Importing External PSKs for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-00

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Last updated 2019-05-14
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tls                                                          D. Benjamin
Internet-Draft                                              Google, LLC.
Intended status: Experimental                                    C. Wood
Expires: November 15, 2019                                   Apple, Inc.
                                                            May 14, 2019

                    Importing External PSKs for TLS
                draft-ietf-tls-external-psk-importer-00

Abstract

   This document describes an interface for importing external PSK (Pre-
   Shared Key) into TLS 1.3.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 15, 2019.

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   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Benjamin & Wood         Expires November 15, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       Importing External PSKs for TLS            May 2019

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Key Import  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Label Values  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Deprecating Hash Functions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Backwards Compatibility and Incremental Deployment  . . . . .   5
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   TLS 1.3 [RFC8446] supports pre-shared key (PSK) authentication,
   wherein PSKs can be established via session tickets from prior
   connections or externally via some out-of-band mechanism.  The
   protocol mandates that each PSK only be used with a single hash
   function.  This was done to simplify protocol analysis.  TLS 1.2
   [RFC5246], in contrast, has no such requirement, as a PSK may be used
   with any hash algorithm and the TLS 1.2 PRF.  This means that
   external PSKs could possibly be re-used in two different contexts
   with the same hash functions during key derivation.  Moreover, it
   requires external PSKs to be provisioned for specific hash functions.

   To mitigate these problems, external PSKs can be bound to a specific
   hash function when used in TLS 1.3, even if they are associated with
   a different KDF (and hash function) when provisioned.  This document
   specifies an interface by which external PSKs may be imported for use
   in a TLS 1.3 connection to achieve this goal.  In particular, it
   describes how KDF-bound PSKs can be differentiated by different hash
   algorithms to produce a set of candidate PSKs, each of which are
   bound to a specific hash function.  This expands what would normally
   have been a single PSK identity into a set of PSK identities.
   However, it requires no change to the TLS 1.3 key schedule.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
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