Perfect-Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' PFS)
draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-04
Network Working Group J. Arkko
Internet-Draft K. Norrman
Updates: RFC5448 (if approved) V. Torvinen
Intended status: Informational Ericsson
Expires: November 26, 2020 May 25, 2020
Perfect-Forward Secrecy for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA' PFS)
draft-ietf-emu-aka-pfs-04
Abstract
Many different attacks have been reported as part of revelations
associated with pervasive surveillance. Some of the reported attacks
involved compromising smart cards, such as attacking SIM card
manufacturers and operators in an effort to compromise shared secrets
stored on these cards. Since the publication of those reports,
manufacturing and provisioning processes have gained much scrutiny
and have improved. However, the danger of resourceful attackers for
these systems is still a concern.
This specification is an optional extension to the EAP-AKA'
authentication method which was defined in [I-D.ietf-emu-rfc5448bis].
The extension, when negotiated, provides Perfect Forward Secrecy for
the session key generated as a part of the authentication run in EAP-
AKA'. This prevents an attacker who has gained access to the long-
term pre-shared secret in a SIM card from being able to decrypt any
past communications. In addition, if the attacker stays merely a
passive eavesdropper, the extension prevents attacks against future
sessions. This forces attackers to use active attacks instead.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2020.
Arkko, et al. Expires November 26, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft EAP-AKA' PFS May 2020
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Design and Deployment Objectives . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. AKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. EAP-AKA' Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Attacks Against Long-Term Shared Secrets in Smart Cards . 8
4. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Extensions to EAP-AKA' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. AT_PUB_ECDHE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. AT_KDF_PFS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.3. New Key Derivation Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.4. ECDHE Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.5. Message Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.5.1. EAP-Request/AKA'-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.2. EAP-Response/AKA'-Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.3. EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.5.4. EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.5.5. EAP-Request/AKA'-Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.5.6. EAP-Response/AKA'-Reauthentication . . . . . . . . . 17
6.5.7. EAP-Response/AKA'-Synchronization-Failure . . . . . . 18
6.5.8. EAP-Response/AKA'-Authentication-Reject . . . . . . . 18
6.5.9. EAP-Response/AKA'-Client-Error . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.5.10. EAP-Request/AKA'-Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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