Authentication-Transparent Protocol Extensions in Middleware-Relayed Systems
draft-bezerra-relay-auth-transparency-01
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
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| Author | Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra | ||
| Last updated | 2026-08-06 | ||
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draft-bezerra-relay-auth-transparency-01
Individual Submission C. Bezerra
Internet-Draft Independent Researcher
Intended status: Informational 6 August 2026
Expires: 7 February 2027
Authentication-Transparent Protocol Extensions in Middleware-Relayed
Systems
draft-bezerra-relay-auth-transparency-01
Abstract
Protocol-aware middleware (relays, bridges, gateways) re-serializes
messages at their protocol frame boundary, silently discarding any
bytes appended outside that boundary. Authentication material placed
after the frame boundary by a sender is therefore stripped at every
relay hop before reaching the receiver, with no error indication.
This document identifies this behavior as a protocol design
vulnerability class -- "relay-transparent authentication stripping"
-- demonstrates it with running code in three independent protocol
stacks (MAVLink v2, ROS2/DDS CDR, and CAN/ISO-TP with a SecOC-unaware
gateway), and specifies the architectural principle that
authentication material must be carried as a first-class,
independently addressable protocol unit to survive relay transit.
Post-quantum signature sizes push authentication out of fixed fields
and so create the precondition systematically; this revision reports
three measured cases where they do not, because a transport that
refuses to carry the oversized unit produces a loss of availability
instead of a silent authentication bypass.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 February 2027.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Relay-Transparency Vulnerability Class . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Structural Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Attack Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol-Specific Demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. MAVLink v2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. ROS2 / DDS CDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. CAN / AUTOSAR SecOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Impact and Severity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Design Principle: Authentication-Transparent Extensions . . . 9
6.1. The CLEITONQ_CHUNK Pattern (MAVLink) . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. The DDS Parallel-Topic Pattern (ROS2) . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3. General Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Guidance for Protocol Designers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Guidance for Application Developers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Post-Quantum Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Embedded and cyber-physical systems increasingly rely on protocol-
aware middleware components -- MAVLink relays, DDS bridges, CAN
gateways -- to route messages between endpoints that do not share a
direct link. These components are a fixture of drone command-and-
control networks (MAVProxy, mavlink-router), robotic systems
(domain_bridge, ros1_bridge), and automotive Ethernet architectures
(DoIP gateways).
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A common pattern when adding authentication to existing embedded
protocols is to append authentication material (HMAC tags, digital
signatures, nonces) immediately after the protocol-defined frame
boundary. This approach is attractive because it requires no changes
to the protocol specification or to existing, unauthenticated
endpoints.
However, any protocol-aware relay along the path re-serializes
messages at the protocol frame boundary. Bytes outside that boundary
are in the relay's "discard" region. Authentication material placed
there is silently stripped at every relay hop, with no error
indication to sender or receiver. The receiver obtains a valid,
unauthenticated frame.
This document:
* Defines the vulnerability class (Section 3)
* Demonstrates it in three independent protocol stacks (Section 4)
* Provides the architectural principle that authentication material
must be a first-class protocol unit to survive relay transit
(Section 6)
* Provides guidance for protocol designers and application
developers (Section 7, Section 8)
* Addresses post-quantum cryptography implications (Section 9)
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Frame boundary: The byte offset at which a protocol-aware parser
considers the current message complete, as determined by the
protocol's length-delimitation mechanism (e.g., a length field, a
type schema, a DLC field).
Protocol-aware relay: A software or hardware component that parses
incoming messages at the protocol frame boundary, optionally
processes or filters them, and re-serializes new conformant frames
for forwarding. Distinct from a "transparent relay" that forwards
raw bytes without parsing.
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Relay-transparent: An authentication encoding that survives transit
through any protocol-aware relay on the path, emerging intact at
the receiver.
Authentication stripping: The silent removal of authentication
material at a relay, caused by re-serialization at the frame
boundary.
3. The Relay-Transparency Vulnerability Class
3.1. Structural Preconditions
All of the following conditions must be true for this vulnerability
to apply:
1. The protocol uses length-delimited framing (a length field, a
type schema, or a hardware-defined payload size specifies the
exact number of bytes in each message).
2. At least one protocol-aware relay (bridge, gateway, router)
exists on the path between sender and receiver.
3. Authentication material is appended after the protocol-defined
frame boundary, rather than carried in a separately addressed
protocol unit.
When all three conditions are met, the relay MUST (per its correct
implementation of the protocol) discard bytes outside the frame
boundary during re-serialization. No error is generated. The
receiver has no indication that authentication material was ever
present.
3.2. Attack Model
Precondition: An attacker controls, or is co-located with, a relay
node on the sender-to-receiver path.
Attack sequence:
1. Sender transmits an authenticated message: [frame | auth_bytes]
2. Relay parses [frame] at the frame boundary, discards
[auth_bytes], and forwards [frame] only.
3. Attacker now has visibility of unauthenticated [frame] in
transit.
4. Attacker can:
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a. Forward the stripped frame (receiver accepts it as valid
because it has no expectation of auth bytes being present
when operating through a relay), or
b. Substitute a different payload before the relay re-
serializes, since no authentication exists in the forwarded
frame.
The receiver cannot distinguish case (a) or (b) from a legitimately
authenticated message, because authentication was never carried in
the forwarded frame.
4. Protocol-Specific Demonstrations
4.1. MAVLink v2
MAVLink v2 [MAVLINK] is the dominant command-and-control protocol for
unmanned aerial systems. Each frame begins with a Start-of-Frame
byte (0xFD) and a Length byte (LEN) at offset 1. The complete frame
is exactly 10 + LEN + 2 bytes (10-byte header + LEN-byte payload +
2-byte CRC-16-MCRF4XX).
Any protocol-aware relay (MAVProxy, mavlink-router, QGroundControl)
implements the following parse-and-forward loop:
start = stream.find(0xFD)
LEN = stream[start + 1]
frame = stream[start : start + 10 + LEN + 2]
if crc_valid(frame):
forward(frame)
Bytes at offset (start + 10 + LEN + 2) onwards are in the "discard"
region. Three authentication schemes were tested against a MAVLink
v2 COMMAND_LONG frame (45 bytes), all stripped:
+==========================+======+==========+==========+
| Auth Scheme | Sent | Received | Stripped |
+==========================+======+==========+==========+
| HMAC-SHA3-256 (32 bytes) | 77 | 45 | 32 |
+--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
| Ed25519 (64 bytes) | 109 | 45 | 64 |
+--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
| ML-DSA-87 (4627 bytes) | 4672 | 45 | 4627 |
+--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
Table 1
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MAVLink v2 defines a signing extension (INCOMPAT_FLAGS bit 0x01) that
appends a 13-byte block (link_id + timestamp + truncated HMAC-
SHA256). This extension survives relay transit on relays explicitly
configured for signing support. However:
* The signing block uses a 48-bit truncated HMAC-SHA256, providing
only classical security.
* A relay not configured for signing support treats INCOMPAT_FLAGS
bit 0x01 as an unknown flag and MUST discard the frame per
specification -- providing zero auth byte survival and frame loss.
* A new INCOMPAT_FLAGS bit defined for post-quantum authentication
would cause relay frame loss on all relays not updated to
understand the new bit.
The INCOMPAT_FLAGS mechanism therefore cannot be used to introduce
relay-transparent post-quantum authentication without a flag-by-flag
negotiation across all relay software in the deployment.
4.2. ROS2 / DDS CDR
ROS2 uses Data Distribution Service (DDS) [DDS] for inter-process and
inter-domain communication. Messages are serialized using CDR
(Common Data Representation) according to the message type's IDL
schema. The CDR frame boundary is defined by the IDL type schema:
the deserializer reads exactly the number of bytes specified by the
schema.
Two failure modes were observed:
CycloneDDS 11.0.1: The CDR deserializer reads exactly the schema-
defined bytes. Bytes appended after the schema boundary arrive in
the raw RTPS payload but are not transferred to any struct field.
Re-serialization from the struct produces schema-sized bytes only.
Authentication material is silently discarded.
FastDDS (rmw_fastrtps_cpp, the default ROS2 RMW): Reader history
buffers are pre-allocated to the type's maximum CDR length. Payloads
exceeding this limit are rejected before reaching the application
callback. Appending authentication bytes to a CDR payload causes the
message to be silently dropped -- denial of service rather than
silent stripping, but with identical impact on authentication
visibility.
Three authentication schemes were tested against geometry_msgs/msg/
Twist (52-byte CDR payload):
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+==========================+======+==========+==========+
| Auth Scheme | Sent | Received | Stripped |
+==========================+======+==========+==========+
| HMAC-SHA3-256 (32 bytes) | 84 | 52 | 32 |
+--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
| Ed25519 (64 bytes) | 116 | 52 | 64 |
+--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
| ML-DSA-87 (4627 bytes) | 4679 | 52 | 4627 |
+--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
Table 2
Multi-domain deployments using domain_bridge, ros1_bridge, or zenoh-
bridge-ros2dds compound this problem: each bridge deserializes and
re-publishes a typed message, stripping any auth bytes at every hop.
4.3. CAN / AUTOSAR SecOC
Controller Area Network (CAN) frames are hardware-delimited by the
DLC (Data Length Code) field, which specifies 0-8 bytes (CAN 2.0B) or
0-64 bytes (CAN FD). Messages larger than one frame are segmented by
ISO-TP [ISOTP], whose FirstFrame declares the total length of the
transmission.
There are therefore two boundaries on this path, one level apart, and
both fail. The ISO-TP reassembler delivers exactly the number of
octets the FirstFrame declared. Above it, a gateway that understands
the application PDU rebuilds that PDU from the fields it parsed, so
octets past the PDU's own extent were never in the parsed object.
Authentication appended past either boundary does not reach the far
side, and the receiver cannot distinguish its absence from a command
that was never authenticated.
This revision replaces the structural argument of -00 with
measurement. The ISO-TP boundary was exercised against the Linux
kernel's own CAN and ISO-TP implementations over a virtual CAN
interface: a sender emits raw CAN frames whose FirstFrame declares a
27-octet UDS WriteDataByIdentifier PDU while placing 59 octets on the
bus, and an ordinary CAN_ISOTP socket -- the same code path an ECU
uses -- delivers 27. A clean transmission with nothing appended
delivers all 27 and establishes that the path is live. Results were
identical across three consecutive runs. The gateway boundary was
exercised in process against a SecOC-unaware gateway that parses SID,
data identifier and the record the identifier is defined to carry.
AUTOSAR SecOC (Secure Onboard Communication) [SECOCASR] implemented
as specified is NOT an instance of this class. Its MAC is symmetric,
truncated, and carried inside the PDU, which places it within the
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region a gateway parses and re-emits; it therefore fails precondition
C2. The exposure is a SecOC-unaware gateway on the path, or an
authenticator placed outside the PDU because it no longer fits inside
one.
One negative result belongs here because it constrains the post-
quantum argument of Section 9 rather than supporting it. A classical
ISO-TP FirstFrame carries a 12-bit length, so 4095 octets is the
largest transmission a sender can declare. An ML-DSA-87 signature of
4627 octets appended to a 27-octet PDU cannot be carried by a
classical ISO-TP transmission at all. That is an impossibility, not
a strip, and it is reported as one.
The architectural root cause is identical to the MAVLink and DDS
cases: re-serialization at a declared boundary drops any out-of-band
authentication. This is relevant to vehicle OEMs conducting TARA
under UNECE WP.29 R155 [R155]: the relay-transparency attack class
should be assessed under the Tampering category for any gateway that
handles safety-critical PDUs.
5. Impact and Severity
The relay-transparency vulnerability affects any deployment where:
* Authentication is appended after the protocol frame boundary
(rather than carried in a separate, first-class protocol unit),
AND
* At least one protocol-aware relay is on the sender-receiver path.
Impact:
Authentication Bypass: The receiver accepts frames with no
authentication material, having no way to distinguish them from
legitimately authenticated frames (since both arrive stripped of
auth bytes after relay transit).
Command Injection: An attacker controlling a relay can substitute
payloads after stripping, injecting arbitrary commands that the
receiver treats as legitimate.
Denial of Service (FastDDS case): Appending auth bytes causes the
entire message to be dropped at the receiver, preventing
legitimate communication.
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The vulnerability is analogous to CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification
of Data Authenticity), but the root cause is architectural rather
than implementation-level: correct implementations of the protocol
specification cause the stripping.
6. Design Principle: Authentication-Transparent Extensions
Authentication material MUST be carried as a first-class,
independently addressed protocol unit. The DDS middleware, MAVLink
relay, or CAN gateway MUST forward this unit as an independent
message -- whose byte boundary is defined by its own schema or frame
header, not by its position relative to another message's boundary.
6.1. The CLEITONQ_CHUNK Pattern (MAVLink)
CleitonQ [CLEITONQ] implements relay-transparent post-quantum
authentication for MAVLink v2 via the CLEITONQ_CHUNK encoding:
* Authentication material (ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext, ML-DSA-87
signature, HMAC-SHA3-256 tag) is fragmented into 245-byte chunks.
* Each chunk is encapsulated as a valid MAVLink v2 frame with its
own MSG_ID (50000), LEN, and CRC.
* INCOMPAT_FLAGS is set to 0. Any relay that does not know MSG_ID
50000 forwards it as a valid but opaque message. Any relay that
knows the CleitonQ dialect forwards it with full understanding.
* No relay has reason to discard the chunk: it is a well-formed
MAVLink frame passing CRC validation.
This approach requires no relay software changes and no
INCOMPAT_FLAGS negotiation. Authentication material arrives intact
at any receiver connected through any standard MAVLink relay.
6.2. The DDS Parallel-Topic Pattern (ROS2)
For ROS2/DDS deployments, authentication material MUST be published
as a separate typed message on a parallel topic:
/cmd_vel geometry_msgs/Twist (command payload)
/cmd_vel/auth cleitonq_msgs/Auth (ML-DSA-87 sig + nonce)
The cleitonq_msgs/Auth type is defined in IDL. DDS middleware
forwards it as any other typed message, with its byte boundary
defined by its own schema. The receiving node:
1. Subscribes to both topics.
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2. Buffers /cmd_vel messages pending auth verification.
3. On receipt of /cmd_vel/auth, verifies the signature over the
corresponding /cmd_vel payload.
4. Applies the command only after verification succeeds.
6.3. General Principle
For any protocol where the frame boundary is defined by a length
field, a type schema, or a hardware-imposed maximum:
Authentication material SHOULD be carried in a protocol unit with its
own independent framing -- its own length field, schema, or CAN
arbitration ID -- so that any protocol-aware relay can identify,
forward, or route it independently of the message being
authenticated.
Authentication material SHOULD NOT be appended to an existing message
frame beyond its protocol-defined boundary, regardless of whether the
existing protocol version, receiver, or endpoint supports the
authentication extension.
7. Guidance for Protocol Designers
When designing an authentication extension for an existing embedded
or cyber-physical protocol:
1. If the protocol has a first-class extension mechanism that is
supported by all deployed relays (e.g., INCOMPAT_FLAGS bit 0x01
in MAVLink when all relay software is updated), use it.
2. If relay software cannot be universally updated, define the
authentication material as a new message type with its own
message ID (or topic, or PDU ID) within the protocol's normal
addressing space.
3. Test authentication survival by routing through a conformant
relay that does not have any special support for the
authentication extension. Measure bytes received at the far end.
They MUST equal bytes sent.
4. Document whether relays that do not understand the authentication
extension will forward or drop the authentication message.
"Forward as opaque" (unknown MSG_ID with INCOMPAT=0 in MAVLink)
is preferable to "must discard" (unknown INCOMPAT_FLAGS bit).
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8. Guidance for Application Developers
When adding authentication to an existing embedded protocol
deployment without the ability to change relay software:
1. If relay software cannot be changed: use a transport-layer
security mechanism (DTLS, TLS, WireGuard) on the links between
endpoints, bypassing the relay's protocol parsing entirely. Note
that this requires the relay to forward raw UDP/TCP datagrams
without parsing the payload.
2. If transport-layer security is unavailable: carry authentication
as a separate, independently addressed protocol message (see
Section 6).
3. Verify by measurement: route through all relay types present in
the deployment and confirm auth bytes arrive at the receiver.
9. Post-Quantum Considerations
Post-quantum signature schemes defined in FIPS 204 [FIPS204] (ML-DSA,
formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) produce signatures of 2420 to 4627 bytes
(ML-DSA-44 to ML-DSA-87), compared to 64 bytes for Ed25519. Post-
quantum key encapsulation (FIPS 203 [FIPS203], ML-KEM-1024) produces
a ciphertext of 1568 bytes.
These sizes make the relay-transparency vulnerability more
consequential for PQC deployments than for classical ones, wherever
the transport will carry the oversized unit at all:
* Appending 64 bytes after a frame is plausible as a deployment
workaround in some environments. Appending 4627 bytes is not.
* Fragmentation of PQC material into multiple frames (as in the
CLEITONQ_CHUNK pattern) is required for all current embedded
protocols with payload size limits.
* Any PQC authentication extension for an embedded protocol MUST be
designed with relay transparency as a primary requirement, not an
afterthought.
That qualification is not rhetorical, and this revision adds it
because measurement required it. In three of the stacks examined, a
post-quantum-sized authenticator appended outside the boundary does
not produce a silent strip:
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* A classical ISO-TP FirstFrame carries a 12-bit length. A
4627-octet signature appended to a 27-octet PDU cannot be
declared, so the transmission cannot be formed.
* On a SOME/IP routing manager, a datagram carrying the same
appended signature exceeds the implementation's maximum unreliable
message size and is discarded before the application sees it.
Segmentation does not help: the final segment meets the same
ceiling.
* On MQTT over TCP, octets past the declared Remaining Length
desynchronize the stream rather than being absorbed by it.
None of these deliver the authenticator, so none of them is safe.
But the failure they produce is a loss of availability or a broken
connection, which is visible, rather than a command that arrives
looking authentic. A designer choosing between transports has reason
to prefer one that refuses the malformed unit, and a document that
claimed post-quantum sizes uniformly worsen this class would be
overstating what its own measurements support.
The CNSA 2.0 suite [CNSA20] requires ML-KEM and ML-DSA for all
National Security Systems after 2030. Defense and aerospace
deployments transitioning to PQC should assume relay-aware
authentication transport is mandatory, not optional.
10. Security Considerations
This document describes a vulnerability class. The mitigations in
Section 6, Section 7, and Section 8 address the class.
Implementations following the parallel-message pattern (Section 6.2,
Section 6.3) MUST ensure that:
* The authentication message and the authenticated payload message
are correlated by a sequence number, timestamp, or cryptographic
binding, to prevent replay of authentication messages for
previously authenticated payloads.
* The receiver enforces a maximum time window between receipt of the
payload and its corresponding authentication message, to limit the
window for desynchronization attacks.
* The authentication message itself cannot be used as a relay for
oracle attacks (e.g., chosen-ciphertext attacks on the KEM
ciphertext carried in an authentication message).
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11. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
12.2. Informative References
[CLEITONQ] Bezerra, C., "CleitonQ: Relay-Transparent Post-Quantum
Authentication for MAVLink v2 UAS Command and Control",
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20776349,
GitHub cleitonaugusto/CleitonQ, 2026,
<https://github.com/cleitonaugusto/CleitonQ>.
[CNSA20] NSA, "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0",
September 2022, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/
Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF>.
[DDS] Object Management Group, "Data Distribution Service (DDS)
Specification, Version 1.4", April 2015,
<https://www.omg.org/spec/DDS/1.4>.
[FIPS203] NIST, "FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation
Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM)", August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.
[FIPS204] NIST, "FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature
Standard (ML-DSA)", August 2024,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.
[ISOTP] ISO, "Road vehicles -- Diagnostic communication over
Controller Area Network (DoCAN) -- Part 2: Transport
protocol and network layer services", ISO 15765-2:2016,
2016, <https://www.iso.org/standard/66574.html>.
[MAVLINK] Meier, L., "MAVLink Micro Air Vehicle Message Marshalling
Library", 2009, <https://mavlink.io/en/>.
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[R155] UNECE WP.29, "UN Regulation No. 155 on Cybersecurity and
Cybersecurity Management Systems", 2021,
<https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/
un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security>.
[SECOCASR] AUTOSAR, "Specification of Secure Onboard Communication
(SecOC), Version 5.0.0", November 2021,
<https://www.autosar.org/standards/classic-platform>.
Author's Address
Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra
Independent Researcher
Brazil
Email: augusto.cleiton@gmail.com
URI: https://github.com/cleitonaugusto/CleitonQ
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