Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' FS)
draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (emu WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Jari Arkko , Karl Norrman , Vesa Torvinen , John Preuß Mattsson | ||
| Last updated | 2023-03-14 (Latest revision 2023-01-26) | ||
| Replaces | draft-arkko-eap-aka-pfs | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
| Formats | |||
| Reviews |
GENART Last Call review
Ready with Nits
ARTART Last Call review
Ready with Nits
OPSDIR Last Call review
Ready
SECDIR Last Call review
Ready
|
||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Peter E. Yee | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show Last changed 2023-02-01 | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Waiting for Writeup | |
| Action Holder | |||
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | Paul Wouters | ||
| Send notices to | peter@akayla.com | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - Actions Needed | |
| IANA expert review state | Expert Reviews OK |
draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10
Network Working Group J. Arkko
Internet-Draft K. Norrman
Updates: 5448, 9048 (if approved) V. Torvinen
Intended status: Informational J. Preuß Mattsson
Expires: 30 July 2023 Ericsson
26 January 2023
Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for
Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' FS)
draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-10
Abstract
Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations
associated with pervasive surveillance. Some of the reported attacks
involved compromising the smart card supply chain, such as attacking
SIM card manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise
shared secrets stored on these cards. Since the publication of those
reports, manufacturing and provisioning processes have gained much
scrutiny and have improved. However, the danger of resourceful
attackers for these systems is still a concern. Always assuming
breach such as key compromise and minimizing the impact of breach are
essential zero-trust principles.
This specification updates RFC 9048, the improved Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP Mobile Network Authentication
and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA'), with an optional extension. Similarly,
this specification also updates the earlier version of the EAP-AKA'
specification in RFC 5448. The extension, when negotiated, provides
Forward Secrecy for the session key generated as a part of the
authentication run in EAP-AKA'. This prevents an attacker who has
gained access to the long-term pre-shared secret in a Subscriber
Identity Module (SIM) card from being able to decrypt any past
communications. In addition, if the attacker stays merely a passive
eavesdropper, the extension prevents attacks against future sessions.
This forces attackers to use active attacks instead.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 July 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Design and Deployment Objectives . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. EAP-AKA' Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Attacks Against Long-Term Shared Secrets in Smart
Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Extensions to EAP-AKA' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. AT_PUB_ECDHE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. AT_KDF_FS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3. Forward Secrecy Key Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . 14
6.4. ECDHE Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5. Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.1. EAP-Request/AKA'-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.2. EAP-Response/AKA'-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.3. EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.5.4. EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.5.5. EAP-Request/AKA'-Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.5.6. EAP-Response/AKA'-Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . 18
6.5.7. EAP-Response/AKA'-Synchronization-Failure . . . . . . 18
6.5.8. EAP-Response/AKA'-Authentication-Reject . . . . . . . 18
6.5.9. EAP-Response/AKA'-Client-Error . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.5.10. EAP-Request/AKA'-Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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6.5.11. EAP-Response/AKA'-Notification . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Security Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
7.2. Denial-of-Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7.3. Identity Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.4. Unprotected Data and Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.5. Post-Quantum Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1. Introduction
Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations
associated with pervasive surveillance. Some of the reported attacks
involved compromising the smart card supply chain, such as attacking
SIM card manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise
shared secrets stored on these cards. Such attacks are conceivable,
for instance, during the manufacturing process of cards, or during
the transfer of cards and associated information to the operator.
Since the publication of reports about such attacks, manufacturing
and provisioning processes have gained much scrutiny and have
improved.
However, the danger of resourceful attackers attempting to gain
information about Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards is still a
concern. They are a high-value target and concern a large number of
people. Note that the attacks are largely independent of the used
authentication technology; the issue is not vulnerabilities in
algorithms or protocols, but rather the possibility of someone
gaining unlawful access to key material. While the better protection
of manufacturing and other processes is essential in protecting
against this, there is one question that we as protocol designers can
ask. Is there something that we can do to limit the consequences of
attacks, should they occur?
The authors want to provide a public specification of an extension
that helps defend against one aspect of pervasive surveillance. This
is important, given the large number of users such practices may
affect. It is also a stated goal of the IETF to ensure that we
understand the surveillance concerns related to IETF protocols and
take appropriate countermeasures [RFC7258]. This document does that
for the improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3GPP
Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA').
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This specification updates [RFC9048], the EAP-AKA' authentication
method, with an optional extension and strengthens the identity
privacy requirements. While optional, the use of this extension is
strongly RECOMMENDED.
The extension, when negotiated, provides Forward Secrecy (FS) for the
session key generated as a part of the authentication run in EAP-
AKA'. This prevents an attacker who has gained access to the long-
term pre-shared secret in a SIM card from being able to decrypt any
past communications. In addition, if the attacker stays merely a
passive eavesdropper, the extension prevents attacks against future
sessions. This forces attackers to use active attacks instead. This
is beneficial, because active attacks demand much more resources to
launch, and can generally be detected much easier. As with other
protocols, an active attacker with access to the long-term key
material will of course be able to attack all future communications,
but risks detection, particularly if done at scale. The attacker is
forced to attempt to exfiltrate key material, if it can, on a
continuous basis, as opposed to learning it once [RFC7624].
Attacks against Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) authentication
via compromising the long-term secrets in the SIM cards have been an
active discussion topic in many contexts. Forward secrecy is on the
list of features for the next release of 3GPP (5G Phase 2), and this
document provides a basis for providing this feature in a particular
fashion.
It should also be noted that 5G network architecture [TS.33.501]
includes the use of the EAP framework for authentication. While any
methods can be run, the default authentication method within that
context will be EAP-AKA'. As a result, improvements in EAP-AKA'
security have a potential to improve security for large number of
users.
2. Protocol Design and Deployment Objectives
The extension specified here re-uses large portions of the current
structure of 3GPP interfaces and functions, with the rationale that
this will make the construction more easily adopted. In particular,
the construction maintains the interface between the Universal
Subscriber Identification Module (USIM) and the mobile terminal
intact. As a consequence, there is no need to roll out new
credentials to existing subscribers. The work is based on an earlier
paper [TrustCom2015], and uses much of the same material, but applied
to EAP rather than the underlying AKA method.
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It has been a goal to implement this change as an extension of the
widely supported EAP-AKA' method, rather than a completely new
authentication method. The extension is implemented as a set of new,
optional attributes, that are provided alongside the base attributes
in EAP-AKA'. Old implementations can ignore these attributes, but
their presence will nevertheless be verified as part of base EAP-AKA'
integrity verification process, helping protect against bidding down
attacks. This extension does not increase the number of rounds
necessary to complete the protocol.
The use of this extension is at the discretion of the authenticating
parties. It should be noted that FS and defenses against passive
attacks are by no means a panacea, but they can provide a partial
defense that increases the cost and risk associated with pervasive
surveillance.
While adding forward secrecy to the existing mobile network
infrastructure can be done in multiple different ways, the authors
believe that the approach chosen here is relatively easily
deployable. In particular:
* As noted above, no new credentials are needed; there is no change
to SIM cards.
* FS property can be incorporated into any current or future system
that supports EAP, without changing any network functions beyond
the EAP endpoints.
* Key generation happens at the endpoints, enabling highest grade
key material to be used both by the endpoints and the intermediate
systems (such as access points that are given access to specific
keys).
* While EAP-AKA' is just one EAP method, for practical purposes
forward secrecy being available for both EAP-TLS [RFC5216]
[RFC9190] and EAP-AKA' ensures that for many practical systems
forward secrecy can be enabled for either all or significant
fraction of users.
3. Background
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3.1. AKA
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) is based on challenge-response
mechanisms and symmetric cryptography. In contrast with its earlier
GSM counterparts, AKA provides long key lengths and mutual
authentication. AKA typically runs in a Universal Subscriber
Identity Module (USIM). USIM is technically just an application that
can reside on a removable UICC, an embedded UICC, or integrated in a
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). In this document we use the
term "SIM card" to refer to any Subscriber Identity Module capable of
running AKA.
AKA works in the following manner:
* The identity module and the home environment have agreed on a
secret key beforehand.
* The actual authentication process starts by having the home
environment produce an authentication vector, based on the secret
key and a sequence number. The authentication vector contains a
random part RAND, an authenticator part AUTN used for
authenticating the network to the identity module, an expected
result part XRES, a 128-bit session key for integrity check IK,
and a 128-bit session key for encryption CK.
* The authentication vector is passed to the serving network, which
uses it to authenticate the device.
* The RAND and the AUTN are delivered to the identity module.
* The identity module verifies the AUTN, again based on the secret
key and the sequence number. If this process is successful (the
AUTN is valid and the sequence number used to generate AUTN is
within the correct range), the identity module produces an
authentication result RES and sends it to the serving network.
* The serving network verifies the correct result from the identity
module. If the result is correct, IK and CK can be used to
protect further communications between the identity module and the
home environment.
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3.2. EAP-AKA' Protocol
When AKA is embedded into EAP, the authentication on the network side
is moved to the home environment; the serving network performs the
role of a pass-through authenticator. Figure 1 describes the basic
flow in the EAP-AKA' authentication process. The definition of the
full protocol behavior, along with the definition of attributes
AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_MAC, and AT_RES can be found in [RFC9048] and
[RFC4187].
Peer Server
| |
| EAP-Request/Identity |
|<-----------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity |
| (Includes user's Network Access Identifier, NAI) |
+----------------------------------------------------------->|
| +-----------------------------------------------------+--+
| | Server determines the network name and ensures that |
| | the given access network is authorized to use the |
| | claimed name. The server then runs the AKA' algorithms |
| | generating RAND and AUTN, derives session keys from |
| | CK' and IK'. RAND and AUTN are sent as AT_RAND and |
| | AT_AUTN attributes, whereas the network name is |
| | transported in the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute. AT_KDF |
| | signals the used key derivation function. The session |
| | keys are used in creating the AT_MAC attribute. |
| +-----------------------------------------------------+--+
| |
| EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge |
| (AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_KDF, AT_KDF_INPUT, AT_MAC) |
|<-----------------------------------------------------------+
+--+-----------------------------------------------------+ |
| The peer determines what the network name should be, | |
| based on, e.g., what access technology it is using. | |
| The peer also retrieves the network name sent by the | |
| network from the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute. The two names | |
| are compared for discrepancies, and if necessary, the | |
| authentication is aborted. Otherwise, the network name | |
| from AT_KDF_INPUT attribute is used in running the | |
| AKA' algorithms, verifying AUTN from AT_AUTN and MAC | |
| from AT_MAC attributes. The peer then generates RES. | |
| The peer also derives session keys from CK'/IK'. The | |
| AT_RES and AT_MAC attributes are constructed. | |
+--+-----------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
| EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge |
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| (AT_RES, AT_MAC) |
+----------------------------------------------------------->|
| +-----------------------------------------------------+--+
| | Server checks the RES and MAC values received in |
| | AT_RES and AT_MAC, respectively. Success requires both |
| | to be found correct. |
| +-----------------------------------------------------+--+
| |
| EAP-Success |
|<-----------------------------------------------------------+
| |
Figure 1: EAP-AKA' Authentication Process
3.3. Attacks Against Long-Term Shared Secrets in Smart Cards
Current 3GPP systems use SIM pre-shared key-based protocols and
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) to authenticate subscribers.
The general security properties and potential vulnerabilities of AKA
and EAP-AKA' are discussed in [RFC9048].
An important vulnerability in that discussion relates to the recent
reports of compromised long term pre-shared keys used in AKA
[Heist2015]. These attacks are not specific to AKA or EAP-AKA', as
all security systems fail at least to some extent if key material is
stolen. However, the reports indicate a need to look into solutions
that can operate at least to an extent under these types of attacks.
It is noted in [Heist2015] that some security can be retained even in
the face of the attacks by providing Forward Secrecy (FS) [DOW1992]
for the session key. If AKA would have provided FS, compromising the
pre-shared key would not be sufficient to perform passive attacks;
the attacker is, in addition, forced to be a Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
during the AKA run and subsequent communication between the parties.
4. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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5. Protocol Overview
Forward Secrecy for EAP-AKA' is achieved by using an Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) exchange [RFC7748]. To provide FS, the
exchange must be run in an ephemeral manner, i.e., both sides
generate temporary keys according to the negotiated ciphersuite,
e.g., for X25519 this is done as specified in [RFC7748]. This method
is referred to as ECDHE, where the last 'E' stands for Ephemeral.
The two initially registered elliptic curves and their wire format is
chosen to align with the elliptic curves and formats specified for
Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI) encryption in Appendix C.3.4
of 3GPP TS 33.501 [TS.33.501].
The enhancements in the EAP-AKA' FS protocol are compatible with the
signaling flow and other basic structures of both AKA and EAP-AKA'.
The intent is to implement the enhancement as optional attributes
that legacy implementations can ignore.
The purpose of the protocol is to achieve mutual authentication
between the EAP server and peer, and to establish keying material for
secure communication between the two. This document specifies the
calculation of key material, providing new properties that are not
present in key material provided by EAP-AKA' in its original form.
Figure 2 below describes the overall process. Since our goal has
been to not require new infrastructure or credentials, the flow
diagrams also show the conceptual interaction with the USIM card and
the 3GPP authentication server (HSS). The details of those
interactions are outside the scope of this document, however, and the
reader is referred to the 3GPP specifications.
USIM Peer Server HSS
| | | |
| | EAP-Req/Identity | |
| |<---------------------------+ |
| | | |
| | EAP-Resp/Identity | |
| | (Privacy-Friendly) | |
| +--------------------------->| |
| +-------+----------------------------+----------------+--+
| | Server now has an identity for the peer. The server |
| | then asks the help of HSS to run AKA algorithms, |
| | generating RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK, IK. Typically, the |
| | HSS performs the first part of key derivations so that |
| | the authentication server gets the CK' and IK' keys |
| | already tied to a particular network name. |
| +-------+----------------------------+----------------+--+
| | | |
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| | | ID, key deriv. |
| | | function, |
| | | network name |
| | +--------------->|
| | | |
| | | RAND, AUTN, |
| | | XRES, CK', IK' |
| | |<---------------+
| +-------+----------------------------+----------------+--+
| | Server now has the needed authentication vector. It |
| | generates an ephemeral key pair, sends the public key |
| | of that key pair and the first EAP method message to |
| | the peer. In the message the AT_PUB_ECDHE attribute |
| | carries the public key and the AT_KDF_FS attribute |
| | carries other FS-related parameters. Both of these are |
| | skippable attributes that can be ignored if the peer |
| | does not support this extension. |
| +-------+----------------------------+----------------+--+
| | | |
| | EAP-Req/AKA'-Challenge | |
| | AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, AT_KDF, | |
| | AT_KDF_FS, AT_KDF_INPUT, | |
| | AT_PUB_ECDHE, AT_MAC | |
| |<---------------------------+ |
+--+--------------+----------------------------+---------+ |
| The peer checks if it wants to do the FS extension. If | |
| yes, it will eventually respond with AT_PUB_ECDHE and | |
| AT_MAC. If not, it will ignore AT_PUB_ECDHE and | |
| AT_KDF_FS and base all calculations on basic EAP-AKA' | |
| attributes, continuing just as in EAP-AKA' per RFC | |
| 9048 rules. In any case, the peer needs to query the | |
| auth parameters from the USIM card. | |
+--+--------------+----------------------------+---------+ |
| | | |
| RAND, AUTN | | |
|<-------------+ | |
| | | |
| CK, IK, RES | | |
+------------->| | |
+--+--------------+----------------------------+---------+ |
| The peer now has everything to respond. If it wants to | |
| participate in the FS extension, it will then generate | |
| its key pair, calculate a shared key based on its key | |
| pair and the server's public key. Finally, it proceeds | |
| to derive all EAP-AKA' key values and constructs a | |
| full response. | |
+--+--------------+----------------------------+---------+ |
| | | |
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| | EAP-Resp/AKA'-Challenge | |
| | AT_RES, AT_PUB_ECDHE, | |
| | AT_MAC | |
| +--------------------------->| |
| +-------+----------------------------+----------------+--+
| | The server now has all the necessary values. It |
| | generates the ECDHE shared secret and checks the RES |
| | and MAC values received in AT_RES and AT_MAC, |
| | respectively. Success requires both to be found |
| | correct. Note that when this specification is used, |
| | the keys generated from EAP-AKA' are based on both |
| | CK/IK as well as the ECDHE value. Even if there was an |
| | attacker who held the long-term secret keys, only an |
| | active attacker could have determined the generated |
| | session keys; in basic EAP-AKA' the generated keys are |
| | only based on CK and IK. |
| +-------+----------------------------+----------------+--+
| | | |
| | EAP-Success | |
| |<---------------------------+ |
| | | |
Figure 2: EAP-AKA' FS Authentication Process
6. Extensions to EAP-AKA'
6.1. AT_PUB_ECDHE
The AT_PUB_ECDHE carries an ECDHE value.
The format of the AT_PUB_ECDHE attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_PUB_ECDHE | Length | Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields are as follows:
AT_PUB_ECDHE
This is set to TBA1 BY IANA.
Length
The length of the attribute, set as other attributes in EAP-AKA
[RFC4187].
Value
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This value is the sender's ECDHE public key. The value depends on
AT_KDF_FS and is calculated as follows:
* For X25519/Curve25519, the length of this value is 32 bytes,
encoded as specified in [RFC7748] Section 5.
* For P-256, the length of this value is 33 bytes, encoded using
the compressed form specified in Section 2.3.3 of [SEC1].
To retain the security of the keys, the sender SHALL generate a
fresh value for each run of the protocol.
6.2. AT_KDF_FS
The AT_KDF_FS indicates the used or desired forward secrecy key
generation function, if the Forward Secrecy extension is taken into
use. It will also at the same time indicate the used or desired
ECDHE group. A new attribute is needed to carry this information, as
AT_KDF carries the basic KDF value which is still used together with
the forward secrecy KDF value. The basic KDF value is also used by
those EAP peers that cannot or do not want to use this extension.
This specification only specifies the behavior relating to the
following combinations of basic KDF values and forward secrecy KDF
values: The basic KDF value in AT_KDF is 1, as specified in [RFC5448]
and [RFC9048], and the forward secrecy KDF values in AT_KDF_FS are 1
or 2, as specified below and in Section 6.3.
Any future specifications that add either new basic KDF or new
forward secrecy KDF values need to specify how they are treated and
what combinations are allowed. This requirement is an update to how
[RFC5448] and [RFC9048] may be extended in the future.
The format of the AT_KDF_FS attribute is shown below.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AT_KDF_FS | Length | FS Key Derivation Function |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The fields are as follows:
AT_KDF_FS
This is set to TBA2 BY IANA.
Length
The length of the attribute, MUST be set to 1.
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FS Key Derivation Function
An enumerated value representing the forward secrecy key
derivation function that the server (or peer) wishes to use. See
Section 6.3 for the functions specified in this document. Note:
This field has a different name space than the similar field in
the AT_KDF attribute Key Derivation Function defined in [RFC9048].
Servers MUST send one or more AT_KDF_FS attributes in the EAP-
Request/AKA'-Challenge message. These attributes represent the
desired functions ordered by preference, the most preferred function
being the first attribute. The most preferred function is the only
one that the server includes a public key value for, however. So for
a set of AT_KDF_FS attributes, there is always only one AT_PUB_ECDHE
attribute.
Upon receiving a set of these attributes:
* If the peer supports and is willing to use the FS Key Derivation
Function indicated by the first AT_KDF_FS attribute, and is
willing and able to use the extension defined in this
specification, the function is taken into use without any further
negotiation.
* If the peer does not support this function or is unwilling to use
it, it responds to the server with an indication that a different
function is needed. Similarly with the negotiation process
defined in [RFC9048] for AT_KDF, the peer sends EAP-Response/AKA'-
Challenge message that contains only one attribute, AT_KDF_FS with
the value set to the desired alternative function from among the
ones suggested by the server earlier. If there is no suitable
alternative, the peer has a choice of either falling back to EAP-
AKA' or behaving as if AUTN had been incorrect and failing
authentication (see Figure 3 of [RFC4187]). The peer MUST fail
the authentication if there are any duplicate values within the
list of AT_KDF_FS attributes (except where the duplication is due
to a request to change the key derivation function; see below for
further information).
* If the peer does not recognize the extension defined in this
specification or is unwilling to use it, it ignores the AT_KDF_FS
attribute.
Upon receiving an EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge with AT_KDF_FS from the
peer, the server checks that the suggested AT_KDF_FS value was one of
the alternatives in its offer. The first AT_KDF_FS value in the
message from the server is not a valid alternative. If the peer has
replied with the first AT_KDF_FS value, the server behaves as if
AT_MAC of the response had been incorrect and fails the
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authentication. For an overview of the failed authentication process
in the server side, see Section 3 and Figure 2 in [RFC4187].
Otherwise, the server re-sends the EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge
message, but adds the selected alternative to the beginning of the
list of AT_KDF_FS attributes, and retains the entire list following
it. Note that this means that the selected alternative appears twice
in the set of AT_KDF values. Responding to the peer's request to
change the FS Key Derivation Function is the only valid situation
where such duplication may occur.
When the peer receives the new EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge message, it
MUST check that the requested change, and only the requested change
occurred in the list of AT_KDF_FS attributes. If yes, it continues.
If not, it behaves as if AT_MAC had been incorrect and fails the
authentication. If the peer receives multiple EAP-Request/AKA'-
Challenge messages with differing AT_KDF_FS attributes without having
requested negotiation, the peer MUST behave as if AT_MAC had been
incorrect and fail the authentication.
6.3. Forward Secrecy Key Derivation Functions
Two new FS Key Derivation Function types are defined for "EAP-AKA'
with ECDHE and X25519", represented by value 1, and "EAP-AKA' with
ECDHE and P-256", represented by value 2. These represent a
particular choice of key derivation function and at the same time
selects an ECDHE group to be used.
The FS Key Derivation Function type value is only used in the
AT_KDF_FS attribute. When the forward secrecy extension is used, the
AT_KDF_FS attribute determines how to derive the keys MK_ECDHE, K_re,
MSK, and EMSK. The AT_KDF_FS attribute should not be confused with
the different range of key derivation functions that can be
represented in the AT_KDF attribute as defined in [RFC9048]. When
the forward secrecy extension is used, the AT_KDF attribute only
specifies how to derive the keys MK, K_encr, and K_aut.
Key derivation in this extension produces exactly the same keys for
internal use within one authentication run as [RFC9048] EAP-AKA'
does. For instance, K_aut that is used in AT_MAC is still exactly as
it was in EAP-AKA'. The only change to key derivation is in re-
authentication keys and keys exported out of the EAP method, MSK and
EMSK. As a result, EAP-AKA' attributes such as AT_MAC continue to be
usable even when this extension is in use.
When the FS Key Derivation Function field in the AT_KDF_FS attribute
is set to 1 or 2 and the Key Derivation Function field in the AT_KDF
attribute is set to 1, the Master Key (MK) is derived as follows
below.
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MK = PRF'(IK'|CK',"EAP-AKA'"|Identity)
MK_ECDHE = PRF'(IK'|CK'|SHARED_SECRET,"EAP-AKA' FS"|Identity)
K_encr = MK[0..127]
K_aut = MK[128..383]
K_re = MK_ECDHE[0..255]
MSK = MK_ECDHE[256..767]
EMSK = MK_ECDHE[768..1279]
Requirements for how to securely generate, validate, and process the
ephemeral public keys depend on the elliptic curve.
For P-256 the SHARED_SECRET is the shared secret computed as
specified in Section 5.7.1.2 of [SP-800-56A]. Public key validation
requirements are defined in Section 5 of [SP-800-56A]. At least
partial public-key validation MUST be done. The uncompressed
y-coordinate can be computed as described in Section 2.3.4 of [SEC1].
For X25519 the SHARED_SECRET is the shared secret computed as
specified in Section 6.1 of [RFC7748]. Both the peer and the server
MAY check for zero-value shared secret as specified in Section 6.1 of
[RFC7748].
Note: The way that shared secret is tested for zero can, if
performed inappropriately, provide an ability for attackers to
listen to CPU power usage side channels. Refer to [RFC7748] for a
description of how to perform this check in a way that it does not
become a problem.
If validation of the public key or the shared secret fails, both
parties MUST behave as if the current EAP-AKA' authentication process
starts again from the beginning.
The rest of computation proceeds as defined in Section 3.3 of
[RFC9048].
For readability, an explanation of the notation used above is copied
here: [n..m] denotes the substring from bit n to m. PRF' is a new
pseudo-random function specified in [RFC9048]. K_encr is the
encryption key, 128 bits, K_aut is the authentication key, 256 bits,
K_re is the re-authentication key, 256 bits, MSK is the Master
Session Key, 512 bits, and EMSK is the Extended Master Session Key,
512 bits. MSK and EMSK are outputs from a successful EAP method run
[RFC3748].
CK and IK are produced by the AKA algorithm. IK' and CK' are derived
as specified in [RFC9048] from IK and CK.
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The value "EAP-AKA'" is an eight-characters-long ASCII string. It is
used as is, without any trailing NUL characters. Similarly, "EAP-
AKA' FS" is an eleven-characters-long ASCII string, also used as is.
Identity is the peer identity as specified in Section 7 of [RFC4187].
A privacy-friendly identifier SHALL be used.
6.4. ECDHE Groups
The selection of suitable groups for the elliptic curve computation
is necessary. The choice of a group is made at the same time as
deciding to use of particular key derivation function in AT_KDF_FS.
For "EAP-AKA' with ECDHE and X25519" the group is the Curve25519
group specified in [RFC7748]. The support for this group is
REQUIRED.
For "EAP-AKA' with ECDHE and P-256" the group is the NIST P-256 group
(SEC group secp256r1), specified in Appendix D.1.2.3 of [FIPS186-4]
or alternatively Section 2.4.2 of [SEC2]. The support for this group
is REQUIRED.
6.5. Message Processing
This section specifies the changes related to message processing when
this extension is used in EAP-AKA'. It specifies when a message may
be transmitted or accepted, which attributes are allowed in a
message, which attributes are required in a message, and other
message-specific details, where those details are different for this
extension than the base EAP-AKA' or EAP-AKA protocol. Unless
otherwise specified here, the rules from [RFC9048] or [RFC4187]
apply.
6.5.1. EAP-Request/AKA'-Identity
No changes, except that the AT_KDF_FS or AT_PUB_ECDHE attributes MUST
NOT be added to this message. The appearance of these attributes in
a received message MUST be ignored.
6.5.2. EAP-Response/AKA'-Identity
No changes, except that the AT_KDF_FS or AT_PUB_ECDHE attributes MUST
NOT be added to this message and that a privacy-friendly identifier
MUST be used. The appearance of these attributes in a received
message MUST be ignored.
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6.5.3. EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge
The server sends the EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge on full
authentication as specified by [RFC4187] and [RFC9048]. The
attributes AT_RAND, AT_AUTN, and AT_MAC MUST be included and checked
on reception as specified in [RFC4187]. They are also necessary for
backwards compatibility.
In EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge, there is no message-specific data
covered by the MAC for the AT_MAC attribute. The AT_KDF_FS and
AT_PUB_ECDHE attributes MUST be included. The AT_PUB_ECDHE attribute
carries the server's public Diffie-Hellman key. If either AT_KDF_FS
or AT_PUB_ECDHE is missing on reception, the peer MUST treat them as
if neither one was sent, and the assume that the extension defined in
this specification is not in use.
The AT_RESULT_IND, AT_CHECKCODE, AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA, AT_PADDING,
AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM, AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID and other attributes may be
included as specified in Section 9.3 of [RFC4187].
When processing this message, the peer MUST process AT_RAND, AT_AUTN,
AT_KDF_FS, AT_PUB_ECDHE before processing other attributes. Only if
these attributes are verified to be valid, the peer derives keys and
verifies AT_MAC. If the peer is unable or unwilling to perform the
extension specified in this document, it proceeds as defined in
[RFC9048]. Finally, the operation in case an error occurs is
specified in Section 6.3.1. of [RFC4187].
6.5.4. EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge
The peer sends EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge in response to a valid
EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge message, as specified by [RFC4187] and
[RFC9048]. If the peer supports and is willing to perform the
extension specified in this protocol, and the server had made a valid
request involving the attributes specified in Section 6.5.3, the peer
responds per the rules specified below. Otherwise, the peer responds
as specified in [RFC4187] and [RFC9048] and ignores the attributes
related to this extension. If the peer has not received attributes
related to this extension from the Server, and has a policy that
requires it to always use this extension, it behaves as if AUTN had
been incorrect and fails the authentication.
The AT_MAC attribute MUST be included and checked as specified in
[RFC9048]. In EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge, there is no message-
specific data covered by the MAC. The AT_PUB_ECDHE attribute MUST be
included, and carries the peer's public Diffie-Hellman key.
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The AT_RES attribute MUST be included and checked as specified in
[RFC4187]. When processing this message, the Server MUST process
AT_RES before processing other attributes. Only if these attribute
is verified to be valid, the Server derives keys and verifies AT_MAC.
If the Server has proposed the use of the extension specified in this
protocol, but the peer ignores and continues the basic EAP-AKA'
authentication, the Server makes policy decision of whether this is
allowed. If this is allowed, it continues the EAP-AKA'
authentication to completion. If it is not allowed, the Server MUST
behave as if authentication failed.
The AT_CHECKCODE, AT_RESULT_IND, AT_IV, AT_ENCR_DATA and other
attributes may be included as specified in Section 9.4 of [RFC4187].
6.5.5. EAP-Request/AKA'-Reauthentication
No changes, but note that the re-authentication process uses the keys
generated in the original EAP-AKA' authentication, which, if the
extension specified in this document is in use, employs key material
from the Diffie-Hellman procedure.
6.5.6. EAP-Response/AKA'-Reauthentication
No changes, but as discussed in Section 6.5.5, re-authentication is
based on the key material generated by EAP-AKA' and the extension
defined in this document.
6.5.7. EAP-Response/AKA'-Synchronization-Failure
No changes, except that the AT_KDF_FS or AT_PUB_ECDHE attributes MUST
NOT be added to this message. The appearance of these attributes in
a received message MUST be ignored.
6.5.8. EAP-Response/AKA'-Authentication-Reject
No changes, except that the AT_KDF_FS or AT_PUB_ECDHE attributes MUST
NOT be added to this message. The appearance of these attributes in
a received message MUST be ignored.
6.5.9. EAP-Response/AKA'-Client-Error
No changes, except that the AT_KDF_FS or AT_PUB_ECDHE attributes MUST
NOT be added to this message. The appearance of these attributes in
a received message MUST be ignored.
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6.5.10. EAP-Request/AKA'-Notification
No changes.
6.5.11. EAP-Response/AKA'-Notification
No changes.
7. Security Considerations
This section deals only with the changes to security considerations
as they differ from EAP-AKA', or as new information has been gathered
since the publication of [RFC9048].
The possibility of attacks against key storage offered in SIM or
other smart cards has been a known threat. But as the discussion in
Section 3.3 shows, the likelihood of practically feasible attacks
such as breaches in the smart card supply chain has increased. Many
of these attacks can be best dealt with improved processes, e.g.,
limiting the access to the key material within the factory or
personnel, etc. But not all attacks can be entirely ruled out for
well-resourced adversaries, irrespective of what the technical
algorithms and protection measures are. Always assuming breach such
as key compromise and minimizing the impact of breach are essential
zero-trust principles.
If a mechanism without forward secrecy such as (5G-AKA, EAP-AKA') is
used the effects of key compromise are devastating. The serious
consequences of breach somewhere in the supply chain or after
delivery that are possible when 5G-AKA or EAP-AKA' is used but not
when something with forward secrecy like EAP-AKA-FS is used are:
1. A passive attacker can eavesdrop (decrypt) all future 5G
communication (control and user plane both directions),
2. A passive attacker can decrypt 5G communication that they
previously recorded in the past (control and user plane both
directions), and
3. An active attacker can impersonate UE and Network and inject
messages in an ongoing 5G connection between the real UE and the
real network (control and user plane both directions).
Best practice security today is to mandate forward secrecy (as is
done in WPA3, EAP-TLS 1.3, EAP-TTLS 1.3, IKEv2, SSH, QUIC, WireGuard,
Signal, etc.). It is RECOMMENDED to long term completely phase out
AKA without forward secrecy.
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This extension can provide assistance in situations where there is a
danger of attacks against the key material on SIM cards by
adversaries that cannot or who are unwilling to mount active attacks
against a large number of sessions. The extension also provides
protection against active attacks as they are forced to be a Man-In-
The-Middle (MITM) during the AKA run and subsequent communication
between the parties. Without forward secrecy an active attacker that
has compromised the long-term key can inject messages in an
connection between the real Peer and the real server without being a
man-in-the-middle. This extension is most useful when used in a
context where EAP keys are used without further mixing that can
provide Forward Secrecy. For instance, when used with IKEv2
[RFC7296], the session keys produced by IKEv2 have this property, so
better characteristics of EAP keys is not that useful. However,
typical link layer usage of EAP does not involve running Diffie-
Hellman, so using EAP to authenticate access to a network is one
situation where the extension defined in this document can be
helpful.
This extension generates keying material using the ECDHE exchange in
order to gain the FS property. This means that once an EAP-AKA'
authentication run ends, the session that it was used to protect is
closed, and the corresponding keys are forgotten, even someone who
has recorded all of the data from the authentication run and session
and gets access to all of the AKA long-term keys cannot reconstruct
the keys used to protect the session or any previous session, without
doing a brute force search of the session key space.
Even if a compromise of the long-term keys has occurred, FS is still
provided for all future sessions, as long as the attacker does not
become an active attacker. Of course, as with other protocols, if
the attacker has learned the keys and does become an active attacker,
there is no protection that that can be provided for future sessions.
Among other things, such an active attacker can impersonate any
legitimate endpoint in EAP-AKA', become a MITM in EAP-AKA' or the
extension defined in this document, retrieve all keys, or turn off
FS. Still, past sessions where FS was in use remain protected.
Achieving FS requires that when a connection is closed, each endpoint
MUST forget not only the ephemeral keys used by the connection but
also any information that could be used to recompute those keys.
Using EAP-AKA' FS once provides forward secrecy. Forward secrecy
limits the effect of key leakage in one direction (compromise of a
key at time T2 does not compromise some key at time T1 where T1 <
T2). Protection in the other direction (compromise at time T1 does
not compromise keys at time T2) can be achieved by rerunning ECDHE
frequently. If a long-term authentication key has been compromised,
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rerunning EAP-AKA' FS gives protection against passive attackers.
Using the terms in [RFC7624], forward secrecy without rerunning ECDHE
does not stop an attacker from doing static key exfiltration.
Frequently rerunning EC(DHE) forces an attacker to do dynamic key
exfiltration (or content exfiltration).
7.1. Security Properties
The following security properties of EAP-AKA' are impacted through
this extension:
Protected ciphersuite negotiation
EAP-AKA' has a negotiation mechanism for selecting the key
derivation functions, and this mechanism has been extended by the
extension specified in this document. The resulting mechanism
continues to be secure against bidding down attacks.
There are two specific needs in the negotiation mechanism:
Negotiating key derivation function within the extension
The negotiation mechanism allows changing the offered key
derivation function, but the change is visible in the final
EAP- Request/AKA'-Challenge message that the server sends to
the peer. This message is authenticated via the AT_MAC
attribute, and carries both the chosen alternative and the
initially offered list. The peer refuses to accept a change it
did not initiate. As a result, both parties are aware that a
change is being made and what the original offer was.
Negotiating the use of this extension
This extension is offered by the server through presenting the
AT_KDF_FS and AT_PUB_ECDHE attributes in the EAP-Request/AKA'-
Challenge message. These attributes are protected by AT_MAC,
so attempts to change or omit them by an adversary will be
detected.
Except of course, if the adversary holds the long-term shared
secret and is willing to engage in an active attack. Such an
attack can, for instance, forge the negotiation process so that
no FS will be provided. However, as noted above, an attacker
with these capabilities will in any case be able to impersonate
any party in the protocol and perform MITM attacks. That is
not a situation that can be improved by a technical solution.
However, as discussed in the introduction, even an attacker
with access to the long-term keys is required to be a MITM on
each AKA run and subsequent communication, which makes mass
surveillance more laborious.
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The security properties of the extension also depend on a
policy choice. As discussed in Section 6.5.4, both the peer
and the server make a policy decision of what to do when it was
willing to perform the extension specified in this protocol,
but the other side does not wish to use the extension.
Allowing this has the benefit of allowing backwards
compatibility to equipment that did not yet support the
extension. When the extension is not supported or negotiated
by the parties, no FS can obviously be provided.
If turning off the extension specified in this protocol is not
allowed by policy, the use of legacy equipment that does not
support this protocol is no longer possible. This may be
appropriate when, for instance, support for the extension is
sufficiently widespread, or required in a particular version of
a mobile network.
Key derivation
This extension provides key material that is based on the Diffie-
Hellman keys, yet bound to the authentication through the SIM
card. This means that subsequent payload communications between
the parties are protected with keys that are not solely based on
information in the clear (such as the RAND) and information
derivable from the long-term shared secrets on the SIM card. As a
result, if anyone successfully recovers shared secret information,
they are unable to decrypt communications protected by the keys
generated through this extension. Note that the recovery of
shared secret information could occur either before or after the
time that the protected communications are used. When this
extension is used, communications at time t0 can be protected if
at some later time t1 an adversary learns of long-term shared
secret and has access to a recording of the encrypted
communications.
Obviously, this extension is still vulnerable to attackers that
are willing to perform an active attack and who at the time of the
attack have access to the long-term shared secret.
This extension does not change the properties related to re-
authentication. No new Diffie-Hellman run is performed during the
re-authentication allowed by EAP-AKA'. However, if this extension
was in use when the original EAP-AKA' authentication was
performed, the keys used for re-authentication (K_re) are based on
the Diffie-Hellman keys, and hence continue to be equally safe
against expose of the long-term secrets as the original
authentication.
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7.2. Denial-of-Service
In addition, it is worthwhile to discuss Denial-of-Service attacks
and their impact on this protocol. The calculations involved in
public key cryptography require computing power, which could be used
in an attack to overpower either the peer or the server. While some
forms of Denial-of-Service attacks are always possible, the following
factors help mitigate the concerns relating to public key
cryptography and EAP-AKA' FS.
* In 5G context, other parts of the connection setup involve public
key cryptography, so while performing additional operations in
EAP-AKA' is an additional concern, it does not change the overall
situation. As a result, the relevant system components need to be
dimensioned appropriately, and detection and management mechanisms
to reduce the effect of attacks need to be in place.
* This specification is constructed so that a separation between the
USIM and Peer on client side and the Server and HSS on network
side is possible. This ensures that the most sensitive (or
legacy) system components cannot be the target of the attack. For
instance, EAP-AKA' and public key cryptography takes place in the
phone and not the low-power SIM card.
* EAP-AKA' has been designed so that the first actual message in the
authentication process comes from the Server, and that this
message will not be sent unless the user has been identified as an
active subscriber of the operator in question. While the initial
identity can be spoofed before authentication has succeeded, this
reduces the efficiency of an attack.
* Finally, this memo specifies an order in which computations and
checks must occur. When processing the EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge
message, for instance, the AKA authentication must be checked and
succeed before the peer proceeds to calculating or processing the
FS related parameters (see Section 6.5.4). The same is true of
EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge (see Section 6.5.4). This ensures
that the parties need to show possession of the long-term secret
in some way, and only then will the FS calculations become active.
This limits the Denial-of-Service to specific, identified
subscribers. While botnets and other forms of malicious parties
could take advantage of actual subscribers and their key material,
at least such attacks are (a) limited in terms of subscribers they
control, and (b) identifiable for the purposes of blocking the
affected subscribers.
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7.3. Identity Privacy
Best practice privacy today is to mandate client identity protection
as is done in EAP-TLS 1.3, EAP-TTLS 1.3, etc. A client supporting
EAP-AKA' FS MUST NOT send its username (or any other permanent
identifiers) in cleartext in the Identity Response (or any message
used instead of the Identity Response).
7.4. Unprotected Data and Privacy
Unprotected data and metadata can reveal sensitive information and
need to be selected with care. In particular, this applies to
AT_KDF, AT_KDF_FS, AT_PUB_ECDHE, and AT_KDF_INPUT. AT_KDF,
AT_KDF_FS, and AT_PUB_ECDHE reveal the used cryptographic algorithms,
if these depend on the peer identity they leak information about the
peer. AT_KDF_INPUT reveals the network name, although that is done
on purpose to bind the authentication to a particular context.
An attacker observing network traffic may use the above types of
information for traffic flow analysis or to track an endpoint.
7.5. Post-Quantum Considerations
As of the publication of this specification, it is unclear when or
even if a quantum computer of sufficient size and power to exploit
elliptic curve cryptography will exist. Deployments that need to
consider risks decades into the future should transition to Post-
Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in the not-too-distant future. Other
systems may employ PQC when the quantum threat is more imminent.
Current PQC algorithms have limitations compared to Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC) and the data sizes could be problematic for some
constrained systems. If a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum
Computer (CRQC) is built it could recover the SHARED_SECRET from the
ECDHE public keys.
This would not affect the ability of EAP-AKA' - with or without this
extension - to authenticate properly, however. As symmetric key
cryptography is safe even if CRQCs are built, an adversary still will
not be able to disrupt authentication as it requires computing a
correct AT_MAC value. This computation requires the K_aut key which
is based on MK and, ultimately, CK' and IK', but not SHARED_SECRET.
Other output keys do include SHARED_SECRET via MK_ECDHE, but still
include also CK' and IK' which are entirely based on symmetric
cryptography. As a result, an adversary with a quantum computer
still cannot compute the other output keys either.
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However, if the adversary has also obtained knowledge of the secrets
associated with the SIM card, they could then compute CK', IK', and
SHARED_SECRET, and any derived output keys. This means that the
introduction of a powerful enough quantum computer would disable this
protocol extension's ability to provide the forward security
capability. This would make it necessary to update the current ECC
algorithms in this specification to PQC algorithms. This
specification does not add such algorithms, but a future update can
do that.
Symmetric algorithms used in EAP-AKA' FS such as HMAC-SHA-256 and the
algorithms use to generate AT_AUTN and AT_RES are practically secure
against even large robust quantum computers. EAP-AKA' FS is
currently only specified for use with ECDHE key exchange algorithms,
but use of any Key Encapsulation Method (KEM), including Post-Quantum
Cryptography (PQC) KEMs, can be specified in the future. While the
key exchange is specified with terms of the Diffie-Hellman protocol,
the key exchange adheres to a KEM interface. AT_PUB_ECDHE would then
contain either the ephemeral public key of the server or the
SHARED_SECRET encapsulated with the server's public key.
8. IANA Considerations
This extension of EAP-AKA' shares its attribute space and subtypes
with Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-SIM)
[RFC4186], EAP-AKA [RFC4186], and EAP-AKA' [RFC9048].
Two new values (TBA1, TBA2) in the skippable range need to be
assigned for AT_PUB_ECDHE (Section 6.1) and AT_KDF_FS (Section 6.2 in
the "Attribute Types" registry under the "EAP-AKA and EAP-SIM
Parameters" group.
Also, a new registry "EAP-AKA' AT_KDF_FS Key Derivation Function
Values" should be created to represent FS Key Derivation Function
types. The "EAP-AKA' with ECDHE and X25519" and "EAP-AKA' with ECDHE
and P-256" types (1 and 2, see Section 6.3) need to be assigned,
along with one reserved value. The initial contents of this registry
is illustrated in Table 1; new values can be created through the
Specification Required policy [RFC8126].
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+=========+==================+=========================+
| Value | Description | Reference |
+=========+==================+=========================+
| 0 | Reserved | [TBD BY IANA: THIS RFC] |
+---------+------------------+-------------------------+
| 1 | EAP-AKA' with | [TBD BY IANA: THIS RFC] |
| | ECDHE and X25519 | |
+---------+------------------+-------------------------+
| 2 | EAP-AKA' with | [TBD BY IANA: THIS RFC] |
| | ECDHE and P-256 | |
+---------+------------------+-------------------------+
| 3-65535 | Unassigned | [TBD BY IANA: THIS RFC] |
+---------+------------------+-------------------------+
Table 1: Initial Content of the EAP-AKA' AT_KDF_FS
Key Derivation Function Values Registry
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC4187] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key
Agreement (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, DOI 10.17487/RFC4187,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4187>.
[RFC5448] Arkko, J., Lehtovirta, V., and P. Eronen, "Improved
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd
Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA')",
RFC 5448, DOI 10.17487/RFC5448, May 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5448>.
[RFC7624] Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
"Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624>.
Arkko, et al. Expires 30 July 2023 [Page 26]
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[RFC7748] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9048] Arkko, J., Lehtovirta, V., Torvinen, V., and P. Eronen,
"Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for
3GPP Mobile Network Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-
AKA')", RFC 9048, DOI 10.17487/RFC9048, October 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9048>.
[FIPS186-4]
NIST, "Digital Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-4, July
2013, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4>.
[SEC1] Certicom Research, "SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography",
Standards for Efficient Cryptography 1 (SEC 1) Version
2.0, May 2009, <https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf>.
[SEC2] Certicom Research, "SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve
Domain Parameters", Standards for Efficient Cryptography 2
(SEC 2) Version 2.0, January 2010,
<https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf>.
[SP-800-56A]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R.
Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment
Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography",
NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, April 2018,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC4186] Haverinen, H., Ed. and J. Salowey, Ed., "Extensible
Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for
Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules
(EAP-SIM)", RFC 4186, DOI 10.17487/RFC4186, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4186>.
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[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.
[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC9190] Preuß Mattsson, J. and M. Sethi, "EAP-TLS 1.3: Using the
Extensible Authentication Protocol with TLS 1.3",
RFC 9190, DOI 10.17487/RFC9190, February 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9190>.
[TrustCom2015]
Arkko, J., Norrman, K., Näslund, M., and B. Sahlin, "A
USIM compatible 5G AKA protocol with perfect forward
secrecy", Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on
Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and
Communications (TrustCom) 2015, August 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/Trustcom.2015.506>.
[Heist2015]
Scahill, J. and J. Begley, "The Great SIM Heist", February
2015,
<https://theintercept.com/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/>.
[DOW1992] Diffie, W., Van Oorschot, P., and M. Wiener,
"Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges", Designs,
Codes and Cryptography 2 pp. 107-125, June 1992,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124891>.
[TS.33.501]
3GPP, "Security architecture and procedures for 5G
System", 3GPP TS 33.501 18.0.0, December 2022.
Appendix A. Change Log
RFC Editor: Please remove this appendix.
The -10 version of the WG draft has the following changes:
* Various nits found by Peter Yee.
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The -09 version of the WG draft has the following changes:
* Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) versions for all figures has been
added and the figures has been slightly modified to render nicely
with aasvg.
* A reference has been added to the Section in SEC1 describing how
to do decompression.
* The strengthened identity protection requirements are now
mentioned in the introduction.
* Corrections and clarifications were made in the IANA
considerations. The table in the IANA section has been made into
a proper xml table.
* Reference updates.
* Various editorial improvements.
The -08 version of the WG draft has the following changes:
* Further clarification of key calculation in Section 6.3.
* Support for the NIST P-256 group has been made mandatory in
Section 6.4, in order to align the requirements with 3GPP SUCI
encryption requirements.
* The interaction between AT_KDF and AT_KDF_FS has been specified
more clearly, including specifying how future specifications need
to specify the treatment of new combinations.
* Addition of a discussion about the impacts of potential future
quantum computing attacks with specific impacts to this extension.
* Addition of a discussion about metadata/unprotected data in
Section 7.4.
* Reference updates.
* Various editorial improvements.
The -07 version of the WG draft has the following changes:
* The impact of forward secrecy explanation has been improved in the
abstract and security considerations.
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* The draft now more forcefully explains why the authors believe it
is important to migrate existing systems to use forward secrecy,
and makes a recommendation for this migration.
* The draft does no longer refer to issues within the smart cards
but rather the smart card supply chain.
* The rationale for chosen algorithms is explained.
* Also, the authors have checked the language relating to the public
value encoding, and believe it is exactly according to the
references ([RFC7748] Section 6.1 and [SEC2] Section 2.7.1)
The -06 version of the WG draft is a refresh and a reference update.
However, the following should be noted:
* The draft now uses "forward secrecy" terminology and references
RFC 7624 per recommendations on mailing list discussion.
* There's been mailing list discussion about the encoding of the
public values; the current text requires confirmation from the
working group that it is sufficient.
The -05 version of the WG draft takes into account feedback from the
working group list, about the number of bytes needed to encode P-256
values.
The -04 version of the WG draft takes into account feedback from the
May 2020 WG interim meeting, correcting the reference to the NIST
P-256 specification.
The -03 version of the WG draft is first of all a refresh; there are
no issues that we think need addressing, beyond the one for which
there is a suggestion in -03: The specification now suggests an
alternate group/curve as an optional one besides X25519. The
specific choice of particular groups and algorithms is still up to
the working group.
The -02 version of the WG draft took into account additional reviews,
and changed the document to update RFC 5448 (or rather, its
successor, [RFC9048]), changed the wording of the recommendation with
regards to the use of this extension, clarified the references to the
definition of X25519 and Curve25519, clarified the distinction to
ECDH methods that use partially static keys, and simplified the use
of AKA and SIM card terminology. Some editorial changes were also
made.
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The -00 and -01 versions of the WG draft made no major changes, only
updates to some references.
The -05 version is merely a refresh while the draft was waiting for
WG adoption.
The -04 version of this draft made only editorial changes.
The -03 version of this draft changed the naming of various protocol
components, values, and notation to match with the use of ECDH in
ephemeral mode. The AT_KDF_FS negotiation process was clarified in
that exactly one key is ever sent in AT_KDF_ECDHE. The option of
checking for zero key values IN ECDHE was added. The format of the
actual key in AT_PUB_ECDHE was specified. Denial-of-service
considerations for the FS process have been updated. Bidding down
attacks against this extension itself are discussed extensively.
This version also addressed comments from reviewers, including the
August review from Mohit Sethi, and comments made during IETF-102
discussion.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to note that the technical solution in this
document came out of the TrustCom paper [TrustCom2015], whose authors
were J. Arkko, K. Norrman, M. Näslund, and B. Sahlin. This document
uses also a lot of material from [RFC4187] by J. Arkko and
H. Haverinen as well as [RFC5448] by J. Arkko, V. Lehtovirta, and
P. Eronen.
The authors would also like to thank Ben Campbell, Tim Evans, Zhang
Fu, Russ Housley, Tero Kivinen, Eliot Lear, Vesa Lehtovirta, Kathleen
Moriarty, Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi, Anand R. Prasad, Michael Richardson,
Göran Rune, Bengt Sahlin, Joseph Salowey, Mohit Sethi, Rene Struik,
Sean Turner, Helena Vahidi Mazinani, and many other people at the
IETF, GSMA and 3GPP groups for interesting discussions in this
problem space.
Authors' Addresses
Jari Arkko
Ericsson
FI-02420 Jorvas
Finland
Email: jari.arkko@piuha.net
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Karl Norrman
Ericsson
SE-16483 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: karl.norrman@ericsson.com
Vesa Torvinen
Ericsson
FI-02420 Jorvas
Finland
Email: vesa.torvinen@ericsson.com
John Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
SE-164 40 Kista
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
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