de Velde, G., Hain, T., Droms, R., Carpenter, B., and
              E. Klein, "Local Network Protection for IPv6", RFC 4864,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4864, May 2007,

   [RFC4890]  Davies, E. and J. Mohacsi, "Recommendations for Filtering
              ICMPv6 Messages in Firewalls", RFC 4890,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4890, May 2007,

   [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
              Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
              IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,

   [RFC4942]  Davies, E., Krishnan, S., and P. Savola, "IPv6 Transition/
              Co-existence Security Considerations", RFC 4942,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4942, September 2007,

   [RFC5082]  Gill, V., Heasley, J., Meyer, D., Savola, P., Ed., and C.
              Pignataro, "The Generalized TTL Security Mechanism
              (GTSM)", RFC 5082, DOI 10.17487/RFC5082, October 2007,

   [RFC5214]  Templin, F., Gleeson, T., and D. Thaler, "Intra-Site
              Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)", RFC 5214,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5214, March 2008,

   [RFC5340]  Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem, "OSPF
              for IPv6", RFC 5340, DOI 10.17487/RFC5340, July 2008,

   [RFC5635]  Kumari, W. and D. McPherson, "Remote Triggered Black Hole
              Filtering with Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)",
              RFC 5635, DOI 10.17487/RFC5635, August 2009,

   [RFC5952]  Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
              Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,

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   [RFC5969]  Townsley, W. and O. Troan, "IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4
              Infrastructures (6rd) -- Protocol Specification",
              RFC 5969, DOI 10.17487/RFC5969, August 2010,

   [RFC6092]  Woodyatt, J., Ed., "Recommended Simple Security
              Capabilities in Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) for
              Providing Residential IPv6 Internet Service", RFC 6092,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6092, January 2011,

   [RFC6104]  Chown, T. and S. Venaas, "Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement
              Problem Statement", RFC 6104, DOI 10.17487/RFC6104,
              February 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6104>.

   [RFC6105]  Levy-Abegnoli, E., Van de Velde, G., Popoviciu, C., and J.
              Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6105, February 2011,

   [RFC6144]  Baker, F., Li, X., Bao, C., and K. Yin, "Framework for
              IPv4/IPv6 Translation", RFC 6144, DOI 10.17487/RFC6144,
              April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6144>.

   [RFC6146]  Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. van Beijnum, "Stateful
              NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6
              Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, DOI 10.17487/RFC6146,
              April 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6146>.

   [RFC6147]  Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I. van
              Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address
              Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6147, April 2011,

   [RFC6164]  Kohno, M., Nitzan, B., Bush, R., Matsuzaki, Y., Colitti,
              L., and T. Narten, "Using 127-Bit IPv6 Prefixes on Inter-
              Router Links", RFC 6164, DOI 10.17487/RFC6164, April 2011,

   [RFC6169]  Krishnan, S., Thaler, D., and J. Hoagland, "Security
              Concerns with IP Tunneling", RFC 6169,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6169, April 2011,

   [RFC6192]  Dugal, D., Pignataro, C., and R. Dunn, "Protecting the
              Router Control Plane", RFC 6192, DOI 10.17487/RFC6192,
              March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6192>.

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   [RFC6221]  Miles, D., Ed., Ooghe, S., Dec, W., Krishnan, S., and A.
              Kavanagh, "Lightweight DHCPv6 Relay Agent", RFC 6221,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6221, May 2011,

   [RFC6241]  Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
              and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
              (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,

   [RFC6264]  Jiang, S., Guo, D., and B. Carpenter, "An Incremental
              Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN) for IPv6 Transition", RFC 6264,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6264, June 2011,

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Ed., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and
              P. Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6269, June 2011,

   [RFC6302]  Durand, A., Gashinsky, I., Lee, D., and S. Sheppard,
              "Logging Recommendations for Internet-Facing Servers",
              BCP 162, RFC 6302, DOI 10.17487/RFC6302, June 2011,

   [RFC6324]  Nakibly, G. and F. Templin, "Routing Loop Attack Using
              IPv6 Automatic Tunnels: Problem Statement and Proposed
              Mitigations", RFC 6324, DOI 10.17487/RFC6324, August 2011,

   [RFC6333]  Durand, A., Droms, R., Woodyatt, J., and Y. Lee, "Dual-
              Stack Lite Broadband Deployments Following IPv4
              Exhaustion", RFC 6333, DOI 10.17487/RFC6333, August 2011,

   [RFC6343]  Carpenter, B., "Advisory Guidelines for 6to4 Deployment",
              RFC 6343, DOI 10.17487/RFC6343, August 2011,

   [RFC6459]  Korhonen, J., Ed., Soininen, J., Patil, B., Savolainen,
              T., Bajko, G., and K. Iisakkila, "IPv6 in 3rd Generation
              Partnership Project (3GPP) Evolved Packet System (EPS)",
              RFC 6459, DOI 10.17487/RFC6459, January 2012,

   [RFC6547]  George, W., "RFC 3627 to Historic Status", RFC 6547,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6547, February 2012,

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   [RFC6564]  Krishnan, S., Woodyatt, J., Kline, E., Hoagland, J., and
              M. Bhatia, "A Uniform Format for IPv6 Extension Headers",
              RFC 6564, DOI 10.17487/RFC6564, April 2012,

   [RFC6583]  Gashinsky, I., Jaeggli, J., and W. Kumari, "Operational
              Neighbor Discovery Problems", RFC 6583,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6583, March 2012,

   [RFC6598]  Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
              M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
              Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.

   [RFC6620]  Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS
              SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation
              Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses",
              RFC 6620, DOI 10.17487/RFC6620, May 2012,

   [RFC6666]  Hilliard, N. and D. Freedman, "A Discard Prefix for IPv6",
              RFC 6666, DOI 10.17487/RFC6666, August 2012,

   [RFC6762]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6762, February 2013,

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,

   [RFC6877]  Mawatari, M., Kawashima, M., and C. Byrne, "464XLAT:
              Combination of Stateful and Stateless Translation",
              RFC 6877, DOI 10.17487/RFC6877, April 2013,

   [RFC6939]  Halwasia, G., Bhandari, S., and W. Dec, "Client Link-Layer
              Address Option in DHCPv6", RFC 6939, DOI 10.17487/RFC6939,
              May 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6939>.

   [RFC6964]  Templin, F., "Operational Guidance for IPv6 Deployment in
              IPv4 Sites Using the Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel
              Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)", RFC 6964,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6964, May 2013,

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   [RFC6980]  Gont, F., "Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation
              with IPv6 Neighbor Discovery", RFC 6980,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6980, August 2013,

   [RFC7011]  Claise, B., Ed., Trammell, B., Ed., and P. Aitken,
              "Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)
              Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77,
              RFC 7011, DOI 10.17487/RFC7011, September 2013,

   [RFC7012]  Claise, B., Ed. and B. Trammell, Ed., "Information Model
              for IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)", RFC 7012,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7012, September 2013,

   [RFC7039]  Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,
              "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework",
              RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, October 2013,

   [RFC7045]  Carpenter, B. and S. Jiang, "Transmission and Processing
              of IPv6 Extension Headers", RFC 7045,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7045, December 2013,

   [RFC7050]  Savolainen, T., Korhonen, J., and D. Wing, "Discovery of
              the IPv6 Prefix Used for IPv6 Address Synthesis",
              RFC 7050, DOI 10.17487/RFC7050, November 2013,

   [RFC7084]  Singh, H., Beebee, W., Donley, C., and B. Stark, "Basic
              Requirements for IPv6 Customer Edge Routers", RFC 7084,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7084, November 2013,

   [RFC7112]  Gont, F., Manral, V., and R. Bonica, "Implications of
              Oversized IPv6 Header Chains", RFC 7112,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7112, January 2014,

   [RFC7113]  Gont, F., "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
              Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7113, February 2014,

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   [RFC7166]  Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and A. Lindem, "Supporting
              Authentication Trailer for OSPFv3", RFC 7166,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7166, March 2014,

   [RFC7381]  Chittimaneni, K., Chown, T., Howard, L., Kuarsingh, V.,
              Pouffary, Y., and E. Vyncke, "Enterprise IPv6 Deployment
              Guidelines", RFC 7381, DOI 10.17487/RFC7381, October 2014,

   [RFC7404]  Behringer, M. and E. Vyncke, "Using Only Link-Local
              Addressing inside an IPv6 Network", RFC 7404,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7404, November 2014,

   [RFC7422]  Donley, C., Grundemann, C., Sarawat, V., Sundaresan, K.,
              and O. Vautrin, "Deterministic Address Mapping to Reduce
              Logging in Carrier-Grade NAT Deployments", RFC 7422,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7422, December 2014,

   [RFC7454]  Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
              and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
              February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.

   [RFC7513]  Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "Source Address
              Validation Improvement (SAVI) Solution for DHCP",
              RFC 7513, DOI 10.17487/RFC7513, May 2015,

   [RFC7526]  Troan, O. and B. Carpenter, Ed., "Deprecating the Anycast
              Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers", BCP 196, RFC 7526,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7526, May 2015,

   [RFC7552]  Asati, R., Pignataro, C., Raza, K., Manral, V., and R.
              Papneja, "Updates to LDP for IPv6", RFC 7552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7552, June 2015,

   [RFC7597]  Troan, O., Ed., Dec, W., Li, X., Bao, C., Matsushima, S.,
              Murakami, T., and T. Taylor, Ed., "Mapping of Address and
              Port with Encapsulation (MAP-E)", RFC 7597,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7597, July 2015,

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   [RFC7599]  Li, X., Bao, C., Dec, W., Ed., Troan, O., Matsushima, S.,
              and T. Murakami, "Mapping of Address and Port using
              Translation (MAP-T)", RFC 7599, DOI 10.17487/RFC7599, July
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7599>.

   [RFC7610]  Gont, F., Liu, W., and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-Shield:
              Protecting against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", BCP 199,
              RFC 7610, DOI 10.17487/RFC7610, August 2015,

   [RFC7707]  Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6
              Networks", RFC 7707, DOI 10.17487/RFC7707, March 2016,

   [RFC7721]  Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
              Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
              RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,

   [RFC7872]  Gont, F., Linkova, J., Chown, T., and W. Liu,
              "Observations on the Dropping of Packets with IPv6
              Extension Headers in the Real World", RFC 7872,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7872, June 2016,

   [RFC7915]  Bao, C., Li, X., Baker, F., Anderson, T., and F. Gont,
              "IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm", RFC 7915,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7915, June 2016,

   [RFC7934]  Colitti, L., Cerf, V., Cheshire, S., and D. Schinazi,
              "Host Address Availability Recommendations", BCP 204,
              RFC 7934, DOI 10.17487/RFC7934, July 2016,

   [RFC8064]  Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu,
              "Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
              RFC 8064, DOI 10.17487/RFC8064, February 2017,

   [RFC8190]  Bonica, R., Cotton, M., Haberman, B., and L. Vegoda,
              "Updates to the Special-Purpose IP Address Registries",
              BCP 153, RFC 8190, DOI 10.17487/RFC8190, June 2017,

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   [RFC8210]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
              RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,

   [RFC8273]  Brzozowski, J. and G. Van de Velde, "Unique IPv6 Prefix
              per Host", RFC 8273, DOI 10.17487/RFC8273, December 2017,

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,

   [RFC8504]  Chown, T., Loughney, J., and T. Winters, "IPv6 Node
              Requirements", BCP 220, RFC 8504, DOI 10.17487/RFC8504,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8504>.

              Barnes, R., Altmann, R., and D. Kerr, "Mapping the Great
              Void - Smarter scanning for IPv6", February 2012,

              Weber, J., "Dynamic IPv6 Prefix - Problems and VPNs",
              March 2018, <https://blog.webernetz.net/wp-

Authors' Addresses

   Eric Vyncke (editor)
   De Kleetlaan 6a
   Diegem  1831

   Phone: +32 2 778 4677
   Email: evyncke@cisco.com

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   Kiran Kumar Chittimaneni
   415 Mission St.
   San Francisco  94105

   Email: kk.chittimaneni@gmail.com

   Merike Kaeo
   Double Shot Security
   3518 Fremont Ave N 363
   Seattle  98103

   Phone: +12066696394
   Email: merike@doubleshotsecurity.com

   Enno Rey
   Carl-Bosch-Str. 4
   Heidelberg, Baden-Wuertemberg  69115

   Phone: +49 6221 480390
   Email: erey@ernw.de

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