Financial Incentives for Route Aggregation and Efficient Address Utilization in the Internet: A Framework
draft-bellovin-piara-framework-00

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 1996-06-12
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Expired & archived
pdf htmlized bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state Expired
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)

This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-bellovin-piara-framework-00.txt

Abstract

The ability to sustain continuous growth of the Internet is affected both by the ability of the Internet routing system to scale, and by the availability of IP addresses that are unique within the Internet. We argue that scalable routing and efficient address space utilization should not be treated as two separate problems, but as two inter-related facets of a single problem - how to scale the Internet. Unfortunately, scalable routing and efficient address space utilization do not come for free: they sometimes require renumbering of existing hosts to new addresses or otherwise undersirable address allocations. We propose to use financial incentives rather than just the existing methods of persuasion and coercion to motivate IP address assignment that is efficient both with respect to its suitability for aggregation (via hierarchical routing), and with respect to the address space utilization. We argue that where tradeoffs must be made between conflicting goals, use of financial incentives will permit local decisions that take into account local differences, thus leading to better choices than could be made by any centralized administrative body.

Authors

Steven Bellovin (smb@cs.columbia.edu)
Yakov Rekhter (yakov@juniper.net)
Paul Resnick (presnick@research.att.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)