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CAPtive PORTal interaction
charter-ietf-capport-01

Yes

(Barry Leiba)

No Objection

(Alia Atlas)
(Alvaro Retana)
(Benoît Claise)
(Deborah Brungard)
(Martin Stiemerling)
(Terry Manderson)

Note: This ballot was opened for revision 00-01 and is now closed.

Ballot question: "Is this charter ready for external review?"

Barry Leiba Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (for -00-01) Unknown

                            
Ben Campbell Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (2015-10-14 for -00-01) Unknown
I agree with Spencer's comment about MiTM attacks.
Jari Arkko Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (2015-10-15 for -00-01) Unknown
This is important work and should go forward.

Minor comment which you can ignore: on re-reading the charter, I thought that the concepts of captive portals and roaming was a bit mixed. These are independent issues. A web-based captive portal may allow roaming, but would still benefit from the results of this working group. A non-roaming 802.1X or EAP or application-based access point would not need. I'd suggest that the real issue is whether one uses web traffic capture or automated 1X/EAP/application mechanisms to attach. In the former case the results of this working group apply; in the latter case they don't nor is there any need to add something.
Spencer Dawkins Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (2015-10-12 for -00-01) Unknown
This would be great. I did have a couple of observations for your consideration.

Two comments on this text:

"Currently, network providers use a number of interception techniques to
reach a human user (such as intercepting cleartext HTTP to force a
redirect to a web page of their choice), and these interceptions often
look like man-in-the-middle attacks. As endpoints become inherently more
secure, existing interception techniques will become less effective or
will fail entirely. This will result in a poor user experience as well
as a lower rate of success for the Captive Portal operator."

RFC 7258/BCP 188 characterizes monitoring for network management as "indistinguishable from other attacks", and we're talking about actual hijacking here, not just monitoring. Perhaps it's better to say "these interceptions are indistinguishable from man-in-the-middle attacks". 

("they look like man-in-the-middle attacks because they are man-in-the-middle attacks" :-)

I'm not sure what "As endpoints become inherently more secure" means. Is this a reference to endpoints using TLS by default, and refusing to downgrade to plaintext? 

I thought 

"These might or might not be published as RFCs, and/or might be combined in some way."

was awkward. Perhaps 

"These might or might not be published as RFCs, and might or might not be combined in some way."

would be clearer?
Stephen Farrell Former IESG member
Yes
Yes (2015-10-15 for -00-01) Unknown
Good to see us trying to make this better.

One question below. (I'm still a "yes" ballot regardless
of whether the answer is yes or no btw.)

Say if someone wanted to make a protocol to advertise
that such and such a captive portal exists and can be
interacted with at such and such a URL when one is 
connected to such and such a WLAN/LAN/SSID in such
and such a location. Would discussing that be in scope 
for the WG?
Alia Atlas Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-01) Unknown

                            
Alvaro Retana Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-01) Unknown

                            
Benoît Claise Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-01) Unknown

                            
Brian Haberman Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2015-10-15 for -00-01) Unknown
I agree with Joel that we should keep non-human-driven machines in mind.
Deborah Brungard Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-01) Unknown

                            
Joel Jaeggli Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2015-10-12 for -00-01) Unknown
Might consider a block on this but it's readily addressed.

 A stretch-goal / phase 2 work may attempt to solve this problem
for devices that have no human interaction (such as "IoT" devices).

Rather than presuppose what might be in a future charter I would simply include this as a potential issue. 

one probably bad proposal is:

A secondary goal is  to look at the problem posed to or by devices that have little or no recourse to  human interaction.
Kathleen Moriarty Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (2015-10-13 for -00-01) Unknown
I support Spencer's text change to explicitly state man-in-the-middle attacks.
Martin Stiemerling Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-01) Unknown

                            
Terry Manderson Former IESG member
No Objection
No Objection (for -00-01) Unknown