RPKI Signed Object for Trust Anchor Key
draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (sidrops WG)
Authors Carlos Martínez  , George Michaelson  , Tom Harrison  , Tim Bruijnzeels  , Rob Austein 
Last updated 2021-12-16
Replaces draft-tbruijnzeels-sidrops-signed-tal
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Network Working Group                                        C. Martinez
Internet-Draft                                                    LACNIC
Intended status: Standards Track                           G. Michaelson
Expires: 20 June 2022                                        T. Harrison
                                                                   APNIC
                                                          T. Bruijnzeels
                                                              NLnet Labs
                                                              R. Austein
                                                    Dragon Research Labs
                                                        17 December 2021

                RPKI Signed Object for Trust Anchor Key
                    draft-ietf-sidrops-signed-tal-08

Abstract

   A Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) is used by Relying Parties (RPs) in the
   Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to locate and validate a
   Trust Anchor (TA) Certification Authority (CA) certificate used in
   RPKI validation.  This document defines an RPKI signed object for a
   Trust Anchor Key (TAK), that can be used by a TA to signal the
   location(s) of the accompanying CA certificate for the current key to
   RPs, as well as the successor key and the location(s) of its CA
   certificate.  This object helps to support both planned and unplanned
   key rolls without impacting RPKI validation.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 June 2022.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  TAK Object Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  The TAK Object Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  The TAK Object eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.1.  TAKey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       3.2.2.  TAK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  TAK Object Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  TAK Object Generation and Publication . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Maintaining Multiple TA Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   7.  Performing TA Key Rolls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  Phase 1: Add a TAK for Key 'A'  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.2.  Phase 2: Add a Key 'B'  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.3.  Phase 3: Activate Key 'B' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.4.  Phase 4: Remove Key 'A' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.5.  Unplanned Direction Roll  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.1.  OID  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.2.  File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     10.3.  Module Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.1.  APNIC  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. Revision History  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   13. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   14. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     14.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     14.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17

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1.  Requirements Notation

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Overview

   A TAL [RFC8630] is used by an RP in the RPKI to locate and validate
   TA CA certificates used in RPKI validation.  However, until now there
   has been no in-band way of notifying RPs of updates to a TAL.  In-
   band notification means that TAs can be more confident of RPs being
   aware of key roll operations.

   This document defines a new RPKI signed object that can be used to
   document the location(s) of the TA CA certificate for the current TA
   key, as well as the value of the successor key and the location(s) of
   its TA CA certificate.  This allows RPs to be notified automatically
   of such changes, and enables TAs to pre-stage a successor key so that
   planned and unplanned key rolls can be performed without risking the
   invalidation of the RPKI tree under the TA.  We call this object the
   Trust Anchor Key (TAK) object.

   When RPs are first bootstrapped, they use a TAL to discover the key
   and location(s) of the CA certificate for a TA.  The RP can then
   retrieve and validate the CA certificate, and subsequently validate
   the manifest [RFC6486] and CRL published by that TA (section 5 of
   [RFC6487]).  However, before processing any other objects it will
   first validate the TAK object, if present.  If the TAK object
   indicates that the current key is still valid, then the RP updates
   its local state to reflect any changes to the certificate location(s)
   for that current key, and then continues processing as per normal.
   If the TAK object indicates that the current key has been revoked,
   then the RP will fetch the successor key, update its local state with
   that key and its associated certificate location(s), and continue
   processing using that key.

   In a situation where an RP is very outdated, it may have to process a
   large number of TAK objects in order to reach the current TA key.
   This is a one-time cost only, though, since once the current TA key
   is recorded as such by the RP, future operations will start at the
   certificate location(s) for that TA key, and the previous TAK objects
   will not need to be retrieved again.

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3.  TAK Object Definition

   The TAK object makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed
   objects [RFC6488], which defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
   [RFC5652] wrapper for the content as well as a generic validation
   procedure for RPKI signed objects.  Therefore, to complete the
   specification of the TAK object (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this
   document defines:

   *  The OID (in Section 3.1) that identifies the signed object as
      being a TAK.  (This OID appears within the eContentType in the
      encapContentInfo object, as well as the content-type signed
      attribute in the signerInfo object.)

   *  The ASN.1 syntax for the TAK eContent, in Section 3.2.

   *  The additional steps required to validate a TAK, in Section 3.3.

3.1.  The TAK Object Content Type

   This document requests an OID for the TAK object as follows:

      id-ct-signed-Tal OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
         { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
           smime(16) id-smime ct(1) TBD }

   This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the
   encapContentInfo object, as well as the content-type signed attribute
   in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).

3.2.  The TAK Object eContent

   The content of a TAK object is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished
   Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690], and is defined per the module in
   Appendix A.

3.2.1.  TAKey

   This structure defines a TA key, similarly to [RFC8630].  It contains
   a sequence of one or more URIs and a SubjectPublicKeyInfo.

3.2.1.1.  certificateURIs

   This field is equivalent to the URI section defined in section 2.2 of
   [RFC8630].  It MUST contain at least one CertificateURI element.
   Each CertificateURI element contains the IA5String representation of
   either an rsync URI [RFC5781], or an HTTPS URI [RFC7230].

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3.2.1.2.  subjectPublicKeyInfo

   This field contains a SubjectPublicKeyInfo (section 4.1.2.7 of
   [RFC5280]) in DER format [X.690].

3.2.2.  TAK

3.2.2.1.  version

   The version number of the TAK object MUST be 0.

3.2.2.2.  current

   This field contains the TA key of the repository in which the TAK
   object is published.

3.2.2.3.  successor

   This field contains the TA key to be used once the current key is
   revoked.

3.2.2.4.  revoked

   This field contains a boolean which (if true) indicates that the
   current TA key should be considered as revoked, in which case RPs
   should continue processing using the successor TA key.

3.3.  TAK Object Validation

   To determine whether a TAK object is valid, the RP MUST perform the
   following checks in addition to those specified in [RFC6488]:

   *  The eContentType OID matches the OID described in Section 3.1.

   *  The TAK object appears as the product of a TA CA certificate.

   *  The TA CA has published only one TAK object in its repository for
      this key, and this object appears on the manifest as the only
      entry using the ".tak" extension (see [RFC6481]).

   *  The EE certificate of this TAK object describes its Internet
      Number Resources (INRs) using the "inherit" attribute.

   *  The decoded TAK content conforms to the format defined in
      Section 3.2.

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   *  The SubjectPublicKeyInfo value of the current TA key in the TAK
      object matches that of the TA CA certificate used to issue the EE
      certificate of the TAK object.

   If any of these checks does not succeed, the RP MUST ignore the TAK
   object, and proceed as though it were not listed on the manifest.

4.  TAK Object Generation and Publication

   A TA MAY choose to use TAK objects to communicate its current and
   successor keys.  If a TA chooses to use TAK objects, then it SHOULD
   generate and publish TAK objects under each of its keys.

   A non-normative guideline for naming this object is that the filename
   chosen for the TAK object in the publication repository be a value
   derived from the public key part of the entity's key pair, using the
   algorithm described for CRLs in section 2.2 of [RFC6481] for
   generation of filenames.  The filename extension of ".tak" MUST be
   used to denote the object as a TAK.

   In order to generate a TAK object, the TA MUST perform the following
   actions:

   *  The TA MUST generate a key pair for a "one-time-use" EE
      certificate to use for the TAK.

   *  The TA MUST generate a one-time-use EE certificate for the TAK.

   *  This EE certificate MUST have an SIA extension access description
      field with an accessMethod OID value of id-ad-signedObject, where
      the associated accessLocation references the publication point of
      the TAK as an object URL.

   *  As described in [RFC6487], an [RFC3779] extension is required in
      the EE certificate used for this object.  However, because the
      resource set is irrelevant to this object type, this certificate
      MUST describe its Internet Number Resources (INRs) using the
      "inherit" attribute, rather than explicit description of a
      resource set.

   *  This EE certificate MUST have a "notBefore" time that matches or
      predates the moment that the TAK will be published.

   *  This EE certificate MUST have a "notAfter" time that reflects the
      intended duration for which this TAK will be published.  If the EE
      certificate for a TAK object is expired, it MUST no longer be
      published, but it MAY be replaced by a newly generated TAK object
      with equivalent content and an updated "notAfter" time.

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   *  The current TA key for the TAK MUST match that of the TA CA
      certificate under which the TAK was issued.

5.  Relying Party Use

   Relying Parties MUST keep a record of the current key for each
   configured TA, as well as the URI(s) where the CA certificate for
   this key may be retrieved.  This record MAY be bootstrapped by the
   use of a pre-configured (and unsigned) TAL file [RFC8630], but it
   MUST be updated with authoritative signed information found in valid
   TAK objects from subsequent validation runs.

   When performing top-down validation, RPs MUST first validate and
   process the TAK object for its current known key, by performing the
   following steps:

   *  A CA certificate is retrieved and validated from the known URIs as
      described in sections 3 and 4 of [RFC8630].

   *  The manifest and CRL for this certificate are then validated as
      described in [RFC6487] and [RFC6486].

   *  The TAK object, if present, is validated as described in
      Section 3.3.

   If the TAK object indicates that the current key has not been
   revoked, then the RP updates its local state with the URIs for that
   key from the TAK object and continues standard top-down validation as
   described in [RFC6487] using that key.

   If the TAK object indicates that the current key has been revoked,
   then the RP updates its current known key details to be those of the
   successor key, and then begins top-down validation again using the
   successor key.  The RP repeats this process until it reaches a TA key
   that either does not publish a TAK object, or publishes a TAK object
   that indicates that the corresponding current key is not revoked.  At
   that point, it continues standard top-down validation using that key.

   If the RP reaches a TAK object that does not include a successor key,
   but is marked as revoked, then the TA has accidentally revoked its
   current key.  Similarly, if the RP processes the same TAK object
   twice while attempting to validate a TA, then the TA has accidentally
   set up a loop among its TAK objects.  If the RP encounters either of
   these scenarios, the RP MUST ignore the TAK objects that it has
   processed, and proceed as though they were not listed on any of the
   relevant manifests, so as to allow the TA time to fix the problem.
   For discussion of how a TA can resolve these problems, see Section 8.

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   An RP MUST NOT use a successor key for top-down validation when the
   current key is not revoked, except for the purposes of testing that
   the new key is working correctly.  This allows a TA to publish a
   successor key for a period of time, allowing RPs to test it, while
   still being able to rely on RPs using the current key for their
   production RPKI operations.  Once any RP problem reports have been
   resolved, a TA can then revoke the current key to advance the
   transition.

6.  Maintaining Multiple TA Keys

   Although an RP that can process TAK objects will only ever use one
   key (either the current key, or the successor key if the current key
   is revoked), an RP that cannot process TAK objects will continue to
   use the current key even when it is marked as revoked in the TAK.  As
   a result, even when a TA has revoked a key, the TA may have to
   maintain that key for a period of time alongside the new key in order
   to ensure continuity of service for older clients.

   If a TA has multiple TA keys, then the signed material for these keys
   MUST be published under different directories in the context of the
   'id-ad-caRepository' and 'id-ad-rpkiManifest' Subject Information
   Access descriptions contained on the CA certificates [RFC6487].
   Publishing objects under the same directory is potentially confusing
   for RPs, and could lead to object invalidity in the event of file
   name collisions.

   However, the CA certificates for each key, and the contents published
   by each key, MUST be equivalent (except for the TAK object).  In
   other words, for the purposes of RPKI validation, it MUST NOT make a
   difference which of the keys is used as a starting point.

   This means that the IP and AS resources contained on all current CA
   certificates for the current TA keys MUST be the same.  Furthermore,
   for any delegation of IP and AS resources to a child, the TA MUST
   have an equivalent CA certificate published under each of its keys.
   Any updates in delegations MUST be reflected under each of its keys.
   A TA SHOULD NOT publish any other objects besides a CRL, a Manifest,
   a single TAK object, and any number of CA certificates for delegation
   to child CAs.

   If a TA uses a single remote publication server for its keys, per
   [RFC8181], then it MUST include all <publish/> and <withdraw/> PDUs
   for the products of each of its keys in a single query, in order to
   ensure that they will reflect the same content at all times.

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   If a TA uses multiple publication servers, then it is by definition
   inevitable that the content of different keys will be out of sync at
   times.  In such cases, the TA SHOULD ensure that the duration of
   these moments are limited to the shortest possible time.
   Furthermore, the following should be observed:

   *  In cases where a CA certificate is revoked completely, or replaced
      by a certificate with a reduced set of resources, these changes
      will not take effect fully until all the relevant repository
      publication points have been updated.  Given that TA key
      operations are normally performed infrequently, this is unlikely
      to be a problem: if the revocation or shrinking of an issued CA
      certificate is staged for days/weeks, then experiencing a delay of
      several minutes for the repository publication points to be
      updated is fairly insignificant.

   *  In cases where a CA certificate is replaced by a certificate with
      an extended set of resources, the TA MUST inform the receiving CA
      only after all of its repository publication points have been
      updated.  This ensures that the receiving CA will not issue any
      products that could be invalid if an RP uses a TA key just before
      the CA certificate was due to be updated.

   Finally, note that the publication locations of CA certificates for
   delegations to child CAs under each key will be different, and
   therefore the Authority Information Access 'id-ad-caIssuers' values
   (section 4.8.7 of [RFC6487]) on certificates issued by the child CAs
   may not be as expected when performing top-down validation, depending
   on the TA key that is used.  However, these values are not critical
   to top-down validation, so RPs performing such validation MUST NOT
   reject a certificate simply because this value is not as expected.

7.  Performing TA Key Rolls

   In this section we will describe how present day RPKI TAs that use
   only one key pair, and that do not use TAK objects, can change to
   having a successor key, allowing them to perform both planned and
   unplanned key rolls.

7.1.  Phase 1: Add a TAK for Key 'A'

   Before adding a successor key, a Trust Anchor may want to build up
   operational experience in maintaining a TAK object that describes its
   current key only.  We will refer to this key as key 'A' throughout
   this section.

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   The TA will have a TAL file [RFC8630] that contains one or more URIs
   where the (equivalent) CA certificates for this key 'A' can be
   retrieved.  The TA can now generate a TAK object that sets key 'A' as
   its current key.

   The TA SHOULD publish the CA certificate for key 'A' at one or more
   new locations not used in the TAL file, and use these new URIs in the
   TAK object.  The TA is free to choose any naming strategy for these
   locations.  As a non-normative suggestion, the TA could use the date
   that this phase was started as part of the file name or directory
   where the CA certificate is published.

   The TA can now monitor the retrieval of its CA certificates from the
   URI(s) in the newly published TAK object, relative to the retrieval
   from the URI(s) listed in its TAL file, to learn the proportion of
   RPs that can successfully validate and use the TAK object.

7.2.  Phase 2: Add a Key 'B'

   The TA can now generate a new key pair, key 'B'.  This key MUST now
   be used to create a new CA certificate for this key, and issue
   equivalent CA certificates for delegations to child CAs, as described
   in Section 6.

   At this point, the TA can also construct a new TAL file [RFC8630] for
   key 'B', and test locally that the validation outcome for the new key
   is indeed equivalent to the other current key(s).

   When the TA is certain that both keys are equivalent, it MUST issue a
   new TAK object under key 'A', setting key 'B' as the successor key
   for key 'A' without revoking key 'A'.  It MUST also issue a TAK
   object under key 'B', with key 'B' as the current key for that
   object.

7.3.  Phase 3: Activate Key 'B'

   To roll to key 'B', the TA issues a new TAK object under key 'A' with
   the revoked field set to true.  RPs that process TAK objects will
   start validating from key 'B' at that point.

   The TA must also release a new TAL file for key 'B', as the intended
   key to be used by RP software.  As described above, it SHOULD use a
   different set of URIs in the TAL compared to the TAK file, so that
   the TA can learn the proportion of RPs that can successfully validate
   and use the updated TAK objects.

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   To support RPs that do not take account of TAK objects, the TA should
   continue operating key 'A' for a period of time after it has been
   marked as revoked.  The length of that period of time is a local
   policy matter for that TA: it might operate the key until no clients
   are attempting to validate using it, for example.

7.4.  Phase 4: Remove Key 'A'

   The TA SHOULD now publish a long-lived TAK object, CRL and manifest
   under key 'A', remove all other content, and destroy key 'A'.  This
   way, RP software that uses a TAL for key 'A' can still successfully
   find keys 'B' and 'C', and in future 'D', 'E', etc.

   If access to key 'A' was lost, then there is no way to indicate to
   clients still using key 'A' that key 'B' should be used from that
   point onwards.  In this instance, the TA will rely on clients
   updating their local state manually, by way of the new TAL file.

7.5.  Unplanned Direction Roll

   If key 'B' is compromised, then the TA replaces it as the successor
   key for key 'A' with another new key ('C').  Since RPs cannot move to
   key 'B' until key 'A' is marked as revoked, they will begin
   validation using key 'A', and note that key 'B' has since been
   replaced as the successor key.

8.  Deployment Considerations

   Including TAK objects while RPs do not support this standard will
   result in those RPs rejecting these objects.  It is not expected that
   this will result in the invalidation of any other object under a
   Trust Anchor.

   The mechanism introduced here can only be relied on once a majority
   of RPs support it.  Defining when that moment arrives is something
   that cannot be established at the time of writing this document.  The
   use of unique URIs for keys in TAK objects, different from those used
   for the corresponding TAL files, should help TAs understand the
   proportion of RPs that support this mechanism.

   A TA that accidentally revokes a current key via a TAK object without
   listing a successor key can set the 'revoked' field on that TAK
   object to false and republish that TAK object.  The same is true of a
   TA that accidentally sets up a loop among its TAK objects, such that
   a client cannot access a TAK with an unrevoked key and proceed with
   validation.  These are the only instances in which it would be
   sensible for a TA to publish a TAK object that marked a TA key as not
   revoked after having already published a TAK object that marked that

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   TA key as revoked.  In all other instances, publishing such a TAK
   object could lead to a split in the RP population for the TA: RPs
   that had already processed the TAK object with the 'revoked' field
   set to true would have moved on to the successor key, while RPs that
   had not would continue to use the current key.

9.  Security Considerations

   Because a TA key can mark itself as revoked and require clients to
   start using a new key, an adversary that gains access to a TA's
   current key and its associated publication servers can essentially
   take over the TA.

   This risk can be mitigated by the use of Hardware Security Modules
   (HSMs) by TAs, which will guard against theft of a private key, as
   well as operational processes to guard against (accidental) misuse of
   the keys in an HSM by operators.

   An example where planned rolls are useful is when a TA is using an
   HSM from vendor X, and they want to migrate to an HSM from vendor Y.

   Alternate models of TAL update exist and can be complementary to this
   mechanism.  For example, TAs can liaise directly with validation
   software developers to include updated and reissued TAL files in new
   code releases, and use existing code update mechanisms in the RP
   community to distribute the changes.

10.  IANA Considerations

10.1.  OID

   IANA is asked to add the following to the "RPKI Signed Objects"
   registry:

          Decimal | Description                    | References
          --------+--------------------------------+---------------
          TBD     | Trust Anchor Key               | [section 3.1]

10.2.  File Extension

   IANA is asked to add an item for the Signed TAL file extension to the
   "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" created by [RFC6481] as follows:

          Extension  |   RPKI Object              | References
          -----------+-------------------------------------------
           .tak      |   Trust Anchor Key         | [this document]

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10.3.  Module Identifier

   IANA is asked to register an object identifier for one module
   identifier in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
   (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)" registry as follows:

          Decimal | Description                    | References
          --------+--------------------------------+---------------
          TBD     | Trust Anchor Key               | [section 3.1]

   *  Description: RPKISignedTrustAnchorList-2021

   *  OID: 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0.TBD

   *  Specification: [this document]

11.  Implementation Status

   NOTE: Please remove this section and the reference to RFC 7942 prior
   to publication as an RFC.

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
   exist.

   According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
   to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
   running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
   and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
   It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
   they see fit".

11.1.  APNIC

   *  Responsible Organization: Asia-Pacific Network Information Centre

   *  Location: https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-signed-tal-demo

   *  Description: A proof-of-concept for relying party TAK usage.

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   *  Level of Maturity: This is a proof-of-concept implementation.

   *  Coverage: This implementation includes all of the features
      described in this specification.  The repository includes a link
      to various test TALs that can be used for testing TAK scenarios,
      too.

   *  Contact Information: Tom Harrison, tomh@apnic.net

12.  Revision History

   03 - Last draft under Tim's authorship.

   04 - First draft with George's authorship.  No substantive revisions.

   05 - First draft with Tom's authorship.  No substantive revisions.

   06 - Rob Kisteleki's critique.

   07 - Switch to two-key model.

   08 - Keepalive.

13.  Acknowledgments

   The authors wish to thank Martin Hoffmann for a thorough review of
   this document, and Russ Housley for reviewing the ASN.1 definitions
   and providing a new module for the TAK object.

14.  References

14.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3779]  Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
              Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

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   [RFC5781]  Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI
              Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>.

   [RFC6481]  Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
              Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.

   [RFC6486]  Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
              "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.

   [RFC6487]  Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
              X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.

   [RFC6488]  Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
              Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.

   [RFC7230]  Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
              Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
              RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8181]  Weiler, S., Sonalker, A., and R. Austein, "A Publication
              Protocol for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
              (RPKI)", RFC 8181, DOI 10.17487/RFC8181, July 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8181>.

   [RFC8630]  Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., Kent, S., and T.
              Bruijnzeels, "Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
              Trust Anchor Locator", RFC 8630, DOI 10.17487/RFC8630,
              August 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8630>.

   [X.690]    ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002,
              "Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
              Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
              Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
              (DER)", 2002.

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14.2.  Informative References

   [RFC5652]  Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
              RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.

Appendix A.  ASN.1 Module

   This appendix includes the ASN.1 module for the TAK object.

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   <CODE BEGINS>
   RPKISignedTrustAnchorList-2021
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
         pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) TBD }

   DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
   BEGIN

   IMPORTS

   CONTENT-TYPE
       FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2009 -- in [RFC5911]
       { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
         pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2004-02(41) }

   SubjectPublicKeyInfo
       FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- in [RFC5912]
       { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
         security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
         id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ;

   ct-signedTAL CONTENT-TYPE ::=
       { TYPE TAK IDENTIFIED BY
         id-ct-signedTAL }

   id-ct-signedTAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
       us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) ct(1) TBD }

   CertificateURI ::= IA5String

   TAKey ::= SEQUENCE {
       certificateURIs  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertificateURI,
       subjectPublicKeyInfo  SubjectPublicKeyInfo
   }

   TAK ::= SEQUENCE {
       version     INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
       current     TAKey,
       successor   TAKey OPTIONAL,
       revoked     BOOLEAN
   }

   END
   <CODE ENDS>

Authors' Addresses

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   Carlos Martinez
   LACNIC

   Email: carlos@lacnic.net
   URI:   https://www.lacnic.net/

   George G. Michaelson
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
   6 Cordelia St
   South Brisbane
                QLD 4101
   Australia

   Email: ggm@apnic.net

   Tom Harrison
   Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
   6 Cordelia St
   South Brisbane
                QLD 4101
   Australia

   Email: tomh@apnic.net

   Tim Bruijnzeels
   NLnet Labs

   Email: tim@nlnetlabs.nl
   URI:   https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/

   Rob Austein
   Dragon Research Labs

   Email: sra@hactrn.net

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