RPKI signed object for TAL
draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Last updated 2018-06-08
Replaces draft-tbruijnzeels-sidrops-signed-tal
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Network Working Group                                     T. Bruijnzeels
Internet-Draft                                                NLnet Labs
Intended status: Best Current Practice                       C. Martinez
Expires: December 10, 2018                                        LACNIC
                                                            June 8, 2018

                       RPKI signed object for TAL
                    draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-01

Abstract

   Trust Anchor Locators (TALs) [I-D.ietf-sidrops-https-tal] are used by
   Relying Parties in the RPKI to locate and validate Trust Anchor
   certificates used in RPKI validation.  This document defines an RPKI
   signed object [RFC6488] for a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) that can be
   used by Trust Anchors to perform a planned migration to a new key,
   allowing Relying Parties to discover the new key up to one year after
   the migration occurred.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 10, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must

Bruijnzeels & Martinez  Expires December 10, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft         RPKI signed object for TAL              June 2018

   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Signed TAL definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  The Signed TAL Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  The Signed TAL eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.2.  activationTime  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.3.  certificateURIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.4.  subjectPublicKeyInfo  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Signed TAL Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Signed TAL Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Signed TAL Publication  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Performing a planned Key Roll as a Trust Anchor . . . . . . .   6
     6.1.  Prepare a new Trust Anchor key and CA certificate . . . .   7
     6.2.  Publish the new CA certificate  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.3.  Verify the validity of the new CA certificate . . . . . .   7
     6.4.  Publish the objects under the current key under the new
           key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     6.5.  Verify that the validity of objects under the new key . .   7
     6.6.  Publish a Signed TAL as the only object under the current
           key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     6.7.  Delete the current key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Unplanned Key Roll operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. Changing a Trust Anchor Certificate URIs  . . . . . . . . . .   9
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     11.1.  OID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     11.2.  File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   13. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
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