Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode
draft-ietf-tls-psk-new-mac-aes-gcm-05
Yes
(Pasi Eronen)
No Objection
(Cullen Jennings)
(Dan Romascanu)
(David Ward)
(Jari Arkko)
(Jon Peterson)
(Lisa Dusseault)
(Magnus Westerlund)
(Mark Townsley)
(Ron Bonica)
(Ross Callon)
(Tim Polk)
Note: This ballot was opened for revision 05 and is now closed.
Pasi Eronen Former IESG member
Yes
Yes
()
Unknown
Chris Newman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2009-01-28)
Unknown
It would be helpful to add an informative reference to a definition of the term "Perfect Forward Secrecy." That term has a technical meaning that may differ from a layman's interpretation of the words. RFC 4949 may be a suitable reference.
Cullen Jennings Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Dan Romascanu Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
David Ward Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Jon Peterson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Lisa Dusseault Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Magnus Westerlund Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Mark Townsley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ron Bonica Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Ross Callon Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
()
Unknown
Russ Housley Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2009-01-28)
Unknown
The Gen-ART Review by Robert Sparks posted on 22-Jan-2009 raised a few editorial comments that ought to be addressed: 1) In the applicability statement, consider pointing to (or moving forward) the statement in 4279. 2) The IANA considerations section should name the registry (btw - where are the instructions to IANA on how to choose the next numbers?)
Tim Polk Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection
(2009-01-27)
Unknown
I don't quite follow the second paragraph of the security considerations: As described in [RFC5288], the cipher suites defined in the Section 2 of this document may only be used with TLS 1.2 or greater. The cipher suites defined in the Section 3 may be used, whatever the negotiated TLS version is. Is the point that cipher suites defined in section 3 provide slightly more cryptographic security if version 1.2 has been negotiated, since we are using a stronger hash in the PRF? As written, this paragraph restates an interoperability issue (already rasied in 1.1) rather than a security consideration.