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Guidelines for Human Rights Protocol and Architecture Considerations
draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-16

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (hrpc RG)
Authors Gurshabad Grover , Niels ten Oever
Last updated 2022-11-26 (Latest revision 2022-11-10)
Replaces draft-tenoever-hrpc-guidelines
RFC stream Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)
Intended RFC status Informational
Formats
Stream IRTF state IRSG Review
Consensus boilerplate Yes
Document shepherd Mallory Knodel
Shepherd write-up Show Last changed 2021-09-21
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to mknodel@cdt.org
draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-16
Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group            G. Grover
Internet-Draft                                                          
Updates: 8280 (if approved)                                 N. ten Oever
Intended status: Informational                   University of Amsterdam
Expires: 14 May 2023                                    10 November 2022

  Guidelines for Human Rights Protocol and Architecture Considerations
                     draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-16

Abstract

   This document sets guidelines for human rights considerations for
   developers working on network protocols and architectures, similar to
   the work done on the guidelines for privacy considerations [RFC6973].
   This is an updated version of the guidelines for human rights
   considerations in [RFC8280].

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This informational document has consensus for publication from the
   Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Human Right Protocol
   Considerations Research (HRPC) Group.  It has been reviewed, tried,
   and tested by both by the research group as well as by researchers
   and practitioners from outside the research group (for example see:
   https://gitlab.com/hr-rt/documents).  The research group acknowledges
   that the understanding of the impact of Internet protocols and
   architecture on society is a developing practice and is a body of
   research that is still in development.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 May 2023.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Human rights threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Conducting human rights reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Analyzing drafts based on guidelines for human rights
           considerations model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Analyzing drafts based on their perceived or speculated
           impact  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Expert interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Interviews with impacted persons and communities  . . . .   6
     3.5.  Tracing impacts of implementations  . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Guidelines for human rights considerations  . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Connectivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.2.  Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     4.3.  Content agnosticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.4.  Internationalization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.5.  Localization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.6.  Open Standards  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.7.  Heterogeneity Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.8.  Adaptability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.9.  Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.10. Authenticity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     4.11. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     4.12. Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     4.13. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     4.14. Pseudonymity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     4.15. Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     4.16. Censorship resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     4.17. Outcome Transparency  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     4.18. Accessibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     4.19. Decentralization  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     4.20. Remedy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     4.21. Misc. considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26

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   5.  Document Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   9.  Research Group Information  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   10. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33

1.  Introduction

   This document outlines a set of human rights protocol considerations
   for protocol developers.  It provides questions engineers should ask
   themselves when developing or improving protocols if they want to
   understand how their decisions can potentially influence the exercise
   of human rights on the Internet.  It should be noted that the impact
   of a protocol cannot solely be deduced from its design, but its usage
   and implementation should also be studied to form a full protocol
   human rights impact assessment.

   The questions are based on the research performed by the Human Rights
   Protocol Considerations (HRPC) research group which has been
   documented before these considerations.  The research establishes
   that human rights relate to standards and protocols, and offers a
   common vocabulary of technical concepts that influence human rights
   and how these technical concepts can be combined to ensure that the
   Internet remains an enabling environment for human rights.  With
   this, the contours of a model for developing human rights protocol
   considerations has taken shape.

   This document is an iteration of the guidelines that can be found in
   [RFC8280].  The methods for conducting human rights reviews
   (Section 3.2), and guidelines for human rights considerations
   (Section 3.3) in this document are being tested for relevance,
   accuracy, and validity.  [HR-RT] The understanding of what human
   rights are is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
   [UDHR] and subsequent treaties that jointly form the body of
   international human rights law [UNHR].

   This document does not provide a detailed taxonomy of the nature of
   (potential) human rights violations, whether direct or indirect,
   long-term or short-term, certain protocol choices might present.  In
   part because this is highly context-dependent, and in part, because
   this document aims to provide a practical set of guidelines.
   However, further research in this field would definitely benefit
   developers and implementers.

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

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   This informational document has consensus for publication from the
   Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Human Right Protocol
   Considerations Research Group.  It has been reviewed, tried, and
   tested by both by the research group as well as by researchers and
   practitioners from outside the research group.  The HRPC research
   group acknowledges that the understanding of the impact of Internet
   protocols and architecture on society is a developing practice and is
   a body of research that is still in development.

2.  Human rights threats

   Threats to the exercise of human rights on the Internet come in many
   forms.  Protocols and standards may harm or enable the right to
   freedom of expression, right to freedom of information, right to non-
   discrimination, right to equal protection, right to participate in
   cultural life, arts and science, right to freedom of assembly and
   association, right to privacy, and the right to security.  An end-
   user who is denied access to certain services or content may be
   unable to disclose vital information about the malpractices of a
   government or other authority.  A person whose communications are
   monitored may be prevented or dissuaded from exercising their right
   to freedom of association or participate in political processes
   [Penney].  In a worst-case scenario, protocols that leak information
   can lead to physical danger.  A realistic example to consider is when
   individuals perceived as threats to the state are subjected to
   torture, extra-judicial killing or detention on the basis of
   information gathered by state agencies through the monitoring of
   network traffic.

   This document presents several examples of how threats to human
   rights materialize on the Internet.  This threat modeling is inspired
   by [RFC6973] Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols, which is
   based on security threat analysis.  This method is a work in progress
   and by no means a perfect solution for assessing human rights risks
   in Internet protocols and systems.  Certain specific human rights
   threats are indirectly considered in Internet protocols as part of
   the security considerations [BCP72], but privacy considerations
   [RFC6973] or reviews, let alone human rights impact assessments of
   protocols, are neither standardized nor implemented.

   Many threats, enablers, and risks are linked to different rights.
   This is not surprising if one takes into account that human rights
   are interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible.  Here, however,
   we're not discussing all human rights because not all human rights
   are relevant to information and communication technologies (ICTs) in
   general and protocols and standards in particular [Bless]: "The main
   source of the values of human rights is the International Bill of
   Human Rights that is composed of the Universal Declaration of Human

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   Rights [UDHR] along with the International Covenant on Civil and
   Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International Covenant on Economic,
   Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR].  In the light of several cases
   of Internet censorship, the UN Human Rights Council Resolution 20/8
   was adopted in 2012, affirming that "the same rights that people have
   offline must also be protected online."  [UNHRC2016] In 2015, the
   Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet [IRP] was
   developed and released.  According to these documents, some examples
   of human rights relevant for ICT systems are human dignity (Art. 1
   UDHR), non-discrimination (Art. 2), rights to life, liberty and
   security (Art. 3), freedom of opinion and expression (Art. 19),
   freedom of assembly and association (Art. 20), rights to equal
   protection, legal remedy, fair trial, due process, presumed innocent
   (Art. 7-11), appropriate social and international order (Art. 28),
   participation in public affairs (Art. 21), participation in cultural
   life, protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
   any scientific, literary or artistic production of which [they are]
   the author (Art. 27), and privacy (Art. 12)."  A partial catalog of
   human rights related to Information and Communications Technologies,
   including economic rights, can be found in [Hill2014].

   This is by no means an attempt to exclude specific rights or
   prioritize some rights over others.

3.  Conducting human rights reviews

   Ideally, protocol developers and collaborators should incorporate
   human rights considerations into the design process itself (see
   Guidelines for human rights considerations).  This section provides
   guidance on how to conduct a human rights review, i.e., gauge the
   impact or potential impact of a protocol or standard on human rights.

   Human rights reviews can be done by any participant, and can take
   place at different stages of the development process of an Internet-
   Draft.  Generally speaking, it is easier to influence the development
   of a technology at earlier stages than at later stages.  This does
   not mean that reviews at last-call are not relevant, but they are
   less likely to result in significant changes in the reviewed
   document.

   Human rights review can be done by document authors, document
   shepherds, members of review teams, advocates, or impacted
   communities to influence the standard development process.  IETF
   documents can benefit from people with different knowledges,
   perspectives, and backgrounds, especially since their implementation
   can impact many different communities as well.

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   Methods for analyzing technology for specific human rights impacts
   are still quite nascent.  Currently, five methods have been explored
   by the Human Rights Review Team, often in conjunction with each
   other:

3.1.  Analyzing drafts based on guidelines for human rights
      considerations model

   This analysis of Internet-Drafts uses the model as described in
   section 4.  The outlined categories and questions can be used to
   review an Internet-Draft.  The advantage of this is that it provides
   a known overview, and document authors can go back to this document
   as well as [RFC8280] to understand the background and the context.

3.2.  Analyzing drafts based on their perceived or speculated impact

   When reviewing an Internet-Draft, specific human rights impacts can
   become apparent by doing a close reading of the draft and seeking to
   understand how it might affect networks or society.  While less
   structured than the straight use of the human rights considerations
   model, this analysis may lead to new speculative understandings of
   links between human rights and protocols.

3.3.  Expert interviews

   Interviews with document authors, active members of the Working
   Group, or experts in the field can help explore the characteristics
   of the protocol and its effects.  There are two main advantages to
   this approach: one the one hand, it allows the reviewer to gain a
   deeper understanding of the (intended) workings of the protocol; on
   the other hand, it also allows for the reviewer to start a discussion
   with experts or even document authors, which can help the review gain
   traction when it is published.

3.4.  Interviews with impacted persons and communities

   Protocols impact users of the Internet.  Interviews can help the
   reviewer understand how protocols affect the people that use the
   protocols.  Since human rights are best understood from the
   perspective of the rights-holder, this approach will improve the
   understanding of the real world effects of the technology.  At the
   same time, it can be hard to attribute specific changes to a
   particular protocol, this is of course even harder when a protocol
   has not been (widely) deployed.

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3.5.  Tracing impacts of implementations

   The reality of deployed protocols can be at odds with the
   expectations during the protocol design and development phase
   [RFC8980].  When a specification already has associated running code,
   the code can be analyzed either in an experimental setting or on the
   Internet where its impact can be observed.  In contrast to reviewing
   the draft text, this approach can allow the reviewer to understand
   how the specifications works in practice, and potentially what
   unknown or unexpected effects the technology has.

4.  Guidelines for human rights considerations

   This section provides guidance for document authors in the form of a
   questionnaire about protocols and how technical decisions can shape
   the exercise of human rights.  The questionnaire may be useful at any
   point in the design process, particularly after the document authors
   have developed a high-level protocol model as described in [RFC4101].
   These guidelines do not seek to replace any existing referenced
   specifications, but rather contribute to them and look at the design
   process from a human rights perspective.

   Protocols and Internet Standards might benefit from a documented
   discussion of potential human rights risks arising from potential
   misapplications of the protocol or technology described in the
   Request For Comments (RFC).  This might be coupled with an
   Applicability Statement for that RFC.

   Note that the guidance provided in this section does not recommend
   specific practices.  The range of protocols developed in the IETF is
   too broad to make recommendations about particular uses of data or
   how human rights might be balanced against other design goals.
   However, by carefully considering the answers to the following
   questions, document authors should be able to produce a comprehensive
   analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion on whether the
   protocol adequately takes specific human rights threats into account.
   This guidance is meant to help the thought process of a human rights
   analysis; it does not provide specific directions for how to write a
   human rights considerations section (following the example set in
   [RFC6973]).

   In considering these questions, authors will need to be aware of the
   potential of technical advances or the passage of time to undermine
   protections.  In general, considerations of rights are likely to be
   more effective if they are considered given a purpose and specific
   use cases, rather than as abstract absolute goals.

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   Also note that while the section uses the word, 'protocol', the
   principles identified in these questions may be applicable to other
   types of solutions (extensions to existing protocols, architecture
   for solutions to specific problems, etc.).

4.1.  Connectivity

   Question(s): Does your protocol add application-specific functions to
   intermediary nodes?  Could this functionality be added to end nodes
   instead of intermediary nodes?

   Is your protocol optimized for low bandwidth and high latency
   connections?  Could your protocol also be developed in a stateless
   manner?

   Explanation: The end-to-end principle [Saltzer] holds that certain
   functions can and should be performed at 'ends' of the network.
   [RFC1958] states "that in very general terms, the community believes
   that the goal is connectivity [...] and the intelligence is end to
   end rather than hidden in the network."  Generally speaking, it is
   easier to attain reliability of data transmissions with computation
   at endpoints rather than at intermediary nodes.

   Also considering the fact that network quality and conditions vary
   across geography and time, it is also important to design protocols
   such that they are reliable even on low bandwidth and high latency
   connections.

   Example: Encrypting connections, like done with HTTPS, can add a
   significant network overhead and consequently make web resources less
   accessible to those with low bandwidth and/or high latency
   connections.  [HTTPS-REL] Encrypting traffic is a net positive for
   privacy and security, and thus protocol designers can acknowledge the
   tradeoffs of connectivity made by such decisions.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

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4.2.  Reliability

   Question(s): Is your protocol fault tolerant?  Does it downgrade
   gracefully, i.e., with mechanisms for fallback and/or notice?  Can
   your protocol resist malicious degradation attempts?  Do you have a
   documented way to announce degradation?  Do you have measures in
   place for recovery or partial healing from failure?  Can your
   protocol maintain dependability and performance in the face of
   unanticipated changes or circumstances?

   Explanation: Reliability and resiliency ensures that a protocol will
   execute its function consistently and error resistant as described,
   and function without unexpected result.  Measures for reliability in
   protocols assure users that their intended communication was
   successfully executed.

   A system that is reliable degrades gracefully and will have a
   documented way to announce degradation.  It will also have mechanisms
   to recover from failure gracefully, and if applicable, will allow for
   partial healing.

   It is important here to draw a distinction between random degradation
   and malicious degradation.  Many current attacks against TLS
   [RFC8446], for example, exploit TLS' ability to gracefully downgrade
   to non-secure cipher suites -- from a functional perspective, this is
   useful; from a security perspective, this can be disastrous.  As with
   confidentiality, the growth of the Internet and fostering innovation
   in services depends on users having confidence and trust [RFC3724] in
   the network.  For reliability, it is necessary that services notify
   the users if a delivery fails.  In the case of real-time systems in
   addition to the reliable delivery the protocol needs to safeguard
   timeliness.

   Example: In the modern IP stack structure, a reliable transport layer
   requires an indication that transport processing has successfully
   completed, such as given by TCP's ACK message [RFC0793], and not
   simply an indication from the IP layer that the packet arrived.
   Similarly, an application layer protocol may require an application-
   specific acknowledgment that contains, among other things, a status
   code indicating the disposition of the request (See [RFC3724]).

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to security

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4.3.  Content agnosticism

   Question(s): If your protocol impacts packet handling, does it use
   user data (packet data that is not included in the header)?  Is it
   making decisions based on the payload of the packet?  Does your
   protocol prioritize certain content or services over others in the
   routing process?  Is the protocol transparent about the
   prioritization that is made (if any)?

   Explanation: Content agnosticism refers to the notion that network
   traffic is treated identically regardless of payload, with some
   exceptions where it comes to effective traffic handling, for instance
   where it comes to delay-tolerant or delay-sensitive packets, based on
   the header.  If there is any prioritization based on the content or
   metadata of the protocol, the protocol should be transparent about
   such information and reasons thereof.

   Example: Content agnosticism prevents payload-based discrimination
   against packets.  This is important because changes to this principle
   can lead to a two-tiered Internet, where certain packets are
   prioritized over others on the basis of their content.  Effectively
   this would mean that although all users are entitled to receive their
   packets at a certain speed, some users become more equal than others.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to equal protection

4.4.  Internationalization

   Question(s): Does your protocol or specification define text string
   elements, in the payload or headers, that have to be understood or
   entered by humans?  Does your specification allow Unicode?  If so, do
   you accept texts in one charset (which must be UTF-8), or several
   (which is dangerous for interoperability)?  If character sets or
   encodings other than UTF-8 are allowed, does your specification
   mandate a proper tagging of the charset?  Did you have a look at
   [RFC6365]?

   Explanation: Internationalization refers to the practice of making
   protocols, standards, and implementations usable in different
   languages and scripts (see Localization).  In the IETF,
   internationalization means to add or improve the handling of non-
   ASCII text in a protocol.  [RFC6365] A different perspective, more

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   appropriate to protocols that are designed for global use from the
   beginning, is the definition used by the World Wide Web Consortium
   (W3C):

        "Internationalization is the design and development of a
        product, application or document content that enables easy
        localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region,
        or language."  {{W3Ci18nDef}}

   Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset (US-ASCII),
   or leave the question of what coded character set and encoding are
   used up to local guesswork (which leads, of course, to
   interoperability problems).  If multiple charsets are permitted, they
   must be explicitly identified [RFC2277].  Adding non-ASCII text to a
   protocol allows the protocol to handle more scripts, hopefully
   representing users across the world.  In today's world, that is
   normally best accomplished by allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only.

   In the current IETF policy [RFC2277], internationalization is aimed
   at user-facing strings, not protocol elements, such as the verbs used
   by some text-based protocols.  (Do note that some strings are both
   content and protocol elements, such as identifiers.)  Given the
   IETF's mission to make the Internet a global network of networks,
   [RFC3935] developers should ensure that protocols work with languages
   apart from English and character sets apart from Latin characters.
   It is therefore crucial that at the very least, the content carried
   by the protocol can be in any script, and that all scripts are
   treated equally.

   Example: See localization

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to political participation

   *  Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science

4.5.  Localization

   Question(s): Does your protocol uphold the standards of
   internationalization?  Have you made any concrete steps towards
   localizing your protocol for relevant audiences?

   Explanation: Localization refers to the adaptation of a product,
   application or document content to meet the language, cultural and
   other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)

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   [W3Ci18nDef].  For our purposes, it can be described as the practice
   of translating an implementation to make it functional in a specific
   language or for users in a specific locale (see
   Internationalization).  Internationalization is related to
   localization, but they are not the same.  Internationalization is a
   necessary precondition for localization.

   Example: The Internet is a global medium, but many of its protocols
   and products are developed with a certain audience in mind, that
   often share particular characteristics like knowing how to read and
   write in American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII)
   and knowing English.  This limits the ability of a large part of the
   world's online population from using the Internet in a way that is
   culturally and linguistically accessible.  An example of a standard
   that has taken into account the view that individuals like to have
   access to data in their native language can be found in [RFC5646].
   The document describes a way to label information with an identifier
   for the language in which it is written.  And this allows information
   to be presented and accessed in more than one language.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science

   *  Right to freedom of expression

4.6.  Open Standards

   Question(s): Is your protocol fully documented in a way that it could
   be easily implemented, improved, built upon and/or further developed?
   Do you depend on proprietary code for the implementation, running or
   further development of your protocol?  Does your protocol favor a
   particular proprietary specification over technically-equivalent
   competing specification(s), for instance by making any incorporated
   vendor specification "required" or "recommended" [RFC2026]?  Do you
   normatively reference another standard that is not available without
   cost (and could you do without it)?  Are you aware of any patents
   that would prevent your standard from being fully implemented
   [RFC8179] [RFC6701]?

   Explanation: The Internet was able to be developed into the global
   network of networks because of the existence of open, non-proprietary
   standards [Zittrain].  They are crucial for enabling
   interoperability.  Yet, open standards are not explicitly defined
   within the IETF.  On the subject, [RFC2026] states: "Various national
   and international standards bodies, such as ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU-

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   T, develop a variety of protocol and service specifications that are
   similar to Technical Specifications defined at the IETF.  National
   and international groups also publish "implementors' agreements" that
   are analogous to Applicability Statements, capturing a body of
   implementation-specific detail concerned with the practical
   application of their standards.  All of these are considered to be
   "open external standards" for the purposes of the Internet Standards
   Process."  Similarly, [RFC3935] does not define open standards but
   does emphasize the importance of an "open process", i.e., "any
   interested person can participate in the work, know what is being
   decided, and make [their] voice heard on the issue."

   Open standards (and open source software) allow users to glean
   information about how the tools they are using work, including the
   tools' security and privacy properties.  They additionally allow for
   permissionless innovation, which is important to maintain the freedom
   and ability to freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the
   communications constructs that currently exist.  It is at the heart
   of the Internet as we know it, and to maintain its fundamentally open
   nature, we need to be mindful of the need for developing open
   standards.

   All standards that need to be normatively implemented should be
   freely available and with reasonable protection for patent
   infringement claims, so it can also be implemented in open source or
   free software.  Patents have often held back open standardization or
   been used against those deploying open standards, particularly in the
   domain of cryptography [newegg].  An exemption of this is sometimes
   made when a protocol is standardized that normatively relies on
   specifications produced by others standards development organizations
   (SDOs) that are not freely available.  Patents in open standards or
   in normative references to other standards should have a patent
   disclosure [notewell], royalty-free licensing [patentpolicy], or some
   other form of fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.

   Example: [RFC6108] describes a system for providing critical end-user
   notifications to web browsers, which has been deployed by Comcast, an
   Internet Service Provider (ISP).  Such a notification system is being
   used to provide near-immediate notifications to customers, such as to
   warn them that their traffic exhibits patterns that are indicative of
   malware or virus infection.  There are other proprietary systems that
   can perform such notifications, but those systems utilize Deep Packet
   Inspection (DPI) technology.  In contrast, that document describes a
   system that does not rely upon DPI, and is instead based on open IETF
   standards and open source applications.

   Impacts:

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   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science

4.7.  Heterogeneity Support

   Question(s): Does your protocol support heterogeneity by design?
   Does your protocol allow for multiple types of hardware?  Does your
   protocol allow for multiple types of application protocols?  Is your
   protocol liberal in what it receives and handles?  Will it remain
   usable and open if the context changes?

   Explanation: The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on many
   levels: devices and nodes, router scheduling algorithms and queue
   management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of multiplexing,
   protocol versions and implementations, underlying link layers (e.g.,
   point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless, FDDI, etc.), in the
   traffic mix and in the levels of congestion at different times and
   places.  Moreover, as the Internet is composed of autonomous
   organizations and ISPs, each with their own separate policy concerns,
   there is a large heterogeneity of administrative domains and pricing
   structures.  As a result, the heterogeneity principle proposed in
   [RFC1958] needs to be supported by design [FIArch].

   Heterogeneity support in protocols can thus enable a wide range of
   devices and (by extension) users to participate on the network.

   Example: Heterogeneity is inevitable and needs be supported by
   design.  Multiple types of hardware must be allowed for (e.g.,
   transmission speeds differing by at least 7 orders of magnitude,
   various computer word lengths, and hosts ranging from memory-starved
   microprocessors up to massively parallel supercomputers).  Multiple
   types of application protocols must be allowed for, ranging from the
   simplest such as remote login up to the most complex such as commit
   protocols for distributed databases.  [RFC1958].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to political participation

4.8.  Adaptability

   Question(s): Is your protocol written in such a way that it would be
   easy for other protocols to be developed on top of it, or to interact
   with it?  Does your protocol impact permissionless innovation?  (See
   Open Standards)

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   Explanation: Adaptability is closely interrelated with permissionless
   innovation: both maintain the freedom and ability to freely create
   and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs that
   currently exist.  It is at the heart of the Internet as we know it,
   and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need to be mindful
   of the impact of protocols on maintaining or reducing permissionless
   innovation to ensure the Internet can continue to develop.

   Adaptability and permissionless innovation can be used to shape
   information networks as preferenced by groups of users.  Furthermore,
   a precondition of adaptability is the ability of the people who can
   adapt the network to be able to know and understand the network.
   This is why adaptability and permissionless innovation are inherently
   connected to the right to education and the right to science as well
   as the right to freedom of assembly and association as well as the
   right to freedom of expression.  Since it allows the users of the
   network to determine how to assemble, collaborate, and express
   themselves.

   Example: WebRTC generates audio and/or video data.  In order to
   ensure that WebRTC can be used in different locations by different
   parties, it is important that standard Javascript application
   programming interfaces (APIs) are developed to support applications
   from different voice service providers.  Multiple parties will have
   similar capabilities, in order to ensure that all parties can build
   upon existing standards these need to be adaptable, and allow for
   permissionless innovation.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to education

   *  Right to science

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.9.  Integrity

   Question(s): Does your protocol maintain, assure and/or verify the
   accuracy of payload data?  Does your protocol maintain and assure the
   consistency of data?  Does your protocol in any way allow for the
   data to be (intentionally or unintentionally) altered?

   Explanation: Integrity refers to the maintenance and assurance of the
   accuracy and consistency of data to ensure it has not been
   (intentionally or unintentionally) altered.

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   Example: Integrity verification of data is important to prevent
   vulnerabilities and attacks from on-path attackers.  These attacks
   happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons) intercepts a
   communication between two parties, inserting themselves in the middle
   changing the content of the data.  In practice this looks as follows:

   Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Alice sends a message to Bob,
   which Corinne intercepts and modifies.  Bob cannot see that the data
   from Alice was altered by Corinne.  Corinne intercepts and alters the
   communication as it is sent between Alice and Bob.  Corinne is able
   to control the communication content.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to security

4.10.  Authenticity

   Question(s): Do you have sufficient measures to confirm the truth of
   an attribute of a single piece of data or entity?  Can the attributes
   get garbled along the way (see security)?  If relevant, have you
   implemented IPsec, DNS Security (DNSSEC), HTTPS and other Standard
   Security Best Practices?

   Explanation: Authenticity ensures that data does indeed come from the
   source it claims to come from.  This is important to prevent certain
   attacks or unauthorized access and use of data.

   At the same time, authentication should not be used as a way to
   prevent heterogeneity support, as is often done for vendor lock-in or
   digital rights management.

   Example: Authentication of data is important to prevent
   vulnerabilities, and attacks from on-path attackers.  These attacks
   happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons) intercepts a
   communication between two parties, inserting themselves in the middle
   and posing as both parties.  In practice this looks as follows:

   Alice wants to communicate with Bob.  Alice sends data to Bob.
   Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob.  Corinne reads (and
   potentially alters) the message to Bob.  Bob cannot see that the data
   did not come from Alice but from Corinne.

   With proper authentication, the scenario would be as follows:

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   Alice wants to communicate with Bob.  Alice sends data to Bob.
   Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob.  Corinne reads and alters
   the message to Bob.  Bob can see that the data did not come from
   Alice.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to privacy

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to security

4.11.  Confidentiality

   Question(s): Does the protocol expose the transmitted data over the
   wire?  Does the protocol expose information related to identifiers or
   data?  If so, what does it reveal to each protocol entity (i.e.,
   recipients, intermediaries, and enablers) [RFC6973]?  What options
   exist for protocol implementers to choose to limit the information
   shared with each entity?  What operational controls are available to
   limit the information shared with each entity?

   What controls or consent mechanisms does the protocol define or
   require before personal data or identifiers are shared or exposed via
   the protocol?  If no such mechanisms or controls are specified, is it
   expected that control and consent will be handled outside of the
   protocol?

   Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to share different
   pieces of information with different recipients?  If not, are there
   mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide initiators
   with such control?

   Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to limit the sharing or
   express individuals' preferences to recipients or intermediaries with
   regard to the collection, use, or disclosure of their personal data?
   If not, are there mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to
   provide users with such control?  Is it expected that users will have
   relationships that govern the use of the information (contractual or
   otherwise) with those who operate these intermediaries?  Does the
   protocol prefer encryption over clear text operation?

   Explanation: Confidentiality refers to keeping your data secret from
   unintended listeners [BCP72].  The growth of the Internet depends on
   users having confidence that the network protects their personal data
   [RFC1984].  The possibility of pervasive monitoring and surveillance
   undermines users' trust, and can be mitigated by ensuring

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   confidentiality, i.e., passive attackers should gain little or no
   information from observation or inference of protocol activity.
   [RFC7258][RFC7624].

   Example: Protocols that do not encrypt their payload make the entire
   content of the communication available to the idealized attacker
   along their path.  Following the advice in [RFC3365], most such
   protocols have a secure variant that encrypts the payload for
   confidentiality, and these secure variants are seeing ever-wider
   deployment.  A noteworthy exception is DNS [RFC1035], as DNSSEC
   [RFC4033] does not have confidentiality as a requirement.  This
   implies that, in the absence of the use of more recent standards like
   DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484], all DNS queries
   and answers generated by the activities of any protocol are available
   to the attacker.  When store-and-forward protocols are used (e.g.,
   SMTP [RFC5321]), intermediaries leave this data subject to
   observation by an attacker that has compromised these intermediaries,
   unless the data is encrypted end-to-end by the application-layer
   protocol or the implementation uses an encrypted store for this data
   [RFC7624].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to privacy

   *  Right to security

4.12.  Security

   Question(s): Did you have a look at Guidelines for Writing RFC Text
   on Security Considerations [BCP72]?  Have you found any attacks that
   are somewhat related to your protocol/specification, yet considered
   out of scope of your document?  Would these attacks be pertinent to
   the human rights enabling features of the Internet (as described
   throughout this document)?

   Explanation: Security is not a single monolithic property of a
   protocol or system, but rather a series of related but somewhat
   independent properties.  Not all of these properties are required for
   every application.  Since communications are carried out by systems
   and access to systems is through communications channels, security
   goals obviously interlock, but they can also be independently
   provided.  [BCP72].

   Typically, any protocol operating on the Internet can be the target
   of passive attacks (when the attacker can access and read packets on
   the network); active attacks (when an attacker is capable of writing
   information to the network packets).  [BCP72]

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   Example: See [BCP72].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to security

4.13.  Privacy

   Question(s): Did you have a look at the Guidelines in the Privacy
   Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973] section 7?  Does your
   protocol maintain the confidentiality of metadata?  Could your
   protocol counter traffic analysis?  Does your protocol adhere to data
   minimization principles?  Does your document identify potentially
   sensitive data logged by your protocol and/or for how long that needs
   to be retained for technical reasons?

   Explanation: Privacy refers to the right of an entity (normally a
   person), acting on its own behalf, to determine the degree to which
   it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which
   the entity is willing to share its personal information with others.
   [RFC4949].  If a protocol provides insufficient privacy protection it
   may have a negative impact on freedom of expression as users self-
   censor for fear of surveillance, or find themselves unable to express
   themselves freely.

   Example: See [RFC6973]

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to privacy

   *  Right to non-discrimination

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4.14.  Pseudonymity

   Question(s): Does the protocol collect personally derived data?  Does
   the protocol generate or process anything that can be, or be tightly
   correlated with, personally identifiable information?  Does the
   protocol utilize data that is personally-derived, i.e. derived from
   the interaction of a single person, or their device or address?  If
   yes, can the protocol be implemented in a way that does not rely on
   personally identifiable information?  If not, does the specification
   describe how any such data be handled?  Have you considered the
   Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially
   section 6.1.2?

   Explanation: Pseudonymity means using a pseudonym instead of one's
   "real" name.  There are many reasons for users to use pseudonyms, for
   instance to: hide their gender, protect themselves against
   harassment, protect their families' privacy, frankly discuss
   sexuality, or develop an artistic or journalistic persona without
   repercussions from an employer, (potential) customers, or social
   surrounding. [geekfeminism] The difference between anonymity and
   pseudonymity is that a pseudonym often is persistent.  "Pseudonymity
   is strengthened when less personal data can be linked to the
   pseudonym; when the same pseudonym is used less often and across
   fewer contexts; and when independently chosen pseudonyms are more
   frequently used for new actions (making them, from an observer's or
   attacker's perspective, unlinkable)."  [RFC6973]

   Pseudonymity - the ability to use a persistent identifier not linked
   to one's offline identity - is an important feature for many end-
   users, as it allows them different degrees of disguised identity and
   privacy online.  This can allow an enabling environment for users to
   exercise other rights, including freedom of expression and political
   participation, without fear or direct identification or
   discrimination.

   Example: Generally, pseudonymous identifiers cannot be simply reverse
   engineered.  Some early approaches took approaches such as simple
   hashing of IP addresses, but these could then be simply reversed by
   generating a hash for each potential IP address and comparing it to
   the pseudonym.

   Example: There are also efforts for application layer protocols, like
   Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS, [draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh] that can
   separate identifiers from requests.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to non-discrimination

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   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to political participation

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.15.  Anonymity

   Question(s): Does your protocol make use of persistent identifiers?
   Can it be done without them?  Did you have a look at the Privacy
   Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially section
   6.1.1 of that document?

   Explanation: Anonymity refers to the condition of an identity being
   unknown or concealed [RFC4949].  Even though full anonymity is hard
   to achieve, it is a non-binary concept.  Making pervasive monitoring
   and tracking harder is important for many users as well as for the
   IETF [RFC7258].  Achieving a higher level of anonymity is an
   important feature for many end-users, as it allows them different
   degrees of privacy online.  Anonymity is an inherent part of the
   right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to privacy.
   Avoid adding identifiers, options or configurations that create or
   might lead to patterns or regularities that are not explicitly
   required by the protocol.

   If your protocol collects data and seeks to distribute it to more
   entities than the originally-intended recipients (see [RFC6235] as an
   example), you should anonymize the data, but keep in mind that
   "anonymizing" data is notoriously hard.  For example, just dropping
   the last byte of an IP address does not "anonymize" data.

   If your protocol allows for identity management, there should be a
   clear barrier between the identities to ensure that they cannot
   (easily) be associated with each other.

   A protocol that uses data that could help identify a sender (items of
   interest) should be protected from third parties.  For instance, if
   one wants to hide the source/destination IP addresses of a packet,
   the use of IPsec in tunneling mode (e.g., inside a virtual private
   network) can be helpful to protect from third parties likely to
   eavesdrop packets exchanged between the tunnel endpoints.

   Example: An example is Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
   where sending a persistent identifier as the client name was not
   mandatory but, in practice, done by many implementations, before
   [RFC7844].

   Impacts:

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   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to political participation

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

   *  Right to security

4.16.  Censorship resistance

   Question(s): Can your protocol contribute to filtering?  Could it
   implemented to censor data or services?  Could it be designed to
   ensure this doesn't happen?  Does your protocol make it apparent or
   transparent when access to a resource is restricted and the reasons
   why it is restricted?  Does your protocol introduce new identifiers
   or reuse existing identifiers (e.g., MAC addresses) that might be
   associated with persons or content?

   Explanation: Governments and service providers block or filter
   content or traffic, often without the knowledge of end-users.
   [RFC7754] See [draft-irtf-pearg-censorship] for a survey of
   censorship techniques employed across the world, which lays out
   protocol properties that have been exploited to censor access to
   information.  Censorship resistance refers to the methods and
   measures to prevent Internet censorship.

   Example: Identifiers of content exposed within a protocol might be
   used to facilitate censorship, as in the case of Application Layer
   based censorship, which affects protocols like HTTP.  In HTTP, denial
   or restriction of access can be made apparent by the use of status
   code 451, which allows server operators to operate with greater
   transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy
   affect their operation [RFC7725].

   If a protocol potentially enables censorship, protocol designers
   should strive towards creating error codes that capture different
   scenarios (blocked due to administrative policy, unavailable because
   of legal requirements, etc.) to minimize ambiguity for end-users.

   In the development of the IPv6 protocol, it was discussed to embed a
   Media Access Control (MAC) address into unique IP addresses.  This
   would make it possible for eavesdroppers and other information
   collectors to identify when different addresses used in different
   transactions actually correspond to the same node.  This is why
   standardization efforts like Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address
   Autoconfiguration in IPv6 [RFC4941] and MAC address randomization
   [draft-zuniga-mac-address-randomization] have been pursued.

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   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to political participation

   *  Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.17.  Outcome Transparency

   Question(s): Are the intended and forseen effects of your protocol
   documented and easily comprehensible?

   Explanation: Certain technical choices may have unintended
   consequences.

   Example: Lack of authenticity may lead to lack of integrity and
   negative externalities, of which spam is an example.  Lack of data
   that could be used for billing and accounting can lead to so-called
   "free" arrangements which obscure the actual costs and distribution
   of the costs, for example the barter arrangements that are commonly
   used for Internet interconnection; and the commercial exploitation of
   personal data for targeted advertising which is the most common
   funding model for the so-called "free" services such as search
   engines and social networks.  Unexpected outcomes might not be
   technical, but rather architectural, social or economic.  Therefore
   it is of importance to document the intended outcomes and other
   possible outcomes that have been considered.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to privacy

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

   *  Right to access to information

4.18.  Accessibility

   Question(s): Is your protocol designed to provide an enabling
   environment for all?  Have you looked at the W3C Web Accessibility
   Initiative for examples and guidance?

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   Explanation: Sometimes in the design of protocols, websites, web
   technologies, or web tools, barriers are created that exclude people
   from using the Web. The Internet should be designed to work for all
   people, whatever their hardware, software, language, culture,
   location, or physical or mental ability.  When the Internet
   technologies meet this goal, it will be accessible to people with a
   diverse range of hearing, movement, sight, and cognitive ability.
   [W3CAccessibility]

   Example: The HTML protocol as defined in [HTML5] specifically
   requires that every image must have an alt attribute (with a few
   exceptions) to ensure images are accessible for people that cannot
   themselves decipher non-text content in web pages.

   Another example is the work done in the AVT and AVTCORE working
   groups in the IETF that enables text conversation in multimedia, text
   telephony, wireless multimedia and video communications for sign
   language and lip-reading (i.e., [RFC9071]).

   Impacts:

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

   *  Right to education

   *  Right to political participation

4.19.  Decentralization

   Question(s): Can your protocol be implemented without a single point
   of control?  If applicable, can your protocol be deployed in a
   federated manner?  Does your protocol create additional centralized
   points of control?

   Explanation: Decentralization is one of the central technical
   concepts of the architecture of the Internet, and is embraced as such
   by the IETF [RFC3935].  It refers to the absence or minimization of
   centralized points of control, a feature that is assumed to make it
   easy for new users to join and new uses to unfold [Brown].  It also
   reduces issues surrounding single points of failure, and distributes
   the network such that it continues to function even if one or several
   nodes are disabled.  With the commercialization of the Internet in
   the early 1990s, there has been a slow move away from
   decentralization, to the detriment of the technical benefits of
   having a decentralized Internet.  For a more detailed discussion of
   this topic, please see [arkkoetal].

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   Example: The bits traveling the Internet are increasingly susceptible
   to monitoring and censorship, from both governments and ISPs, as well
   as third (malicious) parties.  The ability to monitor and censor is
   further enabled by the increased centralization of the network that
   creates central infrastructure points that can be tapped into.  The
   creation of peer-to-peer networks and the development of voice-over-
   IP protocols using peer-to-peer technology in combination with
   distributed hash table (DHT) for scalability are examples of how
   protocols can preserve decentralization [Pouwelse].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.20.  Remedy

   Question(s): Can your protocol facilitate a negatively impacted
   party's right to remedy without disproportionately impacting other
   parties' human rights, especially their right to privacy?

   Explanation: Providing access to remedy by states and corporations is
   a part of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
   [UNGP].  Access to remedy may help victims of human rights violations
   in seeking justice, or allow law enforcement agencies to identify a
   possible violator.  However, mechanisms in protocols that try to
   enable 'attribution' to individuals will impede the exercise of the
   right to privacy.  The former UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
   Expression has also argued that anonymity is an inherent part of
   freedom of expression [Kaye].  Considering the potential adverse
   impact of attribution on the right to privacy and freedom of
   expression, enabling attribution on an individual level is most
   likely not consistent with human rights.

   Example: Adding personally identifiable information to data streams
   might help in identifying a violator of human rights and provide
   access to remedy, but this would disproportionally affect all users
   right to privacy, anonymous expression, and association.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to remedy

   *  Right to security

   *  Right to privacy

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4.21.  Misc. considerations

   Question(s): Have you considered potential negative consequences
   (individual or societal) that your protocol or document might have?

   Explanation: Publication of a particular RFC under a certain status
   has consequences.  Publication as an Internet Standard as part of the
   Standards Track may signal to implementers that the specification has
   a certain level of maturity, operational experience, and consensus.
   Similarly, publication of a specification an experimental document as
   part of the non-standards track would signal to the community that
   the document "may be intended for eventual standardization but [may]
   not yet [be] ready" for wide deployment.  The extent of the
   deployment, and consequently its overall impact on end-users, may
   depend on the document status presented in the RFC.  See [BCP9] and
   updates to it for a fuller explanation.

5.  Document Status

   This RG document lays out best practices and guidelines for human
   rights reviews of network protocols, architectures and other
   Internet-Drafts and RFCs.

6.  Acknowledgements

   Thanks to:

   *  Corinne Cath-Speth for work on [RFC8280].

   *  Theresa Engelhard, Joe Hall, Avri Doria, Joey Salazar, Corinne
      Cath-Speth, Farzaneh Badii, Sandra Braman, Colin Perkins, John
      Curran, Eliot Lear, Mallory Knodel, Brian Trammell, Jane Coffin,
      and the hrpc list for reviews and suggestions.

   *  Individuals who conducted human rights reviews for their work and
      feedback: Amelia Andersdotter, Beatrice Martini, Karan Saini and
      Shivan Kaul Sahib.

7.  Security Considerations

   Article three of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reads:
   "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.".
   This article underlines the importance of security and its
   interrelation with human life and liberty, but since human rights are
   indivisible, interrelated and interdependent, security is also
   closely linked to other human rights and freedoms.  This document
   seeks to strengthen human rights, freedoms, and security by relating
   and translating these concepts to concepts and practices as they are

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   used in Internet protocol and architecture development.  The aim of
   this is to secure human rights and thereby improve the
   sustainability, usability, and effectiveness of the network.  The
   document seeks to achieve this by providing guidelines as done in
   section three of this document.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

9.  Research Group Information

   The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations
   Research Group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org
   (mailto:hrpc@ietf.org).  Information on the group and information on
   how to subscribe to the list is at
   https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc
   (https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc)

   Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail-
   archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html (https://www.irtf.org/mail-
   archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html)

10.  Informative References

   [arkkoetal]
              Arkko, J., Trammell, B., Notthingham, M., Huitema, C.,
              Thomson, M., Tantsure, J., and N. ten Oever,
              "Considerations on Internet Consolidation and the Internet
              Architecture", 2019,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arkko-iab-
              internet-consolidation-02>.

   [BCP72]    IETF, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security
              Considerations", 2003,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/bcp72/>.

   [BCP9]     Bradner, S. and IETF, "The Internet Standards Process --
              Revision 3", 1996,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc2026/>.

   [Bless]    Bless, R. and C. Orwat, "Values and Networks", 2015.

   [Brown]    Brown, I. and M. Ziewitz, "A Prehistory of Internet
              Governance", Research Handbook on Governance of the
              Internet. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar , 2013.

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   [draft-irtf-pearg-censorship]
              Hall, J., Aaron, M., Adams, S., Jones, B., and N.
              Feamster, "A Survey of Worldwide Censorship Techniques",
              2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-pearg-censorship>.

   [draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-doh]
              Kinnear, E., McManus, P., Pauly, T., Verma, T., and C. A.
              Wood, "Oblivious DNS Over HTTPS", 2022,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pauly-dprive-oblivious-
              doh>.

   [draft-zuniga-mac-address-randomization]
              JC Zuniga, CJ Bernardos, and A. Andersdotter, "MAC address
              randomization", 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-pearg-censorship>.

   [FIArch]   "Future Internet Design Principles", January 2012,
              <http://www.future-internet.eu/uploads/media/
              FIArch_Design_Principles_V1.0.pdf>.

   [geekfeminism]
              Geek Feminism Wiki, "Pseudonymity", 2015,
              <http://geekfeminism.wikia.com/wiki/Pseudonymity>.

   [Hill2014] Hill, R., "Partial Catalog of Human Rights Related to ICT
              Activities", 2014,
              <http://www.apig.ch/UNIGE%20Catalog.pdf>.

   [HR-RT]    "Human Rights Reviews", 2022,
              <https://github.com/IRTF-HRPC/reviews>.

   [HTML5]    W3C, "HTML5", 2014, <https://www.w3.org/TR/html5/>.

   [HTTPS-REL]
              Meyer, E., "Securing Web Sites Made Them Less Accessible",
              2018, <https://meyerweb.com/eric/thoughts/2018/08/07/
              securing-sites-made-them-less-accessible/>.

   [ICCPR]    United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
              on Civil and Political Rights", 1976,
              <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
              CCPR.aspx>.

   [ICESCR]   United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
              on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 1966,
              <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
              CESCR.aspx>.

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   [IRP]      Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition, "10
              Internet Rights & Principles", 2014,
              <http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/wp-
              content/uploads/2014/06/
              IRPC_10RightsandPrinciples_28May2014-11.pdf>.

   [Kaye]     Kaye, D., "The use of encryption and anonymity in digital
              communications", 2015,
              <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRbodies/HRC/RegularSessions/
              Session29/Documents/A.HRC.29.32_AEV.doc>.

   [newegg]   Mullin, J., "Newegg on trial: Mystery company TQP rewrites
              the history of encryption", 2013, <http://arstechnica.com/
              tech-policy/2013/11/newegg-on-trial-mystery-company-tqp-
              re-writes-the-history-of-encryption/>.

   [notewell] IETF, "Note Well", 2015,
              <https://www.ietf.org/about/note-well.html>.

   [patentpolicy]
              W3C, "W3C Patent Policy", 2004,
              <https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/>.

   [Penney]   Penney, J., "Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and
              Wikipedia Use", 2016, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
              papers.cfm?abstract_id=2769645>.

   [Pouwelse] Pouwelse, Ed, J., "Media without censorship", 2012,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-pouwelse-censorfree-
              scenarios>.

   [RFC0793]  Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", RFC 793,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc793>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC1958]  Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
              Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>.

   [RFC1984]  IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
              Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1984>.

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   [RFC2026]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
              3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2026>.

   [RFC2277]  Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
              Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, DOI 10.17487/RFC2277,
              January 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2277>.

   [RFC3365]  Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet
              Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", BCP 61,
              RFC 3365, DOI 10.17487/RFC3365, August 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3365>.

   [RFC3724]  Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, "The Rise of
              the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on
              the Evolution of the Internet Architecture", RFC 3724,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3724>.

   [RFC3935]  Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF",
              BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3935>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

   [RFC4101]  Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4101>.

   [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
              Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
              IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC5646]  Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
              Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
              September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.

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   [RFC6108]  Chung, C., Kasyanov, A., Livingood, J., Mody, N., and B.
              Van Lieu, "Comcast's Web Notification System Design",
              RFC 6108, DOI 10.17487/RFC6108, February 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6108>.

   [RFC6235]  Boschi, E. and B. Trammell, "IP Flow Anonymization
              Support", RFC 6235, DOI 10.17487/RFC6235, May 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6235>.

   [RFC6365]  Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in
              Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.

   [RFC6701]  Farrel, A. and P. Resnick, "Sanctions Available for
              Application to Violators of IETF IPR Policy", RFC 6701,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6701, August 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6701>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7624]  Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
              Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
              "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
              Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624>.

   [RFC7725]  Bray, T., "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles",
              RFC 7725, DOI 10.17487/RFC7725, February 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7725>.

   [RFC7754]  Barnes, R., Cooper, A., Kolkman, O., Thaler, D., and E.
              Nordmark, "Technical Considerations for Internet Service
              Blocking and Filtering", RFC 7754, DOI 10.17487/RFC7754,
              March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7754>.

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   [RFC7844]  Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity
              Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7844>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8179]  Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property
              Rights in IETF Technology", BCP 79, RFC 8179,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8179, May 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8179>.

   [RFC8280]  ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights
              Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280,
              October 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8280>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8980]  Arkko, J. and T. Hardie, "Report from the IAB Workshop on
              Design Expectations vs. Deployment Reality in Protocol
              Development", RFC 8980, DOI 10.17487/RFC8980, February
              2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8980>.

   [RFC9071]  Hellström, G., "RTP-Mixer Formatting of Multiparty Real-
              Time Text", RFC 9071, DOI 10.17487/RFC9071, July 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9071>.

   [Saltzer]  Saltzer, J. H., Reed, D. P., and D. D. Clark, "End-to-End
              Arguments in System Design", ACM TOCS, Vol 2, Number 4,
              November 1984, pp 277-288. , 1984.

   [UDHR]     United Nations General Assembly, "The Universal
              Declaration of Human Rights", 1948,
              <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.

   [UNGP]     United Nations, "United Nations Guiding Principles on
              Business and Human Rights", 2011,
              <https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/
              guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf>.

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   [UNHR]     United Nations, "The Core International Human Rights
              Instruments and their monitoring bodies", 2011,
              <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/
              coreinstruments.aspx>.

   [UNHRC2016]
              United Nations Human Rights Council, "UN Human Rights
              Council Resolution "The promotion, protection and
              enjoyment of human rights on the Internet" (A/HRC/32/
              L.20)", 2016, <https://documents-dds-
              ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G16/131/89/PDF/
              G1613189.pdf?OpenElement>.

   [W3CAccessibility]
              W3C, "Accessibility", 2015,
              <https://www.w3.org/standards/webdesign/accessibility>.

   [W3Ci18nDef]
              W3C, "Localization vs. Internationalization", 2010,
              <http://www.w3.org/International/questions/qa-i18n.en>.

   [Zittrain] Zittrain, J., "The Future of the Internet - And How to
              Stop It", Yale University Press , 2008,
              <https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4455262/
              Zittrain_Future%20of%20the%20Internet.pdf?sequence=1>.

Authors' Addresses

   Gurshabad Grover
   Email: gurshabad@cis-india.org

   Niels ten Oever
   University of Amsterdam
   Email: mail@nielstenoever.net

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