Anchors: Post-Quantum Command Provenance for Autonomous Machine Links
draft-bezerra-anchors-command-provenance-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra | ||
| Last updated | 2026-08-06 | ||
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draft-bezerra-anchors-command-provenance-01
Individual Submission C. Bezerra
Internet-Draft Independent Researcher
Intended status: Informational 6 August 2026
Expires: 7 February 2027
Anchors: Post-Quantum Command Provenance for Autonomous Machine Links
draft-bezerra-anchors-command-provenance-01
Abstract
Autonomous machines such as uncrewed aircraft, ground robots, and
spacecraft execute commands issued by human operators and,
increasingly, by AI agents. When an incident occurs, no independent
evidence exists of which commands the machine received: conventional
logs are mutable by the operating party, symmetric message
authentication codes cannot demonstrate origin to a third party, and
records signed with elliptic-curve cryptography lose their
evidentiary value once cryptographically relevant quantum computers
exist.
This document defines the Anchor: a post-quantum digital signature
over a compact commitment to a window of authenticated machine
traffic. An anchor chain constitutes a tamper-evident, non-
repudiable record of what a machine was commanded to do and what it
reported back, verifiable by any third party without trusting the
operator, without network access at recording time, and with security
that survives the quantum transition. The construction is protocol-
agnostic and is designed for bandwidth-constrained links where per-
message post-quantum signatures are impractical.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Accountability Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Mutable Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Authentication Without Non-Repudiation . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Quantum-Expiring Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. AI Agents as Command Issuers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. The Anchor Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Instantiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Verification Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
Command-and-control (C2) links for autonomous machines increasingly
require two distinct security services that current deployments
conflate or omit:
1. _Real-time authentication_: the machine must verify, at line
rate, that each received command originates from an authorized
party. Symmetric constructions (HMAC) satisfy this within tight
bandwidth and latency budgets.
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2. _Durable provenance_: after the fact, parties other than the
operator -- insurers, accident investigators, regulators, courts
-- must be able to verify which commands the machine received and
which telemetry it emitted. Symmetric constructions cannot
provide this service: either session party could have generated
any message, so proof to a third party is impossible.
Per-message digital signatures would provide both services but are
impractical on constrained links when post-quantum signature sizes
are considered: an ML-DSA-87 signature [FIPS204] is 4627 bytes, which
at a 100 Hz telemetry rate implies 3.7 Mbit/s of signature traffic
alone -- exceeding the total budget of most deployed C2 radio links
by two orders of magnitude.
This document specifies a construction, the Anchor, that decouples
the two services: symmetric per-message authentication at line rate,
plus one post-quantum signature per window of traffic that converts
the accumulated symmetric authenticators into third-party-verifiable
evidence. Per-message overhead remains constant regardless of window
size.
The underlying problem of deploying authentication extensions across
relay-mediated protocol stacks (MAVLink v2, ROS2/DDS, CAN/AUTOSAR) is
documented in [I-D.bezerra-relay-auth-transparency]. This document
addresses the complementary question: once messages are
authenticated, how is durable, quantum-resistant evidence of the
traffic produced within the same link budget?
2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Window: A contiguous sequence of authenticated messages delimited by
a maximum message count W and a maximum duration T, whichever
bound is reached first.
Commitment: A cryptographic hash over the ordered concatenation of
the MAC tags of all messages in a window.
Anchor: A record comprising window metadata, the window commitment,
and a post-quantum digital signature over both.
Anchor chain: The ordered sequence of anchors emitted over a session
or mission, linked by monotonic anchor sequence numbers.
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Auditor: Any party, possibly adversarial to the operator, that
verifies an anchor chain after the fact.
3. The Accountability Gap
3.1. Mutable Logs
Flight logs and command histories are files under the operator's
control. In a liability dispute, the party producing the log is the
party with both the motive and the means to alter it. A log format
without cryptographic binding to the traffic it claims to record has
no evidentiary weight beyond the operator's testimony. Regulatory
frameworks increasingly require more: high-risk AI systems, including
AI safety components of regulated machinery, are required to
automatically record events over their lifetime in a manner that
enables post-hoc reconstruction of individual decisions [EU-AI-ACT].
3.2. Authentication Without Non-Repudiation
Symmetric MACs -- including quantum-resistant constructions such as
HMAC with SHA-3 [FIPS202] -- prove authenticity only to the holder of
the session key. Because both session parties hold the same key, a
MAC-authenticated archive proves nothing to an auditor: the operator
could have fabricated the entire archive after the fact.
3.3. Quantum-Expiring Evidence
Records signed with ECDSA or EdDSA -- including records anchored to
distributed ledgers, which inherit the elliptic-curve signatures of
their underlying platforms -- become forgeable when a
cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. Machines
entering service today operate for one to three decades; their
evidence trails must remain verifiable for at least as long,
including for incidents litigated years after recording. Evidence
whose integrity guarantee expires before the statute of limitations
is structurally inadequate. National guidance already mandates the
transition away from quantum-vulnerable algorithms for security
systems [CNSA2].
3.4. AI Agents as Command Issuers
When commands originate from AI agents rather than human operators,
the provenance question acquires a second dimension: not only whether
the machine received a given command, but which identity -- human or
agent -- issued and authorized it. Existing agent-authorization
mechanisms bind tokens to software API calls; they do not extend to
the physical machine boundary and do not employ post-quantum
cryptography. An anchor chain over the machine link records the
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authenticated command stream at exactly that boundary, regardless of
whether the issuer was human or machine.
4. The Anchor Construction
The construction assumes an established authenticated channel in
which each message i carries a MAC tag mac_i computed with a session
key (for example, established via ML-KEM-1024 [FIPS203] and
authenticated with HMAC-SHA3-256).
Given a window of n authenticated messages with MAC tags
mac_0 ... mac_{n-1}:
commitment = H( mac_0 || mac_1 || ... || mac_{n-1} )
anchor = ( metadata,
commitment,
Sig_sk( metadata || commitment ) )
where:
H = SHA3-256 [FIPS202]
Sig = ML-DSA-87 [FIPS204]
metadata = anchor sequence number,
window start identifier,
window end identifier,
message count
Window closure is governed by two parameters: W, the maximum number
of messages per window, and T, the maximum window duration. An
anchor MUST be emitted when either bound is reached. The anchor
sequence number MUST be strictly monotonic; a verifier MUST reject an
anchor whose sequence number does not exceed that of the last
verified anchor.
The signer retains no per-message state beyond the running MAC
accumulation for the current window. Per-message overhead on the
link is the MAC tag plus framing (32-44 bytes in the instantiations
of Section 6), independent of W.
5. Properties
Tamper evidence: Alteration, insertion, or deletion of any message
MAC in a window changes the commitment; the anchor signature no
longer verifies.
Non-repudiation: The ML-DSA-87 signature binds the window to the
holder of the signing key. Neither session party can later
disclaim an anchored window.
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Third-party verifiability: Verification requires only the MAC
sequence, the anchor records, and the public verifying key -- not
the session key and not the operator's cooperation.
Offline operation: Anchors are generated and stored locally. No
network connection, ledger, consensus mechanism, or external
service is required at recording time, making the construction
suitable for disconnected, intermittent, and low-bandwidth
environments.
Quantum durability: ML-DSA-87 (NIST security category 5) and
SHA3-256 remain secure against known quantum attacks; the
evidentiary value of an anchor chain does not expire with the
quantum transition.
Constrained-link fit: One signature amortized over a window keeps
per-message overhead constant. Amortized anchor cost at W=256 is
approximately 18 bytes per message; at W=4096, approximately 1.1
bytes.
The construction is deliberately not a distributed ledger: it
requires no consensus, no replication, and no energy cost beyond one
signature per window. It provides evidence, not confidentiality; a
confidentiality layer composes independently.
6. Instantiations
Two instantiations have been specified by the author. Both use the
construction of Section 4, and they differ in metadata fields, in
windowing policy, and -- as -00 did not say -- in one respect that is
not cosmetic.
The CCSDS Telecommand instantiation prefixes the signed payload with
a 24-octet domain separation string, so that a signature over an
anchor cannot be reinterpreted as a signature over any other
structure the same key produces. The high-rate telemetry
instantiation, as specified, does not. This document does not
resolve which is right. Either the telemetry instantiation needs the
same prefix, or the telecommand one does not need it, and a
construction offered for reuse should not leave that open.
Implementers taking this construction elsewhere are advised to
domain-separate until the question is settled, since the cost is a
constant prefix and the failure it prevents is a cross-protocol
signature substitution.
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+=============+===========================+===================+
| | High-Rate Telemetry (TAP) | CCSDS Telecommand |
+=============+===========================+===================+
| Per-message | 42 bytes | 44 bytes |
| overhead | | |
+-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
| Window | W=256 packets or T=10 s | One ground |
| policy | | contact window |
+-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
| Anchor size | 4685 bytes | 4719 bytes (5 TC |
| | | frames) |
+-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
| Link budget | 48.2 kbit/s total at 100 | 18.9 s at 2 kbit/ |
| fit | Hz | s, once per pass |
+-------------+---------------------------+-------------------+
Table 1: Anchor Instantiations
The telecommand anchor size is corrected from -00, which gave 4687
octets. That figure assumed the verifier recomputes the 32-octet
commitment from the tags it already holds, so the commitment need not
be transmitted. The implementation transmits it, because an auditor
reconstructing a contact after the fact may hold the anchor without
holding the tag stream, and an anchor that only a live receiver can
check is not evidence. 4719 octets is the transmitted size: an
84-octet signed payload, an 8-octet signature-layer nonce, and the
4627-octet ML-DSA-87 signature. The link-budget figure follows from
it.
The telemetry figure of 4685 octets is arithmetic over the field list
in Section 6 and has not been measured, because that instantiation is
specified but not implemented. It is marked here rather than left
for a reader to discover.
Specifications for both instantiations are published in the
repository referenced in the author's address block. The same
construction applies to ROS2/DDS topics and CAN buses; the relay-
transparency considerations for those stacks are documented in
[I-D.bezerra-relay-auth-transparency].
Session keys for the MAC layer are established via ML-KEM-1024
[FIPS203]. Signing-key revocation employs SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s
[FIPS205] as a hash-based mechanism whose security is independent of
lattice assumptions.
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7. Verification Model
An auditor holding (1) the stored MAC sequence for the period in
question, (2) the anchor records, and (3) the signer's ML-DSA-87
verifying key -- distributed at provisioning time, for example
through a documented key ceremony -- proceeds as follows:
1. Partition the MAC sequence into windows according to the anchor
metadata.
2. Recompute each window commitment from the stored MACs.
3. Verify each anchor signature over the recomputed commitment and
metadata.
4. Verify that anchor sequence numbers are strictly monotonic and
gap-free for the claimed period.
A verified anchor chain establishes that the recorded traffic is
exactly what the signer authenticated at recording time. The
operator cannot retroactively insert, delete, or modify messages
without breaking the chain. Verification requires no live system and
no trust in the party producing the archive.
8. Security Considerations
Signer compromise: An attacker holding the signing key can anchor
forged windows from the moment of compromise onward. Anchors
emitted before the compromise remain valid evidence. Deployments
SHOULD provision a revocation mechanism; the instantiations
referenced here use SLH-DSA-signed revocation certificates.
Selective omission: An operator may withhold entire windows from an
archive. Because anchor sequence numbers are monotonic, gaps in
the presented chain are themselves detectable and constitute
evidence of omission. An auditor MUST treat a gapped chain as an
incomplete record.
Commitment security: SHA3-256 provides 128-bit classical collision
resistance. Known quantum collision-search algorithms do not
reduce this below practical security margins under realistic
memory assumptions.
Replay across sessions: Anchor metadata binds each window to
session-scoped identifiers. A verifier MUST validate window
boundary identifiers against the session context in addition to
signature validity.
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Algorithm agility: The construction is parametric in H and Sig.
Migration to future signature standards changes the anchor format
version, not the architecture.
9. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[FIPS202] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "SHA-3
Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output
Functions", NIST FIPS 202, August 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.202>.
[FIPS203] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard", NIST
FIPS 203, August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.
[FIPS204] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-
Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", NIST FIPS 204,
August 2024, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.
[FIPS205] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Stateless
Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard", NIST FIPS 205,
August 2024, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
10.2. Informative References
[CNSA2] National Security Agency, "Commercial National Security
Algorithm Suite 2.0", September 2022,
<https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/News-Highlights/Article/
Article/3148990/>.
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[EU-AI-ACT]
European Parliament and Council, "Regulation (EU)
2024/1689 (Artificial Intelligence Act), Article 12:
Record-keeping", June 2024,
<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj>.
[I-D.bezerra-relay-auth-transparency]
Bezerra, C., "Authentication-Transparent Protocol
Extensions in Middleware-Relayed Systems", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bezerra-relay-auth-
transparency-01, 6 August 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-bezerra-relay-
auth-transparency/>.
Acknowledgements
This work builds on the relay-transparency analysis and the two-layer
authentication protocols developed in the CleitonQ project.
Author's Address
Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra
Independent Researcher
Brazil
Email: augusto.cleiton@gmail.com
URI: https://github.com/cleitonaugusto/CleitonQ
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