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Telnet Encryption: DES3 64 bit Output Feedback
draft-altman-telnet-enc-des3-ofb-01

The information below is for an old version of the document that is already published as an RFC.
Document Type This is an older version of an Internet-Draft that was ultimately published as an RFC.
Author Jeffrey E. Altman
Last updated 2013-03-02 (Latest revision 1999-08-11)
Stream Legacy stream
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IESG IESG state RFC 2948 (Proposed Standard)
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draft-altman-telnet-enc-des3-ofb-01
Network Working Group                                     Jeffrey Altman
Internet-Draft                                       Columbia University
draft-altman-telnet-enc-des3-ofb-01.txt                    February 1999

             Telnet Encryption: DES3 64 bit Output Feedback

Status of this Memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.  Internet-Drafts are working
   documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas,
   and its working groups.  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.

Abstract

   This document specifies how to use the Triple-DES encryption algorithm
   in output feedback mode with the telnet encryption option.

1.  Command Names and Codes

   Encryption Type

      DES3_OFB64       3

   Suboption Commands

      OFB64_IV         1
      OFB64_IV_OK      2
      OFB64_IV_BAD     3

2.  Command Meanings

   IAC SB ENCRYPT IS DES3_OFB64 OFB64_IV <initial vector> IAC SE

      The sender of this command generates a random 8 byte initial vec-
      tor, and sends it to the other side of the connection using the
      OFB64_IV command.  The initial vector is sent in clear text.  Only
      the side of the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT may send the
      OFB64_IV command.

   IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY DES3_OFB64 OFB64_IV_OK IAC SE
   IAC SB ENCRYPT REPLY DES3_OFB64 OFB64_IV_BAD IAC SE

      The sender of these commands either accepts or rejects the initial
      vector received in a OFB64_IV command.  Only the side of the con-
      nection that is DO ENCRYPT may send the OFB64_IV_OK and
      OFB64_IV_BAD commands.  The OFB64_IV_OK command MUST be sent for
      backwards compatibility with existing implementations; there real-
      ly isn't any reason why a sender would need to send the
      OFB64_IV_BAD command except in the case of a protocol violation
      where the IV sent was not of the correct length (i.e., 8 bytes).

3.  Implementation Rules

   Once a OFB64_IV_OK command has been received, the WILL ENCRYPT side
   of the connection should do keyid negotiation using the ENC_KEYID
   command.  Once the keyid negotiation has successfully identified a
   common keyid, then START and END commands may be sent by the side of
   the connection that is WILL ENCRYPT.  Data will be encrypted using
   the DES3 64 bit Cipher Feedback algorithm.

   If encryption (decryption) is turned off and back on again, and the
   same keyid is used when re-starting the encryption (decryption), the
   intervening clear text must not change the state of the encryption
   (decryption) machine.

   If a START command is sent (received) with a different keyid, the en-
   cryption (decryption) machine must be re-initialized immediately fol-
   lowing the end of the START command with the new key and the initial
   vector sent (received) in the last OFB64_IV command.

   If a new OFB64_IV command is sent (received), and encryption (decryp-
   tion) is enabled, the encryption (decryption) machine must be re-ini
   tialized immediately following the end of the OFB64_IV command with
   the new initial vector, and the keyid sent (received) in the last
   START command.

   If encryption (decryption) is not enabled when a OFB64_IV command is
   sent (received), the encryption (decryption) machine must be re-ini
   tialized after the next START command, with the keyid sent (received)
   in that START command, and the initial vector sent (received) in this
   OFB64_IV command.

4.  Algorithm

    DES3 64 bit Output Feedback

                   key1       key2       key3
                    |          |          |
                    v          v          v
                +-------+  +-------+  +-------+
             +->| DES-e |->| DES-d |->| DES-e |-- +
             |  +-------+  +-------+  +-------+   |
             +------------------------------------+
                                                 v
     INPUT ------------------------------------->(+) ----> DATA

    Given:
        iV: Initial vector, 64 bits (8 bytes) long.
        Dn: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of data to encrypt (decrypt).
        On: the nth chunk of 64 bits (8 bytes) of encrypted (decrypted)
output.

        V0 = DES-e(DES-d(DES-e(iV, key1),key2),key3)
        V(n+1) = DES-e(DES-d(DES-e(Vn, key1),key2),key3)
        On = Dn ^ Vn

5.  Integration with the AUTHENTICATION telnet option

   As noted in the telnet ENCRYPTION option specifications, a keyid val-
   ue of zero indicates the default encryption key, as might be derived
   from the telnet AUTHENTICATION option.  If the default encryption key
   negotiated as a result of the telnet AUTHENTICATION option contains
   less than 16 bytes, then the DES_OFB64 option must not be offered or
   used as a valid telnet encryption option.

   The following rules are to be followed for creating three DES encryp-
   tion keys based upon the available encrypt key data:

     keys_to_use = bytes of key data / DES block size (8 bytes)

   where the keys are labeled "key1" through "key6" with "key1" being
   the first 8 bytes; "key2" the second 8 bytes; ... and "key6" being
   sixth 8 bytes (if available).

   When two keys are available:

   . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
     key2, and encrypted with key1;

   . data sent from the client is encrypted with key2, decrypted with
     key1, and encrypted with key2

  When three keys are available:

   . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
     key2, and encrypted with key3;

   . data sent from the client is encrypted with key2, decrypted with
     key3, and encrypted with key1

  When four keys are available:

   . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
     key2, and encrypted with key3;

   . data sent from the client is encrypted with key2, decrypted with
     key4, and encrypted with key1

  When five keys are available:

   . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
     key2, and encrypted with key3;

   . data sent from the client is encrypted with key2, decrypted with
     key4, and encrypted with key5

  When six keys are available:

   . data sent from the server is encrypted with key1, decrypted with
     key2, and encrypted with key3;

   . data sent from the client is encrypted with key4, decrypted with
     key5, and encrypted with key6

   In all cases, the keys used by DES3_OFB64 must have their parity
   corrected after they are determined using the above algorithm.

   Note that the above algorithm assumes that it is safe to use a non-
   DES key (or part of a non-DES key) as a DES key.  This is not neces-
   sarily true of all cipher systems, but we specify this behaviour as
   the default since it is true for most authentication systems in popu-
   lar use today, and for compatibility with existing implementations.
   New telnet AUTHENTICATION mechanisms may specify althernative methods
   for determining the keys to be used for this cipher suite in their
   specification, if the session key negotiated by that authentication
   mechanism is not a DES key and and where this algorithm may not be
   safely used.

6.  Security considerations

   Encryption using Output Feedback does not ensure data integrity; an
   active attacker may be able to substitute text, if he can predict the
   clear-text that was being transmitted.

   The tradeoff here is that adding a message authentication code (MAC)
   will significantly increase the number of bytes needed to send a sin-
   gle character in the telnet protocol, which will impact performance
   on slow (i.e. dialup) links.

   This option was originally drafted back when CPU speeds where not
   necessarily fast enough to do allow use of CFB.  Since then, CPU's
   have gotten much faster.  Given the inherent weaknesses in Output
   Feedback mode, perhaps it should be deprecated in favor of CFB modes?

7.  Acknowledgments

   This document was based on the "Telnet Encryption: DES 64 bit Output
   Feedback" draft originally written by Dave Borman of Cray Research
   with the assistance of the IETF Telnet Working Group.

Author's Address

   Jeffrey Altman, Editor
   Columbia University
   612 West 115th Street Room 716
   New York NY 10025 USA

   Phone: +1 (212) 854-1344

   EMail: jaltman@columbia.edu

                                                                [Page 3]

    Jeffrey Altman * Sr.Software Designer * Kermit-95 for Win32 and OS/2
                 The Kermit Project * Columbia University
              612 West 115th St #716 * New York, NY * 10025
  http://www.kermit-project.org/k95.html * kermit-support@kermit-project.org