Security Events Working Group A. Backman, Ed.
Internet-Draft Amazon
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones, Ed.
Expires: April 21, 2019 Microsoft
M. Scurtescu
Coinbase
M. Ansari
Cisco
A. Nadalin
Microsoft
October 18, 2018
Push-Based Security Event Token (SET) Delivery Using HTTP
draft-ietf-secevent-http-push-03
Abstract
This specification defines how a Security Event Token (SET) may be
delivered to an intended recipient using HTTP POST. The SET is
transmitted in the body of an HTTP POST reqest to an endpoint
operated by the recipient, and the recipient indicates successful or
failed transmission via the HTTP response.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction and Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. SET Delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Transmitting a SET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Success Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Failure Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 6
3. Authentication and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Delivery Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. TLS Support Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Authenticating Persisted SETs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix B. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix C. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction and Overview
This specification defines a mechanism by which a transmitter of a
Security Event Token (SET) [RFC8417] may deliver the SET to an
intended recipient via HTTP POST [RFC7231].
Push-Based SET Delivery over HTTP POST is intended for scenarios
where all of the following apply:
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o The transmitter of the SET is capable of making outbound HTTP
requests.
o The recipient is capable of hosting an HTTP endpoint that is
accessible to the transmitter.
o The transmitter and recipient are known to one another.
o The transmitter and recipient have an out-of-band mechanism for
exchanging configuration metadata such as endpoint URLs and
cryptographic key parameters.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Throughout this documents all figures may contain spaces and extra
line-wrapping for readability and due to space limitations.
1.2. Definitions
This specification utilizes terminology defined in [RFC8417], as well
as the terms defined below:
SET Transmitter
An entity that delivers SETs in its possession to one or more SET
Recipients.
2. SET Delivery
To deliver a SET to a given SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes
a SET Transmission Request to the SET Recipient, with the SET itself
contained within the request. The SET Recipient replies to this
request with a response either acknowledging successful transmission
of the SET, or indicating that an error occurred while receiving,
parsing, and/or validating the SET.
Upon receipt of a SET, the SET Recipient SHALL validate that all of
the following are true:
o The SET Recipient can parse the SET.
o The SET is authentic (i.e., it was issued by the issuer specified
within the SET).
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o The SET Recipient is identified as an intended audience of the
SET.
The mechanisms by which the SET Recipient performs this validation
are out of scope for this document. SET parsing and issuer and
audience identification are defined in [RFC8417]. The mechanism for
validating the authenticity of a SET is implementation specific, and
may vary depending on the authentication mechanisms in use, and
whether the SET is signed and/or encrypted (See Section 3).
The SET Recipient SHOULD ensure that the SET is persisted in a way
that is sufficient to meet the SET Recipient's own reliability
requirements, and MUST NOT expect or depend on a SET Transmitter to
re-transmit or otherwise make available to the SET Recipient a SET
once the SET Recipient acknowledges that it was received
successfully.
Once the SET has been validated and persisted, the SET Recipient
SHOULD immediately return a response indicating that the SET was
successfully delivered. The SET Recipient SHOULD NOT perform
extensive business logic that processes the event expressed by the
SET prior to sending this response. Such logic SHOULD be executed
asynchronously from delivery, in order to minimize the expense and
impact of SET delivery on the SET Transmitter.
The SET Transmitter SHOULD NOT re-transmit a SET, unless the response
from the SET Recipient in previous transmissions indicated a
potentially recoverable error (such as server unavailability that may
be transient, or a decryption failure that may be due to
misconfigured keys on the SET Recipient's side). In the latter case,
the SET Transmitter MAY re-transmit a SET, after an appropriate delay
to avoid overwhelming the SET Recipient (see Section 4).
2.1. Transmitting a SET
To transmit a SET to a SET Recipient, the SET Transmitter makes an
HTTP POST request to an HTTP endpoint provided by the SET Recipient.
The "Content-Type" header of this request MUST be "application/
secevent+jwt" as defined in Sections 2.2 and 6.2 of [RFC8417], and
the "Accept" header MUST be "application/json". The request body
MUST consist of the SET itself, represented as a JWT [RFC7519].
The mechanisms by which the SET Transmitter determines the HTTP
endpoint to use when transmitting a SET to a given SET Recipient are
not defined by this specification and may be implementation-specific.
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The following is a non-normative example of a SET transmission
request:
POST /Events HTTP/1.1
Host: notify.rp.example.com
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/secevent+jwt
eyJhbGciOiJub25lIn0
.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.
Figure 1: Example SET Transmission Request
2.2. Success Response
If the SET is determined to be valid, the SET Recipient SHALL
"acknowledge" successful transmission by responding with HTTP
Response Status Code 202 (Accepted) (see Section 6.3.3 of [RFC7231]).
The body of the response MUST be empty.
The following is a non-normative example of a successful receipt of a
SET.
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
Figure 2: Example Successful Delivery Response
Note that the purpose of the "acknowledgement" response is to let the
SET Transmitter know that a SET has been delivered and the
information no longer needs to be retained by the SET Transmitter.
Before acknowledgement, SET Recipients SHOULD ensure they have
validated received SETs and retained them in a manner appropriate to
information retention requirements appropriate to the SET event types
signaled. The level and method of retention of SETs by SET
Recipients is out of scope of this specification.
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2.3. Failure Response
In the event of a general HTTP error condition, the SET Recipient MAY
respond with an appropriate HTTP Status Code as defined in Section 6
of [RFC7231].
When the SET Recipient detects an error parsing or validating a SET
transmitted in a SET Transmission Request, the SET Recipient SHALL
respond with an HTTP Response Status Code of 400 (Bad Request). The
"Content-Type" header of this response MUST be "application/json",
and the body MUST be a JSON object containing the following name/
value pairs:
err A Security Event Token Error Code (see Section 2.4).
description Human-readable text that describes the error and MAY
contain additional diagnostic information.
The following is an example non-normative error response.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Content-Type: application/json
{
"err":"dup",
"description":"SET already received. Ignored."
}
Figure 3: Example Error Response
2.4. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes are strings that identify a
specific type of error that may occur when parsing or validating a
SET. Every Security Event Token Delivery Error Code MUST have a
unique name registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery
Error Codes" registry established by Section 7.1.
The following table presents the initial set of Error Codes that are
registered in the IANA "Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes"
registry:
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+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| Error | Description |
| Code | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| json | Invalid JSON object. |
| jwtParse | Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure. |
| jwtHdr | An invalid JWT header was detected. |
| jwtCrypto | Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm. |
| jws | Signature was not validated. |
| jwe | Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data. |
| jwtAud | Invalid audience value. |
| jwtIss | Issuer not recognized. |
| setType | An unexpected Event type was received. |
| setParse | Invalid structure was encountered such as an |
| | inability to parse or an incomplete set of Event |
| | claims. |
| setData | SET claims incomplete or invalid. |
| dup | A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored. |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: SET Delivery Error Codes
3. Authentication and Authorization
The SET delivery method described in this specification is based upon
HTTP and depends on the use of TLS and/or standard HTTP
authentication and authorization schemes as per [RFC7235].
Because SET Delivery describes a simple function, authorization for
the ability to pick-up or deliver SETs can be derived by considering
the identity of the SET issuer, or via other employed authentication
methods. Because SETs are not commands, SET Recipients are free to
ignore SETs that are not of interest.
4. Delivery Reliability
Delivery reliability requirements may vary from implementation to
implementation. This specification defines the response from the SET
Recipient in such a way as to provide the SET Transmitter with the
information necessary to determine what further action is required,
if any, in order to meet their requirements. SET Transmitters with
high reliability requirements may be tempted to always retry failed
transmissions, however it should be noted that for many types of SET
delivery errors, a retry is extremely unlikely to be successful. For
example, "json", "jwtParse", and "setParse" all indicate structural
errors in the content of the SET that are likely to remain when re-
transmitting the same SET. Others such as "jws" or "jwe" may be
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transient, for example if cryptographic material has not been
properly distributed to the SET Recipient's systems.
Implementers SHOULD evaluate their reliability requirements and the
impact of various retry mechanisms on the performance of their
systems to determine the correct strategy for various error
conditions.
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Authentication Using Signed SETs
In scenarios where HTTP authorization or TLS mutual authentication
are not used or are considered weak, JWS signed SETs SHOULD be used
(see [RFC7515] and Security Considerations [RFC8417]). This enables
the SET Recipient to validate that the SET issuer is authorized to
deliver the SET.
5.2. TLS Support Considerations
SETs may contain sensitive information that is considered PII (e.g.,
subject claims). In such cases, SET Transmitters and SET Recipients
MUST require the use of a transport-layer security mechanism. Event
delivery endpoints MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support
additional transport-layer mechanisms meeting its security
requirements. When using TLS, the client MUST perform a TLS/SSL
server certificate check, per [RFC6125]. Implementation security
considerations for TLS can be found in "Recommendations for Secure
Use of TLS and DTLS" [RFC7525].
5.3. Denial of Service
The SET Recipient may be vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack
where a malicious party makes a high volume of requests containing
invalid SETs, causing the endpoint to expend significant resources on
cryptographic operations that are bound to fail. This may be
mitigated by authenticating SET Transmitters with a mechanism with
low runtime overhead, such as mutual TLS.
5.4. Authenticating Persisted SETs
At the time of receipt, the SET Recipient can rely upon transport
layer mechanisms, HTTP authentication methods, and/or other context
from the transmission request to authenticate the SET Transmitter and
validate the authenticity of the SET. However, this context is
typically unavailable to systems that the SET Recipient forwards the
SET onto, or to systems that retrieve the SET from storage. If the
SET Recipient requires the ability to validate SET authenticity
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outside of the context of the transmission request, then the SET
Transmitter SHOULD sign the SET in accordance with [RFC7515] and
optionally also encrypt it in accordance with [RFC7516].
6. Privacy Considerations
If a SET needs to be retained for audit purposes, a JWS signature MAY
be used to provide verification of its authenticity.
When sharing personally identifiable information or information that
is otherwise considered confidential to affected users, SET
Transmitters and Recipients MUST have the appropriate legal
agreements and user consent or terms of service in place.
The propagation of subject identifiers can be perceived as personally
identifiable information. Where possible, SET Transmitters and
Recipients SHOULD devise approaches that prevent propagation -- for
example, the passing of a hash value that requires the subscriber to
already know the subject.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes
This document defines Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes, for
which IANA is asked to create and maintain a new registry titled
"Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes". Initial values for the
Security Event Token Delivery Error Codes registry are given in
Table 1. Future assignments are to be made through the Expert Review
registration policy ([RFC8126]) and shall follow the template
presented in Section 7.1.1.
7.1.1. Registration Template
Error Code
The name of the Security Event Token Delivery Error Code, as
described in Section 2.4. The name MUST be a case-sensitive ASCII
string consisting only of upper-case letters ("A" - "Z"), lower-
case letters ("a" - "z"), and digits ("0" - "9").
Description
A brief human-readable description of the Security Event Token
Delivery Error Code.
Change Controller
For error codes registered by the IETF or its working groups, list
"IETF Secevent Working Group". For all other error codes, list
the name of the party responsible for the registration. Contact
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information such as mailing address, email address, or phone
number may also be provided.
Defining Document(s)
A reference to the document or documents that define the Security
Event Token Delivery Error Code. The definition MUST specify the
name and description of the error code, and explain under what
circumstances the error code may be used. URIs that can be used
to retrieve copies of each document at no cost SHOULD be included.
7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
Error Code: json
Description: Invalid JSON object
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: jwtParse
Description: Invalid or unparsable JWT or JSON structure
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: jwtHdr
Description: An invalid JWT header was detected
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: jwtCrypto
Description: Unable to parse due to unsupported algorithm
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: jws
Description: Signature was not validated
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: jwe
Description: Unable to decrypt JWE encoded data
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: jwtAud
Description: Invalid audience value
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: jwtIss
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Description: Issuer not recognized
Change Controller:
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: setType
Description: An unexpected Event type was received
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: setParse
Description: Invalid structure was encountered such as an
inability to parse or an incomplete set of Event claims.
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: setData
Description: SET claims incomplete or invalid
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
Error Code: dup
Description: A duplicate SET was received and has been ignored.
Change Controller: IETF Secevent Working Group
Defining Document(s): Section 2.4 of this document
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5988] Nottingham, M., "Web Linking", RFC 5988,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5988, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5988>.
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[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7525] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
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[RFC8417] Hunt, P., Ed., Jones, M., Denniss, W., and M. Ansari,
"Security Event Token (SET)", RFC 8417,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8417, July 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8417>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.
[RFC7521] Campbell, B., Mortimore, C., Jones, M., and Y. Goland,
"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication
and Authorization Grants", RFC 7521, DOI 10.17487/RFC7521,
May 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
Appendix A. Other Streaming Specifications
[[EDITORS NOTE: This section to be removed prior to publication]]
The following pub/sub, queuing, streaming systems were reviewed as
possible solutions or as input to the current draft:
XMPP Events
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The WG considered the XMPP events ands its ability to provide a
single messaging solution without the need for both polling and push
modes. The feeling was the size and methodology of XMPP was to far
apart from the current capabilities of the SECEVENTs community which
focuses in on HTTP based service delivery and authorization.
Amazon Simple Notification Service
Simple Notification Service, is a pub/sub messaging product from AWS.
SNS supports a variety of subscriber types: HTTP/HTTPS endpoints, AWS
Lambda functions, email addresses (as JSON or plain text), phone
numbers (via SMS), and AWS SQS standard queues. It doesn't directly
support pull, but subscribers can get the pull model by creating an
SQS queue and subscribing it to the topic. Note that this puts the
cost of pull support back onto the subscriber, just as it is in the
push model. It is not clear that one way is strictly better than the
other; larger, sophisticated developers may be happy to own message
persistence so they can have their own internal delivery guarantees.
The long tail of OIDC clients may not care about that, or may fail to
get it right. Regardless, I think we can learn something from the
Delivery Policies supported by SNS, as well as the delivery controls
that SQS offers (e.g., Visibility Timeout, Dead-Letter Queues). I'm
not suggesting that we need all of these things in the spec, but they
give an idea of what features people have found useful.
Other information:
o API Reference:
http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSSimpleQueueService/latest/
APIReference/Welcome.html
o Visibility Timeouts:
http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSSimpleQueueService/latest/
SQSDeveloperGuide/sqs-visibility-timeout.html
Apache Kafka
Apache Kafka is an Apache open source project based upon TCP for
distributed streaming. It prescribes some interesting general
purpose features that seem to extend far beyond the simpler streaming
model SECEVENTs is after. A comment from MS has been that Kafka does
an acknowledge with poll combination event which seems to be a
performance advantage. See: https://kafka.apache.org/intro
Google Pub/Sub
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Google Pub Sub system favours a model whereby polling and
acknowledgement of events is done as separate endpoints as separate
functions.
Information:
o Cloud Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/
o Subscriber Overview - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/
subscriber
o Subscriber Pull(poll) - https://cloud.google.com/pubsub/docs/pull
Appendix B. Acknowledgments
The editors would like to thank the members of the SCIM working
group, which began discussions of provisioning events starting with:
draft-hunt-scim-notify-00 in 2015.
The editors would like to thank Phil Hunt and the other authors of
draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02, on which this draft is based.
The editors would like to thank the participants in the the SECEVENTS
working group for their contributions to this specification.
Appendix C. Change Log
Draft 00 - AB - Based on draft-ietf-secevent-delivery-02 with the
following changes:
o Renamed to "Push-Based SET Token Delivery Using HTTP"
o Removed references to the HTTP Polling delivery method.
o Removed informative reference to RFC6202.
Draft 01 - AB:
o Fixed area and workgroup to match secevent.
o Removed unused definitions and definitions already covered by SET.
o Renamed Event Transmitter and Event Receiver to SET Transmitter
and SET Receiver, respectively.
o Added IANA registry for SET Delivery Error Codes.
o Removed enumeration of HTTP authentication methods.
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o Removed generally applicable guidance for HTTP, authorization
tokens, and bearer tokens.
o Moved guidance for using authentication methods as DoS protection
to Security Considerations.
o Removed redundant instruction to use WWW-Authenticate header.
o Removed further generally applicable guidance for authorization
tokens.
o Removed bearer token from example delivery request, and text
referencing it.
o Broke delivery method description into separate request/response
sections.
o Added missing empty line between headers and body in example
request.
o Removed unapplicable notes about example formatting.
o Removed text about SET creation and handling.
o Removed duplication in protocol description.
o Added "non-normative example" text to example transmission
request.
o Fixed inconsistencies in use of Error Code term.
Draft 02 - AB:
o Rewrote abstract and introduction.
o Rewrote definitions for SET Transmitter, SET Receiver.
o Renamed Event Delivery section to SET Delivery.
o Readability edits to Success Response and Failure Response
sections.
o Consolidated definition of error response under Failure Response
section.
o Removed Event Delivery Process section and moved its content to
parent section.
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o Readability edits to SET Delivery section and its subsections.
o Added callout that SET Receiver HTTP endpoint configuration is
out-of-scope.
o Added callout that SET verification mechanisms are out-of-scope.
o Added retry guidance, notes regarding delivery reliability
requirements.
o Added guidance around using JWS and/or JWE to authenticate
persisted SETs.
Draft 03 - mbj:
o Addressed problems identified in my 18-Jul-18 review message
titled "Issues for both the Push and Poll Specs".
o Changes to align terminology with RFC 8417, for instance, by using
the already defined term SET Recipient rather than SET Receiver.
o Applied editorial and minor normative corrections.
o Updated Marius' contact information.
Authors' Addresses
Annabelle Backman (editor)
Amazon
Email: richanna@amazon.com
Michael B. Jones (editor)
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/
Marius Scurtescu
Coinbase
Email: marius.scurtescu@coinbase.com
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Morteza Ansari
Cisco
Email: morteza.ansari@cisco.com
Anthony Nadalin
Microsoft
Email: tonynad@microsoft.com
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