Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in Network Protocols
draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-04

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Last updated 2019-07-08
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Network Working Group                                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                              SI6 Networks
Updates: 3552 (if approved)                                      I. Arce
Intended status: Best Current Practice                         Quarkslab
Expires: January 9, 2020                                    July 8, 2019

 Security Considerations for Transient Numeric Identifiers Employed in
                           Network Protocols
              draft-gont-numeric-ids-sec-considerations-04

Abstract

   For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/
   IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with
   effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to
   information leakage that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring.
   The root of these issues has been, in many cases, the poor selection
   of transient numeric identifiers in such protocols, usually as a
   result of insufficient or misleading specifications.  This document
   formally updates RFC3552, such that RFCs are required to include a
   security and privacy analysis of the transient numeric identifiers
   they specify.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 9, 2020.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Gont & Arce              Expires January 9, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       Security Considerations for IDs           July 2019

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Issues with the Specification of Identifiers  . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Common Flaws in the Generation of Transient Identifiers . . .   5
   5.  Security and Privacy Requirements for Identifiers . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     9.3.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1.  Introduction

   Network protocols employ a variety of transient numeric identifiers
   for different protocol entities, ranging from DNS Transaction IDs
   (TxIDs) to transport protocol numbers (e.g.  TCP ports) or IPv6
   Interface Identifiers (IIDs).  These identifiers usually have
   specific properties that must be satisfied such that they do not
   result in negative interoperability implications (e.g. uniqueness
   during a specified period of time), and an associated failure
   severity when such properties not met.

   For more than 30 years, a large number of implementations of the TCP/
   IP protocol suite have been subject to a variety of attacks, with
   effects ranging from Denial of Service (DoS) or data injection, to
   information leakage that could be exploited for pervasive monitoring
   [RFC7258].  The root of these issues has been, in many cases, the
   poor selection of identifiers in such protocols, usually as a result
   of insufficient or misleading specifications.  While it is generally
   trivial to identify an algorithm that can satisfy the
   interoperability requirements for a given identifier, there exists
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