Why Enterprises Need Out-of-Band TLS Decryption
draft-fenter-tls-decryption-00
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Steve Fenter | ||
| Last updated | 2018-09-06 (Latest revision 2018-03-05) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Some enterprises are heavily TLS encrypted within their own enterprise network boundaries. Many of these enterprises are also utilizing out-of-band TLS decryption in order to inspect their own traffic for purposes of troubleshooting, network security monitoring, and for other kinds of monitoring. These monitoring functions are mission critical, and cannot just be done without when TLS 1.3 (draft-ietf-tls-tls13-26) is released or when the RSA key exchange is someday deprecated from TLS 1.2 (RFC5246). This draft will outline the use cases for out-of-band TLS decryption, as well as alternative suggestions for monitoring and troubleshooting and the limitations of those alternatives.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)