Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes
draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-02

PQUIP                                                        F. Driscoll
Internet-Draft                         UK National Cyber Security Centre
Intended status: Informational                           2 February 2024
Expires: 5 August 2024

        Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes
               draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-02

Abstract

   One aspect of the transition to post-quantum algorithms in
   cryptographic protocols is the development of hybrid schemes that
   incorporate both post-quantum and traditional asymmetric algorithms.
   This document defines terminology for such schemes.  It is intended
   to be used as a reference and, hopefully, to ensure consistency and
   clarity across different protocols, standards, and organisations.

About This Document

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Status information for this document may be found at
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-
   terminology/.

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   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Primitives  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Cryptographic Elements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Properties  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Algorithm Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   10. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

1.  Introduction

   The mathematical problems of integer factorisation and discrete
   logarithms over finite fields or elliptic curves underpin most of the
   asymmetric algorithms used for key establishment and digital
   signatures on the internet.  These problems, and hence the algorithms
   based on them, will be vulnerable to attacks using Shor's Algorithm
   on a sufficiently large general-purpose quantum computer, known as a
   Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC).  It is difficult
   to predict when, or if, such a device will exist.  However, it is
   necessary to anticipate and prepare to defend against such a
   development.  Data encrypted today (2024) with an algorithm
   vulnerable to a quantum computer could be stored for decryption by a
   future attacker with a CRQC.  Signing algorithms in products that are
   expected to be in use for many years are also at risk if a CRQC is
   developed during the operational lifetime of that product.

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   Preparing for the potential development of a CRQC requires modifying
   established (standardised) protocols to use asymmetric algorithms
   that are perceived to be secure against quantum computers as well as
   today's classical computers.  These algorithms are called post-
   quantum, while algorithms based on integer factorisation, finite-
   field discrete logarithms or elliptic-curve discrete logarithms are
   called traditional cryptographic algorithms.  In this document
   "traditional algorithm" is also used to refer to this class of
   algorithms.

   During the transition from traditional to post-quantum algorithms,
   there may be a desire or a requirement for protocols that use both
   algorithm types.  A designer may choose to combine a post-quantum
   algorithm with a traditional algorithm to add protection against an
   attacker with a CRQC to the security properties provided by the
   traditional algorithm.  They may also choose to implement a post-
   quantum algorithm alongside a traditional algorithm for ease of
   migration from an ecosystem where only traditional algorithms are
   implemented and used, to one that only uses post-quantum algorithms.
   Examples of solutions that could use both types of algorithm include,
   but are not limited to, [RFC9370], [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design],
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem], and
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth].  Schemes that combine
   post-quantum and traditional algorithms for key establishment or
   digital signatures are often called hybrids.  For example:

   *  NIST defines hybrid key establishment to be a "scheme that is a
      combination of two or more components that are themselves
      cryptographic key-establishment schemes" [NIST_PQC_FAQ];

   *  ETSI defines hybrid key exchanges to be "constructions that
      combine a traditional key exchange ... with a post-quantum key
      exchange ... into a single key exchange" [ETSI_TS103774].

   The word "hybrid" is also used in cryptography to describe encryption
   schemes that combine asymmetric and symmetric algorithms [RFC4949],
   so using it in the post-quantum context overloads it and risks
   misunderstandings.  However, this terminology is well-established
   amongst the post-quantum cryptography (PQC) community.  Therefore, an
   attempt to move away from its use for PQC could lead to multiple
   definitions for the same concept, resulting in confusion and lack of
   clarity.

   This document provides language for constructions that combine
   traditional and post-quantum algorithms.  Specific solutions for
   enabling use of multiple asymmetric algorithms in cryptographic
   schemes may be more general than this, allowing the use of solely
   traditional or solely post-quantum algorithms.  However, where

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   relevant, we focus on post-quantum traditional combinations as these
   are the motivation for the wider work in the IETF.  This document is
   intended as a reference terminology guide for other documents to add
   clarity and consistency across different protocols, standards, and
   organisations.  Additionally, this document aims to reduce
   misunderstanding about use of the word "hybrid" as well as defining a
   shared language for different types of post-quantum traditional
   hybrid constructions.

   In this document, a "cryptographic algorithm" is defined, as in
   [NIST_SP_800-152], to be a "well-defined computational procedure that
   takes variable inputs, often including a cryptographic key, and
   produces an output".  Examples include RSA, ECDH, ML-KEM (formerly
   known as Kyber) and ML-DSA (formerly known as Dilithium).  The
   expression "cryptographic scheme" is used to refer to a construction
   that uses a cryptographic algorithm or a group of cryptographic
   algorithms to achieve a particular cryptographic outcome, e.g., key
   agreement.  A cryptographic scheme may be made up of a number of
   functions.  For example, a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) is a
   cryptographic scheme consisting of three functions: Key Generation,
   Encapsulation, and Decapsulation.  A cryptographic protocol
   incorporates one or more cryptographic schemes.  For example, TLS
   [RFC8446] is a cryptographic protocol that includes schemes for key
   agreement, record layer encryption, and server authentication.

2.  Primitives

   This section introduces terminology related to cryptographic
   algorithms and to hybrid constructions for cryptographic schemes.

   *Traditional Cryptographic Algorithm*:  An asymmetric cryptographic
      algorithm based on integer factorisation, finite field discrete
      logarithms, elliptic curve discrete logarithms, or related
      mathematical problems.

      A related mathematical problem is one that can be solved by
      solving the integer factorisation, finite field discrete logarithm
      or elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.

      Where there is little risk of confusion traditional cryptographic
      algorithms can also be referred to as traditional algorithms for
      brevity.  Traditional algorithms can also be called classical or
      conventional algorithms.

   *Post-Quantum Algorithm*:  An asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that
      is believed to be secure against attacks using quantum computers
      as well as classical computers.

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      Post-quantum algorithms can also be called quantum-resistant or
      quantum-safe algorithms.

   *Component Algorithm*:  Each cryptographic algorithm that forms part
      of a cryptographic scheme.

   *Single-Algorithm Scheme*:  A cryptographic scheme with one component
      algorithm.

      A single-algorithm scheme could use either a traditional algorithm
      or a post-quantum algorithm.

   *Multi-Algorithm Scheme*:  A cryptographic scheme that incorporates
      more than one component algorithm, where the component algorithms
      have the same cryptographic purpose.

      For example, a multi-algorithm scheme may include multiple
      signature algorithms or multiple Public Key Encryption (PKE)
      algorithms.  Component algorithms could be all traditional, all
      post-quantum, or a mixture of the two.

   *Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Scheme*:  A multi-algorithm
      scheme where at least one component algorithm is a post-quantum
      algorithm and at least one is a traditional algorithm.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)*:  A multi-algorithm
      KEM made up of two or more component KEM algorithms where at least
      one is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a traditional
      algorithm.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Public Key Encryption (PKE)*:  A multi-algorithm PKE
      scheme made up of two or more component PKE algorithms where at
      least one is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a
      traditional algorithm.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Digital Signature*:  A multi-algorithm digital signature
      scheme made up of two or more component digital signature
      algorithms where at least one is a post-quantum algorithm and at
      least one is a traditional algorithm.

      PQ/T hybrid KEMs, PQ/T hybrid PKE, and PQ/T hybrid digital
      signatures are all examples of PQ/T hybrid schemes.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Combiner*:  A method that takes two or more component
      algorithms and combines them to form a PQ/T hybrid scheme.

   *PQ/PQ Hybrid Scheme*:  A multi-algorithm scheme where all components
      are post-quantum algorithms.

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      The definitions for types of PQ/T hybrid schemes can adapted to
      define types of PQ/PQ hybrid schemes, which are multi-algorithm
      schemes where all component algorithms are Post-Quantum
      algorithms.

   In cases where there is little chance of confusion between other
   types of hybrid cryptography e.g., as defined in [RFC4949], and where
   the component algorithms of a multi-algorithm scheme could be either
   post-quantum or traditional, it may be appropriate to use the phrase
   "hybrid scheme" without PQ/T or PQ/PQ preceding it.

   *Component Scheme*:  Each cryptographic scheme that makes up a PQ/T
      hybrid scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol.

      Depending on the construction of a PQ/T hybrid scheme or PQ/T
      hybrid protocol it may or may not be meaningful to define the
      component schemes as well as the component algorithms.  For
      example, fused hybrids, as defined in
      [I-D.hale-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums], may sufficiently
      entangle the component algorithms that the component schemes are
      not relevant.

3.  Cryptographic Elements

   This section introduces terminology related to cryptographic elements
   and their inclusion in hybrid schemes.

   *Cryptographic Element*:  Any data type (private or public) that
      contains an input or output value for a cryptographic algorithm or
      for a function making up a cryptographic algorithm.

      Types of cryptographic elements include public keys, private keys,
      plaintexts, ciphertexts, shared secrets, and signature values.

   *Component Cryptographic Element*:  A cryptographic element of a
      component algorithm in a multi-algorithm scheme.

      For example, in [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design], the client's
      keyshare contains two component public keys, one for a post-
      quantum algorithm and one for a traditional algorithm.

   *Composite Cryptographic Element*:  A cryptographic element that
      incorporates multiple component cryptographic elements of the same
      type in a multi-algorithm scheme.

      For example, a composite cryptographic public key is made up of
      two component public keys.

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   *Cryptographic Element Combiner*:  A method that takes two or more
      component cryptographic elements of the same type and combines
      them to form a composite cryptographic element.

      A cryptographic element combiner could be concatenation, such as
      where two component public keys are concatenated to form a
      composite public key as in [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design], or
      something more involved such as the dualPRF defined in [BINDEL].

4.  Protocols

   This section introduces terminology related to the use of post-
   quantum and traditional algorithms together in protocols.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Protocol*:  A protocol that uses two or more component
      algorithms providing the same cryptographic functionality, where
      at least one is a post-quantum algorithm and at least one is a
      traditional algorithm.

      For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol providing confidentiality
      could use a PQ/T hybrid KEM such as in
      [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design], or it could combine the output of a
      post-quantum KEM and a traditional KEM at the protocol level to
      generate a single shared secret, such as in [RFC9370].  Similarly,
      a PQ/T hybrid protocol providing authentication could use a PQ/T
      hybrid digital signature scheme, or it could include both post-
      quantum and traditional single-algorithm digital signature
      schemes.

      A protocol that can negotiate the use of either a traditional
      algorithm or a post-quantum algorithm, but not of both types of
      algorithm, is not a PQ/T hybrid protocol.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Protocol with Composite Key Exchange*:  A PQ/T hybrid
      protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid scheme to achieve key
      exchange, in such a way that the protocol fields and message flow
      are the same as those in a version of the protocol that uses a
      single-algorithm scheme.

      For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite key exchange
      could include a single PQ/T hybrid KEM.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Protocol with Composite Key Agreement*:  A PQ/T hybrid
      protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid scheme to achieve key
      agreement, in such a way that the protocol fields and message flow
      are the same as those in a version of the protocol that uses a
      single-algorithm scheme.

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      For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite key agreement
      could include a single PQ/T hybrid KEM, such as in
      [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design].

   *PQ/T Hybrid Protocol with Composite Authentication*:  A PQ/T hybrid
      protocol that incorporates a PQ/T hybrid scheme to achieve
      authentication, in such a way that the protocol fields and message
      flow are the same as those in a version of the protocol that uses
      a single-algorithm scheme.

      For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with composite authentication
      could include a single PQ/T hybrid digital signature, with
      component cryptographic elements being included in a PQ/T hybrid
      certificate.

   In a PQ/T hybrid protocol with a composite construction, changes are
   primarily made to the formats of the cryptographic elements, while
   the protocol fields and message flow remain largely unchanged.  In
   implementations, most changes are likely to be made to the
   cryptographic libraries, with minimal changes to the protocol
   libraries.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Protocol with Non-Composite Key Exchange*:  A PQ/T
      hybrid protocol that incorporates multiple single-algorithm
      schemes to achieve key exchange, where at least one uses a post-
      quantum algorithm and at least one uses a traditional algorithm,
      in such a way that the formats of the component cryptographic
      elements are the same as when they are used a part of a single-
      algorithm scheme.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Protocol with Non-Composite Key Agreement*:  A PQ/T
      hybrid protocol that incorporates multiple single-algorithm
      schemes to achieve key agreement, where at least one uses a post-
      quantum algorithm and at least one uses a traditional algorithm,
      in such a way that the formats of the component cryptographic
      elements are the same as when they are used a part of a single-
      algorithm scheme.

      For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite key
      agreement could include a traditional key exchange scheme and a
      post-quantum KEM.  A construction like this for IKEv2 is enabled
      by [RFC9370].

   *PQ/T Hybrid Protocol with Non-Composite Authentication*:  A PQ/T

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      hybrid protocol that incorporates multiple single-algorithm
      schemes to achieve authentication, where at least one uses a post-
      quantum algorithm and at least one uses a traditional algorithm,
      in such a way that the formats of the component cryptographic
      elements are the same as when they are used a part of a single-
      algorithm scheme.

      For example, a PQ/T hybrid protocol with non-composite
      authentication could use a PQ/T parallel PKI with one traditional
      certificate chain and one post-quantum certificate chain.

   In a PQ/T hybrid protocol with a non-composite construction, changes
   are primarily made to the protocol fields, the message flow, or both,
   while changes to cryptographic elements are minimised.  In
   implementations, most changes are likely to be made to the protocol
   libraries, with minimal changes to the cryptographic libraries.

   It is possible for a PQ/T hybrid protocol to be designed with both
   composite and non-composite constructions.  For example, a protocol
   that offers both confidentiality and authentication could have
   composite key agreement and non-composite authentication.  Similarly,
   it is possible for a PQ/T hybrid protocol to achieve certain
   cryptographic outcomes in a non-hybrid manner.  For example
   [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design] describes a PQ/T hybrid protocol with
   composite key agreement, but with single-algorithm authentication.

5.  Properties

   This section describes properties that may be desired from or
   achieved by a PQ/T hybrid scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol.

   It is not possible for one PQ/T hybrid scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol
   to achieve all of the properties in this section.  To understand what
   properties are desirable a designer or implementer will think about
   why they are using a PQ/T hybrid scheme.  For example, a scheme that
   is designed for implementation security will likely require PQ/T
   hybrid confidentiality or PQ/T hybrid authentication, while a scheme
   for interoperability will require PQ/T hybrid interoperability.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Confidentiality*:  The property that confidentiality is
      achieved by a PQ/T hybrid scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol as long
      as at least one component algorithm that aims to provide this
      property remains secure.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Authentication*:  The property that authentication is
      achieved by a PQ/T hybrid scheme or a PQ/T hybrid protocol as long
      as at least one component algorithm that aims to provide this
      property remains secure.

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   The security properties of a PQ/T hybrid scheme or protocol depend on
   the security of its component algorithms, the choice of PQ/T hybrid
   combiner, and the capability of an attacker.  Changes to the security
   of a component algorithm can impact the security properties of a PQ/T
   hybrid scheme providing hybrid confidentiality or hybrid
   authentication.  For example, if the post-quantum component algorithm
   of a PQ/T hybrid scheme is broken, the scheme will remain secure
   against an attacker with a classical computer, but will be vulnerable
   to an attacker with a CRQC.

   PQ/T hybrid protocols that offer both confidentiality and
   authentication do not necessarily offer both hybrid confidentiality
   and hybrid authentication.  For example, [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design]
   provides hybrid confidentiality but does not address hybrid
   authentication.  Therefore, if the design in
   [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design] is used with single-algorithm X.509
   certificates as defined in [RFC5280] only authentication with a
   single algorithm is achieved.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Interoperability*:  The property that a PQ/T hybrid
      scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol can be completed successfully
      provided that both parties share support for at least one
      component algorithm.

      For example, a PQ/T hybrid digital signature might achieve hybrid
      interoperability if the signature can be verified by either
      verifying the traditional or the post-quantum component, such as
      the approach defined in section 7.2.2 of [ITU-T-X509-2019].  In
      this example a verifier that has migrated to support post-quantum
      algorithms is required to verify only the post-quantum signature,
      while a verifier that has not migrated will verify only the
      traditional signature.

   In the case of a protocol that aims to achieve both authentication
   and confidentiality, PQ/T hybrid interoperability requires that at
   least one component authentication algorithm and at least one
   component algorithm for confidentiality is supported by both parties.

   It is not possible for a PQ/T hybrid scheme to achieve both PQ/T
   hybrid interoperability and PQ/T hybrid confidentiality without
   additional functionality at a protocol level.  For PQ/T hybrid
   interoperability a scheme needs to work whenever one component
   algorithm is supported by both parties, while to achieve PQ/T hybrid
   confidentiality all component algorithms need to be used.  However,
   both properties can be achieved in a PQ/T hybrid protocol by building
   in downgrade protection external to the cryptographic schemes.  For
   example, in [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design], the client uses the TLS
   supported groups extension to advertise support for a PQ/T hybrid

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   scheme and the server can select this group if it supports the
   scheme.  This is protected using TLS's existing downgrade protection,
   so achieves PQ/T hybrid confidentiality, but the connection can still
   be made if either the client or server does not support the PQ/T
   hybrid scheme, so PQ/T hybrid interoperability is achieved.

   The same is true for PQ/T hybrid interoperability and PQ/T hybrid
   authentication.  It is not possible to achieve both with a PQ/T
   hybrid scheme alone, but it is possible with a PQ/T hybrid protocol
   that has appropriate downgrade protection.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Backwards Compatibility*:  The property that a PQ/T
      hybrid scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol can be completed
      successfully provided that both parties support the traditional
      component algorithm.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Forwards Compatibility*:  The property that a PQ/T
      hybrid scheme or PQ/T hybrid protocol can be completed
      successfully provided that both parties support the post-quantum
      component algorithm.

   *Weak Non-Separability*:  A property of a hybrid digital signature
      that guarantees that, given a hybrid signature value, an adversary
      cannot remove either component signature without leaving some
      evidence behind.

      Weak non-separability does not necessarily prevent an attacker
      with a PQ/T hybrid signature value from creating a traditional-
      only or post-quantum-only signature that will be accepted by the
      verification function for one of the component algorithms.  Rather
      it means that a verifier would be able to identify, under a
      stripping attack, that the remaining signature had been derived
      from a PQ/T hybrid signature.

   *Strong Non-Separability*:  A property of a hybrid digital signature
      that guarantees that, given a hybrid signature value, an attacker
      cannot create a single-algorithm signature that will be accepted
      by the verification function for one of the component algorithms.

      A signature only achieves strong non-separability if the attacker
      cannot use the hybrid signature to create any single-algorithm
      signature that verifies, even if the signature is on a different
      message to the original hybrid digital signature.

      In the context of PQ/T hybrid signatures this means that an
      attacker cannot take a PQ/T hybrid digital signature and generate
      any post-quantum or traditional signature that will verify
      correctly.

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   *Simultaneous Verification*:  A property of a hybrid digital
      signature where the verifier cannot return a positive result and
      finish the verification process before all component signatures
      are verified.  Moreover, this property is within the algorithm
      rather than being policy or protocol based.

      In the context of PQ/T hybrid signatures this means that both the
      post-quantum and traditional component signatures need to be
      verified before the verifier returns a result.

   Weak non-separability, strong non-separability and simultaneous
   verification are related concepts, with strong non-separability being
   a stronger property than weak non-separability and simultaneous
   verification being a stronger property still.  These concepts are
   introduced, explored in more detail and examples provided in
   [BINDELHALE].

6.  Certificates

   This section introduces terminology related to the use of
   certificates in hybrid schemes.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Certificate*:  A digital certificate that contains
      public keys for two or more component algorithms where at least
      one is a traditional algorithm and at least one is a post-quantum
      algorithm.

      A PQ/T hybrid certificate could be used to facilitate a PQ/T
      hybrid authentication protocol.  However, a PQ/T hybrid
      authentication protocol does not need to use a PQ/T hybrid
      certificate; separate certificates could be used for individual
      component algorithms.

      The component public keys in a PQ/T hybrid certificate could be
      included as a composite public key or as individual component
      public keys.

      The use of a PQ/T hybrid certificate does not necessarily achieve
      hybrid authentication of the identity of the sender; this is
      determined by properties of the chain of trust.  For example, an
      end-entity certificate that contains a composite public key, but
      which is signed using a single-algorithm digital signature scheme
      could be used to provide hybrid authentication of the source of a
      message, but would not achieve hybrid authentication of the
      identity of the sender.

   *Post-Quantum Certificate*:  A digital certificate that contains a
      single public key for a post-quantum digital signature algorithm.

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   *Traditional Certificate*:  A digital certificate that contains a
      single public key for a traditional digital signature algorithm.

   X.509 certificates as defined in [RFC5280] could be either
   traditional or post-quantum certificates depending on the algorithm
   in the Subject Public Key Info.  For example, a certificate
   containing a ML-DSA public key, as will be defined in
   [I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates], would be a post-quantum
   certificate.

   *Post-Quantum Certificate Chain*:  A certificate chain where all
      certificate include a public key for a post-quantum algorithm and
      are signed using a post-quantum digital signature scheme.

   *Traditional Certificate Chain*:  A certificate chain where all
      certificates include a public key for a traditional algorithm and
      are signed using a traditional digital signature scheme.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Certificate Chain*:  A certificate chain where all
      certificates are PQ/T hybrid certificates and each certificate is
      signed with two or more component algorithms with at least one
      being a traditional algorithm and at least one being a post-
      quantum algorithm.

   A PQ/T hybrid certificate chain is one way of achieving hybrid
   authentication of the identity of a sender in a protocol, but is not
   the only way.  An alternative is to use a PQ/T parallel PKI as
   defined below.

   *PQ/T Mixed Certificate Chain*:  A certificate chain containing at
      least two of the three certificate types defined in this draft
      (PQ/T hybrid certificates, post-quantum certificates and
      traditional certificates)

      For example, a traditional end-entity certificate could be signed
      by a post-quantum intermediate certificate, which in turn could be
      signed by a post-quantum root certificate.  This may be desirable
      due to the lifetimes of the certificates, the relative difficulty
      of rotating keys, or for efficiency reasons.  The security
      properties of a certificate chain that mixes post-quantum and
      traditional algorithms would need to be analysed on a case-by-case
      basis.

   *PQ/T Parallel PKI*:  Two certificate chains, one a post-quantum
      certificate chain and one a traditional certificate chain, that
      are used together in a protocol.

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      A PQ/T parallel PKI might be used achieve hybrid authentication or
      hybrid interoperability depending on the protocol implementation.

   *Multi-Certificate Authentication*:  Authentication that uses two or
      more end-entity certificates.

      For example, multi-certificate authentication may be achieved
      using a PQ/T parallel PKI.

7.  Algorithm Specification

   This section introduces terminology for specifying the component
   algorithms used in PQ/T hybrid schemes or PQ/T hybrid protocols.

   *PQ/T Hybrid Scheme Identifier*:  A single code point that specifies
      all component algorithms used in a PQ/T hybrid scheme.

8.  Security Considerations

   This document defines security-relevant terminology to be used in
   documents specifying PQ/T hybrid protocols and schemes.  However, the
   document itself does not have a security impact on Internet
   protocols.  The security considerations for each PQ/T hybrid protocol
   are specific to that protocol and should be discussed in the relevant
   specification documents.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

10.  Informative References

   [BINDEL]   Bindel, N., Brendel, J., Fischlin, M., Goncalves, B., and
              D. Stebila, "Hybrid Key Encapsulation Mechanisms and
              Authenticated Key Exchange", Post-Quantum Cryptography
              pp.206-226, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_12, July 2019,
              <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25510-7_12>.

   [BINDELHALE]
              Bindel, N. and B. Hale, "A Note on Hybrid Signature
              Schemes", Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/423, 23
              July 2023, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/423.pdf>.

   [ETSI_TS103774]
              ETSI TS 103 744 V1.1.1, "CYBER; Quantum-safe Hybrid Key
              Exchanges", December 2020, <https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
              etsi_ts/103700_103799/103744/01.01.01_60/
              ts_103744v010101p.pdf>.

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   [I-D.hale-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums]
              Bindel, N., Hale, B., Connolly, D., and F. D, "Hybrid
              signature spectrums", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-hale-pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums-01, 6 November
              2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hale-
              pquip-hybrid-signature-spectrums-01>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth]
              Becker, A., Guthrie, R., and M. J. Jenkins, "Related
              Certificates for Use in Multiple Authentications within a
              Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              lamps-cert-binding-for-multi-auth-03, 29 November 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              cert-binding-for-multi-auth-03>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates]
              Massimo, J., Kampanakis, P., Turner, S., and B.
              Westerbaan, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure:
              Algorithm Identifiers for Dilithium", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-
              02, 7 August 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
              draft-ietf-lamps-dilithium-certificates-02>.

   [I-D.ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem]
              Ounsworth, M. and J. Gray, "Composite KEM For Use In
              Internet PKI", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-lamps-pq-composite-kem-02, 23 October 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-lamps-
              pq-composite-kem-02>.

   [I-D.ietf-tls-hybrid-design]
              Stebila, D., Fluhrer, S., and S. Gueron, "Hybrid key
              exchange in TLS 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-tls-hybrid-design-09, 7 September 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              hybrid-design-09>.

   [ITU-T-X509-2019]
              ITU-T, "ITU-T X.509 The Directory - Public-key and
              attribute certificate frameworks", January 2019,
              <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509-201910-I>.

   [NIST_PQC_FAQ]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              "Post-Quantum Cryptography FAQs", 5 July 2022,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/
              faqs>.

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   [NIST_SP_800-152]
              Barker, E. B., Smid, M., Branstad, D., and National
              Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "NIST SP
              800-152 A Profile for U. S. Federal Cryptographic Key
              Management Systems", October 2015,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-152>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

   [RFC9370]  Tjhai, CJ., Tomlinson, M., Bartlett, G., Fluhrer, S., Van
              Geest, D., Garcia-Morchon, O., and V. Smyslov, "Multiple
              Key Exchanges in the Internet Key Exchange Protocol
              Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 9370, DOI 10.17487/RFC9370, May
              2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9370>.

Acknowledgments

   This document is the product of numerous fruitful discussions in the
   IETF PQUIP group.  Thank you in particular to Mike Ounsworth, John
   Gray, Tim Hollebeek, Wang Guilin, Britta Hale, Paul Hoffman and Sofía
   Celi for their contributions.

   This document is inspired by many others from the IETF and elsewhere.
   In particular, many of the definitions in the Properties section are
   drawn from [BINDELHALE].

Author's Address

   Florence Driscoll
   UK National Cyber Security Centre
   Email: florence.d@ncsc.gov.uk

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