ICNRG C. Tschudin
Internet-Draft University of Basel
Intended status: Experimental C. Wood
Expires: May 7, 2020 University of California Irvine
M. Mosko
PARC, Inc.
D. Oran, Ed.
Network Systems Research & Design
November 4, 2019
File-Like ICN Collections (FLIC)
draft-irtf-icnrg-flic-02
Abstract
This document describes a bare bones "index table"-approach for
organizing a set of ICN data objects into a large, File-Like ICN
Collection (FLIC). At the core of this collection is a so called
manifest which acts as the collection's root node. The manifest
contains an index table with pointers, each pointer being a hash
value pointing to either a final data block or another index table
node.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 7, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. FLIC Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Locators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Namespaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Manifest Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5. Pointer Annotations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.6. Manifest Grammar (ABNF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.7. Manifest Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.7.1. Traversal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.8. Manifest Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.8.1. Preshared Key Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.8.2. RSA Key Encapsulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.8.3. RSA KEM-DEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.9. Protocol Encodings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.9.1. CCNx Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.9.1.1. CCNx Hash Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.9.1.2. CCNx Single Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.9.1.3. CCNx Segmented Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.9.1.4. CCNx Hybrid Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.9.2. NDN Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.9.2.1. NDN Hash Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.9.2.2. NDN Single Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.9.2.3. NDN Segmented Prefix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.9.2.4. NDN Hybrid Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.10. Example Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.10.1. Leaf-only data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.10.2. Linear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. Usage Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1. Locating FLIC leaf and manifest nodes . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2. Seeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.3. Block-level de-duplication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.4. Growing ICN collections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.5. Re-publishing a FLIC under a new name . . . . . . . . . . 26
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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7. Appendix A: Building Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction
ICN architectures such as Content-Centric Networking (CCN)[RFC8569]
and Named Data Networking [NDN] are well suited for static content
distribution. Each piece of possibly immutable) static content is
assigned a name by its producer. Consumers fetch this content using
said name. Optionally, consumers may specify the full name of
content, which includes its name and a unique (with overwhelming
probability) cryptographic digest of said content. (See
[I-D.irtf-icnrg-terminology] for a formal definition of "full name".)
To enable requests with full names, consumers need a priori knowledge
of content digests. Manifests, or catalogs, are data structures
commonly proposed to transport this information. Typically,
manifests are signed content objects (data) which carry a collection
of hash digests. However, as content objects, manifests themselves
may be fetched by full name. Thus, manifests may contain hash
digests of, or pointers to, other manifests or content objects. A
collection of manifests and content objects represents a large piece
of application data, e.g., one that cannot otherwise fit in a single
content object.
Structurally, this relationship between manifests and content objects
is reminiscent of the UNIX inode concept with index tables and memory
pointers. In this document, we specify a simple, yet extensible,
manifest data structure called FLIC - File-Like ICN Collection. FLIC
is suitable for ICNs such as CCN and NDN. We describe the FLIC
design, grammar, and various use cases, e.g., seeking, de-
duplication, extension, and variable-sized encoding. We also include
FLIC encoding examples for CCN and NDN.
The purpose of a manifest is to concisely name the constiuent pieces
of a larger object. A FLIC manifest does this by using a first
manifest to name and cryptographically sign the data structure and
then use more concise lists of hash-based names to indicate the
constituent pieces. This maintains strong security from a single
signature. A Manifest entry gives one enough information to create
an Interest for that entry, so it must specify the name, the hash
digest, and if needed the locators (routing hints).
FLIC is a distributed data structure best illustrated by the
following picture.
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root manifest
.------------------------------------.
| optional name: |
| /icn/name/of/this/flic |
| |
| HashGroup (HG): |
| optional metadata: |
| overall digest, locator, etc. | .------.
| hash-valued data pointer -----------> | data |
| ... | `------' sub manifest
| hash-valued manifest pointer ------. .------------------.
| | `--> | ----->
| optional additional HashGroups .. | | ----->
| | `------------------'
| optional signature |
`------------------------------------'
Figure 1: A FLIC manifest and its directed acyclic graph
A key question is how one names the root manifest, the application
data, and other subsequent manifests. The question of namespaces is
specific to the names of each Content Object (CCNx) or Data (NDN),
and is separate from the question of Locators. FLIC allows one to
use a first namespace for the manifests and a second namespace for
the application data. A given namespace may use one of three
schemas: hash-based naming, single-prefix naming, or segmented
naming. We describe the allowed methods in Section 3.3. There are
also particulars of how to encode the name schema in a given ICN
protocol, which we describe in Section 3.9.
Locators are routing hints to find a Content Object / Data. They
exist in both CCNx and NDN, though the specifics differ. A FLIC
manifest encodes locators the same for both ICN protocols, though
they are encoded differently in the underlying protocol. See
Section 3.9 for encoding differences.
We follow the CCNx [RFC8569] terminology where a Content Object is
the data structure that holds application payload. It is made up of
an optional Name, a PayloadType, a Payload, and an optional
Signature.
FLIC has encodings for CCNx encoding (Section 3.9.1) as per RFC 8609
[RFC8609] and for NDN (Section 3.9.2).
An example implementation in Python may be found at
[FLICImplementation].
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1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Design Goals
The preferred FLIC structure copies the proven UNIX inode concept of
direct and indirect pointers, but without the specific structural
forms of direct versus indirect.
In FLIC terms, a direct pointer links to application-level data,
which is a Content Object with application data in the Payload. An
indirect pointer links to a Content Object with a FLIC Manifest in
the Payload.
Links in FLIC use hash-based naming of Content Objects, rather than
inode block numbers. Both CCNx and NDN support hash-based naming,
though the details vary. See Section 3.9.1 and Section 3.9.2.
Another advantage of using hash-based naming is it permits block-
level de-duplication of application data because two blocks with the
same payload will have the same hash name.
Because FLIC uses hash-based naming, FLIC graphs are inherently
acyclic.
The preferred FLIC structure includes a root manifest with a strong
cryptographic signature and then strong hash names to other manifests
(e.g. SHA256). The advantage of this structure is the single
signature in the root manifest covers the entire data structure no
matter how many additional manifests are in the data structure.
Another advantage of this structure is it removes the need to use
chunk (CCNx) or segment (NDN) name components for the subordinate
manifests.
FLIC supports manifest encryption separate from application payload
encryption. It has a flexible encryption envelope to support various
encryption algorithms and key discovery mechanisms. The byte layout
allows for in-place encryption and decryption.
A limitation of this approach is that one cannot construct a hash-
based name for a child until one knows the payload of that child. In
practical terms, this means that one must have the complete
application payload available at the time of manifest creation.
FLIC's design allows straightforward applications that just need to
traverse a linear set of related objects to do so simply, but FLIC
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has two extensibility mechanisms that allow for more sophisticated
uses: manifest metadata, and pointer annotations. These are
described in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 respectively.
3. FLIC Structure
3.1. Terminology
Data Object: a CCNx nameless Content Object that usually only has
Payload. It might also have an ExpiryTime to limit the lifetime
of the data.
Direct Pointer: borrowed from inode terminology, it is a CCNx link
using a content object hash restriction and a locator name to
point to a Data Object.
Indirect Pointer: borrowed from inode terminology, it is a CCNx link
using a content object hash restriction and a locator name to
point to a manifest content object.
Manifest: a CCNx ContentObject with PayloadType 'Manifest' and a
Payload of the encoded manifest. A leaf manifest only has direct
pointers. An internal manifest has a mixture of direct and
indirect manifests.
Leaf Manifest: all pointers are direct pointers.
Internal Manifest: some or all pointers are indirect. The order and
number of each is up to the manifest builder. By convention, all
the direct manifests come first, then the indirect.
Manifest Waste: a metric used to measure the amount of waste in a
manifest tree. Waste is the number of unused pointers. For
example, a leaf manifest might be able to hold 40 direct pointers,
but only 30 of them are used, so the waste of this node is 10.
Manifest tree waste is the sum of waste over all manifests in a
tree.
Root Manifest: A signed, named, manifest that points to nameless
manifest nodes. This structure means that the internal tree
structure of internal and leaf manifests have no names and thus
may be located anywhere in a namespace, while the root manifest
has a name to fetch it by.
Top Manifest: A preferred manifest structure is to use a Root
manifest that points to a single Internal manifest called the Top
Manifest. The Top manifest the begins the structure used to
organize manifests.
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Namespace: The prefix and object name that goes inside a Content
Object. It may include typed name components specifying a version
and/or chunk/segment number.
Locator: A routing hint in an Interest used by forwarding to get the
Interest to where it can be matched based on its Namespace-derived
name.
3.2. Locators
Locators are routing hints used by forwarders to get an Interest to a
node in the network that can resolve the Interest's name. In some
naming conventions, the name might only be a hash-based name so the
Locator is the only available routing information.
A manifest Node may define one or more Locator prefixes that can be
used in the construction of Interests from the pointers in the
manifest. The Locators are inherited when walking a manifest tree,
so they do not need to be defined everywhere. It is RECOMMENDED that
only the Root manifest contain Locators so that a single operation
can update the locators. One usecase when storing application
payloads at different replicas is to replace the Root manifest with a
new one that contains locators for the current replicas.
3.3. Namespaces
A FLIC manifest may define zero or more namespaces. If none are
defined, FLIC uses the default Hash Naming approach. If using
namespaces, typically there are two defined: one for the manifest
namespace and one for the application data namespace. If the two are
the same, they can share a namepace. There may be more than two
namespaces.
A namespace follows a naming convention. The naming convention
governs how FLIC creates the ICN Name that goes in an Interest's Name
and must match a Content Object / Data Name. The conventions are:
(1) Hash Naming, (2) Single Prefix, and (3) Segmented Prefix. The
default is to use Hash Naming. Hash Naming does not include anything
besides a hash name in the Interest's name and relies on the Locator
to forward the Interest. Single Prefix uses the same name
differntiated only by a Content Object's implicit hash. Segmented
Prefix keeps a counter for the namespace, starting with 0, and
increments it after each use of the namespace.
The namespace definitions may be inherited from the Root manifest or
the Top manifest, or any prior manifest. It is RECOMMENDED that the
namespace definitions appear in the Root manifest so they can be
updated by a single operation. Because Segmented Prefix namespaces
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use a counter, it is RECOMMENDED to only define them in the Root
manifest or Top manifest and not elsewhere, as it may confuse the
counters.
In the NodeData, there may be zero or more NSDef contains. Each
NSDef defines a namespace identifier (octet string) and its naming
convention. For the Hash Naming convention, no further information
is required. For the Single Prefix and Segmented Prefix conventions,
the NSDef specifies the ICN Name prefix used by the namespace.
A HashGroup may have an NSRef container that indicates which
namespace it is using, and by implication which naming convention and
the corresponding prefix. If there is no NSRef, the hash group uses
Hash Naming convention.
3.4. Manifest Metadata
The FLIC Manifest may be extended by defining TLVs that apply to the
Manifest as a whole, or alternatively, individually to every data
object pointed to by the Manifest. This basic specification does not
specify any, but metadata TLVs may be defined through additional RFCs
or via Vendor TLVs. FLIC uses a Vendor TLV structure similar to
[RFC8609] for vendor-specific annotations that require no
standardization process.
For example, some applications may find it useful to allow
specialized consumers such as _repositories_ (for example
[repository]) or enhanced forwarder caches to pre-place, or
adaptively pre-fetch data in order to improve robustness of delay
performance. We note in passing that FLICs use of separate
namespaces for the Manifest and the underlying Data allows different
encryption keys to be used, hence giving a element like a cache or
repository access to the Manifest data does not as a side effect
reveal the contents of the application data itself.
3.5. Pointer Annotations
FLIC allows each manifest pointer to be annotated with extra data.
Annotations allow applications to exploit metadata about each Data
Object pointed to without having to first fetch the corresponding
Content Object. This specification defines one such annotation. The
_SizeAnnotation_ specifies the number of application layer octets
covered by the pointer.
An annotation may, for example, give hints about a preferred
traversal order for fetching the data, or an importance/precedence
indication to aid applications that do not require every content
object pointed to in the manifest to be fetched. This can be very
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useful for real-time or streaming media applications that can perform
error concealment when rendering the media.
Additional annotations may be defined through additional RFCs or via
Vendor TLVs. FLIC uses a Vendor TLV structure similar to [RFC8609]
for vendor-specific annotations that require no standardization
process.
3.6. Manifest Grammar (ABNF)
The manifest grammar is mostly independent of the transport ICN
protocol. The TLV encoding therefore follows the corresponding ICN
protocol, so for CCNx FLIC uses 2 octet length, 2 octet type and for
NDN uses the 1/3/5 octet types and lengths. There are also some
differences in how one structures and resolves links. [RFC8569]
defines HashValue and Link for CCNx encodings. The NDN
ImplicitSha256DigestComponent defines HashValue and NDN Delegation
(from Link Object) defines Link for NDN. The Section 3.9 section
below specifies these differences.
The basic structure of a FLIC manifest is a security context, a node,
and an authentication tag. The security context and authentication
tag are not needed if the node is unencrypted. A node is made up of
a set of metadata, the NodeData, that applies to the entire node, and
one or more HashGroups that contain pointers.
The NodeData element defines the namespaces used by the manifest.
There may be multiple namespaces, depending on how one names
subsequent manifests or data objects. Each HashGroup may reference a
single namespace to control how one forms Interests from the
HashGroup. If one is using separate namespaces for manifests and
application data, one needs at least two HashGroups. For a manifest
structure of "MMMDDD," (where M means manifest (indirect pointer) and
D means data (direct pointer)) for example, one would have a first
hash group for the child manifests with its namespace and a second
HashGroup for the data pointers with the other namespace. If one
used a structure like "MMMDDDMMM," then one would need three
HashGroups.
TYPE = 2OCTET / {1,3,5}OCTET ; As per CCNx or NDN TLV
LENGTH = 2OCTET / {1,3,5}OCTET ; As per CCNx or NDN TLV
Manifest = TYPE LENGTH [SecurityCtx] (EncryptedNode / Node) [AuthTag]
SecurityCtx = TYPE LENGTH AlgorithmCtx
AlgorithmCtx = PresharedKeyCtx / RsaKemCtx / RsaKemDemCtx
AuthTag = TYPE LENGTH *OCTET ; e.g. AEAD authentication tag
EncryptedNode = TYPE LENGTH *OCTET ; Encrypted Node
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Node = TYPE LENGTH [NodeData] 1*HashGroup
NodeData = TYPE LENGTH [SubtreeSize] [SubtreeDigest] [Locators] 0*NSDef
SubtreeSize = TYPE LENGTH INTEGER
SubtreeDigest = TYPE LENGTH HashValue
NSDef = TYPE LENGTH NsId NsSchema
NsId = TYPE LENGTH INTEGER
NsSchema = HashSchema / SinglePrefixSchema / SegmentedPrefixSchema
HashSchema = TYPE 0
SinglePrefixSchema = TYPE LENGTH Name
SegmentedPrefixSchema = TYPE LENGTH Name
Locators = TYPE LENGTH 1*Link
HashValue = TYPE LENGTH *OCTET ; As per ICN Protocol
Link = TYPE LENGTH *OCTET ; As per ICN protocol
HashGroup = TYPE LENGTH [GroupData] (Ptrs / AnnotatedPtrs)
Ptrs = TYPE LENGTH *HashValue
AnnotatedPtrs = TYPE LENGTH *PointerBlock
PointerBlock = TYPE LENGTH *Annotation Ptr
Ptr = TYPE LENGTH HashValue
Annotation = SizeAnnotation / Vendor
SizeAnnotation = TYPE LENGTH Integer
Vendor = TYPE LENGTH PEN *OCTET
GroupData = TYPE LENGTH [LeafSize] [LeafDigest] [SubtreeSize] [SubtreeDigest] [NsId]
LeafSize = TYPE LENGTH INTEGER
LeafDigest = TYPE LENGTH HashValue
PresharedKeyCtx = TYPE LENGTH PresharedKeyData
PresharedKeyData = KeyNum IV Mode
KeyNum = TYPE LENGTH INTEGER
IV = TYPE LENGTH 1*OCTET
Mode = TYPE LENGTH (AES-GCM-128 / AES-GCM-256)
RsaKemCtx = 2 LENGTH RsaKemData
RsaKemData = KeyId IV Mode WrappedKey LocatorPrefix
KeyId = TYPE LENGTH HashValue; ID of Key Encryption Key
WrappedKey = TYPE LENGTH 1*OCTET
LocatorPrefix = TYPE LENGTH Link
RsaKemDemCtx = 3 LENGTH RsaKemDemData
RsaKemDemData = KeyId IV Mode WrappedKey LocatorPrefix
Figure 1: FLIC Grammar
SecurityCtx: information about how to decrypt an EncryptedNode. The
structure will depend on the specific encryption algorithm.
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AlgorithmId: The ID of the encryption method (e.g. preshared key, a
broadcast encryption scheme, etc.)
AlgorithmData: The context for the encryption algorithm.
EncryptedNode: An opaque octet string with an optional
authentication tag (i.e. for AEAD authentication tag)
Node: A plain-text manifest node. The structure allows for in-place
encryption/decryption.
NodeData: the metadata about the Manifest node
SubtreeSize: The size of all application data at and below the Node
or Group
SubtreeDigest: The cryptographic digest of all application data at
and below the Node or Group
Locators: An array of routing hints to find the manifest components
HashGroup: A set of child pointers and associated metadata
Ptrs: A list of one or more Hash Values
GroupData: Metadata that applies to a HashGroup
LeafSize: Size of all application data immediately under the Group
(i.e. via direct pointers)
LeafDigest: Digest of all application data immediately under the
Group
Ptr: The ContentObjectHash of a child, which may be a data
ContentObject (i.e. with Payload) or another Manifest Node.
3.7. Manifest Trees
3.7.1. Traversal
FLIC manifests use a pre-order traversal. This means they are read
top to bottom, left to right. The algorithms in Figure 2 show the
in-order forward traversal code and the reverse-oder traversal code,
which we use below to construct such a tree. This document does not
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mandate how to build trees. Appendix A provides a detailed example
of building inode-like trees.
If using Annotated Pointers, an annotation could influence the
traversal order.
preorder(node)
if (node = null)
return
visit(node)
for (i = 0, i < node.child.length, i++)
preorder(node.child[i])
reverse_preorder(node)
if (node = null)
return
for (i = node.child.length - 1, i >= 0, i-- )
reverse_preorder(node.child[i])
visit(node)
Figure 2: Traversal Pseudocode
In terms of the FLIC grammar, one expands a node into its hash
groups, visiting each hash group in order. In each hash group, one
follows each pointer in order. Figure Figure 3 shows how hash groups
inside a manifest expand like virtual children in the tree. The in-
order traversal is M0, HG1, M1, HG3, D0, D1, D2, HG2, D3, D4.
M0 ____
| \
HG1 HG2
| \ | \
M1 D2 D3 D4
|
HG3
| \
D0 D1
Figure 3: Node Expansion
Using the example manifest tree shown in Figure Figure 9, the in-
order traversal would be: Root, M0, M1, D0, D1, D2, M2, D3, D4, D5,
M3, D6, D7, D8.
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3.8. Manifest Encryption
This document specifies three encryption methods. The first is a
preshared key algorithm, where the parties are assumed to have the
decryption keys already. This is useful, for example, when using a
key agreement protocol such as CCNxKE. The second is an RSA key
encapsulation mechanisms (RsaKem). The third is a standard RSA KEM-
DEM mechanism that uses a shared group key (RsaKemDem).
For group key based encryption, RsaKem and RsaKemDem, this
specification only details the pertinent aspects of the encryption.
It does not specify aspects of a key manager which may or may not be
used as part of key distribution and management, nor does it specify
the protocol between a key manager and a publisher. In it's
simpliest form, the publisher could be the key manager, so there is
no extra protocol needed between the publisher and key manager. This
specification does describe how a consumer locates the appropriate
keys.
While the preshared key algorithm is limited in use, the AES
encryption mechanisms described apply to the group key mechanisms
too. They group key mechanisms simply facilitate distribution of the
shared key without an on-line key agreement protocol like CCNxKE.
A fourth encryption mechanism based on elliptic curve key
distribution is forthcoming.
3.8.1. Preshared Key Algorithm
The KeyNum identifies a key on the receiver. The key must be of the
correct length of the Mode used. If the key is longer, use the left
bits. Many receivers many have the same key with the same KeyId. A
publisher creates a signed root manifest with a security context. A
consumer must ensure that the root manifest signer is the expected
publisher for use with the pre-shared key, which may be shared with
many other consumers. The publisher may use either method 8.2.1
(deterministic IV) or 8.2.2 (RBG-based IV) [NIST 800-38D] for
creating the IV.
Each encrypted manifest node (root manifest or internal manifest) has
a full security context (KeyNum, IV, Mode). The AES-GCM decryption
is independent for each manifest so Manifest objects can be fetched
and decrypted in any order. This design also ensures that if a
manifest tree points to the same subtree repeatedly, such as for
deduplication, the decryptions are all idempotent.
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The functions for authenticated encryption and authenticated
decryption are as given in Sections 7.1 and 7.2 of NIST 800-38D: GCM-
AE_K(IV, P, A) and GCM-AD_K(IV, C, A, T).
EncryptNode(SecurityCtx, Node, K, IV) -> GCM-AE_K(IV, P, A) -> (C, T)
Node: The wire format of the Node (P)
SecurityCtx: The wire format of the SecurityCtx as the Additional Authenticated Data (A)
K: the pre-shared key (128 or 256 bits)
IV: The initialization vector (usually 96 or 128 bits)
C: The cipher text
T: The authentication tag
Figure 4: Preshared Key Encrypt
The pair (C,T) is the OpaqueNode encoded as a TLV structure:
(OpaqueNode (CipherText C) (AuthTag T)).
DecryptNode(SecurityCtx, C, T, K, IV) -> GCM-AD_K (IV, C, A, T) -> (Node, FailFlag)
Node: The wire format of the decrypted Node
FailFlag: Indicates authenticated decryption failure (true or false)
Figure 5: Preshared Key Decrypt
If doing in-place decryption, the cipher text C will be enclosed in
an EncryptedNode TLV value. After decryption, change the TLV type to
Node. The length should be the same. After decryption the AuthTag
is no longer needed. The TLV type should be changed to T_PAD and the
value zeroed. The SecurityCtx could be changed to T_PAD and zeroed
or left as-is.
3.8.2. RSA Key Encapsulation
See also RFC 5990, NIST SP 800-56B Rev. 2 and
https://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xmlsec/2009May/att-0032/
Key_Encapsulation.pdf
In this system, a key manager (KM) (which could be the publisher)
creates a symmetric Content Encryption Key (CEK) and a key wrapping
pair with a Key Encryption Key (KEK) and Key Decryption Key (KDK).
Each publisher and consumer has its own public/private key pair, and
the KM knows each publisher's and consumer's identity and its public
key (PK_x).
We do not describe the publisher-key manager protocol to request a
CEK. The publisher will obtain the (CEK, E_KEK(Z), KeyId, Locator),
where each element is: the content encryption key, the CEK precursor,
Z, encrypted with the KEK (an RSA operation), and the KeyId of the
corresponding KDK, and the Locator is the CCNx name prefix to fetch
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the KDK (see below). The precursor Z is chosen randomly z < n-1,
where n is KEK's public modulus. Note that CEK = KDF(Z). Note that
the publisher does not see KEK or Z.
We use HKDF (RFC 5869) for the KDF. CEK = HKDF-Expand(HKDF-
Extract(0, Z), "CEK", KeyLen), where KenLen is usually 32 bytes (256
bits).
In the ABNF grammar, the RsaKemData includes a KeyId, IV, Mode,
WrappedKey, and LocatorPrefix. The KeyId is the ID (sha256) of the
KEK. The IV and Mode are as per preshared key, and describe how the
manifest is encrypted with AES-GCM. The WrappedKey is the AES key to
decrypt the manifest. The LocatorPrefix is used to construct an
Interest to fetch the KDK.
To fetch the KDK, a consumer with public key PK_c constructs an
Interest with name /LocatorPrefix/{KeyId}/{PK_c keyid} and a
KeyIdRestriction of the KM's KeyId (from the LocatorPrefix Link). It
should receive back a signed Content Object with the KDK wrapped for
the consumer, or a NAK from the KM. The payload of the ContentObject
will be RsaKemWrap(PK, KDK). The signed ContentObject must have a
KeyLocator to the KM's public key. The consumer will trust the KM's
public key because the publisher, whom the consumer trusts, relayed
that KeyId inside its own signed Manifest.
The signed Content Object should have an ExpiryTime, which may be
shorter than the Manifest's, but should not be substantially longer
than the Manifest's ExpiryTime. The KM may decide how to handle the
Recommended Cache Time, or if caching of the response is even
permissible. The KM may require on-line fetching of the response via
a CCNxKE encrypted transport tunnel.
RsaKemWrap(PK, K, KeyLen = 256):
choose z < n-1, where n is PK's public modulus
encrypt c = z^e mod n
prk = HKDF-Extract(0, Z)
kek = HKDF-Expand(prk, "RsaKemWrap", KeyLen)
WK = E_KEK(K) # [AES-WRAP, RFC 3394]
output (c, WK)
Figure 6: RSA KEM Wrap
A consumer must verify the signed content object's signature against
the Key Manager's public key. The consumer then unwraps the KDK from
the Content Object's payload using RsaKemUnwrap(). The KeyLen is
taken from the WrapMode parameter.
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RsaKemUnwrap(SK, c, WK, KeyLen = 256):
Using the consumers private key SK, decrypt Z from c.
prk = HKDF-Extract(0, Z)
kek = HKDF-Expand(prk, "RsaKemWrap", KeyLen)
K = D_KEK(WK) # [AES-UNWRAP, RFC 33940]
output K
Figure 7: RSA KEM Unwrap
The consumer then unwraps the CEK precursor by using the KDK to
decrypt Z. It then derives CEK as above. Manifest encryption and
decryption proceed as with PresharedKey, but using the CEK.
3.8.3. RSA KEM-DEM
In this scheme a Key Manager (KM), who could be the publisher,
creates a Key Encryption Key (KEK) and Key Decryption Key (KDK) key
pair. The publisher obtains the KEK. The KM distributes the KDK to
each group member by encrypting it under each member's public key.
To encrypt data, the publisher generates a symmetric Content
Encryption Key (CEK), wraps it with the KEK, then encrypts the
manifest with the CEK. It places the wrapped CEK in the manifest.
The KM communicates the KEK to the publisher through an unspecified
means particular to the KM.
The KM distributes the KDK to each group member. It uses a name
/{km-prefix}/{publisher-prefix}/{KDK KeyId}/{member KeyId} to publish
the encrypted KDK under a member's public key. It uses RSA-OAEP for
the encryption.
The publisher creates a random symmetric CEK of an appropriate bit
length. It uses the KEK to wrap the CEK using RSA-OAEP. It places
the wrapped key in the manifest's RsaKemDemData along with the KeyId
set to the KDK's KeyId and the KeyLocator prefix /{km-
prefix}/{publisher-prefix}/. Each member appends the KDK KeyId and
their public key KeyId to the name to attemt to fetch the KDK. When
forming the Interest to fetch the key, a consumer should also use a
KeyIdRestriction of the KM's KeyId, which it can retrieve from the
KeyLocator.
3.9. Protocol Encodings
3.9.1. CCNx Encoding
In CCNx, all Manifest content objects use a PayloadType of
T_PYLDTYPE_MANIFEST, while all application data content objects use a
PayloadType of T_PYLDTYPE_DATA.
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ManifestContentObject = TYPE LENGTH [Name] [ExpiryTime] PayloadType Payload
Name = TYPE LENGTH *OCTET ; As per RFC8569
ExpiryTime = TYPE LENGTH *OCTET ; As per RFC8569
PayloadType = TYPE LENGTH T_PYLDTYPE_MANIFEST ; Value TBD
Payload : TYPE LENGTH *OCTET ; the serialized Manifest object
Figure 8: CCNx Embedding Grammar
3.9.1.1. CCNx Hash Naming
The Hash Naming namespace uses CCNx nameless content objects.
It proceeds as follows:
o The Root Manifest content object has a name used to fetch the
manifest. It is signed by the publisher. It has a set of
Locators used to fetch the remainder of the manifest. It has a
single HashPointer that points to the Top Manifest. It may also
have cache control directives, such as ExpiryTime.
o The Root Manifest has an NsDef that specifies HashSchema. It's
GroupData uses that NsId. All internal and leaf manifests use the
same GroupData NsId. A Manifest Tree MAY omit the NsDef and NsId
elements and rely on the default being HashSchema.
o The Top Manifest is a nameless CCNx content object. It may have
cache control directies.
o Internal and Leaf manifests are nameless CCNx content objects,
possibly with cache control directives.
o The Data content objects are nameless CCNx content objects,
possibly with cache control directives.
o To form an Interest for a direct or indirect pointer, use a Name
from one of the Locators and put the pointer HashValue into the
ContentObjectHashRestriction.
3.9.1.2. CCNx Single Prefix
The Single Prefix schema uses the same name in all Content Objects
and distinguishes them via their ContentObjectHash. Note that in
CCNx, using a SinglePrefix name means that we do not use Locators.
It proceeds as follows:
o The Root Manifest content object has a name used to fetch the
manifest. It is signed by the publisher. It has a set of
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Locators used to fetch the remainder of the manifest. It has a
single HashPointer that points to the Top Manifest. It may also
have cache control directives, such as ExpiryTime.
o The Root Manifest has an NsDef that specifies SinglePrefix and the
SinglePrefixSchema element specifies the SinglePrefixName.
o The Top Manifest has the name SinglePrefixName. It may have cache
control directies. It's GroupData elements must have an NsId that
references the NsDef.
o An Internal or Leaf manifest has the name SinglePrefixName,
possibly with cache control directives. It's GroupData elements
must have an NsId that references the NsDef.
o The Data content objects have the name SinglePrefixName, possibly
with cache control directives.
o To form an Interest for a direct or indirect pointer, use
SinglePrefixName as the Name and put the pointer HashValue into
the ContentObjectHashRestriction.
3.9.1.3. CCNx Segmented Prefix
The Segmented Prefix schema uses a different name in all Content
Objects and distinguishes them via their ContentObjectHash. Note
that in CCNx, using a SegmentedPrefixSchema means that we do not use
Locators. OPTIONAL: Use AnnotatedPointers to indicate the segment
number of each hash pointer to avoid needing to infer the segment
numbers.
It proceeds as follows:
o The Root Manifest content object has a name used to fetch the
manifest. It is signed by the publisher. It has a set of
Locators used to fetch the remainder of the manifest. It has a
single HashPointer that points to the Top Manifest. It may also
have cache control directives, such as ExpiryTime.
o The Root Manifest has an NsDef that specifies SegmentedPrefix and
the SegmentedPrefixSchema element specifies the
SegmentedPrefixName.
o The publisher will track the chunk number of each content object
within the NsId. Objects will be numbered in their traversal
order. Within each manifest, the name will be constructed from
the SegmentedPrefixName plus a Chunk name component.
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o The Top Manifest has the name SegmentedPrefixName plus chunk
number. It may have cache control directies. It's GroupData
elements must have an NsId that references the NsDef.
o An Internal or Leaf manifest has the name SegmentedPrefixName plus
chunk number, possibly with cache control directives. It's
GroupData elements must have an NsId that references the NsDef.
o The Data content objects have the name SegmentedPrefixName plus
chunk number, possibly with cache control directives.
o To form an Interest for a direct or indirect pointer, use
SegmentedPrefixName plus chunk number as the Name and put the
pointer HashValue into the ContentObjectHashRestriction. A
consumer must track the chunk number in traversal order for each
SegmentedPrefixSchema NsId.
3.9.1.4. CCNx Hybrid Schema
A manifest may use multiple schemas. For example, the application
payload in data content objects might use SegmentedPrefix while the
manifest content objects might use HashNaming.
The Root Manifest should specify an NsDef with a first NsId (say 1)
as the HashNaming schema and a second NsDef with a second NsId (say
2) as the SegmentedPrefix schema along with the SegmentedPrefixName.
Each manifest (Top, Internal, Leaf) uses two or more HashGroups,
where eash HashGroup has only Direct (with the second NsId) or
Indirect (with the first NsId). The number of hash groups will
depend on how the publisher wishes to interleave direct and indirect
pointers.
Manifests and data objects are named as appropriate for their naming
schema.
3.9.2. NDN Encoding
In NDN, all Manifest Data objects use a ContentType of FLIC (1024),
while all application data content objects use a PayloadType of Blob.
3.9.2.1. NDN Hash Naming
In NDN Hash Naming, a Data Object has a 0-length name. This means
that an Interest will only have an ImplicitDigest name component in
it. This method relies on using NDN ForwardingHints.
It proceeds as follows:
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o The Root Manifest Data has a name used to fetch the manifest. It
is signed by the publisher. It has a set of Locators used to
fetch the remainder of the manifest. It has a single HashPointer
that points to the Top Manifest. It may also have cache control
directives.
o The Root Manifest has an NsDef that specifies HashSchema. It's
GroupData uses that NsId. All internal and leaf manifests use the
same GroupData NsId. A Manifest Tree MAY omit the NsDef and NsId
elements and rely on the default being HashSchema.
o The Top Manifest has a 0-length Name. It may have cache control
directies.
o Internal and Leaf manifests has a 0-length Name, possibly with
cache control directives.
o The application Data use a 0-length name, possibly with cache
control directives.
o To form an Interest for a direct or indirect pointer, the name is
only the Implicit Digest name component derived from a pointer's
HashValue. The ForwardingHints come from the Locators. In NDN,
one may use one or more locators within a single Interest.
3.9.2.2. NDN Single Prefix
In Single Prefix, the Data name is a common prefix used between all
objects in that namespace, without a Segment or other counter. They
are distinguished via the Implicit Digest name component. The FLIC
Locators go in the ForwardingHints.
It proceeds as follows:
o The Root Manifest Data object has a name used to fetch the
manifest. It is signed by the publisher. It has a set of
Locators used to fetch the remainder of the manifest. It has a
single HashPointer that points to the Top Manifest. It may also
have cache control directives.
o The Root Manifest has an NsDef that specifies SinglePrefix and the
SinglePrefixSchema element specifies the SinglePrefixName.
o The Top Manifest has the name SinglePrefixName. It may have cache
control directies. It's GroupData elements must have an NsId that
references the NsDef.
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o An Internal or Leaf manifest has the name SinglePrefixName,
possibly with cache control directives. It's GroupData elements
must have an NsId that references the NsDef.
o The Data content objects have the name SinglePrefixName, possibly
with cache control directives.
o To form an Interest for a direct or indirect pointer, use
SinglePrefixName as the Name and append the pointer's HashValue
into an ImplicitDigest name component. Set the ForwardingHints
from the FLIC locators.
3.9.2.3. NDN Segmented Prefix
In Segmented Prefix, the Data name is a common prefix plus a segment
number, so each manifest or application data object has a unique full
name before the implicit digest. This means the consumer must
maintain a counter for each SegmentedPrefix namespace. OPTIONAL: Use
AnnotatedPointers to indicate the segment number of each hash pointer
to avoid needing to infer the segment numbers.
It proceeds as follows:
o The Root Manifest Data object has a name used to fetch the
manifest. It is signed by the publisher. It has a set of
Locators used to fetch the remainder of the manifest. It has a
single HashPointer that points to the Top Manifest. It may also
have cache control directives.
o The Root Manifest has an NsDef that specifies SegmentedPrefix and
the SegmentedPrefixSchema element specifies the
SegmentedPrefixName.
o The publisher will track the segment number of each Data object
within a SegmentedPrefix NsId. Data will be numbered in their
traversal order. Within each manifest, the name will be
constructed from the SegmentedPrefixName plus a Segment name
component.
o The Top Manifest has the name SegmentedPrefixName plus segment
number. It may have cache control directies. It's GroupData
elements must have an NsId that references the NsDef.
o An Internal or Leaf manifest has the name SegmentedPrefixName plus
segment number, possibly with cache control directives. It's
GroupData elements must have an NsId that references the NsDef.
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o The Data content objects have the name SegmentedPrefixName plus
chunk number, possibly with cache control directives.
o To form an Interest for a direct or indirect pointer, use
SegmentedPrefixName plus segment number as the Name and put the
pointer HashValue into the ImplicitDigest name component. A
consumer must track the segment number in traversal order for each
SegmentedPrefixSchema NsId.
3.9.2.4. NDN Hybrid Schema
A manifest may use multiple schemas. For example, the application
payload in data content objects might use SegmentedPrefix while the
manifest content objects might use HashNaming.
The Root Manifest should specify an NsDef with a first NsId (say 1)
as the HashNaming schema and a second NsDef with a second NsId (say
2) as the SegmentedPrefix schema along with the SegmentedPrefixName.
Each manifest (Top, Internal, Leaf) uses two or more HashGroups,
where eash HashGroup has only Direct (with the second NsId) or
Indirect (with the first NsId). The number of hash groups will
depend on how the publisher wishes to interleave direct and indirect
pointers.
Manifests and data objects are named as appropriate for their naming
schema.
3.10. Example Structures
3.10.1. Leaf-only data
Root
|
______ M0 _____
/ | \
M1 M2 M3
/ | \ / | \ / | \
D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8
Figure 9: Leaf-only manifest tree
3.10.2. Linear
Of special interest are "skewed trees" where a pointer to a manifest
may only appear as last pointer of (sub-) manifests. Such a tree
becomes a sequential list of manifests with a maximum of datapointers
per manifest packet. Beside the tree shape we also show this data
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structure in form of packet content where D stands for a data pointer
and M is the hash of a manifest packet.
Root -> M0 ----> M1 ----> ...
|->DDDD |->DDDD
4. Usage Examples
4.1. Locating FLIC leaf and manifest nodes
The names of manifest and data objects are often missing or not
unique, unless using specific naming conventions. In this example,
we show how using manifest locators is used to generate Interests.
Take for example the figure below where the root manifest is named by
hash h0. It has nameless children with hashes with hashes h1 ... hN.
Objects:
manifest(name=/a/b/c, ptr=h1, ptr=hN) - has hash h0
nameless(data1) - has hash h1
...
nameless(dataN) - has hash hN
Query for the manifest:
interest(name=/a/b/c, implicitDigest=h0)
Figure 10: Data Organization
After obtaining the manifest, the client fetches the contents. In
this first instance, the manifest does not provide any Locators data
structure, so the client must continue using the name it used for the
manifest.
interest(name=/a/b/c, implicitDigest=h1)
...
interest(name=/a/b/c, implicitDigest=hN)
Figure 11: Data Interests
Using the locator metadata entry, this behavior can be changed:
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Objects:
manifest(name=/a/b/c,
hashgroup(loc=/x/y/z, ptr=h1)
hashgroup(ptr=h2) - has hash h0
nameless(data1) - has hash h1
nameless(data2) - has hash h2
Queries:
interest(name=/a/b/c, implicitDigest=h0)
interest(name=/x/y/z, implicitDigest=h1)
interest(name=/a/b/c, implicitDigest=h2)
Figure 12: Using Locators
4.2. Seeking
Fast seeking (without having to sequentially fetch all content) works
by skipping over entries for which we know their size. The following
expression shows how to compute the byte offset of the data pointed
at by pointer P_i, offset_i. In this formula, let P_i represent the
Size value of the i-th pointer.
offset_i = \sum_{i = 1}^{i - 1} P_i.size
With this offset, seeking is done as follows:
Input: seek_pos P, a FLIC manifest with a hash group having N entries
Output: pointer index i and byte offset o, or out-of-range error
Algo:
offset = 0
for i in 1..N do
if (P < P_i.size)
return (i, P - offset)
offset += P_i.size
return out-of-range
Figure 13: Seeking Algorithm
Seeking in a BlockHashGroup is different since offsets can be quickly
computed. This is because the size of each pointer P_i except the
last is equal to the SizePerPtr value. For a BlockHashGroup with N
pointers, OverallByteCount D, and SizePerPointer L, the size of P_i
is equal to the following:
D - ((i - 1) * L)
In a BlockHashGroup with k pointers, the size of P_k is equal to:
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D - L * (k - 1)
Using these, the seeking algorithm can be thus simplified to the
following:
Input: seek_pos P, a FLIC manifest with a hash group having
OverallByteCount S and SizePerPointer L.
Output: pointer index i and byte offset o, or out-of-range error
Algo:
if (P > S)
return out-of-range
i = floor(P / L)
if (i > N)
return out-of-range # bad FLIC encoding
o = P mod L
return (i, o)
Figure 14: Seeking Algorithm
Note: In both cases, if the pointer at position i is a manifest
pointer, this algorithm has to be called once more, seeking to
seek_pos o inside that manifest.
4.3. Block-level de-duplication
Consider a huge file, e.g. an ISO image of a DVD or program in binary
form, that had previously been FLIC-ed but now needs to be patched.
In this case, all existing encoded ICN chunks can remain in the
repository while only the chunks for the patch itself is added to a
new manifest data structure, as is shown in the picture below. For
example, the venti [1] archival file system of Plan9 uses this
technique.
old_mfst - - > h1 --> oldData1 <-- h1 < - - new_mfst
\ - > h2 --> oldData2 <-- h2 < - - /
\ replace3 <-- h5 < - -/
\- > h3 --> oldData3 /
\ > h4 --> oldData4 <-- h4 < - /
Figure 15: De-duplication
4.4. Growing ICN collections
A log file, for example, grows over time. Instead of having to re-
FLIC the grown file it suffices to construct a new manifest with a
manifest pointer to the old root manifest plus the sequence of data
hash pointers for the new data (or additional sub-manifests if
necessary). Note that this tree will not be skewed (anymore).
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old data < - - - mfst_old <-- h_old - - mfst_new
/
new data1 <-- h_1 - - - - - - - - -/
new data2 /
... /
new dataN <-- h_N - - - - - - - -/
Figure 16: Growing A Collection
4.5. Re-publishing a FLIC under a new name
There are several usecases for republishing a collection under a new
namespace, or having one collection exist under several namespaces:
o It can happen that a publisher's namespace is part of a service
provider's prefix. When switching provider, the publisher may
want to republish the old data under a new name.
o A publishes wishes to distribute its content to several caches and
would like a local result to appear. For example, the publisher
/alpha wishes to place content at /beta and /gamma, but routing to
/alpha would not send a request to either of those sites. Each of
/beta and /gamma could create a locally named and signed version
of the root manifest with appropriate keys (or delegate that to
/alpha) so the results are always local without having to change
the bulk of the maniest tree.
This can easily be achieved with a single nameless root manifest for
the large FLIC plus arbitrarily many per-name manifests (which are
signed by whomever wants to publish this data):
data < - nameless_mfst() <-- h < - mfst(/com/example/east/the/flic)
< - mfst(/com/example/west/old/the/flic)
< - mfst(/internet/archive/flic234)
Figure 17: Relocating A Collection
Note that the hash computation (of h) only requires reading the
nameless root manifest, not the entire FLIC.
This example points out the problem of HashGroups having locator
metadata elements: A retriever would be urged to follow these hints
which are "hardcoded" deep inside the FLIC but might have become
outdated. We therefore recommend to name FLIC manifests only at the
highest level (where these names have no locator function). Child
nodes in a FLIC manifest should not be named as these names serve no
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purpose except retrieving a sub-tree's manifest by name, if would be
required.
5. IANA Considerations
TODO Need IANA actions:
o Create a registry for Manifest Data and Annotation TLVs
o Register the SizeAnnotation TLV
Also TODO: If this document is submitted as an official RG draft,
this section must be updated to reflect the IANA registries described
in [RFC8609]
6. Security Considerations
TODO Need a discussion on:
o signing and hash chaining security.
o republishing under a new namespace.
o encryption mechanisms.
o encryption key distribution mechanisms.
7. Appendix A: Building Trees
This section describes one method to build trees. It constructs a
pre-order tree in a single pass of the application data, going from
the tail to the beginning. This allows us to work up the right side
of the tree in a single pass, then work down each left branch until
we exhaust the data. Using the reverse-order traversal, we create
the right-most-child manifest, then its parent, then the indirect
pointers of that parent, then the parent's direct pointers, then the
parent of the parent (repeating). This process uses recursion, as it
is the clearest way to show the code. A more optimized approach
could do it in a true single pass.
Because we're building from the bottom up, we use the term 'level' to
be the distance from the right-most child up. Level 0 is the bottom-
most level of the tree, such as where node 7 is:
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1
2 3
4 5 6 7
preorder: 1 2 4 5 3 6 7
reverse: 7 6 3 5 4 2 1
The Python-like pseudocode build_tree(data, n, k, m) algorithm
creates a tree of n data objects. The data[] array is an array of
Content Objects that hold application payload; the application data
has already been packetized into n Content Object packets. An
interior manifest node has k direct pointers and m indirect pointers.
build_tree(data[0..n-1], n, k, m)
# data is an array of Content Objects (Data in NDN) with application payload.
# n is the number of data items
# k is the number of direct pointers per internal node
# m is the number of indirect pointers per internal node
segment = namedtuple('Segment', 'head tail')(0, n)
level = 0
# This bootstraps the process by creating the right most child manifest
# A leaf manifest has no indirect pointers, so k+m are direct pointers
root = leaf_manifest(data, segment, k + m)
# Keep building subtrees until we're out of direct pointers
while not segment.empty():
level += 1
root = bottom_up_preorder(data, segment, level, k, m, root)
return root
bottom_up_preorder(data, segment, level, k, m, right_most_child=None)
manifest = None
if level == 0:
assert right_most_child is None
# build a leaf manifest with only direct pointers
manifest = leaf_manifest(data, segment, k + m)
else:
# If the number of remaining direct pointers will fit in a leaf node, make one of those.
# Otherwise, we need to be an interior node
if right_most_child is None and segment.length() <= k + m:
manifest = leaf_manifest(data, segment, k+m)
else:
manifest = interior_manifest(data, segment, level, k, m, right_most_child)
return manifest
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leaf_manifest(data, segment, count)
# At most count items, but never go before the head
start = max(segment.head(), segment.tail() - count)
manifest = Manifest(data[start:segment.tail])
segment.tail -= segment.tail() - start
return manifest
interior_manifest(data, segment, level, k, m, right_most_child)
children = []
if right_most_child is not None:
children.append(right_most_child)
interior_indirect(data, segment, level, k, m, children)
interior_direct(data, segment, level, k, m, children)
manifest = Manifest(children)
return manifest, tail
interior_indirect(data, segment, level, k, m, children)
# Reserve space at the head of the segment for this node's direct pointers before
# descending to children. We want the top of the tree packed.
reserve_count = min(m, segment.tail - segment.head)
segment.head += reserve_count
while len(children) < m and not segment.head == segment.tail:
child = bottom_up_preorder(data, segment, level - 1, k, m)
# prepend
children.insert(0, child)
# Pull back our reservation and put those pointers in our direct children
segment.head -= reserve_count
interior_direct(data, segment, level, k, m, children)
while len(children) < k+m and not segment.head == segment.tail:
pointer = data[segment.tail() - 1]
children.insert(0, pointer)
segment.tail -= 1
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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8.2. Informative References
[FLICImplementation]
Mosko, M., "FLIC Implementation in Python", various,
<https://github.com/mmosko/ccnpy>.
[I-D.irtf-icnrg-terminology]
Wissingh, B., Wood, C., Afanasyev, A., Zhang, L., Oran,
D., and C. Tschudin, "Information-Centric Networking
(ICN): CCNx and NDN Terminology", draft-irtf-icnrg-
terminology-07 (work in progress), November 2019.
[NDN] "Named Data Networking", various,
<https://named-data.net/project/execsummary/>.
[NDNTLV] "NDN Packet Format Specification.", 2016,
<http://named-data.net/doc/ndn-tlv/>.
[repository]
"Repo Protocol Specification", Various,
<https://redmine.named-data.net/projects/repo-ng/wiki/
Repo_Protocol_Specification>.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC8569] Mosko, M., Solis, I., and C. Wood, "Content-Centric
Networking (CCNx) Semantics", RFC 8569,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8569, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8569>.
[RFC8609] Mosko, M., Solis, I., and C. Wood, "Content-Centric
Networking (CCNx) Messages in TLV Format", RFC 8609,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8609, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8609>.
Authors' Addresses
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Christian Tschudin
University of Basel
Email: christian.tschudin@unibas.ch
Christopher A. Wood
University of California Irvine
Email: woodc1@uci.edu
Marc Mosko
PARC, Inc.
Email: marc.mosko@parc.com
David Oran (editor)
Network Systems Research & Design
Email: daveoran@orandom.net
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