Network Working Group J. Vcelak
Internet-Draft CZ.NIC
Intended status: Standards Track S. Goldberg
Expires: September 08, 2017 Boston University
D. Papadopoulos
University of Maryland
S. Huque
Salesforce
D. Lawrence
Akamai Technologies
March 07, 2017
NSEC5, DNSSEC Authenticated Denial of Existence
draft-vcelak-nsec5-04
Abstract
The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) introduced the
NSEC resource record (RR) for authenticated denial of existence and
the NSEC3 RR for hashed authenticated denial of existence. This
document introduces NSEC5 as an alternative mechanism for DNSSEC
authenticated denial of existence. NSEC5 uses verifiable random
functions (VRFs) to prevent offline enumeration of zone contents.
NSEC5 also protects the integrity of the zone contents even if an
adversary compromises one of the authoritative servers for the zone.
Integrity is preserved because NSEC5 does not require private zone-
signing keys to be present on all authoritative servers for the zone,
in contrast to DNSSEC online signing schemes like NSEC3 White Lies.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 08, 2017.
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Copyright Notice
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document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Backward Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. How NSEC5 Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. NSEC5 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. The NSEC5KEY Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. NSEC5KEY RDATA Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. NSEC5KEY RDATA Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. The NSEC5 Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. NSEC5 RDATA Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. NSEC5 Flags Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.3. NSEC5 RDATA Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. The NSEC5PROOF Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. NSEC5PROOF RDATA Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.2. NSEC5PROOF RDATA Presentation Format . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Types of Authenticated Denial of Existence with NSEC5 . . . . 12
8.1. Name Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. No Data Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2.1. No Data Response, Opt-Out Not In Effect . . . . . . . 13
8.2.2. No Data Response, Opt-Out In Effect . . . . . . . . . 13
8.3. Wildcard Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.4. Wildcard No Data Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Authoritative Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Zone Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1.1. Precomputing Closest Provable Encloser Proofs . . . . 16
9.2. Zone Serving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.3. NSEC5KEY Rollover Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.4. Secondary Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9.5. Zones Using Unknown NSEC5 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . 18
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9.6. Dynamic Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. Resolver Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. Validator Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.1. Validating Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.2. Validating Referrals to Unsigned Subzones . . . . . . . 19
11.3. Responses With Unknown NSEC5 Algorithms . . . . . . . . 20
12. Special Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.1. Transition Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.2. Private NSEC5 keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.3. Domain Name Length Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
13. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
14. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
15.1. Zone Enumeration Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
15.2. Compromise of the Private NSEC5 Key . . . . . . . . . . 21
15.3. Key Length Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
15.4. NSEC5 Hash Collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
16. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
17. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
18. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
18.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
18.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix A. Elliptic Curve VRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
A.1. EC-VRF Auxiliary Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.1.1. EC-VRF Hash To Curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A.1.2. EC-VRF Hash Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.1.3. EC-VRF Decode Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A.2. EC-VRF Proving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.3. EC-VRF Proof To Hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.4. EC-VRF Verifying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Introduction
1.1. Rationale
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NSEC5 provides an alternative mechanism for authenticated denial of
existence for the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). NSEC5 has two
key security properties. First, NSEC5 protects the integrity of the
zone contents even if an adversary compromises one of the
authoritative servers for the zone. Second, NSEC5 prevents offline
zone enumeration, where an adversary makes a small number of online
DNS queries and then processes them offline in order to learn all of
the names in a zone. Zone enumeration can be used to identify
routers, servers or other "things" that could then be targeted in
more complex attacks. An enumerated zone can also be a source of
probable email addresses for spam, or as a "key for multiple WHOIS
queries to reveal registrant data that many registries may have legal
obligations to protect" [RFC5155].
All other DNSSEC mechanisms for authenticated denial of existence
either fail to preserve integrity against a compromised server, or
fail to prevent offline zone enumeration.
When offline signing with NSEC is used [RFC4034], an NSEC chain of
all existing domain names in the zone is constructed and signed
offline. The chain is made of resource records (RRs), where each RR
represents two consecutive domain names in canonical order present in
the zone. The authoritative server proves the non-existence of a
name by presenting a signed NSEC RR which covers the name. Because
the authoritative server does not need not to know the private zone-
signing key, the integrity of the zone is protected even if the
server is compromised. However, the NSEC chain allows for easy zone
enumeration: N queries to the server suffice to learn all N names in
the zone (see e.g., [nmap-nsec-enum], [nsec3map], and [ldns-walk]).
When offline signing with NSEC3 is used [RFC5155], the original names
in the NSEC chain are replaced by their cryptographic hashes.
Offline signing ensures that NSEC3 preserves integrity even if an
authoritative server is compromised. However, offline zone
enumeration is still possible with NSEC3 (see e.g., [nsec3walker],
[nsec3gpu]), and is part of standard network reconnaissance tools
(e.g., [nmap-nsec3-enum], [nsec3map]).
When online signing is used, the authoritative server holds the
private zone-signing key and uses this key to synthesize NSEC or
NSEC3 responses on the fly (e.g. NSEC3 White Lies (NSEC3-WL) or
Minimally-Covering NSEC, both described in [RFC7129]). Because the
synthesized response only contains information about the queried name
(but not about any other name in the zone), offline zone enumeration
is not possible. However, because the authoritative server holds the
private zone-signing key, integrity is lost if the authoritative
server is compromised.
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+----------+-------------+---------------+----------------+---------+
| Scheme | Integrity | Integrity vs | Prevents | Online |
| | vs network | compromised | offline zone | crypto? |
| | attacks? | auth. server? | enumeration? | |
+----------+-------------+---------------+----------------+---------+
| Unsigned | NO | NO | YES | NO |
| NSEC | YES | YES | NO | NO |
| NSEC3 | YES | YES | NO | NO |
| NSEC3-WL | YES | NO | YES | YES |
| NSEC5 | YES | YES | YES | YES |
+----------+-------------+---------------+----------------+---------+
NSEC5 prevents offline zone enumeration and also protects integrity
even if a zone's authoritative server is compromised. To do this,
NSEC5 replaces the unkeyed cryptographic hash function used in NSEC3
with a verifiable random function (VRF) [MRV99]. A VRF is the
public-key version of a keyed cryptographic hash. Only the holder of
the private VRF key can compute the hash, but anyone with public VRF
key can verify the correctness of the hash.
The public VRF key is distributed in an NSEC5KEY RR, similar to a
DNSKEY RR, and is used to verify NSEC5 hash values. The private VRF
key is present on all authoritative servers for the zone, and is used
to compute hash values. For every query that elicits a negative
response, the authoritative server hashes the query on the fly using
the private VRF key, and also returns the corresponding precomputed
NSEC5 record(s). In contrast to the online signing approach
[RFC7129], the private key that is present on all authoritative
servers for NSEC5 cannot be used to modify the zone contents.
Like online signing approaches, NSEC5 requires the authoritative
server to perform online public key cryptographic operations for
every query eliciting a denying response. This is necessary; [nsec5]
proved that online cryptography is required to prevent offline zone
enumeration while still protecting the integrity of zone contents
against network attacks.
NSEC5 is not intended to replace NSEC or NSEC3. It is an alternative
mechanism for authenticated denial of existence. This document
specifies NSEC5 based on the FIPS 186-3 P-256 elliptic curve and on
the Ed25519 elliptic curve. A formal cryptographic proof of security
for elliptic curve (EC) NSEC5 is in [nsec5ecc].
1.2. Requirements
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.3. Terminology
The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic DNS and DNSSEC
concepts described in [RFC1034], [RFC1035], [RFC4033], [RFC4034], and
[RFC4035]; subsequent RFCs that update them in [RFC2136], [RFC2181],
[RFC2308], [RFC5155], and [RFC7129]; and DNS terms in [RFC7719].
The following terminology is used through this document:
Base32hex: The "Base 32 Encoding with Extended Hex Alphabet" as
specified in [RFC4648]. The padding characters ("=") are not used
in the NSEC5 specification.
Base64: The "Base 64 Encoding" as specified in [RFC4648].
QNAME: The domain name being queried (query name).
Private NSEC5 key: The private key for the verifiable random
function (VRF).
Public NSEC5 key: The public key for the VRF.
NSEC5 proof: A VRF proof. The holder of the private NSEC5 key
(e.g., authoritative server) can compute the NSEC5 proof for an
input domain name. Anyone who knows the public VRF key can verify
that the NSEC5 proof corresponds to the input domain name.
NSEC5 hash: A cryptographic digest of an NSEC5 proof. If the NSEC5
proof is known, anyone can compute its corresponding NSEC5 hash.
NSEC5 algorithm: A triple of VRF algorithms that compute an NSEC5
proof, verify an NSEC5 proof, and process an NSEC5 proof to obtain
its NSEC5 hash.
2. Backward Compatibility
The specification describes a protocol change that is not backward
compatible with [RFC4035] and [RFC5155]. An NSEC5-unaware resolver
will fail to validate responses introduced by this document.
To prevent NSEC5-unaware resolvers from attempting to validate the
responses, new DNSSEC algorithms identifiers are introduced in
Section 16 which alias existing algorithm numbers. The zones signed
according to this specification MUST use only these algorithm
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identifiers, thus NSEC5-unaware resolvers will treat the zone as
insecure.
3. How NSEC5 Works
With NSEC5, the original domain name is hashed using the VRF using
the following steps:
1. The domain name is processed using a VRF keyed with the private
NSEC5 key to obtain the NSEC5 proof. Anyone who knows the public
NSEC5 key, normally acquired via an NSEC5KEY RR, can verify that
a given NSEC5 proof corresponds to a given domain name.
2. The NSEC5 proof is then processed using a publicly-computable VRF
proof-to-hash function to obtain the NSEC5 hash. The NSEC5 hash
can be computed by anyone who knows the input NSEC5 proof.
The NSEC5 hash determines the position of a domain name in an NSEC5
chain.
To sign a zone, the private NSEC5 key is used to compute the NSEC5
hashes for each name in the zone. These NSEC5 hashes are sorted in
canonical order [RFC4034] , and each consecutive pair forms an NSEC5
RR. Each NSEC5 RR is signed offline using the private zone-signing
key. The resulting signed chain of NSEC5 RRs is provided to all
authoritative servers for the zone, along with the private NSEC5 key.
To prove non-existence of a particular domain name in response to a
query, the server uses the private NSEC5 key to compute the NSEC5
proof and NSEC5 hash corresponding to the queried name. The server
then identifies the NSEC5 RR that covers the NSEC5 hash. The server
then responds with the NSEC5 RR and its corresponding RRSIG signature
RRset, as well as a synthesized NSEC5PROOF RR that contains the NSEC5
proof corresponding to the queried name.
To validate the response, the client verifies the following items:
o The client uses the public NSEC5 key, normally acquired from the
NSEC5KEY RR, to verify that the NSEC5 proof in the NSEC5PROOF RR
corresponds to the queried name.
o The client uses the VRF proof-to-hash function to compute the
NSEC5 hash from the NSEC5 proof in the NSEC5PROOF RR. The client
verifies that the NSEC5 hash is covered by the NSEC5 RR.
o The client verifies that the NSEC5 RR is validly signed by the
RRSIG RRset.
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4. NSEC5 Algorithms
The algorithms used for NSEC5 authenticated denial are independent of
the algorithms used for DNSSEC signing. An NSEC5 algorithm defines
how the NSEC5 proof and the NSEC5 hash are computed and validated.
The input for the NSEC5 proof computation is an RR owner name in
[RFC4034] canonical wire format followed by a private NSEC5 key. The
output is an octet string.
The input for the NSEC5 hash computation is the corresponding NSEC5
proof; the output is an octet string.
This document defines EC-P256-SHA256 NSEC5 algorithm as follows:
o The NSEC5 proof is computed using an Elliptic Curve VRF with FIPS
186-3 P-256 curve. The proof computation and verification, and
the proof-to-hash function are formally specified in Appendix A.
The curve parameters are specified in [FIPS-186-3]
(Section D.1.2.3) and [RFC5114] (Section 2.6).
o The NSEC5 hash is the x-coordinate of the group element gamma from
the NSEC5 proof (specified in Appendix A), encoded as a 32-octet
unsigned integer in network byte order. In practice, the hash is
a substring of the proof ranging from 2nd through 33th octet of
the proof, inclusive.
o The public key format to be used in the NSEC5KEY RR is defined in
Section 4 of [RFC6605] and thus is the same as the format used to
store ECDSA public keys in DNSKEY RRs.
This document defines EC-ED25519-SHA256 NSEC5 algorithm as follows:
o The NSEC5 proof and NSEC5 hash are the same as with EC-P256-SHA256
but using Ed25519 elliptic curve with parameters defined in
[RFC7748] Section 4.1.
o The public key format to be used in the NSEC5KEY RR is defined in
Section 3 of [RFC8080] and thus is the same as the format used to
store Ed25519 public keys in DNSKEY RRs.
5. The NSEC5KEY Resource Record
The NSEC5KEY RR stores a public NSEC5 key. The key allows clients to
validate an NSEC5 proof sent by a server.
5.1. NSEC5KEY RDATA Wire Format
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The RDATA for NSEC5KEY RR is as shown below:
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Algorithm | Public Key /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Algorithm is a single octet identifying the NSEC5 algorithm.
Public Key is a variable-sized field holding public key material for
NSEC5 proof verification.
5.2. NSEC5KEY RDATA Presentation Format
The presentation format of the NSEC5KEY RDATA is as follows:
The Algorithm field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer.
The Public Key field is represented in Base64 encoding. Whitespace
is allowed within the Base64 text.
6. The NSEC5 Resource Record
The NSEC5 RR provides authenticated denial of existence for an RRset
or domain name. One NSEC5 RR represents one piece of an NSEC5 chain,
proving existence of the owner name and non-existence of other domain
names in the part of the hashed domain space covered until the next
owner name hashed in the RDATA.
6.1. NSEC5 RDATA Wire Format
The RDATA for NSEC5 RR is as shown below:
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Key Tag | Flags | Next Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Hashed Owner Name /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ Type Bit Maps /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Key Tag field contains the key tag value of the NSEC5KEY RR that
validates the NSEC5 RR, in network byte order. The value is computed
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from the NSEC5KEY RDATA using the same algorithm, which is used to
compute key tag values for DNSKEY RRs. The algorithm is defined in
[RFC4034].
The Flags field is a single octet. The meaning of individual bits of
the field is defined in Section 6.2.
The Next Length field is an unsigned single octet specifying the
length of the Next Hashed Owner Name field in octets.
The Next Hashed Owner Name field is a sequence of binary octets. It
contains an NSEC5 hash of the next domain name in the NSEC5 chain.
Type Bit Maps is a variable-sized field encoding RR types present at
the original owner name matching the NSEC5 RR. The format of the
field is equivalent to the format used in the NSEC3 RR, described in
[RFC5155].
6.2. NSEC5 Flags Field
The following one-bit NSEC5 flags are defined:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |W|O|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
O - Opt-Out flag
W - Wildcard flag
All the other flags are reserved for future use and MUST be zero.
The Opt-Out flag has the same semantics as in NSEC3. The definition
and considerations in [RFC5155] are valid, except that NSEC3 is
replaced by NSEC5.
The Wildcard flag indicates that a wildcard synthesis is possible at
the original domain name level (i.e., there is a wildcard node
immediately descending from the immediate ancestor of the original
domain name). The purpose of the Wildcard flag is to reduce the
maximum number of RRs required for an authenticated denial of
existence proof, as originally described in [I-D.gieben-nsec4]
Section 7.2.1.
6.3. NSEC5 RDATA Presentation Format
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The presentation format of the NSEC5 RDATA is as follows:
The Key Tag field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer.
The Flags field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer.
The Next Length field is not represented.
The Next Hashed Owner Name field is represented as a sequence of
case-insensitive Base32hex digits without any whitespace and without
padding.
The Type Bit Maps representation is equivalent to the representation
used in NSEC3 RR, described in [RFC5155].
7. The NSEC5PROOF Resource Record
The NSEC5PROOF record is not to be included in the zone file. The
NSEC5PROOF record contains the NSEC5 proof, proving the position of
the owner name in an NSEC5 chain.
7.1. NSEC5PROOF RDATA Wire Format
The RDATA for NSEC5PROOF is shown below:
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Key Tag | Owner Name Hash /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Key Tag field contains the key tag value of the NSEC5KEY RR that
validates the NSEC5PROOF RR, in network byte order.
Owner Name Hash is a variable-sized sequence of binary octets
encoding the NSEC5 proof of the owner name of the RR.
7.2. NSEC5PROOF RDATA Presentation Format
The presentation format of the NSEC5PROOF RDATA is as follows:
The Key Tag field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer.
The Owner Name Hash is represented in Base64 encoding. Whitespace is
allowed within the Base64 text.
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8. Types of Authenticated Denial of Existence with NSEC5
This section summarizes all possible types of authenticated denial of
existence. For each type the following lists are included:
1. Facts to prove: the minimum amount of information that an
authoritative server must provide to a client to assure the
client that the response content is valid.
2. Authoritative server proofs: the names for which the NSEC5PROOF
RRs are synthesized and added into the response along the NSEC5
RRs matching or covering each such name. These records together
prove the listed facts.
3. Validator checks: the individual checks that a validating server
is required to perform on a response. The response content is
considered valid only if all of the checks pass.
If NSEC5 is said to match a domain name, the owner name of the NSEC5
RR has to be equivalent to an NSEC5 hash of that domain name. If an
NSEC5 RR is said to cover a domain name, the NSEC5 hash of the domain
name must sort in canonical order between that NSEC5 RR's Owner Name
and Next Hashed Owner Name.
8.1. Name Error Responses
Facts to prove:
No RRset matching the QNAME exists.
No RRset matching the QNAME via wildcard expansion exists.
The QNAME does not fall into a delegation.
The QNAME does not fall into a DNAME redirection.
Authoritative server proofs:
NSEC5PROOF for closest encloser and matching NSEC5 RR.
NSEC5PROOF for next closer name and covering NSEC5 RR.
Validator checks:
Closest encloser is in the zone.
Closest encloser has the Wildcard flag cleared.
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Closest encloser does not have NS without SOA in the Type Bit Map.
Closest encloser does not have DNAME in the Type Bit Maps.
Next closer name is derived correctly.
Next closer name is not in the zone.
8.2. No Data Responses
The processing of a No Data response for DS QTYPE differs if the Opt-
Out is in effect. For DS QTYPE queries, the validator has two
possible checking paths. The correct path can be simply decided by
inspecting if the NSEC5 RR in the response matches the QNAME.
Note that the Opt-Out is valid only for DS QTYPE queries.
8.2.1. No Data Response, Opt-Out Not In Effect
Facts to prove:
An RRset matching the QNAME exists.
No QTYPE RRset matching the QNAME exists.
No CNAME RRset matching the QNAME exists.
Authoritative server proofs:
NSEC5PROOF for the QNAME and matching NSEC5 RR.
Validator checks:
The QNAME is in the zone.
The QNAME does not have QTYPE in the Type Bit Map.
The QNAME does not have CNAME in the Type Bit Map.
8.2.2. No Data Response, Opt-Out In Effect
Facts to prove:
The delegation is not covered by the NSEC5 chain.
Authoritative server proofs:
NSEC5PROOF for closest provable encloser and matching NSEC5 RR.
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Validator checks:
Closest provable encloser is in zone.
Closest provable encloser covers (not matches) the QNAME.
Closest provable encloser has the Opt-Out flag set.
8.3. Wildcard Responses
Facts to prove:
No RRset matching the QNAME exists.
No wildcard closer to the QNAME exists.
Authoritative server proofs:
NSEC5PROOF for next closer name and covering NSEC5 RR.
Validator checks:
Next closer name is derived correctly.
Next closer name is not in the zone.
8.4. Wildcard No Data Responses
Facts to prove:
No RRset matching the QNAME exists.
No QTYPE RRset exists at the wildcard matching the QNAME.
No CNAME RRset exists at the wildcard matching the QNAME.
No wildcard closer to the QNAME exists.
Authoritative server proofs:
NSEC5PROOF for source of synthesis (i.e., wildcard at closest
encloser) and matching NSEC5 RR.
NSEC5PROOF for next closer name and covering NSEC5 RR.
Validator checks:
Source of synthesis matches the QNAME.
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Source of synthesis does not have QTYPE in the Type Bit Map.
Source of synthesis does not have CNAME in the Type Bit Map.
Next closer name is derived correctly.
Next closer name is not in the zone.
9. Authoritative Server Considerations
9.1. Zone Signing
Zones using NSEC5 MUST satisfy the same properties as described in
Section 7.1 of [RFC5155], with NSEC3 replaced by NSEC5. In addition,
the following conditions MUST be satisfied as well:
o If the original owner name has a wildcard label immediately
descending from the original owner name, the corresponding NSEC5
RR MUST have the Wildcard flag set in the Flags field. Otherwise,
the flag MUST be cleared.
o The zone apex MUST include an NSEC5KEY RRset containing a NSEC5
public key allowing verification of the current NSEC5 chain.
The following steps describe one possible method to properly add
required NSEC5 related records into a zone. This is not the only
such existing method.
1. Select an algorithm for NSEC5. Generate the public and private
NSEC5 keys.
2. Add a NSEC5KEY RR into the zone apex containing the public NSEC5
key.
3. For each unique original domain name in the zone and each empty
non-terminal, add an NSEC5 RR. If Opt-Out is used, owner names
of unsigned delegations MAY be excluded.
a. The owner name of the NSEC5 RR is the NSEC5 hash of the
original owner name encoded in Base32hex without padding,
prepended as a single label to the zone name.
b. Set the Key Tag field to be the key tag corresponding to the
public NSEC5 key.
c. Clear the Flags field. If Opt-Out is being used, set the
Opt-Out flag. If there is a wildcard label directly
descending from the original domain name, set the Wildcard
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flag. Note that the wildcard can be an empty non-terminal
(i.e., the wildcard synthesis does not take effect and
therefore the flag is not to be set).
d. Set the Next Length field to a value determined by the used
NSEC5 algorithm. Leave the Next Hashed Owner Name field
blank.
e. Set the Type Bit Maps field based on the RRsets present at
the original owner name.
4. Sort the set of NSEC5 RRs into canonical order.
5. For each NSEC5 RR, set the Next Hashed Owner Name field by using
the owner name of the next NSEC5 RR in the canonical order. If
the updated NSEC5 is the last NSEC5 RR in the chain, the owner
name of the first NSEC5 RR in the chain is used instead.
The NSEC5KEY and NSEC5 RRs MUST have the same class as the zone SOA
RR. Also the NSEC5 RRs SHOULD have the same TTL value as the SOA
minimum TTL field.
Notice that a use of Opt-Out is not indicated in the zone. This does
not affect the ability of a server to prove insecure delegations.
The Opt-Out MAY be part of the zone-signing tool configuration.
9.1.1. Precomputing Closest Provable Encloser Proofs
The worst-case scenario when answering a negative query with NSEC5
requires authoritative server to respond with two NSEC5PROOF RRs and
two NSEC5 RRs. Per Section 8, one pair of NSEC5PROOF and NSEC5 RRs
corresponds to the closest provable encloser, and the other pair
corresponds to the next closer name. The NSEC5PROOF corresponding to
the next closer name MUST be computed on the fly by the authoritative
server when responding to the query. However, the NSEC5PROOF
corresponding to the closest provable encloser MAY be precomputed and
stored as part of zone signing.
Precomputing NSEC5PROOF RRs can halve the number of online
cryptographic computations required when responding to a negative
query. NSEC5PROOF RRs MAY be precomputed as part of zone signing as
follows: For each NSEC5 RR, compute an NSEC5PROOF RR corresponding to
the original owner name of the NSEC5 RR. The content of the
precomputed NSEC5PROOF record MUST be the same as if the record was
computed on the fly when serving the zone. NSEC5PROOF records are
not part of the zone and SHOULD be stored separately from the zone
file.
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9.2. Zone Serving
This specification modifies DNSSEC-enabled DNS responses generated by
authoritative servers. In particular, it replaces use of NSEC or
NSEC3 RRs in such responses with NSEC5 RRs and adds NSEC5PROOF RRs.
According to the type of a response, an authoritative server MUST
include NSEC5 RRs in the response, as defined in Section 8. For each
NSEC5 RR in the response, a corresponding RRSIG RRset and an
NSEC5PROOF MUST be added as well. The NSEC5PROOF RR has its owner
name set to the domain name required according to Section 8. The
class and TTL of the NSEC5PROOF RR MUST be the same as the class and
TTL value of the corresponding NSEC5 RR. The RDATA payload of the
NSEC5PROOF is set according to the description in Section 7.1.
Notice that the NSEC5PROOF owner name can be a wildcard (e.g., source
of synthesis proof in wildcard No Data responses). The name also
always matches the domain name required for the proof while the NSEC5
RR may only cover (not match) the name in the proof (e.g., closest
encloser in Name Error responses).
If NSEC5 is used, an answering server MUST use exactly one NSEC5
chain for one signed zone.
NSEC5 MUST NOT be used in parallel with NSEC, NSEC3, or any other
authenticated denial of existence mechanism that allows for
enumeration of zone contents, as this would defeat a principal
security goal of NSEC5.
Similarly to NSEC3, the owner names of NSEC5 RRs are not represented
in the NSEC5 chain and therefore NSEC5 records deny their own
existence. The desired behavior caused by this paradox is the same
as described in Section 7.2.8 of [RFC5155].
9.3. NSEC5KEY Rollover Mechanism
Replacement of the NSEC5 key implies generating a new NSEC5 chain.
The NSEC5KEY rollover mechanism is similar to "Pre-Publish Zone
Signing Key Rollover" as specified in [RFC6781]. The NSEC5KEY
rollover MUST be performed as a sequence of the following steps:
1. A new public NSEC5 key is added into the NSEC5KEY RRset in the
zone apex.
2. The old NSEC5 chain is replaced by a new NSEC5 chain constructed
using the new key. This replacement MUST happen as a single
atomic operation; the server MUST NOT be responding with RRs from
both the new and old chain at the same time.
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3. The old public key is removed from the NSEC5KEY RRset in the zone
apex.
The minimum delay between steps 1 and 2 MUST be the time it takes for
the data to propagate to the authoritative servers, plus the TTL
value of the old NSEC5KEY RRset.
The minimum delay between steps 2 and 3 MUST be the time it takes for
the data to propagate to the authoritative servers, plus the maximum
zone TTL value of any of the data in the previous version of the
zone.
9.4. Secondary Servers
This document does not define mechanism to distribute private NSEC5
keys. See Section 15.2 for security considerations for private NSEC5
keys.
9.5. Zones Using Unknown NSEC5 Algorithms
Zones that are signed with unknown NSEC5 algorithm or an unavailable
private NSEC5 key cannot be effectively served. Such zones SHOULD be
rejected when loading and servers SHOULD respond with RCODE=2 (Server
failure) when handling queries that would fall under such zones.
9.6. Dynamic Updates
A zone signed using NSEC5 MAY accept dynamic updates [RFC2136]. The
changes to the zone MUST be performed in a way that ensures that the
zone satisfies the properties specified in Section 9.1 at any time.
The process described in [RFC5155] Section 7.5 describes how to
handle the issues surrounding the handling of empty non-terminals as
well as Opt-Out.
It is RECOMMENDED that the server rejects all updates containing
changes to the NSEC5 chain and its related RRSIG RRs, and performs
itself any required alternations of the NSEC5 chain induced by the
update. Alternatively, the server MUST verify that all the
properties are satisfied prior to performing the update atomically.
10. Resolver Considerations
The same considerations as described in Section 9 of [RFC5155] for
NSEC3 apply to NSEC5. In addition, as NSEC5 RRs can be validated
only with appropriate NSEC5PROOF RRs, the NSEC5PROOF RRs MUST be all
together cached and included in responses with NSEC5 RRs.
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11. Validator Considerations
11.1. Validating Responses
The validator MUST ignore NSEC5 RRs with Flags field values other
than the ones defined in Section 6.2.
The validator MAY treat responses as bogus if the response contains
NSEC5 RRs that refer to a different NSEC5KEY.
According to a type of a response, the validator MUST verify all
conditions defined in Section 8. Prior to making decision based on
the content of NSEC5 RRs in a response, the NSEC5 RRs MUST be
validated.
To validate a denial of existence, public NSEC5 keys for the zone are
required in addition to DNSSEC public keys. Similarly to DNSKEY RRs,
the NSEC5KEY RRs are present at the zone apex.
The NSEC5 RR is validated as follows:
1. Select a correct public NSEC5 key to validate the NSEC5 proof.
The Key Tag value of the NSEC5PROOF RR must match with the key
tag value computed from the NSEC5KEY RDATA.
2. Validate the NSEC5 proof present in the NSEC5PROOF Owner Name
Hash field using the public NSEC5 key. If there are multiple
NSEC5KEY RRs matching the key tag, at least one of the keys must
validate the NSEC5 proof.
3. Compute the NSEC5 hash value from the NSEC5 proof and check if
the response contains NSEC5 RR matching or covering the computed
NSEC5 hash. The TTL values of the NSEC5 and NSEC5PROOF RRs must
be the same.
4. Validate the signature on the NSEC5 RR.
If the NSEC5 RR fails to validate, it MUST be ignored. If some of
the conditions required for an NSEC5 proof are not satisfied, the
response MUST be treated as bogus.
Notice that determining the closest encloser and next closer name in
NSEC5 is easier than in NSEC3. NSEC5 and NSEC5PROOF RRs are always
present in pairs in responses and the original owner name of the
NSEC5 RR matches the owner name of the NSEC5PROOF RR.
11.2. Validating Referrals to Unsigned Subzones
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The same considerations as defined in Section 8.9 of [RFC5155] for
NSEC3 apply to NSEC5.
11.3. Responses With Unknown NSEC5 Algorithms
A validator MUST ignore NSEC5KEY RRs with unknown NSEC5 algorithms.
The practical result of this is that zones signed with unknown
algorithms will be considered bogus.
12. Special Considerations
12.1. Transition Mechanism
[TODO: The following information will be covered.]
o Transition to NSEC5 from NSEC/NSEC3
o Transition from NSEC5 to NSEC/NSEC3
o Transition to new NSEC5 algorithms
12.2. Private NSEC5 keys
This document does not define a format to store private NSEC5 keys.
Use of a standardized and adopted format is RECOMMENDED.
The private NSEC5 key MAY be shared between multiple zones, however a
separate key is RECOMMENDED for each zone.
12.3. Domain Name Length Restrictions
NSEC5 creates additional restrictions on domain name lengths. In
particular, zones with names that, when converted into hashed owner
names, exceed the 255 octet length limit imposed by [RFC1035] cannot
use this specification.
The actual maximum length of a domain name depends on the length of
the zone name and the NSEC5 algorithm used.
All NSEC5 algorithms defined in this document use 256-bit NSEC5 hash
values. Such a value can be encoded in 52 characters in Base32hex
without padding. When constructing the NSEC5 RR owner name, the
encoded hash is prepended to the name of the zone as a single label
which includes the length field of a single octet. The maximum
length of the zone name in wire format using the 256-bit hash is
therefore 202 octets (255 - 53).
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13. Implementation Status
NSEC5 has been implemented for the Knot DNS authoritative server
(version 1.6.4) and the Unbound recursive server (version 1.5.9).
The implementation did not introduce additional library dependencies;
all cryptographic primitives are already present in OpenSSL v1.0.2j,
which is used by both implementations. The implementation supports
the full spectrum of negative responses, (i.e., NXDOMAIN, NODATA,
Wildcard, Wildcard NODATA, and unsigned delegation). The
implementation supports the EC-P256-SHA256 algorithm. The code is
deliberately modular, so that the EC-ED25519-SHA256 algorithm could
be implemented by using the Ed25519 elliptic curve [RFC8080] as a
drop-in replacement for the P256 elliptic curve. The authoritative
server implements the optimization from Section 9.1.1 to precompute
the NSEC5PROOF RRs matching each NSEC5 record.
14. Performance Considerations
The performance of NSEC5 has been evaluated in [nsec5ecc].
15. Security Considerations
15.1. Zone Enumeration Attacks
NSEC5 is robust to zone enumeration via offline dictionary attacks by
any attacker that does not know the private NSEC5 key. Without the
private NSEC5 key, that attacker cannot compute the NSEC5 proof that
corresponds to a given domain name. The only way it can learn the
NSEC5 proof value for a domain name is by querying the authoritative
server for that name. Without the NSEC5 proof value, the attacker
cannot learn the NSEC5 hash value. Thus, even an attacker that
collects the entire chain of NSEC5 RR for a zone cannot use offline
attacks to "reverse" that NSEC5 hash values in these NSEC5 RR and
thus learn which names are present in the zone. A formal
cryptographic proof of this property is in [nsec5] and [nsec5ecc].
15.2. Compromise of the Private NSEC5 Key
NSEC5 requires authoritative servers to hold the private NSEC5 key,
but not the private zone-signing keys or the private key-signing keys
for the zone.
The private NSEC5 key cannot be used to modify zone contents, because
zone contents are signed using the private zone-signing key. As
such, a compromise of the private NSEC5 key does not compromise the
integrity of the zone. An adversary that learns the private NSEC5
key can, however, perform offline zone-enumeration attacks. For this
reason, the private NSEC5 key need only be as secure as the DNSSEC
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records whose privacy (against zone enumeration) is being protected
by NSEC5. A formal cryptographic proof of this property is in
[nsec5] and [nsec5ecc].
To preserve this property of NSEC5, the private NSEC5 key MUST be
different from the private zone-signing keys or key-signing keys for
the zone.
15.3. Key Length Considerations
The NSEC5 key must be long enough to withstand attacks for as long as
the privacy of the zone contents is important. Even if the NSEC5 key
is rolled frequently, its length cannot be too short, because zone
privacy may be important for a period of time longer than the
lifetime of the key. For example, an attacker might collect the
entire chain of NSEC5 RR for the zone over one short period, and
then, later (even after the NSEC5 key expires) perform an offline
dictionary attack that attempt to "reverse" the NSEC5 hash values
present in the NSEC5 RRs. This is in contrast to zone-signing and
key-signing keys used in DNSSEC; these keys, which ensure the
authenticity and integrity of the zone contents, need to remain
secure only during their lifetime.
15.4. NSEC5 Hash Collisions
If the NSEC5 hash of a QNAME collides with the NSEC5 hash of the
owner name of an NSEC5 RR, it will be impossible to prove the non-
existence of the colliding QNAME. However, the NSEC5 VRFs ensure
that obtaining such a collision is as difficult as obtaining a
collision in the SHA-256 hash function (requiring approximately 2^128
effort). Note that DNSSEC already relies on the assumption that a
cryptographic hash function is collision-resistant, since these hash
functions are used for generating and validating signatures and DS
RRs. See also the discussion on key lengths in [nsec5].
16. IANA Considerations
This document updates the IANA registry "Domain Name System (DNS)
Parameters" in subregistry "Resource Record (RR) TYPEs", by defining
the following new RR types:
NSEC5KEY value TBD.
NSEC5 value TBD.
NSEC5PROOF value TBD.
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This document creates a new IANA registry for NSEC5 algorithms. This
registry is named "DNSSEC NSEC5 Algorithms". The initial content of
the registry is:
0 is Reserved.
1 is EC-P256-SHA256.
2 is EC-ED25519-SHA256.
3-255 is Available for assignment.
This document updates the IANA registry "DNS Security Algorithm
Numbers" by defining following aliases:
TBD is NSEC5-ECDSAP256SHA256 alias for ECDSAP256SHA256 (13).
TBD is NSEC5-ED25519, alias for ED25519 (15).
17. Contributors
This document would not be possible without help of Moni Naor
(Weizmann Institute), Sachin Vasant (Cisco Systems), Leonid Reyzin
(Boston University), and Asaf Ziv (Weizmann Institute) who
contributed to the design of NSEC5. Ondrej Sury (CZ.NIC Labs), and
Duane Wessels (Verisign Labs) provided advice on the implementation
of NSEC5, and assisted with evaluating its performance.
18. References
18.1. Normative References
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2136] Vixie, P., Ed., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
"Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
RFC 2136, DOI 10.17487/RFC2136, April 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2136>.
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[RFC2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181>.
[RFC2308] Andrews, M., "Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS
NCACHE)", RFC 2308, DOI 10.17487/RFC2308, March 1998,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2308>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
4033, March 2005.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5114] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "Additional Diffie-Hellman
Groups for Use with IETF Standards", RFC 5114, DOI
10.17487/RFC5114, January 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5114>.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
[RFC6234] Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 10.17487
/RFC6234, May 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6234>.
[RFC6605] Hoffman, P. and W. Wijngaards, "Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 6605, April
2012.
[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8080] Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security
Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080, DOI 10.17487/
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RFC8080, February 2017,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8080>.
[FIPS-186-3]
National Institute for Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-3, June 2009.
[SECG1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group (SECG), "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Version 2.0, May 2009,
<http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
18.2. Informative References
[nsec5] Goldberg, S., Naor, M., Papadopoulos, D., Reyzin, L.,
Vasant, S., and A. Ziv, "NSEC5: Provably Preventing DNSSEC
Zone Enumeration", in NDSS'15, July 2014, <https://
eprint.iacr.org/2014/582.pdf>.
[nsec5ecc]
Papadopoulos, D., Wessels, D., Huque, S., Vcelak, J.,
Naor, M., Reyzin, L., and S. Goldberg, "Can NSEC5 be
Practical for DNSSEC Deployments?", in ePrint Cryptology
Archive 2017/099, February 2017, <https://eprint.iacr.org/
2017/099.pdf>.
[nsec3gpu]
Wander, M., Schwittmann, L., Boelmann, C., and T. Weis,
"GPU-Based NSEC3 Hash Breaking", in IEEE Symp. Network
Computing and Applications (NCA), 2014.
[nsec3walker]
Bernstein, D., "Nsec3 walker", 2011,
<http://dnscurve.org/nsec3walker.html>.
[nmap-nsec-enum]
Bond, J., "nmap: dns-nsec-enum", 2011, <https://nmap.org/
nsedoc/scripts/dns-nsec-enum.html>.
[nmap-nsec3-enum]
Nikolic, A. and J. Bond, "nmap: dns-nsec3-enum", 2011,
<https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/dns-nsec3-enum.html>.
[nsec3map]
anonion0, ., "nsec3map with John the Ripper plugin", 2015,
<https://github.com/anonion0/nsec3map.>.
[ldns-walk]
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NLNetLabs, ., "ldns", 2015,
<http://git.nlnetlabs.nl/ldns/tree/examples/ldns-walk.c>.
[MRV99] Michali, S., Rabin, M., and S. Vadhan, "Verifiable Random
Functions", in FOCS, 1999.
[RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6781, December 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781>.
[RFC7129] Gieben, R. and W. Mekking, "Authenticated Denial of
Existence in the DNS", RFC 7129, DOI 10.17487/RFC7129,
February 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7129>.
[RFC7719] Hoffman, P., Sullivan, A., and K. Fujiwara, "DNS
Terminology", RFC 7719, DOI 10.17487/RFC7719, December
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7719>.
[I-D.gieben-nsec4]
Gieben, R. and M. Mekking, "DNS Security (DNSSEC)
Authenticated Denial of Existence", draft-gieben-nsec4-01
(work in progress), July 2012.
Appendix A. Elliptic Curve VRF
The Elliptic Curve Verifiable Random Function (EC-VRF) operates in a
cyclic group G of prime order with generator g. The cyclic group G
MAY be over the NIST-P256 elliptic curve, with curve parameters as
specified in [FIPS-186-3] (Section D.1.2.3) and [RFC5114]
(Section 2.6). The group G MAY alternatively be over the Ed25519
elliptic curve with parameters defined in [RFC7748] (Section 4.1).
The security of this VRF follows from the decisional Diffie-Hellman
(DDH) assumption in the cyclic group G in the random oracle model.
Formal security proofs for this VRF are in [nsec5ecc].
Fixed options:
G - elliptic curve (EC) group
Used parameters:
g^x - EC public key
x - EC private key
q - prime order of group G
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g - generator of group G
Used primitives:
"" - empty octet string
|| - octet string concatenation
p^k - EC point multiplication
p1*p2 - EC point addition
SHA256 - hash function SHA-256 as specified in [RFC6234]
ECP2OS - EC point to octet string conversion with point
compression as specified in Section 2.3.3 of [SECG1]
OS2ECP - octet string to EC point conversion with point
compression as specified in Section 2.3.4 of [SECG1]
A.1. EC-VRF Auxiliary Functions
A.1.1. EC-VRF Hash To Curve
ECVRF_hash_to_curve(m)
Input:
m - value to be hashed, an octet string
Output:
h - hashed value, EC point
Steps:
1. c = 0
2. C = I2OSP(c, 4)
3. xc = SHA256(m || C)
4. p = 0x02 || xc
5. If p is not a valid octet string representing encoded compressed
point in G:
a. c = c + 1
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b. Go to step 2.
6. h = OS2ECP(p)
7. Output h
A.1.2. EC-VRF Hash Points
ECVRF_hash_points(p_1, p_2, ..., p_n)
Input:
p_x - EC point in G
Output:
h - hash value, integer between 0 and 2^128-1
Steps:
1. P = ""
2. for p in [p_1, p_2, ... p_n]:
P = P || ECP2OS(p)
3. h' = SHA256(P)
4. h = OS2IP(first 16 octets of h')
5. Output h
A.1.3. EC-VRF Decode Proof
ECVRF_decode_proof(pi)
Input:
pi - VRF proof, octet string (81 octets)
Output:
gamma - EC point
c - integer between 0 and 2^128-1
s - integer between 0 and 2^256-1
Steps:
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1. let gamma', c', s' be pi split after 33-rd and 49-th octet
2. gamma = OS2ECP(gamma')
3. c = OS2IP(c')
4. s = OS2IP(s')
5. Output gamma, c, and s
A.2. EC-VRF Proving
ECVRF_PROVE(g^x, x, alpha)
Input:
g^x - EC public key
x - EC private key
alpha - message to be signed, octet string
Output:
pi - VRF proof, octet string (81 octets)
beta - VRF hash, octet string (32 octets)
Steps:
1. h = ECVRF_hash_to_curve(alpha)
2. gamma = h^x
3. choose a nonce k from [0, q-1]
4. c = ECVRF_hash_points(g, h, g^x, h^x, g^k, h^k)
5. s = k - c*q mod q
6. pi = ECP2OS(gamma) || I2OSP(c, 16) || I2OSP(s, 32)
7. beta = h2(gamma)
8. Output pi and beta
A.3. EC-VRF Proof To Hash
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ECVRF_PROOF2HASH(gamma)
Input:
gamma - VRF proof, EC point in G with coordinates (x, y)
Output:
beta - VRF hash, octet string (32 octets)
Steps:
1. beta = I2OSP(x, 32)
2. Output beta
Note: Because of the format of the compressed form of an elliptic
curve, the hash can be retrieved from an encoded gamma simply by
omitting the first octet of the gamma.
A.4. EC-VRF Verifying
ECVRF_VERIFY(g^x, pi, alpha)
Input:
g^x - EC public key
pi - VRF proof, octet string
alpha - message to verify, octet string
Output:
"valid signature" or "invalid signature"
beta - VRF hash, octet string (32 octets)
Steps:
1. gamma, c, s = ECVRF_decode_proof(pi)
2. u = (g^x)^c * g^s
3. h = ECVRF_hash_to_curve(alpha)
4. v = gamma^c * h^s
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5. c' = ECVRF_hash_points(g, h, g^x, gamma, u, v)
6. beta = ECVRF_PROOF2HASH(gamma)
7. If c and c' are the same, output "valid signature"; else output
"invalid signature". Output beta.
[[TODO: check validity of gamma before hashing]]
Appendix B. Change Log
Note to RFC Editor: if this document does not obsolete an existing
RFC, please remove this appendix before publication as an RFC.
pre 00 - initial version of the document submitted to mailing list
only
00 - fix NSEC5KEY rollover mechanism, clarify NSEC5PROOF RDATA,
clarify inputs and outputs for NSEC5 proof and NSEC5 hash
computation.
01 - Add Performance Considerations section.
02 - Add elliptic curve based VRF. Add measurement of response
sizes based on empirical data.
03 - Mention precomputed NSEC5PROOF Values in Performance
Considerations section.
04 - Edit Rationale, How NSEC5 Works, and Security Consideration
sections for clarity. Edit Zone Signing section, adding
precomputation of NSEC5PROOFs. Remove RSA-based NSEC5
specification. Rewrite Performance Considerations and
Implementation Status sections.
Authors' Addresses
Jan Vcelak
CZ.NIC
Milesovska 1136/5
Praha 130 00
CZ
EMail: jan.vcelak@nic.cz
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Sharon Goldberg
Boston University
111 Cummington St, MCS135
Boston, MA 02215
USA
EMail: goldbe@cs.bu.edu
Dimitrios Papadopoulos
University of Maryland
8223 Paint Branch Dr
College Park, MD 20740
USA
EMail: dipapado@umd.edu
Shumon Huque
Salesforce
2550 Wasser Terrace
Herndon, VA 20171
USA
EMail: shuque@gmail.com
David C Lawrence
Akamai Technologies
150 Broadway
Boston, MA 02142-1054
USA
EMail: tale@akamai.com
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