Fast Address Validation
draft-an-fast-address-validation-00

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QUIC                                                               Q. An
Internet-Draft                                                   DP. Liu
Intended status: Standards Track                                 YM. Liu
Expires: May 3, 2020                                             H. Wang
                                                            Alibaba Inc.
                                                        October 31, 2019

                        Fast Address Validation
                  draft-an-fast-address-validation-00

Abstract

   This document describes a fast address validation method for QUIC.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2020.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  Fast Address Validation During Handshake  . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   As described in [I-D.ietf-quic-transport], a token based scheme is
   defined to facilitate address validation of a client.  The token MUST
   be covered by integrity protection against modification or
   falsification by clients.  The server remembers the value it sends to
   clients and validates the token sent back from a client.  In its
   design, Retry packet is used to deliver the token to a client which
   address has not yet been validated.  It voids the first transmission
   of the Initial packet sent by the client, and triggers a second
   Initial packet to be sent with the token.  The exchange of token will
   cause unnecessary longer connection establishment delay for a client.

   In this document, an alternative mechanism is proposed to improve the
   efficiency of address validation during handshake.  For the first
   connection between client and server, eliminate the use of Retry
   packet for token delivery, and rely on handshake encryption layer to
   prove return routability.  In addition, New_Token frame is used by
   server, via i.e. the Initial packet, to provide the client with an
   address validation token that can be used to validate future
   connections.

2.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3.  Problem Statement

   Address validation is used by QUIC to avoid being used for a traffic
   amplification attack.  In such an attack, a request is sent to a
   server with spoofed source address information that identifies a
   victim.  If a server generates more or larger packets in response to
   that request, the attacker can use the server to send more data
   toward the victim than it would be able to send on its own.

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   The primary defense against amplification attack is verifying that an
   endpoint is able to receive packets at the transport address that it
   claims.  Address validation is performed both during connection
   establishment and during connection migration.

   Figure 1 provides an overview of the 0-RTT handshake procedure
   jointly with address validation defined in [I-D.ietf-quic-transport].
   Each line shows a QUIC packet with the packet type and packet number
   shown first, followed by the frames that are typically contained in
   those packets.  So, for instance the first packet is of type Initial,
   with packet number 0, and contains a CRYPTO frame carrying the
   ClientHello.

   Client                                                  Server

   Initial[0]: CRYPTO[CH]
   0-RTT[0]: STREAM[0, "..."] ->
                                                   <- Retry+Token

   Initial+Token[1]: CRYPTO[CH]
   0-RTT[1]: STREAM[0, "..."] ->

                                    Initial[0]: CRYPTO[SH] ACK[1]
                                     Handshake[0] CRYPTO[EE, FIN]
                             <- 1-RTT[0]: STREAM[1, "..."] ACK[1]

   Initial+Token[2]: ACK[0]
   Handshake[0]: CRYPTO[FIN], ACK[0]
   1-RTT[2]: STREAM[0, "..."] ACK[0] ->

                               1-RTT[1]: STREAM[3, "..."], ACK[2]
                                          <- Handshake[1]: ACK[0]

    Figure 1: Example of 0-RTT Handshake joint with address validation

   Note that, the server acknowledges 0-RTT data at the 1-RTT encryption
   level, and the client sends 1-RTT packets in the same packet number
   space.

   A server might wish to validate the client address before starting
   the cryptographic handshake.  In [I-D.ietf-quic-transport], a token
   is defined to provide address validation prior to completing the
   handshake.  Upon receiving the client's Initial packet, the server
   can request address validation by sending a Retry packet containing a
   token.  When this token is delivered to the client during connection
   establishment with a Retry packet, the Initial packet has to be re-
   transmitted from the client including the token.  It in turn adds one
   more round of packet exchange to 0-RTT handshake.

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4.  Fast Address Validation During Handshake

   For the first connection between client and server, server can choose
   to not use Retry packet for token delivery, but rely on handshake
   encryption layer to prove return routability.  In addition, New_Token
   frame is used by server, via i.e. the Initial packet, to provide the
   client with an address validation token that can be used to validate
   future connections.  A flow showing the use of a Handshake packet
   with the token is depicted in Figure 2.

   Client                                                  Server

   Initial[0]: CRYPTO[CH]
   0-RTT[0]: STREAM[0, "..."] ->

                                    Initial[0]: CRYPTO[SH] ACK[0]
                               Handshake[0] CRYPTO[EE, FIN] New_Token
                             <- 1-RTT[0]: STREAM[1, "..."] ACK[0]

   Initial[1]: ACK[0]
   Handshake: CRYPTO[FIN], ACK[0]
   1-RTT[1]: STREAM[0, "..."] ACK[0] ->

                               1-RTT[1]: STREAM[3, "..."], ACK[1]
                                          <- Handshake[1]: ACK[0]

         Figure 2: Example Handshake with fast address validation

   It is the server's decision whether to exchange token in Retry or
   just Handshake to validate client address.  If server chooses to
   accept the cost brought by token exchanging in Handshake, due to that
   server needs to start maintaining handshake states it will bring more
   enhanced experience in client side.

5.  Security Considerations

   Adding token field to Handshake packet does not add new security
   concerns.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document makes no request of IANA.

7.  Normative References

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   [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
              Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
              and Secure Transport", draft-ietf-quic-transport-23 (work
              in progress), September 2019.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

Authors' Addresses

   Qing An
   Alibaba Inc.

   Email: anqing.aq@alibaba-inc.com

   Dapeng Liu
   Alibaba Inc.

   Email: max.ldp@alibaba-inc.com

   Yanmei Liu
   Alibaba Inc.

   Email: miaoji.lym@alibaba-inc.com

   Hao Wang
   Alibaba Inc.

   Email: tars.wh@alibaba-inc.com

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