The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR)
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-17
|
| Document |
Type |
|
Active Internet-Draft (oauth WG)
|
|
Last updated |
|
2018-12-21
(latest revision 2018-10-21)
|
|
Replaces |
|
draft-sakimura-oauth-requrl
|
|
Stream |
|
IETF
|
|
Intended RFC status |
|
Proposed Standard
|
|
Formats |
|
plain text
xml
pdf
html
bibtex
|
|
Reviews |
|
|
| Stream |
WG state
|
|
Submitted to IESG for Publication
(wg milestone:
Apr 2016 - Submit 'Request by J...
)
|
|
Document shepherd |
|
Hannes Tschofenig
|
|
Shepherd write-up |
|
Show
(last changed 2016-10-10)
|
| IESG |
IESG state |
|
Approved-announcement to be sent::Revised I-D Needed
|
|
Consensus Boilerplate |
|
Yes
|
|
Telechat date |
|
|
|
Responsible AD |
|
Eric Rescorla
|
|
Send notices to |
|
(None)
|
| IANA |
IANA review state |
|
IANA OK - No Actions Needed
|
|
IANA action state |
|
None
|
OAuth Working Group N. Sakimura
Internet-Draft Nomura Research Institute
Intended status: Standards Track J. Bradley
Expires: April 24, 2019 Yubico
October 21, 2018
The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request
(JAR)
draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-17
Abstract
The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes
query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request
parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through
user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it
means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not
integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b)
the source of the communication is not authenticated. Because of
these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put
forward.
This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a
JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed
with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and encrypted with JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication and
confidentiality property of the Authorization Request is attained.
The request can be sent by value or by reference.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 24, 2019.
Sakimura & Bradley Expires April 24, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft OAuth JAR October 2018
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Request Object URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Symbols and abbreviated terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Passing a Request Object by Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Passing a Request Object by Reference . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.1. URI Referencing the Request Object . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2.2. Request using the "request_uri" Request Parameter . . 11
5.2.3. Authorization Server Fetches Request Object . . . . . 11
6. Validating JWT-Based Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. Encrypted Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. JWS Signed Request Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.3. Request Parameter Assembly and Validation . . . . . . . . 13
7. Authorization Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Choice of Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. Request Source Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.3. Explicit Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.4. Risks Associated with request_uri . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.4.1. DDoS Attack on the Authorization Server . . . . . . 16
Show full document text