OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura, Ed.
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: July 22, 2016 Ping Identity
January 19, 2016
OAuth 2.0 JWT Authorization Request
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-07
Abstract
The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] utilizes query
parameter serialization, which means that parameters are encoded in
the URI of the request. This document introduces the ability to send
request parameters in form of a JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which
allows the request to be signed and encrypted. using JWT
serialization. The request is sent by value or by reference.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 22, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 10
4.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 11
5. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 12
6. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Revision History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
The OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC 6749] defines the encoding of
requests and responses and in case of the authorization request query
parameter serialization has been chosen. For example, the parameters
'response_type', 'client_id', 'state', and 'redirect_uri' are encoded
in the URI of the request:
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz &redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
The encoding in the URI does not allow application layer security
with confidentiality and integrity protection to be used. While TLS
is used to offer communication security between the client and the
resource server, TLS sessions are often terminated prematurely at
some middlebox (such as a load balancer). The use of application
layer security additionally allows requests to be prepared by a third
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party so that a client application cannot request more permissions
than previously agreed. This offers an additional degree of privacy
protection.
Further, the request by reference allows to reduce the over-the-wire
overhead.
There are other potential formats that could be used for this purpose
instead of JWT. The JWT was chosen because of
1. its close relationship with JSON, which is used as OAuth's
response format;
2. its developer friendliness due to its textaual nature;
3. its relative compactness compared to XML;
4. its development status that it is an RFC and so is its associated
signing and encryption methods as [RFC7515] and [RFC7516].
The parameters "request" and "request_uri" are introduced as
additional authorization request parameters for the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] flows. The "request" parameter is a JSON Web Token (JWT)
[RFC7519] whose JWT Claims Set holds the JSON encoded OAuth 2.0
authorization request parameters. The JWT [RFC7519] can be passed to
the authorization endpoint by reference, in which case the parameter
"request_uri" is used instead of the "request".
Using JWT [RFC7519] as the request encoding instead of query
parameters has several advantages:
1. The request can be signed so that an integrity check can be
implemented. If a suitable algorithm is used for the signing,
then it will provide verification of the client making the
request.
2. The request may be encrypted so that end-to-end confidentiality
may be obtained even if in the case TLS connection is terminated
at a gateway or a similar device.
3. The request may be signed by a third party attesting that the
authorization request is compliant to certain policy. For
example, a request can be pre-examined by a third party that all
the personal data requested is strictly necessary to perform the
process that the end-user asked for, and statically signed by
that third party. The client would then send the request along
with dynamic parameters such as state. The authorization server
then examines the signature and shows the conformance status to
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the end-user, who would have some assurance as to the legitimacy
of the request when authorizing it. In some cases, it may even
be desirable to skip the authorization dialogue under such
circumstances.
There are a few cases that request by reference are useful such as:
1. When it is desirable to reduced the size of transmitted request.
Since we are using application layer security, it may
substantially increase the size of the request particulary in the
case of using public key cryptography.
2. Static signature: The client can make a signed Request Object and
put it at a place that the Authorization Server can access. This
may just be done by a client utility or other process, so that
the private key does not have to reside on the client,
simplifying programming. Downside of it is that the signed
portion just become a token.
3. When the server wants the requests to be cacheable: The
request_uri may include a SHA-256 hash of the contents of the
resources referenced by the Request URI. With this, the server
knows if the resource has changed without fetching it, so it does
not have to re-fetch the same content, which is a win as well.
This is explained in Section 4.2.
This capability is in use by OpenID Connect [OpenID.Core].
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Terminology
For the purposes of this specification, the following terms and
definitions apply.
2.1. Request Object
JWT [RFC7519] that holds an OAuth 2.0 authorization request as JWT
Claims Set
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2.2. Request Object URI
Absolute URI from which the Request Object (Section 2.1) can be
obtained
3. Request Object
A Request Object (Section 2.1) is used to provide authorization
request parameters for an OAuth 2.0 authorization request. It
contains OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] authorization request parameters
including extension parameters. The parameters are represented as
the JWT claims. Parameter names and string values MUST be included
as JSON strings. Numerical values MUST be included as JSON numbers.
It MAY include any extension parameters. This JSON [RFC7159]
constitutes the JWT Claims Set [RFC7519]. The JWS Claims Set is then
signed, encrypted, or signed and encrypted.
To sign, JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515] is used. The result is a
JWS signed JWT [RFC7519]. If signed, the Authorization Request
Object SHOULD contain the Claims "iss" (issuer) and "aud" (audience)
as members, with their semantics being the same as defined in the JWT
[RFC7519] specification.
To encrypt, JWE [RFC7516] is used. Note that JWE is always integrity
protected, so if only integrity protection is desired, JWS signature
is not needed.
It can also be signed then encrypted. This is sometimes desired to
reduced the repudiation risk from the point of view of the receiver.
In this case, it MUST be signed then encrypted, with the result being
a Nested JWT, as defined in JWT [RFC7519].
The Authorization Request Object may be sent by value as described in
Section 4.1 or by reference as described in Section 4.2.
REQUIRED OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters that are not
included in the Request Object MUST be sent as query parameters. If
a required parameter is missing from both the query parameters and
the Request Object, the request is malformed.
"request" and "request_uri" parameters MUST NOT be included in
Request Objects.
If the parameter exists in both the query string and the
Authorization Request Object, the values in the Request Object take
precedence. This means that if it intends to use a cached request
object, it cannot include parameters such as "state" that are
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expected to differ in every request. It is fine to include them in
the request object if it is going to be prepared afresh every time.
The following is a non-normative example of the Claims in a Request
Object before base64url encoding and signing. Note that it includes
extension variables such as "nonce" and "max_age".
{
"iss": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"aud": "https://server.example.com",
"response_type": "code id_token",
"client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"redirect_uri": "https://client.example.org/cb",
"scope": "openid",
"state": "af0ifjsldkj",
"nonce": "n-0S6_WzA2Mj",
"max_age": 86400
}
Signing it with the "RS256" algorithm results in this Request Object
value (with line wraps within values for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3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.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs
F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF
KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx
0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K
ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG
iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
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The following RSA public key, represented in JWK format, can be used
to validate the Request Object signature in this and subsequent
Request Object examples (with line wraps within values for display
purposes only):
{
"kty":"RSA",
"kid":"k2bdc",
"n":"y9Lqv4fCp6Ei-u2-ZCKq83YvbFEk6JMs_pSj76eMkddWRuWX2aBKGHAtKlE5P
7_vn__PCKZWePt3vGkB6ePgzAFu08NmKemwE5bQI0e6kIChtt_6KzT5OaaXDF
I6qCLJmk51Cc4VYFaxgqevMncYrzaW_50mZ1yGSFIQzLYP8bijAHGVjdEFgZa
ZEN9lsn_GdWLaJpHrB3ROlS50E45wxrlg9xMncVb8qDPuXZarvghLL0HzOuYR
adBJVoWZowDNTpKpk2RklZ7QaBO7XDv3uR7s_sf2g-bAjSYxYUGsqkNA9b3xV
W53am_UZZ3tZbFTIh557JICWKHlWj5uzeJXaw",
"e":"AQAB"
}
4. Authorization Request
The client constructs the authorization request URI by adding one of
the following parameters but not both to the query component of the
authorization endpoint URI using the "application/x-www-form-
urlencoded" format:
request The Request Object (Section 3) that holds authorization
request parameters stated in the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
request_uri The absolute URL that points to the Request Object
(Section 3) that holds authorization request parameters stated in
the section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an
HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the
user-agent.
For example, the client directs the end-user's user-agent to make the
following HTTPS request:
GET /authz?request=eyJhbG..AlMGzw HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
The value for the request parameter is abbreviated for brevity.
The authorization request object MAY be signed AND/OR encrypted.
When the Request Object is used, the OAuth 2.0 request parameter
values contained in the JWT supersede those passed using the OAuth
2.0 request syntax. However, parameters MAY also be passed using the
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OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a Request Object is used; this
would typically be done to enable a cached, pre-signed (and possibly
pre-encrypted) Request Object value to be used containing the fixed
request parameters, while parameters that can vary with each request,
such as state and nonce, are passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters.
4.1. Passing a Request Object by Value
The Client sends the Authorization Request as a Request Object to the
Authorization Endpoint as the "request" parameter value.
The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request
using the "request" parameter (with line wraps within values for
display purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&scope=openid
&state=af0ifjsldkj
&nonce=n-0S6_WzA2Mj
&request=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiA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.nwwnNsk1-ZkbmnvsF6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4H
h-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyFKzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2
GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFC
UR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8Kol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImz
jT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPGiyon_-Te111V8uE83Il
zCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
4.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference
The "request_uri" Authorization Request parameter enables OAuth
authorization requests to be passed by reference, rather than by
value. This parameter is used identically to the "request"
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parameter, other than that the Request Object value is retrieved from
the resource at the specified URL, rather than passed by value.
When the "request_uri" parameter is used, the OAuth 2.0 authorization
request parameter values contained in the referenced JWT supersede
those passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax. However, parameters
MAY also be passed using the OAuth 2.0 request syntax even when a
"request_uri" is used; this would typically be done to enable a
cached, pre-signed (and possibly pre-encrypted) Request Object value
to be used containing the fixed request parameters, while parameters
that can vary with each request, such as "state" and "nonce", are
passed as OAuth 2.0 parameters.
Servers MAY cache the contents of the resources referenced by Request
URIs. If the contents of the referenced resource could ever change,
the URI SHOULD include the base64url encoded SHA-256 hash as defined
in FIPS180-2 [FIPS180-2] of the referenced resource contents as the
fragment component of the URI. If the fragment value used for a URI
changes, that signals the server that any cached value for that URI
with the old fragment value is no longer valid.
The entire Request URI MUST NOT exceed 512 ASCII characters. There
are three reasons for this restriction.
1. Many WAP / feature phones do not accept large payloads. The
restriction are typically either 512 or 1024 ASCII characters.
2. The maximum URL length supported by older versions of Internet
Explorer is 2083 ASCII characters.
3. On a slow connection such as 2G mobile connection, a large URL
would cause the slow response and using such is not advisable
from the user experience point of view.
The contents of the resource referenced by the URL MUST be a Request
Object. The scheme used in the "request_uri" value MUST be "https",
unless the target Request Object is signed in a way that is
verifiable by the Authorization Server. The "request_uri" value MUST
be reachable by the Authorization Server, and SHOULD be reachable by
the Client.
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The following is a non-normative example of the contents of a Request
Object resource that can be referenced by a "request_uri" (with line
wraps within values for display purposes only):
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImsyYmRjIn0.ew0KICJpc3MiOiAiczZCaGRSa3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.nwwnNsk1-Zkbmnvs
F6zTHm8CHERFMGQPhos-EJcaH4Hh-sMgk8ePrGhw_trPYs8KQxsn6R9Emo_wHwajyF
KzuMXZFSZ3p6Mb8dkxtVyjoy2GIzvuJT_u7PkY2t8QU9hjBcHs68PkgjDVTrG1uRTx
0GxFbuPbj96tVuj11pTnmFCUR6IEOXKYr7iGOCRB3btfJhM0_AKQUfqKnRlrRscc8K
ol-cSLWoYE9l5QqholImzjT_cMnNIznW9E7CDyWXTsO70xnB4SkG6pXfLSjLLlxmPG
iyon_-Te111V8uE83IlzCYIb_NMXvtTIVc1jpspnTSD7xMbpL-2QgwUsAlMGzw
4.2.1. URL Referencing the Request Object
The Client stores the Request Object resource either locally or
remotely at a URL the Authorization Server can access. This URL is
the Request URI, "request_uri".
It is possible for the Request Object to include values that is to be
revealed only to the Authorization Server. As such, the
"request_uri" MUST have appropriate entropy for its lifetime. It is
RECOMMENDED that it be removed if it is known that it will not be
used again or after a reasonable timeout unless access control
measures are taken.
The following is a non-normative example of a Request URI value (with
line wraps within values for display purposes only):
https://client.example.org/request.jwt#
GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
4.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter
The Client sends the Authorization Request to the Authorization
Endpoint.
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The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request
using the "request_uri" parameter (with line wraps within values for
display purposes only):
https://server.example.com/authorize?
response_type=code%20id_token
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Frequest.jwt
%23GkurKxf5T0Y-mnPFCHqWOMiZi4VS138cQO_V7PZHAdM
&state=af0ifjsldkj
4.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object
Upon receipt of the Request, the Authorization Server MUST send an
HTTP "GET" request to the "request_uri" to retrieve the referenced
Request Object, unless it is already cached, and parse it to recreate
the Authorization Request parameters.
Note that the client SHOULD use a unique URI for each request
utilizing distinct parameters, or otherwise prevent the Authorization
Server from caching the "request_uri".
The following is a non-normative example of this fetch process:
GET /request.jwt HTTP/1.1
Host: client.example.org
5. Validating JWT-Based Requests
5.1. Encrypted Request Object
The Authorization Server MUST decrypt the JWT in accordance with the
JSON Web Encryption [RFC7516] specification. If the result is a
signed request object, signature validation MUST be performed as
defined in Section 5.2 as well.
The Authorization Server MUST return an error if decryption fails.
5.2. Signed Request Object
To perform Signature Validation, the "alg" Header Parameter in the
JOSE Header MUST match the value of the pre-registered algorithm.
The signature MUST be validated against the appropriate key for that
"client_id" and algorithm.
The Authorization Server MUST return an error if signature validation
fails.
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5.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation
The Authorization Server MUST assemble the set of Authorization
Request parameters to be used from the Request Object value and the
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request parameters (minus the "request" or
"request_uri" parameters). If the same parameter exists both in the
Request Object and the OAuth Authorization Request parameters, the
parameter in the Request Object is used. Using the assembled set of
Authorization Request parameters, the Authorization Server then
validates the request as specified in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
6. Authorization Server Response
Authorization Server Response is created and sent to the client as in
Section 4 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] .
In addition, this document uses these additional error values:
invalid_request_uri The "request_uri" in the Authorization Request
returns an error or contains invalid data.
invalid_request_object The request parameter contains an invalid
Request Object.
request_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support the
use of the "request" parameter.
request_uri_not_supported The Authorization Server does not support
use of the "request_uri" parameter.
7. IANA Considerations
This specification requests no actions by IANA.
8. Security Considerations
In addition to the all the security considerations discussed in OAuth
2.0 [RFC6819], the following security considerations SHOULD be taken
into account.
When sending the authorization request object through "request"
parameter, it SHOULD be signed with then considered appropriate
algorithm using [RFC7515]. The "alg=none" SHOULD NOT be used in such
a case.
If the request object contains personally identifiable or sensitive
information, the "request_uri" MUST be of one-time use and MUST have
large enough entropy deemed necessary with applicable security
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policy. For higher security requirement, using [RFC7516] is strongly
recommended.
9. Acknowledgements
Follwoing people contributed to the creation of this document in
OAuth WG. (Affiliations at the time of the contribution is used.)
Sergey Beryozkin, Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), Michael B. Jones
(Microsoft), Jim Manico, Axel Nenker(DT), (add yourself).
Following people contributed to creating this document through the
OpenID Connect 1.0 [OpenID.Core].
Brian Campbell (Ping Identity), George Fletcher (AOL), Ryo Itou
(Yahoo! Japan), Edmund Jay (Illumila), Michael B. Jones
(Microsoft), Breno de Medeiros (Google), Hideki Nara (TACT), Justin
Richer (MITRE), (add yourself).
In addition following people contributed to this and previous
versions through The OAuth Working Group.
Dirk Balfanz (Google), James H. Manger (Telstra), John Panzer
(Google), David Recordon (Facebook), Marius Scurtescu (Google), Luke
Shepard (Facebook), (add yourself).
10. Revision History
-07
o Changed the abbrev to OAuth JAR from oauth-jar.
o Clarified sig and enc methods.
o Better English.
o Removed claims from one of the example.
o Re-worded the URI construction.
o Changed the example to use request instead of request_uri.
o Clarified that Request Object parameters takes precedence
regardless of request or request_uri parameters were used.
o Generalized the language in 4.2.1 to convey the intent more
clearly.
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o Changed "Server" to "Authorization Server" as a clarification.
o Stopped talking about request_object_signing_alg.
o IANA considerations now reflect the current status.
o Added Brian Campbell to the contributers list. Made the lists
alphabetic order based on the last names. Clarified that the
affiliation is at the time of the contribution.
o Added "older versions of " to the reference to IE uri length
limitations.
o Stopped talking about signed or unsigned JWS etc.
o 1.Introduction improved.
-06
o Added explanation on the 512 chars URL restriction.
o Updated Acknowledgements.
-05
o More alignment with OpenID Connect.
-04
o Fixed typos in examples. (request_url -> request_uri, cliend_id ->
client_id)
o Aligned the error messages with the OAuth IANA registry.
o Added another rationale for having request object.
-03
o Fixed the non-normative description about the advantage of static
signature.
o Changed the requirement for the parameter values in the request
itself and the request object from 'MUST MATCH" to 'Req Obj takes
precedence.
-02
o Now that they are RFCs, replaced JWS, JWE, etc. with RFC numbers.
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-01
o Copy Edits.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[FIPS180-2]
U.S. Department of Commerce and National Institute of
Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash Signature
Standard", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
Defines Secure Hash Algorithm 256 (SHA256)
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6819] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6819, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
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[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
11.2. Informative References
[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", February 2014.
Authors' Addresses
Nat Sakimura (editor)
Nomura Research Institute
1-6-5 Marunouchi, Marunouchi Kitaguchi Bldg.
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0005
Japan
Phone: +81-3-5533-2111
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Casilla 177, Sucursal Talagante
Talagante, RM
Chile
Phone: +44 20 8133 3718
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
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