PASSporT Extension for Rich Call Data
draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-10
Network Working Group C. Wendt
Internet-Draft Comcast
Intended status: Standards Track J. Peterson
Expires: August 26, 2021 Neustar Inc.
February 22, 2021
PASSporT Extension for Rich Call Data
draft-ietf-stir-passport-rcd-10
Abstract
This document extends PASSporT, a token for conveying
cryptographically-signed call information about personal
communications, to include rich meta-data about a call and caller
that can be signed and integrity protected, transmitted, and
subsequently rendered to users. This framework is intended to extend
caller and call specific information beyond human-readable display
name comparable to the "Caller ID" function common on the telephone
network. The JSON element defined for this purpose, Rich Call Data
(RCD), is an extensible object defined to either be used as part of
STIR or with SIP Call-Info to include related information about calls
that helps people decide whether to pick up the phone. This signing
of the RCD information is also enhanced with a integrity mechanism
that is designed to protect the authoring and transport of this
information between authoritative and non-authoritative parties
generating and signing the Rich Call Data for support of different
usage and content policies.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 26, 2021.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Overview of the use of the Rich Call Data PASSporT extension 4
4. Overview of Rich Call Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. PASSporT Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. PASSporT "rcd" Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1.1. "nam" key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1.2. "jcd" key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1.3. "jcl" key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. "rcdi" RCD Integrity Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.1. Creation of the "rcd" element digests . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.2. JWT Claim Constraint for "rcd" claims only . . . . . 12
5.2.3. JWT Claim Constraint for "rcd" and "rcdi" claims . . 12
5.3. PASSporT "crn" claim - Call Reason . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3.1. JWT Constraint for "crn" claim . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. "rcd" and "crn" Claims Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. Example "rcd" PASSporTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Compact form of "rcd" PASSporT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.1. Compact form of the "rcd" PASSporT claim . . . . . . . . 15
7.2. Compact form of the "rcdi" PASSporT claim . . . . . . . . 16
7.3. Compact form of the "crn" PASSporT claim . . . . . . . . 16
8. Further Information Associated with Callers . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Third-Party Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9.1. Signing as a Third Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. Levels of Assurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. Using "rcd" in SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.1. Authentication Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.2. Verification Service Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12. Using "rcd" as additional claims to other PASSporT extensions 21
12.1. Procedures for applying "rcd" as claims only . . . . . . 22
12.2. Example for applying "rcd" as claims only . . . . . . . 22
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13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.1. JSON Web Token Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.2. PASSporT Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
14.3. PASSporT RCD Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
15. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
15.1. The use of JWT Claim Constraints in delegate
certificates to exclude unauthorized Claims . . . . . . 24
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Introduction
PASSporT [RFC8225] is a token format based on JWT [RFC7519] for
conveying cryptographically-signed information about the parties
involved in personal communications; it is used to convey a signed
assertion of the identity of the participants in real-time
communications established via a protocol like SIP [RFC8224]. The
STIR problem statement [RFC7340] declared securing the display name
of callers outside of STIR's initial scope, so baseline STIR provides
no features for caller name. This specification documents an
optional mechanism for PASSporT and the associated STIR procedures
which extend PASSporT objects to protect additional elements
conveying richer information: information that is intended to be
rendered to an end user to assist a called party in determining
whether to accept or trust incoming communications. This includes
the name of the person on one side of a communications session, the
traditional "Caller ID" of the telephone network, along with related
display information that would be rendered to the called party during
alerting, or potentially used by an automaton to determine whether
and how to alert a called party.
Traditional telephone network signaling protocols have long supported
delivering a 'calling name' from the originating side, though in
practice, the terminating side is often left to derive a name from
the calling party number by consulting a local address book or an
external database. SIP similarly can carry this information in a
'display-name' in the From header field value from the originating to
terminating side, or alternatively in the Call-Info header field.
However, both are unsecured fields that really cannot be trusted in
most interconnected SIP deployments, and therefore is a good starting
point for a framework that utilizes STIR techniques and procedures
for protecting call related information including but not limited to
calling name.
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As such, the baseline use-case for this document will be extending
PASSporT to provide cryptographic protection for the "display-name"
field of SIP requests as well as further "rich call data" (RCD) about
the caller, which includes the contents of the Call-Info header field
or other data structures that can be added to the PASSporT. This
document furthermore specifies a third-party profile that would allow
external authorities to convey rich information associated with a
calling number via a new type of PASSporT. Finally, this document
describes how to preserve the integrity of the RCD in scenarios where
there may be non-authoritative users initiating and signing RCD and
therefore a constraint on the RCD data that a PASSporT can attest via
certificate-level controls.
2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT
RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as
described in [RFC2119] and [RFC6919].
3. Overview of the use of the Rich Call Data PASSporT extension
The main intended use of the signing of Rich Call Data (RCD) using
STIR [RFC8224] and as a PASSporT extension [RFC8225] is for the
entity that originates a call, either directly the caller themselves,
if they are authoritative, or a service provider or third-party
service that may be authoritative over the rich call data on behalf
of the caller.
The RCD described in this document is of two main categories. The
first data is a more traditional set of info about a caller
associated with "display-name" in SIP [RFC3261], typically a textual
description of the caller. The second category is a set of RCD that
is defined as part of the jCard definitions or extensions to that
data. [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] describes the optional use of
jCard in Call-Info header field as RCD with the "jcard" Call-Info
purpose token. Either or both of these two types of data can be
incorporated into a "rcd" claim defined in this document.
Additionally, [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] also describes a "call-
reason" parameter intended for description of the intent or reason
for a particular call. A new PASSporT claim "crn", or call reason,
can contain the string or object that describes the intent of the
call. This claim is intentionally kept separate from the "rcd" claim
because it is envisioned that call reason is not the same as
information associated with the caller and may change on a more
frequent, per call, type of basis.
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4. Overview of Rich Call Data Integrity
When incorporating call data that represents a user, even in
traditional calling name services today, often there is policy and
restrictions around what data is allowed to be used. Whether
preventing offensive language or icons or enforcing uniqueness,
potential copyright violations or other policy enforcement, there
will likely be the desire to pre-certify or "vet" the specific use of
rich call data. This document defines a mechanism that allows for a
direct or indirect party that controls the policy to approve or
certify the content, create a cryptographic digest that can be used
to validate that data and applies a constraint in the certificate to
allow the recipient and verifier to validate that the specific
content of the RCD is as intended at its creation and approval or
certification.
There are two mechanisms that will be defined to accomplish that for
two distinct categories of purposes. The first of the mechanisms
include the definition of an integrity claim. The RCD integrity
mechanism is a process of generating a sufficiently strong
cryptographic digest for both the "rcd" claim contents (e.g. "nam",
"jcd", "jcl") defined below and the resources defined by one or more
globally unique HTTPS URLs referenced by the contents (e.g. an image
file referenced by "jcd" or a jCard referenced by "jcl"). This
mechanism is inspired by and based on the W3C Subresource Integrity
specification (http://www.w3.org/TR/SRI/). The second of the
mechanisms uses the capability called JWT Claim Constraints, defined
in [RFC8226] and extended in [I-D.housley-stir-enhance-rfc8226]. The
JWT Claim Constraints specifically guide the verifier within the
certificate used to sign the PASSporT for the inclusion (or
exclusion) of specific claims and their values, so that the content
intended by the signer can be verified to be accurate.
Both of these mechanisms, integrity digests and JWT Claims
Constraints, can be used together or separately depending on the
intended purpose. The first category of purpose is whether the rich
call data conveyed by the RCD passport is pass-by-value or passed-by-
reference; i.e., is the information contained in the passport claims
and therefor integrity protected by the passport signature, or is the
information contained in an external resource referenced by a URI in
the RCD PASSporT. The second category of purpose is whether the
signer is authoritative or has responsibility for the accuracy of the
RCD based on the policies of the eco-system the RCD PASSporTs are
being used.
The following table provides an overview of the framework for how
integrity should be used with RCD. (Auth represents authoritative in
this table)
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+----------+---------------------+--------------------------------+
| Modes | No external URIs | Includes URI refs |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------------------+
| Auth | 1: No integrity req | 2: RDC Integrity |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------------------+
| Non-Auth | 3: JWT Claim Const. | 4: RCD Integ./JWT Claim Const. |
+----------+---------------------+--------------------------------+
The first and simplest mode is exclusively for when all RCD content
is directly included as part of the claims (i.e. no external
reference URIs are included in the content, for example, "photo" or
"logo" properties that aren't directly encoded into the JSON of the
jCard) and when the signer is authoritative over the content. In
this mode, integrity protection is not required and the set of claims
is simply protected by the signature of the standard PASSporT
[RFC8225] and SIP identity header [RFC8224] procedures. The second
mode is an extension of the first where the signer is authoritative
and a "rcd" claim contents include a URI identifying external
resources. In this mode, an RCD Integrity or "rcdi" claim MUST be
included. This integrity claim is defined later in this document and
provides a digest of the "rcd" claim content so that, particularly
for the case where there are URI references in the RCD, the content
of that RCD can be comprehensively validated that it was received as
intended by the signer of the PASSporT.
The third and fourth mode cover cases where there is a different
authoritative entity responsible for the content of the RCD, separate
from the signer of the PASSporT itself, allowing the ability to have
forward control at the time of the creation of the certificate of the
allowed or vetted content included in or referenced by the RCD claim
contents. The primary framework for allowing the separation of
authority and the signing of PASSporTs by non-authorized entities is
detailed in [I-D.ietf-stir-cert-delegation] although other cases may
apply. As with the first and second modes, the third and fourth
modes differ with the absence or inclusion of externally referenced
content using URIs.
5. PASSporT Claims
5.1. PASSporT "rcd" Claim
This specification defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "rcd", Rich
Call Data, the value of which is a JSON object that can contain one
or more key value pairs. This document defines a default set of key
values.
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5.1.1. "nam" key
The "nam" key value is a display name, associated with the originator
of personal communications, which may for example derive from the
display-name component of the From header field value of a SIP
request or alternatively from the P-Asserted-Identity header field
value, or a similar field in other PASSporT using protocols. This
key MUST be included once and MUST be included as part of the "rcd"
claim value JSON object. If there is no string associated with a
display name, the claim value SHOULD then be an empty string.
5.1.2. "jcd" key
The "jcd" key value is defined to contain a value of a jCard
[RFC7095] JSON object. This jCard object is intended to represent
and derives from the Call-Info header field value defined in
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] with a type of "jcard". As also
defined in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd], format of the jCard and
properties used should follow the normative usage and formatting
rules and procedures. It is an extensible object where the calling
party can provide both the standard types of information defined in
jCard or can use the built-in extensibility of the jCard
specification to add additional information. The "jcd" is optional.
If included, this key MUST only be included once in the "rcd" JSON
object and SHOULD NOT be included if there is a "jcl" key included.
The "jcd" and "jcl" keys should be mutually exclusive.
Note: even though we refer to [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] as the
definition of the jcard properties for usage in a "rcd" PASSporT,
other protocols can be adapted for use of "jcd" (or similarly "jcl"
below) key beyond SIP and Call-Info.
5.1.3. "jcl" key
The "jcl" key value is defined to contain a HTTPS URL that refers the
recipient to a jCard [RFC7095] JSON object hosted on a HTTPS enabled
web server. The web server MUST use the MIME media type for JSON
text as application/json with a default encoding of UTF-8 [RFC4627].
This link may derive from the Call-Info header field value defined in
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] with a type of "jcard". As also
defined in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd], format of the jCard and
properties used should follow the normative usage and formatting
rules and procedures. The "jcl" key is optional. If included, this
key MUST only be included once in the "rcd" JSON object and MUST NOT
be included if there is a "jcd" key included. The "jcd" and "jcl"
keys MUST be used mutually exclusively.
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5.2. "rcdi" RCD Integrity Claim
The "rcdi" claim is claim that MUST be included for the second and
fourth modes described in integrity overview section of this
document. If this claim is present it MUST be only included once
with a corresponding single "rcd" claim. The value of the "rcdi" key
pair is a JSON object that is defined as follows.
The claim value of "rcdi" claim key is a JSON object with a set of
JSON key/value pairs. These objects will correspond to each of the
elements of the "rcd" claim object that require integrity protection
with an associated digest over the content referenced by the key
string. The individual digest of different elements of the "rcd"
claim data and external URI referenced content is kept specifically
separate to allow the ability to verify the integrity of only the
elements that are ultimately retrieved or downloaded or rendered to
the end-user.
The key value will reference a specific object within the "rcd" claim
value using a JSON pointer defined in [RFC6901] with a minor
additional rule to support external URI references that include JSON
objects themselves, in particular for the specific case of the use of
"jcl". JSON pointer syntax is the key value that specifies exactly
the part of JSON that should be used to generate the digest which
will be the resulting string that makes up the value for the
corresponding key. Detailed procedures are provided below, but an
example "rcdi" is provided here:
"rcdi" : {
"/jcd": "sha256-H8BRh8j48O9oAZzq6A9RINQZngK7T62em8MUt1FLm52",
"/jcd/1/2/3": "sha256-AZzq6A9RINQZngK7T62em8MUt1FLm52H8BRh8j48O9o"
}
The values of each key pair are a digest combined with a string that
defines the crypto algorithm used to generate the digest. For RCD,
implementations MUST support the following hash algorithms, "SHA256",
"SHA384", or "SHA512". The SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are part of
the SHA-2 set of cryptographic hash functions defined by the NIST.
Implementations MAY support additional algorithms, but MUST NOT
support known weak algorithms such as MD5 or SHA-1. In the future,
the list of algorithms may be re-evaluated based on security best
practices. The algorithms MUST be represented in the text by
"sha256", "sha384", or "sha512". The character following the
algorithm string MUST be a minus character, "-". The subsequent
characters MUST be the base64 encoded digest of a canonicalized and
concatenated string based on the JSON pointer referenced elements of
"rcd" claim or the URI referenced content contained in the claim.
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The details of the determination of the input string used to
determine the digest are defined in the next section.
5.2.1. Creation of the "rcd" element digests
"rcd" claim objects can contain "nam", "jcd", or "jcl" keys as part
of the "rcd" JSON object claim value. This specification defines the
use of JSON pointer [RFC6901] as a basic to reference specific
elements.
In the case of "nam", the only allowed value is a "string". In order
to reference the "nam" string value for a digest, the JSON pointer
string would be "/nam" and the digest string would be created using
only the string pointed to by that "/nam" following the rules of JSON
pointer.
In the case of "jcd", the value associated is a jCard JSON object,
which happens to be a JSON array with sub-arrays. JSON pointer
notation uses numeric indexes into elements of arrays, including when
those elements are arrays themselves.
As example, for the following "rcd" claim:
"rcd": {
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets",
"jcd": ["vcard",
[ ["version",{},"text","4.0"],
["fn",{},"text","Q Branch"],
["org",{},"text","MI6;Q Branch Spy Gadgets"],
["photo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/photos/quartermaster-256x256.png"],
["logo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/logos/mi6-256x256.jpg"],
["logo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/logos/mi6-64x64.jpg"]
]
]
}
In order to use JSON pointer to refer to the URIs, the following
example "rcdi" claim includes a digest for the entire "jcd" array
string as well as three additional digests for the URIs, where, as
defined in [RFC6901] zero-based array indexes are used to reference
the URI strings.
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"rcdi": {
"/jcd": "sha256-30SFLGHL40498527",
"/jcd/1/3/3": "sha256-12938918VNJDSNCJ",
"/jcd/1/4/3": "sha256-VNJDSNCJ12938918",
"/jcd/1/5/3": "sha256-4049852730SFLGHL"
}
}
For the use of JSON pointer in "jcd" and because array indexes are
dependent on the order of the elements in the jCard, the digest for
the "/jcd" corresponding to the entire jCard array string MUST be
included to avoid any possibility of substitution or insertion
attacks that may be possible to avoid integrity detection, even
though unlikely. Each URI referenced in the jCard array string MUST
have a corresponding JSON pointer string key and digest value.
In the case of the use of a "jcl" URI reference to an external jCard,
the procedures are similar to "jcd" with the exception and the minor
modification to JSON pointer, where "/jcl" is used to refer to the
external jCard array string and any following numeric array indexes
added to the "jcl" (e.g. "/jcl/1/2/3") are treated as if the
externally referenced jCard was part of the overall "rcd" claim JSON
object. The following example illustrates a "jcl" version of the
above "jcd" example.
"rcd": {
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets",
"jcl": "https://example.com/qbranch.json"
},
"rcdi": {
"/jcl": "sha256-30SFLGHL40498527",
"/jcl/1/3/3": "sha256-12938918VNJDSNCJ",
"/jcl/1/4/3": "sha256-VNJDSNCJ12938918",
"/jcl/1/5/3": "sha256-4049852730SFLGHL"
}
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https://example.com/qbranch.json:
["vcard",
[ ["version",{},"text","4.0"],
["fn",{},"text","Q Branch"],
["org",{},"text","MI6;Q Branch Spy Gadgets"]
["photo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/photos/quartermaster-256x256.png"]
["logo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/logos/mi6-256x256.jpg"]
["logo",{},"uri",
"https://example.com/logos/mi6-64x64.jpg"]
]
]
In order to facilitate proper verification of the digest and whether
the "rcd" elements or content referenced by URIs were modified, the
input to the digest must be completely deterministic at three points
in the process. First, at the certification point where the content
is evaluated to conform to the application policy and the JWT Claim
Constraints is applied to the certificate containing the digest.
Second, when the call is signed at the Authentication Service, there
may be a local policy to verify that the provided "rcd" claim
corresponds to each digest. Third, when the "rcd" data is verified
at the Verification Service, it should verify each digest by
constructing the input digest string for the element being verified
and referenced by the JSON pointer string.
The procedure for the creation of each "rcd" element digest string
corresponding to a JSON pointer string key is as follows.
1. The JSON pointer will either refer to an element that is a part
or whole of a JSON object string or to a string that is a URI
referencing an external resource.
2. For a JSON formatted string, serialize the element JSON to remove
all white space and line breaks. The procedures of this
deterministic JSON serialization are defined in [RFC8225],
Section 9. The resulting string is used to create the digest.
3. For any URI referenced content, the content can either be a
string as in jCard JSON objects or binary content. For example,
image and audio files contain binary content. If the content is
binary format it should be Base64 encoded to create a string,
otherwise the direct string content of the file is used to create
the digest.
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5.2.2. JWT Claim Constraint for "rcd" claims only
For the third mode described in the integrity overview section of
this document, where only JWT Claim Constraint for "rcd" claims,
without an "rcdi" claim, is required, the procedure should be, when
creating the certificate to include a constraint on inclusion of the
"rcd" claim as well as the contents of that claim.
The certificate JWT Claims Constraint MUST include the following:
o a "mustInclude" for the "rcd" claim and a "permittedValues" equal
to the created "rcd" claim value string.
The "permitedValues" for the "rcd" claim may contain multiple
entries, to support the case where the certificate holder is
authorized to use different sets of rich call data.
5.2.3. JWT Claim Constraint for "rcd" and "rcdi" claims
For the fourth mode described in the integrity overview section of
this document, if the signing of an "rcdi" claim is required to be
protected by the authoritative certificate creator using JWT
Constraints in the certificate, the procedure which is intended to
constrain the signer to construct the "rcd" and "rcdi" claims and
reference external content via URI in a pre-determined way. Once
both the contents of the "rcd" claim and any linked content is
certified and the construction of the "rcdi" claim is complete, the
"rcdi" claim is linked to the STIR certificate associated with the
signature in the PASSporT via JWT Claim Constraints as defined in
[RFC8226] Section 8. It should be recognized that the "rcdi" set of
digests is intended to be unique for only a specific combination of
"rcd" content and URI referenced external content.
The certificate JWT Claims Constraint MUST include both of the
following:
o a "mustInclude" for the "rcd" claim, which simply constrains the
fact that an "rcd" should be included if there is a "rcdi"
o a "mustInclude" for the "rcdi" claim and a "permittedValues" equal
to the created "rcdi" claim value string.
The "permitedValues" for the "rcdi" claim may contain multiple
entries, to support the case where the certificate holder is
authorized to use different sets of rich call data.
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5.3. PASSporT "crn" claim - Call Reason
This specification defines a new JSON Web Token claim for "crn", Call
Reason, the value of which is a single string or object that can
contains information as defined in [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd]
corresponding to the "reason" parameter for the Call-Info header.
This claim is optional.
Example "crn" claim with "rcd":
"rcd": { "nam": "James Bond",
"jcl": "https://example.org/james_bond.json"},
"crn" : "For your ears only"
5.3.1. JWT Constraint for "crn" claim
The integrity of the "crn" claim can optionally be protected by the
authoritative certificate creator using JWT Constraints in the
certificate. If this protection is used, a "mustInclude" for the
"rcdi" claim and a "permittedValues" equal to the "crn" claim value
string SHOULD be included.
6. "rcd" and "crn" Claims Usage
Either the "rcd" or "crn" claim may appear in any PASSporT claims
object as an optional element. The creator of a PASSporT MAY also
add a "ppt" value of "rcd" to the header of a PASSporT as well, in
which case the PASSporT claims MUST contain either a "rcd" or "crn"
claim, and any entities verifying the PASSporT object will be
required to understand the "ppt" extension in order to process the
PASSporT in question. A PASSporT header with the "ppt" included will
look as follows:
{ "typ":"passport",
"ppt":"rcd",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":"https://www.example.com/cert.cer" }
The PASSporT claims object will then contain the "rcd" key with its
corresponding value. The value of "rcd" is an array of JSON objects,
of which one, the "nam" object, is mandatory. The key syntax of
"nam" follows the display-name ABNF given in [RFC3261].
After the header and claims PASSporT objects have been constructed,
their signature is generated normally per the guidance in [RFC8225].
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6.1. Example "rcd" PASSporTs
An example of a "nam" only PASSporT claims object is shown next (with
line breaks for readability only).
{ "orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"dest":{"tn":["12025551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"rcd":{"nam":"James Bond"} }
An example of a "nam" only PASSporT claims object with an "rcdi"
claim is shown next (with line breaks for readability only).
{ "orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"dest":{"tn":["12025551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"rcd":{"nam":"James Bond"},
"rcdi":{"/nam": "sha256-918VNJD12938SNCJ"}
}
An example of a "rcd" claims object that includes the "jcd" and also
contains a URI which requires the inclusion of an "rcdi" claim.
{
"orig": { "tn": "12025551000"},
"dest": { "tn": ["12155551001"]},
"iat": 1443208345,
"rcd": {
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets",
"jcd": ["vcard",
[ ["version",{},"text","4.0"],
["fn",{},"text","Q Branch"],
["org",{},"text","MI6;Q Branch Spy Gadgets"],
["photo",{},"uri","https://example.com/photos/q-256x256.png"],
["logo",{},"uri","https://example.com/logos/mi6-256x256.jpg"],
["logo",{},"uri","https://example.com/logos/mi6-64x64.jpg"]
] ]
},
"crn": "Rendezvous for Little Nellie",
"rcdi": {
"/nam": "sha256-918VNJD12938SNCJ",
"/jcd": "sha256-VNJDSNCJ12938918",
"/jcd/1/3/3": "sha256-12938918VNJDSNCJ",
"/jcd/1/4/3": "sha256-VNJDSNCJ12938918",
"/jcd/1/5/3": "sha256-4049852730SFLGHL"
}
}
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In an example PASSporT where a jCard is linked via HTTPS URL and
"jcl" a jCard file served at a particular URL will be created.
An example jCard JSON file is shown as follows:
https://example.com/qbranch.json:
["vcard",
[ ["version",{},"text","4.0"],
["fn",{},"text","Q Branch"],
["org",{},"text","MI6;Q Branch Spy Gadgets"],
["photo",{},"uri","https://example.com/photos/q-256x256.png"],
["logo",{},"uri","https://example.com/logos/mi6-256x256.jpg"],
["logo",{},"uri","https://example.com/logos/mi6-64x64.jpg"]
]
]
If that jCard is hosted at the example address of
"https://example.com/qbranch.json", the corresponding PASSporT claims
object would be as follows:
{
"orig": {"tn": "12025551000"},
"dest": {"tn": ["12155551001"]},
"iat": 1443208345,
"rcd": {
"nam": "Q Branch Spy Gadgets",
"jcl": "https://example.com/qbranch.json"
},
"crn": "Rendezvous for Little Nellie",
"rcdi": {
"/nam": "sha256-918VNJD12938SNCJ",
"/jcl": "sha256-VNJDSNCJ12938918",
"/jcl/1/3/3": "sha256-12938918VNJDSNCJ",
"/jcl/1/4/3": "sha256-VNJDSNCJ12938918",
"/jcl/1/5/3": "sha256-4049852730SFLGHL"
}
}
7. Compact form of "rcd" PASSporT
7.1. Compact form of the "rcd" PASSporT claim
Compact form of an "rcd" PASSporT claim has some restrictions but
mainly follows standard PASSporT compact form procedures. For re-
construction of the "nam" claim the string for the display-name in
the From header field. For re-construction of the "jcl", the Call-
Info header as with purpose "jcard" defined in
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[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd] MUST be used. "jcd" claim MAY NOT be
used as part of compact form.
7.2. Compact form of the "rcdi" PASSporT claim
Compact form of an "rcdi" PASSPorT claim is not supported, so if
"rcdi" is required compact form should not be used.
7.3. Compact form of the "crn" PASSporT claim
Compact form of a "crn" PASSporT claim shall be re-constructed using
the "call-reason" parameter of a Call-Info header as defined by
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd].
8. Further Information Associated with Callers
Beyond naming information and the information that can be contained
in a jCard [RFC7095] object, there may be additional human-readable
information about the calling party that should be rendered to the
end user in order to help the called party decide whether or not to
pick up the phone. This is not limited to information about the
caller, but includes information about the call itself, which may
derive from analytics that determine based on call patterns or
similar data if the call is likely to be one the called party wants
to receive. Such data could include:
o information related to the location of the caller, or
o any organizations or institutions that the caller is associated
with, or even categories of institutions (is this a government
agency, or a bank, or what have you), or
o hyperlinks to images, such as logos or pictures of faces, or to
similar external profile information, or
o information that will be processed by an application before
rendering it to a user, like social networking data that shows
that an unknown caller is a friend-of-a-friend, or reputation
scores derived from crowdsourcing, or confidence scores based on
broader analytics about the caller and callee.
All of these data elements would benefit from the secure attestations
provided by the STIR and PASSporT frameworks. A new IANA registry
has been defined to hold potential values of the "rcd" array; see
Section 14.3. Specific extensions to the "rcd" PASSporT claim are
left for future specification.
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While in the traditional telephone network, the business relationship
between calling customers and their telephone service providers is
the ultimate root of information about a calling party's name, some
other forms of data like crowdsourced reputation scores might derive
from third parties. It is more likely that when those elements are
present, they will be in a third-party "rcd" PASSporT.
9. Third-Party Uses
While rich data about the call can be provided by an originating
authentication service, an intermediary in the call path could also
acquire rich call data by querying a third-party service. Such a
service effectively acts as a STIR Authentication Service, generating
its own PASSporT, and that PASSporT could be attached to a SIP call
by either the originating or terminating side. This third-party
PASSporT attests information about the calling number, rather than
the call or caller itself, and as such its RCD MUST NOT be used when
a call lacks a first-party PASSporT that assures verification
services that the calling party number is not spoofed. It is
intended to be used in cases when the originating side does not
supply a display-name for the caller, so instead some entity in the
call path invokes a third-party service to provide rich caller data
for a call.
In telephone operations today, a third-party information service is
commonly queried with the calling party's number in order to learn
the name of the calling party, and potentially other helpful
information could also be passed over that interface. The value of
using a PASSporT to convey this information from third parties lies
largely in the preservation of the third party's signature over the
data, and the potential for the PASSporT to be conveyed from
intermediaries to endpoint devices. Effectively, these use cases
form a sub-case of out-of-band [I-D.ietf-stir-oob] use cases. The
manner in which third-party services are discovered is outside the
scope of this document.
An intermediary use case might look as follows: a SIP INVITE carries
a display name in its From header field value and an initial PASSporT
object without the "rcd" claim. When a terminating verification
service implemented at a SIP proxy server receives this request, and
determines that the signature is valid, it might query a third-party
service that maps telephone numbers to calling party names. Upon
receiving the PASSport in a response from that third-party service,
the terminating side could add a new Identity header field to the
request for the "rcd" PASSporT object provided by the third-party
service. It would then forward the INVITE to the terminating user
agent. If the display name in the "rcd" PASSporT object matches the
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display name in the INVITE, then the name would presumably be
rendered to the end user by the terminating user agent.
A very similar flow could be followed by an intermediary closer to
the origination of the call. Presumably such a service could be
implemented at an originating network in order to decouple the
systems that sign for calling party numbers from the systems that
provide rich data about calls.
In an alternative use case, the terminating user agent might query a
third-party service. In this case, no new Identity header field
would be generated, though the terminating user agent might receive a
PASSporT object in return from the third-party service, and use the
"rcd" field in the object as a calling name to render to users while
alerting.
9.1. Signing as a Third Party
A third-party PASSporT contains an "iss" element to distinguish its
PASSporTs from first-party PASSporTs. Third-party "rcd" PASSporTs
will necessarily be signed with credentials that do not have
authority over the identity that appears in the "orig" element of the
PASSporT claims. The presence of "iss" signifies that a different
category of credential is being used to sign a PASSporT than the
[RFC8226] certificates used to sign STIR calls; it is instead a
certificate that identifies the source of the "rcd" data. How those
credentials are issued and managed is outside the scope of this
specification; the value of "iss" however MUST reflect the Subject
Name field of the certificate used to sign a third-party PASSporT.
Relying parties in STIR have always been left to make their own
authorization decisions about whether to trust the signers of
PASSporTs, and in the third-party case, where an entity has
explicitly queried a service to acquire the PASSporT object, it may
be some external trust or business relationship that induces the
relying party to trust a PASSporT.
An example of a Third Party issued PASSporT claims object is as
follows.
{ "orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"dest":{"tn":["12025551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"iss":"Example, Inc.",
"rcd":{"nam":"James Bond"} }
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10. Levels of Assurance
As "rcd" can be provided by either first or third parties, relying
parties could benefit from an additional claim that indicates the
relationship of the attesting party to the caller. Even in first
party cases, this admits of some complexity: the Communications
Service Provider (CSP) to which a number was assigned might in turn
delegate the number to a reseller, who would then sell the number to
an enterprise, in which case the CSP might have little insight into
the caller's name. In third party cases, a caller's name could
derive from any number of data sources, on a spectrum between public
data scraped from web searches to a direct business relationship to
the caller. As multiple PASSporTs can be associated with the same
call, potentially a verification service could receive attestations
of the caller name from multiple sources, which have different levels
of granularity or accuracy. Therefore, PASSporTs that carry "rcd"
data SHOULD also carry an indication of the relationship of the
generator of the PASSporT to the caller. As stated in the previous
section, the use of "iss" MUST reflect the Subject Name of the
certificate used to sign a third-party PASSporT to represent that
relationship.
11. Using "rcd" in SIP
This section specifies SIP-specific usage for the "rcd" claim in
PASSporT, and in the SIP Identity header field value. Other using
protocols of PASSporT may define their own usages for the "rcd"
claim.
11.1. Authentication Service Behavior
An authentication service creating a PASSporT containing a "rcd"
claim MAY include a "ppt" for "rcd" or not. Third-party
authentication services following the behavior in Section 9.1 MUST
include a "ppt" of "rcd". If "ppt" does contain a "rcd", then any
SIP authentication services MUST add a "ppt" parameter to the
Identity header containing that PASSporT with a value of "rcd". The
resulting Identity header might look as follows:
Identity: sv5CTo05KqpSmtHt3dcEiO/1CWTSZtnG3iV+1nmurLXV/HmtyNS7Ltrg9
dlxkWzoeU7d7OV8HweTTDobV3itTmgPwCFjaEmMyEI3d7SyN21yNDo2ER/Ovgt
w0Lu5csIppPqOg1uXndzHbG7mR6Rl9BnUhHufVRbp51Mn3w0gfUs=; \
info=<https://biloxi.example.org/biloxi.cer>;alg=ES256;ppt=rcd
This specification assumes that by default, a SIP authentication
service will derive the value of "rcd", specifically only for the
"nam" key value, from the display-name component of the From header
field value of the request, alternatively for some calls this may
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come from the P-Asserted-ID header. It is however a matter of
authentication service policy to decide how it populates the value of
"rcd" and "nam" key, which MAY also derive from other fields in the
request, from customer profile data, or from access to external
services. If the authentication service generates a PASSporT object
containing "rcd" with a value that is not equivalent to the From
header field display-name value, it MUST use the full form of the
PASSporT object in SIP.
11.2. Verification Service Behavior
[RFC8224] Section 6.2 Step 5 requires that specifications defining
"ppt" values describe any additional verifier behavior. The behavior
specified for the "ppt" values of "rcd" is as follows. If the
PASSporT is in compact form, then the verification service SHOULD
extract the display-name from the From header field value, if any,
and use that as the value for the "nam" key when it recomputes the
header and claims of the PASSporT object. Optionally, if there
exists a Call-Info header field as defined in
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd], the "jcard" value can be derived to
determine the "jcd" key when it recomputes the header and claims of
the PASSporT object. If the signature validates over the recomputed
object, then the verification should be considered successful.
However, if the PASSport is in full form with a "ppt" value of "rcd",
then the verification service MUST extract the value associated with
the "rcd" "nam" key in the object. If the signature validates, then
the verification service can use the value of the "rcd" "nam" key as
the display name of calling party, which would in turn be rendered to
alerted users or otherwise leveraged in accordance with local policy.
This will allow SIP networks that convey the display name through a
field other than the From header field to interoperate with this
specification. Similarly, the "jcd" or linked "jcl" jcard
information and "crn" can be optionally, based on local policy for
devices that support it, used to populate a Call-Info header field
following the format of [I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd].
The third-party "rcd" PASSporT cases presents some new challenges, as
an attacker could attempt to cut-and-paste such a third-party
PASSporT into a SIP request in an effort to get the terminating user
agent to render the display name or confidence values it contains to
a call that should have no such assurance. A third-party "rcd"
PASSporT provides no assurance that the calling party number has not
been spoofed: if it is carried in a SIP request, for example, then
some other PASSporT in another Identity header field value would have
to carry a PASSporT attesting that. A verification service MUST
determine that the calling party number shown in the "orig" of the
"rcd" PASSporT corresponds to the calling party number of the call it
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has received, and that the "iat" field of the "rcd" PASSporT is
within the date interval that the verification service would
ordinarily accept for a PASSporT.
Verification services may alter their authorization policies for the
credentials accepted to sign PASSporTs when third parties generate
PASSporT objects, per Section 9.1. This may include accepting a
valid signature over a PASSporT even if it is signed with a
credential that does not attest authority over the identity in the
"orig" claim of the PASSporT, provided that the verification service
has some other reason to trust the signer. No further guidance on
verification service authorization policy is given here.
The behavior of a SIP UAS upon receiving an INVITE containing a
PASSporT object with a "rcd" claim will largely remain a matter of
implementation policy. In most cases, implementations would render
this calling party name information to the user while alerting. Any
user interface additions to express confidence in the veracity of
this information are outside the scope of this specification.
12. Using "rcd" as additional claims to other PASSporT extensions
Rich Call Data, including calling name information, for example, is
often data that is additive data to the personal communications
information defined in the core PASSporT data required to support the
security properties defined in [RFC8225]. For cases where the entity
that is originating the personal communications and additionally is
supporting the authentication service and also is the authority of
the Rich Call Data, rather than creating multiple identity headers
with multiple PASSporT extensions or defining multiple combinations
and permutations of PASSporT extension definitions, the
authentication service can alternatively directly add the "rcd"
claims to the PASSporT it is creating, whether it is constructed with
a PASSporT extension or not.
Note: There is one very important caveat to this capability, because
generally if there is URI referenced content in an "rcd" PASSporT
there is often the requirement to use "rcdi" and JWT Claims
Constraints. So, it is important for the user of this specification
to recognize that the certificates used must include the necessary
JWT Claims Constraints for proper integrity and security of the
values in the "rcd" claim incorporated into PASSporTs that are not
"rcd".
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12.1. Procedures for applying "rcd" as claims only
For a given PASSporT using some other extension than "rcd", the
Authentication Service MAY additionally include the "rcd" claim as
defined in this document. This would result in a set of claims that
correspond to the original intended extension with the addition of
the "rcd" claim.
The Verification service that receives the PASSporT, if it supports
this specification and chooses to, should interpret the "rcd" claim
as simply just an additional claim intended to deliver and/or
validate delivered Rich Call Data.
12.2. Example for applying "rcd" as claims only
In the case of [RFC8588] which is the PASSporT extension supporting
the SHAKEN specification [ATIS-1000074], a common case for an
Authentication service to co-exist in a CSP network along with the
authority over the calling name used for the call. Rather than
require two identity headers, the CSP Authentication Service can
apply both the SHAKEN PASSporT claims and extension and simply add
the "rcd" required claims defined in this document.
For example, the PASSporT claims for the "shaken" PASSporT with "rcd"
claims would be as follows:
Protected Header
{
"alg":"ES256",
"typ":"passport",
"ppt":"shaken",
"x5u":"https://cert.example.org/passport.cer"
}
Payload
{
"attest":"A",
"dest":{"tn":["12025551001"]},
"iat":1443208345,
"orig":{"tn":"12025551000"},
"origid":"123e4567-e89b-12d3-a456-426655440000",
"rcd":{"nam":"James Bond"}
}
A Verification Service that supports "rcd" and "shaken" PASSporT
extensions will be able to receive the above PASSporT and interpret
both the "shaken" claims as well as the "rcd" defined claim.
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If the Verification Service only understands the "shaken" extension
claims but doesn't support "rcd", the "rcd" can simply be ignored and
disregarded.
13. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank David Hancock, Robert Sparks, Russ Housley,
Eric Burger, and Alec Fenichel for helpful suggestions and comments.
14. IANA Considerations
14.1. JSON Web Token Claim
This specification requests that the IANA add three new claims to the
JSON Web Token Claims registry as defined in [RFC7519].
Claim Name: "rcd"
Claim Description: Rich Call Data Information
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): [RFCThis]
Claim Name: "rcdi"
Claim Description: Rich Call Data Integrity Information
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): [RFCThis]
Claim Name: "crn"
Claim Description: Call Reason
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): [RFCThis]
14.2. PASSporT Types
This specification requests that the IANA add a new entry to the
PASSporT Types registry for the type "rcd" which is specified in
[RFCThis].
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14.3. PASSporT RCD Types
This document requests that the IANA create a new registry for
PASSporT RCD types. Registration of new PASSporT RCD types shall be
under the Specification Required policy.
This registry is to be initially populated with three values, "nam",
"jcd", and "jcl", which are specified in [RFCThis].
15. Security Considerations
Revealing information such as the name, location, and affiliation of
a person necessarily entails certain privacy risks. Baseline
PASSporT has no particular confidentiality requirement, as the
information it signs over in a using protocol like SIP is all
information that SIP carries in the clear anyway. Transport-level
security can hide those SIP fields from eavesdroppers, and the same
confidentiality mechanisms would protect any PASSporT(s) carried in
SIP.
15.1. The use of JWT Claim Constraints in delegate certificates to
exclude unauthorized Claims
While this can apply to any PASSporT that is signed with a STIR
Delegate Certificates [I-D.ietf-stir-cert-delegation], it is
important to note that when constraining PASSporTs to include
specific claims or contents of claims, it is also important to
consider potential attacks by non-authorized signers that may include
other potential PASSporT claims that weren't originally vetted by the
authorized entity providing the delegate certificate. The use of JWT
claims constraints as defined in [I-D.housley-stir-enhance-rfc8226]
for preventing the ability to include claims beyond the claims
defined in this document may need to be considered.
16. References
16.1. Normative References
[I-D.housley-stir-enhance-rfc8226]
Housley, R., "Enhanced JWT Claim Constraints for STIR
Certificates", draft-housley-stir-enhance-rfc8226-00 (work
in progress), January 2021.
[I-D.ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd]
Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "SIP Call-Info Parameters for
Rich Call Data", draft-ietf-sipcore-callinfo-rcd-01 (work
in progress), November 2020.
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[I-D.ietf-stir-cert-delegation]
Peterson, J., "STIR Certificate Delegation", draft-ietf-
stir-cert-delegation-03 (work in progress), July 2020.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4627, July 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4627>.
[RFC6901] Bryan, P., Ed., Zyp, K., and M. Nottingham, Ed.,
"JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Pointer", RFC 6901,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6901, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6901>.
[RFC6919] Barnes, R., Kent, S., and E. Rescorla, "Further Key Words
for Use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", RFC 6919,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6919, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6919>.
[RFC7095] Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7095, January 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7095>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
RFC 7340, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8224] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 8224,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224>.
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
Wendt & Peterson Expires August 26, 2021 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft RCD February 2021
[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
[RFC8588] Wendt, C. and M. Barnes, "Personal Assertion Token
(PaSSporT) Extension for Signature-based Handling of
Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)", RFC 8588,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8588, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8588>.
16.2. Informative References
[ATIS-1000074]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/32237/ATIS-1000074.pdf>", January 2017.
[I-D.ietf-stir-oob]
Rescorla, E. and J. Peterson, "STIR Out-of-Band
Architecture and Use Cases", draft-ietf-stir-oob-07 (work
in progress), March 2020.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt
Comcast
Comcast Technology Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
Jon Peterson
Neustar Inc.
1800 Sutter St Suite 570
Concord, CA 94520
US
Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz
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