Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols
draft-hoffman-schneier-4270bis-02
| Document | Type |
Expired Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Paul E. Hoffman , Bruce Schneier | ||
| Last updated | 2013-11-04 (Latest revision 2013-04-29) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
Announcements in the past decade of better-than-expected collision attacks in popular hash algorithms have caused some people to question whether common Internet protocols need to be changed, and if so, how. This document summarizes the use of hashes in many protocols, discusses how the collision attacks affect and do not affect the protocols, shows how to thwart known attacks on digital certificates, and discusses future directions for protocol designers. It also gives rationales for moving away from some hash algorithms altogether and for choosing when to start using newer, presumably better, hash algorithms in Internet protocols. This document obsoletes RFC 4270 and introduces significant new material that has been learned since the publication of that document.
Authors
Paul E. Hoffman
Bruce Schneier
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)