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Anchors: Post-Quantum Command Provenance for Autonomous Machine Links
draft-bezerra-anchors-command-provenance-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra
Last updated 2026-08-06
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draft-bezerra-anchors-command-provenance-01
Individual Submission                                         C. Bezerra
Internet-Draft                                    Independent Researcher
Intended status: Informational                             6 August 2026
Expires: 7 February 2027

 Anchors: Post-Quantum Command Provenance for Autonomous Machine Links
              draft-bezerra-anchors-command-provenance-01

Abstract

   Autonomous machines such as uncrewed aircraft, ground robots, and
   spacecraft execute commands issued by human operators and,
   increasingly, by AI agents.  When an incident occurs, no independent
   evidence exists of which commands the machine received: conventional
   logs are mutable by the operating party, symmetric message
   authentication codes cannot demonstrate origin to a third party, and
   records signed with elliptic-curve cryptography lose their
   evidentiary value once cryptographically relevant quantum computers
   exist.

   This document defines the Anchor: a post-quantum digital signature
   over a compact commitment to a window of authenticated machine
   traffic.  An anchor chain constitutes a tamper-evident, non-
   repudiable record of what a machine was commanded to do and what it
   reported back, verifiable by any third party without trusting the
   operator, without network access at recording time, and with security
   that survives the quantum transition.  The construction is protocol-
   agnostic and is designed for bandwidth-constrained links where per-
   message post-quantum signatures are impractical.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 February 2027.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Accountability Gap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Mutable Logs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Authentication Without Non-Repudiation  . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.3.  Quantum-Expiring Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.4.  AI Agents as Command Issuers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  The Anchor Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Properties  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Instantiations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Verification Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   Command-and-control (C2) links for autonomous machines increasingly
   require two distinct security services that current deployments
   conflate or omit:

   1.  _Real-time authentication_: the machine must verify, at line
       rate, that each received command originates from an authorized
       party.  Symmetric constructions (HMAC) satisfy this within tight
       bandwidth and latency budgets.

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   2.  _Durable provenance_: after the fact, parties other than the
       operator -- insurers, accident investigators, regulators, courts
       -- must be able to verify which commands the machine received and
       which telemetry it emitted.  Symmetric constructions cannot
       provide this service: either session party could have generated
       any message, so proof to a third party is impossible.

   Per-message digital signatures would provide both services but are
   impractical on constrained links when post-quantum signature sizes
   are considered: an ML-DSA-87 signature [FIPS204] is 4627 bytes, which
   at a 100 Hz telemetry rate implies 3.7 Mbit/s of signature traffic
   alone -- exceeding the total budget of most deployed C2 radio links
   by two orders of magnitude.

   This document specifies a construction, the Anchor, that decouples
   the two services: symmetric per-message authentication at line rate,
   plus one post-quantum signature per window of traffic that converts
   the accumulated symmetric authenticators into third-party-verifiable
   evidence.  Per-message overhead remains constant regardless of window
   size.

   The underlying problem of deploying authentication extensions across
   relay-mediated protocol stacks (MAVLink v2, ROS2/DDS, CAN/AUTOSAR) is
   documented in [I-D.bezerra-relay-auth-transparency].  This document
   addresses the complementary question: once messages are
   authenticated, how is durable, quantum-resistant evidence of the
   traffic produced within the same link budget?

2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Window:  A contiguous sequence of authenticated messages delimited by
      a maximum message count W and a maximum duration T, whichever
      bound is reached first.

   Commitment:  A cryptographic hash over the ordered concatenation of
      the MAC tags of all messages in a window.

   Anchor:  A record comprising window metadata, the window commitment,
      and a post-quantum digital signature over both.

   Anchor chain:  The ordered sequence of anchors emitted over a session
      or mission, linked by monotonic anchor sequence numbers.

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   Auditor:  Any party, possibly adversarial to the operator, that
      verifies an anchor chain after the fact.

3.  The Accountability Gap

3.1.  Mutable Logs

   Flight logs and command histories are files under the operator's
   control.  In a liability dispute, the party producing the log is the
   party with both the motive and the means to alter it.  A log format
   without cryptographic binding to the traffic it claims to record has
   no evidentiary weight beyond the operator's testimony.  Regulatory
   frameworks increasingly require more: high-risk AI systems, including
   AI safety components of regulated machinery, are required to
   automatically record events over their lifetime in a manner that
   enables post-hoc reconstruction of individual decisions [EU-AI-ACT].

3.2.  Authentication Without Non-Repudiation

   Symmetric MACs -- including quantum-resistant constructions such as
   HMAC with SHA-3 [FIPS202] -- prove authenticity only to the holder of
   the session key.  Because both session parties hold the same key, a
   MAC-authenticated archive proves nothing to an auditor: the operator
   could have fabricated the entire archive after the fact.

3.3.  Quantum-Expiring Evidence

   Records signed with ECDSA or EdDSA -- including records anchored to
   distributed ledgers, which inherit the elliptic-curve signatures of
   their underlying platforms -- become forgeable when a
   cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists.  Machines
   entering service today operate for one to three decades; their
   evidence trails must remain verifiable for at least as long,
   including for incidents litigated years after recording.  Evidence
   whose integrity guarantee expires before the statute of limitations
   is structurally inadequate.  National guidance already mandates the
   transition away from quantum-vulnerable algorithms for security
   systems [CNSA2].

3.4.  AI Agents as Command Issuers

   When commands originate from AI agents rather than human operators,
   the provenance question acquires a second dimension: not only whether
   the machine received a given command, but which identity -- human or
   agent -- issued and authorized it.  Existing agent-authorization
   mechanisms bind tokens to software API calls; they do not extend to
   the physical machine boundary and do not employ post-quantum
   cryptography.  An anchor chain over the machine link records the

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   authenticated command stream at exactly that boundary, regardless of
   whether the issuer was human or machine.

4.  The Anchor Construction

   The construction assumes an established authenticated channel in
   which each message i carries a MAC tag mac_i computed with a session
   key (for example, established via ML-KEM-1024 [FIPS203] and
   authenticated with HMAC-SHA3-256).

   Given a window of n authenticated messages with MAC tags
   mac_0 ... mac_{n-1}:

     commitment = H( mac_0 || mac_1 || ... || mac_{n-1} )

     anchor = ( metadata,
                commitment,
                Sig_sk( metadata || commitment ) )

   where:
     H        = SHA3-256                      [FIPS202]
     Sig      = ML-DSA-87                     [FIPS204]
     metadata = anchor sequence number,
                window start identifier,
                window end identifier,
                message count

   Window closure is governed by two parameters: W, the maximum number
   of messages per window, and T, the maximum window duration.  An
   anchor MUST be emitted when either bound is reached.  The anchor
   sequence number MUST be strictly monotonic; a verifier MUST reject an
   anchor whose sequence number does not exceed that of the last
   verified anchor.

   The signer retains no per-message state beyond the running MAC
   accumulation for the current window.  Per-message overhead on the
   link is the MAC tag plus framing (32-44 bytes in the instantiations
   of Section 6), independent of W.

5.  Properties

   Tamper evidence:  Alteration, insertion, or deletion of any message
      MAC in a window changes the commitment; the anchor signature no
      longer verifies.

   Non-repudiation:  The ML-DSA-87 signature binds the window to the
      holder of the signing key.  Neither session party can later
      disclaim an anchored window.

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   Third-party verifiability:  Verification requires only the MAC
      sequence, the anchor records, and the public verifying key -- not
      the session key and not the operator's cooperation.

   Offline operation:  Anchors are generated and stored locally.  No
      network connection, ledger, consensus mechanism, or external
      service is required at recording time, making the construction
      suitable for disconnected, intermittent, and low-bandwidth
      environments.

   Quantum durability:  ML-DSA-87 (NIST security category 5) and
      SHA3-256 remain secure against known quantum attacks; the
      evidentiary value of an anchor chain does not expire with the
      quantum transition.

   Constrained-link fit:  One signature amortized over a window keeps
      per-message overhead constant.  Amortized anchor cost at W=256 is
      approximately 18 bytes per message; at W=4096, approximately 1.1
      bytes.

   The construction is deliberately not a distributed ledger: it
   requires no consensus, no replication, and no energy cost beyond one
   signature per window.  It provides evidence, not confidentiality; a
   confidentiality layer composes independently.

6.  Instantiations

   Two instantiations have been specified by the author.  Both use the
   construction of Section 4, and they differ in metadata fields, in
   windowing policy, and -- as -00 did not say -- in one respect that is
   not cosmetic.

   The CCSDS Telecommand instantiation prefixes the signed payload with
   a 24-octet domain separation string, so that a signature over an
   anchor cannot be reinterpreted as a signature over any other
   structure the same key produces.  The high-rate telemetry
   instantiation, as specified, does not.  This document does not
   resolve which is right.  Either the telemetry instantiation needs the
   same prefix, or the telecommand one does not need it, and a
   construction offered for reuse should not leave that open.
   Implementers taking this construction elsewhere are advised to
   domain-separate until the question is settled, since the cost is a
   constant prefix and the failure it prevents is a cross-protocol
   signature substitution.

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      +=============+===========================+===================+
      |             | High-Rate Telemetry (TAP) | CCSDS Telecommand |
      +=============+===========================+===================+
      | Per-message | 42 bytes                  | 44 bytes          |
      | overhead    |                           |                   |
      +-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
      | Window      | W=256 packets or T=10 s   | One ground        |
      | policy      |                           | contact window    |
      +-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
      | Anchor size | 4685 bytes                | 4719 bytes (5 TC  |
      |             |                           | frames)           |
      +-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
      | Link budget | 48.2 kbit/s total at 100  | 18.9 s at 2 kbit/ |
      | fit         | Hz                        | s, once per pass  |
      +-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+

                       Table 1: Anchor Instantiations

   The telecommand anchor size is corrected from -00, which gave 4687
   octets.  That figure assumed the verifier recomputes the 32-octet
   commitment from the tags it already holds, so the commitment need not
   be transmitted.  The implementation transmits it, because an auditor
   reconstructing a contact after the fact may hold the anchor without
   holding the tag stream, and an anchor that only a live receiver can
   check is not evidence. 4719 octets is the transmitted size: an
   84-octet signed payload, an 8-octet signature-layer nonce, and the
   4627-octet ML-DSA-87 signature.  The link-budget figure follows from
   it.

   The telemetry figure of 4685 octets is arithmetic over the field list
   in Section 6 and has not been measured, because that instantiation is
   specified but not implemented.  It is marked here rather than left
   for a reader to discover.

   Specifications for both instantiations are published in the
   repository referenced in the author's address block.  The same
   construction applies to ROS2/DDS topics and CAN buses; the relay-
   transparency considerations for those stacks are documented in
   [I-D.bezerra-relay-auth-transparency].

   Session keys for the MAC layer are established via ML-KEM-1024
   [FIPS203].  Signing-key revocation employs SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s
   [FIPS205] as a hash-based mechanism whose security is independent of
   lattice assumptions.

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7.  Verification Model

   An auditor holding (1) the stored MAC sequence for the period in
   question, (2) the anchor records, and (3) the signer's ML-DSA-87
   verifying key -- distributed at provisioning time, for example
   through a documented key ceremony -- proceeds as follows:

   1.  Partition the MAC sequence into windows according to the anchor
       metadata.

   2.  Recompute each window commitment from the stored MACs.

   3.  Verify each anchor signature over the recomputed commitment and
       metadata.

   4.  Verify that anchor sequence numbers are strictly monotonic and
       gap-free for the claimed period.

   A verified anchor chain establishes that the recorded traffic is
   exactly what the signer authenticated at recording time.  The
   operator cannot retroactively insert, delete, or modify messages
   without breaking the chain.  Verification requires no live system and
   no trust in the party producing the archive.

8.  Security Considerations

   Signer compromise:  An attacker holding the signing key can anchor
      forged windows from the moment of compromise onward.  Anchors
      emitted before the compromise remain valid evidence.  Deployments
      SHOULD provision a revocation mechanism; the instantiations
      referenced here use SLH-DSA-signed revocation certificates.

   Selective omission:  An operator may withhold entire windows from an
      archive.  Because anchor sequence numbers are monotonic, gaps in
      the presented chain are themselves detectable and constitute
      evidence of omission.  An auditor MUST treat a gapped chain as an
      incomplete record.

   Commitment security:  SHA3-256 provides 128-bit classical collision
      resistance.  Known quantum collision-search algorithms do not
      reduce this below practical security margins under realistic
      memory assumptions.

   Replay across sessions:  Anchor metadata binds each window to
      session-scoped identifiers.  A verifier MUST validate window
      boundary identifiers against the session context in addition to
      signature validity.

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   Algorithm agility:  The construction is parametric in H and Sig.
      Migration to future signature standards changes the anchor format
      version, not the architecture.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS202]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
              Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
              Functions", NIST FIPS 202, August 2015,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202>.

   [FIPS203]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
              Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard", NIST
              FIPS 203, August 2024,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.

   [FIPS204]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
              Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", NIST FIPS 204,
              August 2024, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.

   [FIPS205]  National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Stateless
              Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard", NIST FIPS 205,
              August 2024, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [CNSA2]    National Security Agency, "Commercial National Security
              Algorithm Suite 2.0", September 2022,
              <https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/News-Highlights/Article/
              Article/3148990/>.

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   [EU-AI-ACT]
              European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (EU)
              2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act), Article 12:
              Record-keeping", June 2024,
              <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>.

   [I-D.bezerra-relay-auth-transparency]
              Bezerra, C., "Authentication-Transparent Protocol
              Extensions in Middleware-Relayed Systems", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bezerra-relay-auth-
              transparency-01, 6 August 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bezerra-relay-
              auth-transparency/>.

Acknowledgements

   This work builds on the relay-transparency analysis and the two-layer
   authentication protocols developed in the CleitonQ project.

Author's Address

   Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra
   Independent Researcher
   Brazil
   Email: augusto.cleiton@gmail.com
   URI:   https://github.com/cleitonaugusto/CleitonQ

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