The SIP P-Served-User Private-Header (P-Header) for the 3GPP IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) Subsystem
draft-vanelburg-sipping-served-user-08

SIPPING Working Group                                      J. van Elburg
Internet-Draft                            Ericsson Telecommunicatie B.V.
Intended status: Informational                         November 18, 2008
Expires: May 22, 2009

   The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) P-Served-User Private-Header
 (P-Header) for the 3GPP IP Multimedia (IM) Core Network (CN) Subsystem
               draft-vanelburg-sipping-served-user-08.txt

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Abstract

   This document specifies the SIP P-Served-User P-header.  This header
   field addresses an issue that was found in the 3rd-Generation
   Partnership Project (3GPP) IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) between an
   S-CSCF (Serving Call Session Control Function) and an AS (Application
   Server) on the ISC (IMS Subsystem Service Control) interface.  This
   header field conveys the identity of the served user and the session
   case that applies to this particular communication session and
   application invocation.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Definitions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1.  Identity, Network Asserted Identity, Trust Domain and
           Spec(T)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.2.  Served User  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   4.  Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     4.1.  General  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     4.2.  Diversion; continue on terminating leg, but finish
           subsequent terminating iFC first . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     4.3.  Diversion; create new originating leg and provide
           originating iFC processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     4.4.  Call out of the blue; on behalf of user B, but service
           profile of service identity C  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  P-Served-User header field Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   7.  Proxy behaviour  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     7.1.  Generating the P-Served-User header  . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     7.2.  Consuming the P-Served-User header . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  Applicability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   10. Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   11. Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   Appendix A.  Why the History-Info header is not suitable to
                convey the served user information on the ISC
                interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.1.  Semantics  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.2.  Additional Observations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.3.  Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15

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1.  Introduction

   The 3rd-Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) IMS (IP Multimedia
   Subsystem) uses SIP (RFC 3261 [2]) as its main signaling protocol.
   (For more information on the IMS, a detailed description can be found
   in 3GPP TS 23.228 [9] and 3GPP TS 24.229 [11].) 3GPP has identified
   issues with the linking in of a SIP application server that are most
   appropriately resolved by defining a new SIP P-header, according to
   the procedures in RFC 3427 [5].

   The remainder of this document is organized as follows.  Section 4
   outlines the problem using particular service scenarios and Section 5
   discusses the requirements derived from these scenarios.  Section 6
   defines the P-Served-User header field, which meets those
   requirements, and Section 8 discusses the applicability and scope of
   this new header field.  Section 9 registers the P-Served-User header
   field with the IANA and Section 10 discusses the security properties
   of the environment where this header field is intended to be used.

2.  Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [1].

3.  Definitions

3.1.  Identity, Network Asserted Identity, Trust Domain and Spec(T)

   The terms Identity, Network Asserted Identity, Trust Domain and
   Spec(T) in this document are specified in RFC 3324 [3].

3.2.  Served User

   The served user to an S-CSCF (Serving Call Session Control Function)
   or AS (Application Server) is the user whose service profile is
   accessed by that S-CSCF or AS when an initial request is received
   originated by, originated on behalf of or terminated to that user;
   this profile in turn provides some useful information (preferences or
   permissions) for processing at an S-CSCF and potentially at an AS.

4.  Scenarios

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4.1.  General

   In the 3GPP IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) the S-CSCF (Serving CSCF)
   is a SIP proxy that serves as a registrar and handles originating and
   terminating session states for users allocated to it.  This means
   that any call that is originated by a specific user or any call that
   is terminated to that specific user will pass through the S-CSCF that
   is allocated to that user.

   At the moment that an S-CSCF is allocated for a specific user, a user
   profile is downloaded to the S-CSCF from the HSS (Home Subscriber
   Server) over the Cx interface.  This user profile tells the S-CSCF
   whether the user is allowed to originate or terminate calls or
   whether an AS needs to be linked in over the ISC interface.  The user
   profile information that determines whether a particular initial
   request needs to be sent to a particular AS is called initial Filter
   Criteria (iFC), see for example 3GPP TS 23.218 [8].

   For an S-CSCF to be able to meet its responsibilities, it needs to
   determine on which user's behalf it is performing its tasks and which
   session case is applicable for the particular request.  (For a
   definition of session case see 3GPP TS 29.228 [12]) The session case
   distinguishes the originating and terminating call cases and whether
   the particular user is registered or not.

   When the S-CSCF determines that for an incoming initial request the
   originating call case applies, it determines the served user by
   looking at the P-Asserted-Identity header field (RFC 3325 [4]) which
   carries the network asserted identity of the originating user.  When
   after processing the iFC for this initial request, the S-CSCF decides
   to forward the request to an AS, the AS has to go through a similar
   process of determining the session case and the served user.  Since
   it should come to the same conclusion that this is an originating
   session case, it also has to look at the P-Asserted-Identity header
   field to determine the served user

   When the S-CSCF determines that for an incoming initial request the
   terminating call case applies, it determines the served user by
   looking at the Request-URI (RFC 3261 [2]) which carries the identity
   of the intended terminating user.  When after processing the iFC for
   this initial request, the S-CSCF decides to forward the request to an
   AS, the AS has to go through a similar process of determining the
   session case and the served user.  Since it should come to the same
   conclusion that this is a terminating session case, it also has to
   look at the Request-URI to determine the served user.

   In the originating case it can be observed that while the P-Asserted-
   Identity header field just represents the originating user when it

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   enters the S-CSCF, it is overloaded with another meaning when it is
   sent to an AS over the ISC interface.  This other meaning is that it
   serves as a representation of the served user.

   In the terminating case a similar overloading happens to the Request-
   URI, while it first only represented the identity of the intended
   terminating user, it is overloaded with another meaning when it is
   sent to an AS over the ISC interface.  This other meaning is that it
   serves as a representation of the served user.

   In basic call scenarios this does not show up as a problem, but once
   more complicated service scenarios (notably forwarding services)
   needs to be realized, it poses severe limitations.  Such scenarios
   are brought forward in the following sub sections.

4.2.  Diversion; continue on terminating leg, but finish subsequent
      terminating iFC first

   Imagine a service scenario where a user B has a terminating service
   that diverts the call to a different destination, but it is required
   that subsequent terminating services for the same user are still
   executed.  This means that this particular user has multiple iFC
   configured that are applicable for an incoming initial request.  When
   the S-CSCF receives an initial INVITE request it analyses the request
   and determines that the session case is for a terminating registered
   user, then it determines the served user to be user B by looking at
   the Request-URI.

   Now the S-CSCF starts the iFC processing, the first iFC that matches
   the INVITE request causes the INVITE to be forwarded over the ISC
   interface to an AS that hosts user B's diversion service, by adding
   the AS and S-CSCF's own hostnames to the Route header.  The S-CSCF
   adds an Original Dialog Identifier (ODI) to the S-CSCF's own hostname
   on the Route header.  This allows the S-CSCF to correlate an INVITE
   coming from an AS over the ISC interface to the existing session that
   forwarded the INVITE to the AS in the first place.

   When the AS receives the initial INVITE request it analyses the
   request and determines that the session case is for a terminating
   registered user, then it determines the served user to be user B by
   looking at the Request-URI.  Based on some criteria, the diversion
   service concludes that the request needs to be diverted to another
   user or application C. It does this by changing the Request-URI to C.
   Optionally it records the Request-URI history by using the History-
   Info header field (RFC 4244 [7]).  Then the AS removes itself from
   the Route header and routes the INVITE request back to the S-CSCF by
   using the topmost Route header field.

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   When the S-CSCF receives the INVITE over the ISC interface it can see
   that the Route header contains its own hostname and an ODI that
   correlates to an existing terminating session for user B. This can be
   used by the S-CSCF to analyze whether there are still unexecuted iFC.
   (Note that the current behavior of the S-CSCF on receiving an INVITE
   with a changed Request-URI is to terminate the iFC processing and to
   route the request based on the new Request-URI value.)

   The process repeats itself, the INVITE is forwarded to the AS that is
   associated with this particular iFC.  When the AS receives the
   initial INVITE request it analyses the request and determines that
   the session case is for a terminating registered user, then it
   determines the served user to be user C by looking at the Request-
   URI.  This is clearly wrong as the user being served is still user B.

   This scenario clearly shows the problem that occurs when the Request-
   URI is overloaded with the meanings "intended target identity" and
   "served user" with the operation as described in Section 4.1.  And it
   shows that this use case can not be realized without introducing a
   mechanism that conveys information about the served user from the
   S-CSCF to the AS.  Use of the History-Info element does not solve
   this problem as it does not tell the AS which user is being served,
   but just presents a history of diversions that might not be even
   caused by the systems serving this particular user.  A more detailed
   analysis on why the History-Info header field can't be used is
   provided in Appendix A.

4.3.  Diversion; create new originating leg and provide originating iFC
      processing

   Imagine a service scenario where a user B has a terminating service
   that diverts the call to a different destination.  It is required
   that forwarded call leg is handled as an originating call leg and
   that originating services for user B are executed.  This means that
   this particular user has one or more iFC configured that are
   applicable for an outgoing initial request.

   When the S-CSCF receives an initial INVITE request, it analyses the
   request and determines that the session case is for a terminating
   registered user, then it determines the served user to be user B by
   looking at the Request-URI.

   Now the S-CSCF starts the iFC processing, the first iFC that matches
   the INVITE request causes the INVITE to be forwarded over the ISC
   interface to an AS that hosts user B's diversion service, by adding
   the AS and S-CSCF's own hostnames to the Route header.  The S-CSCF
   adds an Original Dialog Identifier (ODI) to the S-CSCF's own hostname
   on the Route header, this allows the S-CSCF to correlate an INVITE

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   coming from an AS over the ISC interface to the existing session that
   forwarded the INVITE to the AS in the first place.

   When the AS receives the initial INVITE request, it analyses the
   request and determines that the session case is for a terminating
   registered user, then it determines the served user to be user B by
   looking at the Request-URI.  Based on some criteria the diversion
   service concludes that the request needs to be diverted to another
   user or application C. It does this by changing the Request-URI to C.
   Optionally it records the Request-URI history by using the History-
   Info header field (RFC 4244 [7]).  Then the AS removes itself from
   the Route header.  To make sure that the request is handled as a new
   originating call on behalf of user B, the AS adds the "orig"
   parameter to the topmost route header.  Then it routes the INVITE
   request back to the S-CSCF by using this topmost Route header field.

   When the S-CSCF receives the INVITE over the ISC interface, it can
   see that the topmost Route header contains its own hostname and an
   "orig" parameter.  Because the topmost Route header contains the
   "orig" parameter, the S-CSCF concludes that the INVITE should be
   handled as if a call is originated by the served user.  The served
   user is determined from the P-Asserted-Identity header to be user A.
   This is clearly wrong as the user being served is and should be user
   B.

   For the sake of discussion lets assume that the S-CSCF can determine
   that the served user is user B. Then the procedure would continue as
   follows: The S-CSCF starts the originating iFC processing, the first
   iFC that matches the INVITE request causes the INVITE to be forwarded
   over the ISC interface to an AS that hosts an originating service of
   user B, by adding the AS and S-CSCF's own hostnames to the Route
   header.  The S-CSCF adds an Original Dialog Identifier (ODI) to the
   S-CSCF's own hostname on the Route header.

   The INVITE is forwarded to the AS that is associated with this
   particular iFC.  When the AS receives the initial INVITE request it
   analyses the request and determines that the session case is for an
   originating registered user, then it determines the served user to be
   user A by looking at the P-Asserted-Identity.  This is clearly wrong
   as the user being served is and should be user B.

   This scenario clearly shows the problem that occurs when the
   P-Asserted-Identity is overloaded with the meanings "call originator"
   and "served user" with the operation as described in chapter
   Section 4.1.  And it shows that this use case can not be realized
   without introducing a mechanism that conveys information about the
   served user from the S-CSCF to the AS and from the AS to the S-CSCF.
   Use of the History-Info element does not solve this problem as it

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   does not tell the AS which user is being served, but just presents a
   history of diversions that might not be even caused by the systems
   serving this particular user.  A more detailed analysis on why the
   History-Info header field can't be used is provided in Appendix A.

4.4.  Call out of the blue; on behalf of user B, but service profile of
      service identity C

   There are services that need to be able to initiate a call, whereby
   the call appears to be coming from a user B, but service profile on
   behalf of service identity C needs to be executed in the S-CSCF.

   When a call needs to appear as coming from user B, that means that
   the P-Asserted-Identity needs to contain B's identity.  This is
   because the Originating Identity Presentation (OIP) service as
   defined in 3GPP TS 24.173 [10] uses the P-Asserted-Identity to
   present the call originator.  Which makes sense because that is the
   main meaning expressed by the P-Asserted-Identity header field.

   It is clear that no INVITE request can be constructed currently that
   would achieve both requirements expressed in the first paragraph,
   because the P-Asserted-Identity is overloaded with two meanings on
   the ISC interface.  When the S-CSCF will receive this request it will
   determine that the served user is user B, which is not what we want
   to achieve.

5.  Requirements

   This section lists the requirements derived from the previous
   scenarios:

   1.  To be able to offer real world application services it is
       required that the identity of the served user can be conveyed on
       the ISC interface (see 3GPP TS 23.218 [8]).
   2.  To be able to offer appropriate services to the served user it is
       required that in addition to the served user identity the session
       case is conveyed.

6.  P-Served-User header field Definition

   This document defines the SIP P-Served-User P-header.  This header
   field can be added to initial requests for a dialog or standalone
   requests routed from a node in a Trust Domain for served user like
   for example between an S-CSCF and an AS.  The P-Served-User P-header
   contains an identity of the user that is (to be) served by the
   S-CSCF.  The sescase parameter may be used to convey whether the

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   initial request is originated by or destined for the served user.
   The regstate parameter may be used by the S-CSCF towards an AS to
   indicate whether the initial request is for a registered or an
   unregistered user.

   The augmented Backus-Naur Form (BNF) (RFC 5234 [6]) syntax of the
   P-Served-User header field is the following:

   P-Served-User            = "P-Served-User" HCOLON PServedUser-value
                                              *(SEMI served-user-param)
   served-user-param        = sessioncase-param
                              / registration-state-param
                              / generic-param
   PServedUser-value        = name-addr / addr-spec
   sessioncase-param        = "sescase" EQUAL "orig" / "term"
   registration-state-param = "regstate" EQUAL "unreg" / "reg"

   EQUAL, HCOLON, SEMI, name-addr, addr-spec and generic-param are
   defined in RFC 3261 [2].

   The following is an example of a P-Served-User header field:

   P-Served-User: <sip:user@example.com>; sescase=orig; regstate=reg

7.  Proxy behaviour

7.1.  Generating the P-Served-User header

   Proxies that support the header MUST only insert the header in
   initial requests for a dialog or standalone requests when the
   following conditions hold:
   o  The proxy has the capability to determine the served user for the
      current request.
   o  The next hop is part of the same Trust Domain for P-Served-User.

   When the above conditions do not hold the proxy MUST NOT insert the
   header.

7.2.  Consuming the P-Served-User header

   A proxy that supports the header, MUST upon receiving from a trusted
   node the P-Served-User header in initial requests for a dialog or
   standalone requests take the value of the P-Served-User header to
   represent the served user in operations that require such
   information.

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   A proxy that supports the header, MUST remove the header from
   requests or responses when the header was received from a node
   outside the Trust Domain for P-Served-User before further forwarding
   the message.

   A proxy that supports the header, MUST remove the header from
   requests or responses when the next hop is a node outside the Trust
   Domain for P-Served-User before further forwarding the message.

8.  Applicability

   According to RFC 3427 [5], P-headers have a limited applicability.
   Specifications of P-headers such as this RFC need to clearly document
   the useful scope of the proposal, and explain its limitations and why
   it is not suitable for the general use of SIP on the Internet.

   The use of the P-Served-User header field extensions is only
   applicable inside a Trust Domain for served user.  Nodes in such a
   Trust Domain explicitly trust each other to convey the served user,
   and to be responsible for withholding that information outside of the
   Trust Domain.  The means by which the network determines the served
   user and the policies that are executed for a specific served user is
   outside the scope of this document.

   The served user information lacks an indication of who or what
   specifically determined the served user, and so it must be assumed
   that the Trust Domain determined the served user.  Therefore, the
   information is only meaningful when securely received from a node
   known to be a member of the Trust Domain.

   Because the served user typically only has validity in one
   administrative domain it is in general not suitable for inter-domain
   use or use in the Internet at large.

   Despite these limitations, there are sufficiently useful specialized
   deployments that meet the assumptions described above, and can accept
   the limitations that result, to warrant informational publication of
   this mechanism.  An example deployment would be a closed network like
   3GPP IMS.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines a new SIP header field: P-Served-User.  This
   header field needs to be registered by the IANA in the SIP Parameters
   registry under the Header Fields subregistry.

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10.  Security Considerations

   The P-Served-User header field defined in this document is to be used
   in an environment where elements are trusted and where attackers are
   not supposed to have access to the protocol messages between those
   elements.  Traffic protection between network elements is sometimes
   achieved by using IPsec and sometimes by physically protecting the
   network.  In any case, the environment where the P-Served-User header
   field will be used ensures the integrity and the confidentiality of
   the contents of this header field.

   The Spec(T) that defines the Trust Domain for P-Served-User MUST
   require that member nodes understand the P-Served-User header
   extension.

   There is a security risk if a P-Served-User header field is allowed
   to propagate out of the Trust Domain where it was generated.  In that
   case user-sensitive information would be revealed by such a breach.
   To prevent such a breach from happening: Proxies MUST NOT insert the
   header when forwarding requests to a next hop located outside the
   Trust Domain.  When forwarding the request to a node in the Trust
   Domain, proxies MUST NOT insert the header unless they have
   sufficient knowledge that the route set includes another proxy in the
   Trust Domain that understands the header, such as the home proxy.
   There is no automatic mechanism to learn the support for this
   specification.  Proxies MUST remove the header when forwarding
   requests to nodes that are not in the Trust Domain or when the proxy
   does not have knowledge of any other proxy included in the route set
   that will remove it before it is routed to any node that is not in
   the Trust Domain.

11.  Acknowledgments

   Alf Heidermark, Hubert Przybysz and Erik Rolin for the discussion
   that led to the solution written down in this document.  Spencer
   Dawkins for performing the expert review.  Jon Peterson for
   performing the AD review.  Gonzalo Camarillo, Paul Kyzivat, Nils
   Haenstroem, Arunachalam Venkatraman, Mikael Forsberg, Miguel Garcia,
   Jozsef Varga, Keith Drage, Tim Polk and Cullen Jennings for providing
   improvements.  Francis Dupont for performing the general area review.
   Sandy Murphy for performing the security area review.

12.  References

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12.1.  Normative References

   [1]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
         Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [2]   Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
         Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
         Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261, June 2002.

   [3]   Watson, M., "Short Term Requirements for Network Asserted
         Identity", RFC 3324, November 2002.

   [4]   Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private Extensions
         to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity
         within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325, November 2002.

   [5]   Mankin, A., Bradner, S., Mahy, R., Willis, D., Ott, J., and B.
         Rosen, "Change Process for the Session Initiation Protocol
         (SIP)", BCP 67, RFC 3427, December 2002.

   [6]   Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
         Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

12.2.  Informative References

   [7]   Barnes, M., "An Extension to the Session Initiation Protocol
         (SIP) for Request History Information", RFC 4244,
         November 2005.

   [8]   3GPP, "IP Multimedia (IM) session handling; IM call model;
         Stage 2", 3GPP TS 23.218 V7.

   [9]   3GPP, "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2", 3GPP TS 23.228
         V7.

   [10]  3GPP, "IMS multimedia telephony communication service and
         supplementary services; Stage 3", 3GPP TS 24.173 V7.

   [11]  3GPP, "Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia call control protocol
         based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session
         Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3", 3GPP TS 24.229 V7.

   [12]  3GPP, "IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx interfaces;
         Signalling flows and message contents", 3GPP TS 29.228 V7.

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Appendix A.  Why the History-Info header is not suitable to convey the
             served user information on the ISC interface

A.1.  Semantics

   The History-Info as specified in (RFC 4244 [7]) holds a record of
   Request-URI's that are put on an initial request during its
   processing in the network and then particularly when the request is
   retargeted or forwarded.

   If it would be possible at all to use the History-Info header for the
   purpose of communicating the served user, then again the same
   overloading would occur as the one that we are trying to get rid of
   (Section 4.2).  Because in that case we overload the particular
   History-Info header field's hi-entry with the meaning "historic
   target identity" and "served user".

   Another reason that the History-Info header can not solve the
   requirements as expressed in this draft is that in originating
   session case scenarios the served user is currently determined from
   the P-Asserted-Identity as that header field contains the asserted
   originating user's identity.  The History-Info header being a record
   of Request-URI's can never be a solution for this case.

   Looking at the call out of the blue scenario (Section 4.4) it is
   impossible to construct a History-Info header for an INVITE request
   on behalf of user C appearing to come from user B and targeting user
   D that would express the served user C without violating the original
   semantics of the History-Info header according to (RFC 4244 [7]).

A.2.  Additional Observations

   The purpose of the History-Info header is a header that has an end to
   end application.  For the purpose of informing an AS on the ISC
   interface this is overkill.

   At the moment that the AS receives an initial INVITE over the ISC
   interface, this INVITE may have passed a vast number of proxies that
   may either have added history information or not.  On top of that,
   the request may have traversed several AS instances for the same
   served user.  In case several subsequent iFC are active all these AS
   instances may perform a forwarding.  This means that it is not
   possible to define an algorithm that points out which hi-entry of a
   History-Info header should represent the served user.  In other words
   a History-Info header field with n entries expresses a branch of
   depth n.  Any or none of these elements could be the served user
   identity.

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   The History-Info header does not comply with the second requirement
   as expressed in Section 5, as it does not have a means to express the
   session case in a natural way.

A.3.  Conclusion

   Each of the observations in the previous subsections in isolation is
   enough to disregard the History-Info header as an information element
   that is suitable for transporting the served user information over
   the ISC interface.

   Note that this does not prohibit the use of the P-Served-User header
   and the History-Info header in the same request.  In fact that will
   be a quite likely scenario for network based diversion services like
   for example the Communication Diversion service as specified in (3GPP
   TS 24.173 [10]).

Author's Address

   Hans Erik van Elburg
   Ericsson Telecommunicatie B.V.
   Ericssonstraat 2
   Rijen  5121 ML
   The Netherlands

   Email: HansErik.van.Elburg@ericsson.com

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