Skip to main content

Authentication-Transparent Protocol Extensions in Middleware-Relayed Systems
draft-bezerra-relay-auth-transparency-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra
Last updated 2026-08-06
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Additional resources GitHub Repository
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
draft-bezerra-relay-auth-transparency-01
Individual Submission                                         C. Bezerra
Internet-Draft                                    Independent Researcher
Intended status: Informational                             6 August 2026
Expires: 7 February 2027

  Authentication-Transparent Protocol Extensions in Middleware-Relayed
                                Systems
                draft-bezerra-relay-auth-transparency-01

Abstract

   Protocol-aware middleware (relays, bridges, gateways) re-serializes
   messages at their protocol frame boundary, silently discarding any
   bytes appended outside that boundary.  Authentication material placed
   after the frame boundary by a sender is therefore stripped at every
   relay hop before reaching the receiver, with no error indication.
   This document identifies this behavior as a protocol design
   vulnerability class -- "relay-transparent authentication stripping"
   -- demonstrates it with running code in three independent protocol
   stacks (MAVLink v2, ROS2/DDS CDR, and CAN/ISO-TP with a SecOC-unaware
   gateway), and specifies the architectural principle that
   authentication material must be carried as a first-class,
   independently addressable protocol unit to survive relay transit.
   Post-quantum signature sizes push authentication out of fixed fields
   and so create the precondition systematically; this revision reports
   three measured cases where they do not, because a transport that
   refuses to carry the oversized unit produces a loss of availability
   instead of a silent authentication bypass.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 7 February 2027.

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  The Relay-Transparency Vulnerability Class  . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Structural Preconditions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Attack Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Protocol-Specific Demonstrations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  MAVLink v2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  ROS2 / DDS CDR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  CAN / AUTOSAR SecOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Impact and Severity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Design Principle: Authentication-Transparent Extensions . . .   9
     6.1.  The CLEITONQ_CHUNK Pattern (MAVLink)  . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  The DDS Parallel-Topic Pattern (ROS2) . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.3.  General Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Guidance for Protocol Designers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   8.  Guidance for Application Developers . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  Post-Quantum Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   12. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     12.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Embedded and cyber-physical systems increasingly rely on protocol-
   aware middleware components -- MAVLink relays, DDS bridges, CAN
   gateways -- to route messages between endpoints that do not share a
   direct link.  These components are a fixture of drone command-and-
   control networks (MAVProxy, mavlink-router), robotic systems
   (domain_bridge, ros1_bridge), and automotive Ethernet architectures
   (DoIP gateways).

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 2]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

   A common pattern when adding authentication to existing embedded
   protocols is to append authentication material (HMAC tags, digital
   signatures, nonces) immediately after the protocol-defined frame
   boundary.  This approach is attractive because it requires no changes
   to the protocol specification or to existing, unauthenticated
   endpoints.

   However, any protocol-aware relay along the path re-serializes
   messages at the protocol frame boundary.  Bytes outside that boundary
   are in the relay's "discard" region.  Authentication material placed
   there is silently stripped at every relay hop, with no error
   indication to sender or receiver.  The receiver obtains a valid,
   unauthenticated frame.

   This document:

   *  Defines the vulnerability class (Section 3)

   *  Demonstrates it in three independent protocol stacks (Section 4)

   *  Provides the architectural principle that authentication material
      must be a first-class protocol unit to survive relay transit
      (Section 6)

   *  Provides guidance for protocol designers and application
      developers (Section 7, Section 8)

   *  Addresses post-quantum cryptography implications (Section 9)

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Frame boundary:  The byte offset at which a protocol-aware parser
      considers the current message complete, as determined by the
      protocol's length-delimitation mechanism (e.g., a length field, a
      type schema, a DLC field).

   Protocol-aware relay:  A software or hardware component that parses
      incoming messages at the protocol frame boundary, optionally
      processes or filters them, and re-serializes new conformant frames
      for forwarding.  Distinct from a "transparent relay" that forwards
      raw bytes without parsing.

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 3]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

   Relay-transparent:  An authentication encoding that survives transit
      through any protocol-aware relay on the path, emerging intact at
      the receiver.

   Authentication stripping:  The silent removal of authentication
      material at a relay, caused by re-serialization at the frame
      boundary.

3.  The Relay-Transparency Vulnerability Class

3.1.  Structural Preconditions

   All of the following conditions must be true for this vulnerability
   to apply:

   1.  The protocol uses length-delimited framing (a length field, a
       type schema, or a hardware-defined payload size specifies the
       exact number of bytes in each message).

   2.  At least one protocol-aware relay (bridge, gateway, router)
       exists on the path between sender and receiver.

   3.  Authentication material is appended after the protocol-defined
       frame boundary, rather than carried in a separately addressed
       protocol unit.

   When all three conditions are met, the relay MUST (per its correct
   implementation of the protocol) discard bytes outside the frame
   boundary during re-serialization.  No error is generated.  The
   receiver has no indication that authentication material was ever
   present.

3.2.  Attack Model

   Precondition: An attacker controls, or is co-located with, a relay
   node on the sender-to-receiver path.

   Attack sequence:

   1.  Sender transmits an authenticated message: [frame | auth_bytes]

   2.  Relay parses [frame] at the frame boundary, discards
       [auth_bytes], and forwards [frame] only.

   3.  Attacker now has visibility of unauthenticated [frame] in
       transit.

   4.  Attacker can:

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 4]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

       a.  Forward the stripped frame (receiver accepts it as valid
           because it has no expectation of auth bytes being present
           when operating through a relay), or

       b.  Substitute a different payload before the relay re-
           serializes, since no authentication exists in the forwarded
           frame.

   The receiver cannot distinguish case (a) or (b) from a legitimately
   authenticated message, because authentication was never carried in
   the forwarded frame.

4.  Protocol-Specific Demonstrations

4.1.  MAVLink v2

   MAVLink v2 [MAVLINK] is the dominant command-and-control protocol for
   unmanned aerial systems.  Each frame begins with a Start-of-Frame
   byte (0xFD) and a Length byte (LEN) at offset 1.  The complete frame
   is exactly 10 + LEN + 2 bytes (10-byte header + LEN-byte payload +
   2-byte CRC-16-MCRF4XX).

   Any protocol-aware relay (MAVProxy, mavlink-router, QGroundControl)
   implements the following parse-and-forward loop:

     start = stream.find(0xFD)
     LEN   = stream[start + 1]
     frame = stream[start : start + 10 + LEN + 2]
     if crc_valid(frame):
         forward(frame)

   Bytes at offset (start + 10 + LEN + 2) onwards are in the "discard"
   region.  Three authentication schemes were tested against a MAVLink
   v2 COMMAND_LONG frame (45 bytes), all stripped:

         +==========================+======+==========+==========+
         | Auth Scheme              | Sent | Received | Stripped |
         +==========================+======+==========+==========+
         | HMAC-SHA3-256 (32 bytes) | 77   | 45       | 32       |
         +--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
         | Ed25519 (64 bytes)       | 109  | 45       | 64       |
         +--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
         | ML-DSA-87 (4627 bytes)   | 4672 | 45       | 4627     |
         +--------------------------+------+----------+----------+

                                  Table 1

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 5]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

   MAVLink v2 defines a signing extension (INCOMPAT_FLAGS bit 0x01) that
   appends a 13-byte block (link_id + timestamp + truncated HMAC-
   SHA256).  This extension survives relay transit on relays explicitly
   configured for signing support.  However:

   *  The signing block uses a 48-bit truncated HMAC-SHA256, providing
      only classical security.

   *  A relay not configured for signing support treats INCOMPAT_FLAGS
      bit 0x01 as an unknown flag and MUST discard the frame per
      specification -- providing zero auth byte survival and frame loss.

   *  A new INCOMPAT_FLAGS bit defined for post-quantum authentication
      would cause relay frame loss on all relays not updated to
      understand the new bit.

   The INCOMPAT_FLAGS mechanism therefore cannot be used to introduce
   relay-transparent post-quantum authentication without a flag-by-flag
   negotiation across all relay software in the deployment.

4.2.  ROS2 / DDS CDR

   ROS2 uses Data Distribution Service (DDS) [DDS] for inter-process and
   inter-domain communication.  Messages are serialized using CDR
   (Common Data Representation) according to the message type's IDL
   schema.  The CDR frame boundary is defined by the IDL type schema:
   the deserializer reads exactly the number of bytes specified by the
   schema.

   Two failure modes were observed:

   CycloneDDS 11.0.1: The CDR deserializer reads exactly the schema-
   defined bytes.  Bytes appended after the schema boundary arrive in
   the raw RTPS payload but are not transferred to any struct field.
   Re-serialization from the struct produces schema-sized bytes only.
   Authentication material is silently discarded.

   FastDDS (rmw_fastrtps_cpp, the default ROS2 RMW): Reader history
   buffers are pre-allocated to the type's maximum CDR length.  Payloads
   exceeding this limit are rejected before reaching the application
   callback.  Appending authentication bytes to a CDR payload causes the
   message to be silently dropped -- denial of service rather than
   silent stripping, but with identical impact on authentication
   visibility.

   Three authentication schemes were tested against geometry_msgs/msg/
   Twist (52-byte CDR payload):

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 6]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

         +==========================+======+==========+==========+
         | Auth Scheme              | Sent | Received | Stripped |
         +==========================+======+==========+==========+
         | HMAC-SHA3-256 (32 bytes) | 84   | 52       | 32       |
         +--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
         | Ed25519 (64 bytes)       | 116  | 52       | 64       |
         +--------------------------+------+----------+----------+
         | ML-DSA-87 (4627 bytes)   | 4679 | 52       | 4627     |
         +--------------------------+------+----------+----------+

                                  Table 2

   Multi-domain deployments using domain_bridge, ros1_bridge, or zenoh-
   bridge-ros2dds compound this problem: each bridge deserializes and
   re-publishes a typed message, stripping any auth bytes at every hop.

4.3.  CAN / AUTOSAR SecOC

   Controller Area Network (CAN) frames are hardware-delimited by the
   DLC (Data Length Code) field, which specifies 0-8 bytes (CAN 2.0B) or
   0-64 bytes (CAN FD).  Messages larger than one frame are segmented by
   ISO-TP [ISOTP], whose FirstFrame declares the total length of the
   transmission.

   There are therefore two boundaries on this path, one level apart, and
   both fail.  The ISO-TP reassembler delivers exactly the number of
   octets the FirstFrame declared.  Above it, a gateway that understands
   the application PDU rebuilds that PDU from the fields it parsed, so
   octets past the PDU's own extent were never in the parsed object.
   Authentication appended past either boundary does not reach the far
   side, and the receiver cannot distinguish its absence from a command
   that was never authenticated.

   This revision replaces the structural argument of -00 with
   measurement.  The ISO-TP boundary was exercised against the Linux
   kernel's own CAN and ISO-TP implementations over a virtual CAN
   interface: a sender emits raw CAN frames whose FirstFrame declares a
   27-octet UDS WriteDataByIdentifier PDU while placing 59 octets on the
   bus, and an ordinary CAN_ISOTP socket -- the same code path an ECU
   uses -- delivers 27.  A clean transmission with nothing appended
   delivers all 27 and establishes that the path is live.  Results were
   identical across three consecutive runs.  The gateway boundary was
   exercised in process against a SecOC-unaware gateway that parses SID,
   data identifier and the record the identifier is defined to carry.

   AUTOSAR SecOC (Secure Onboard Communication) [SECOCASR] implemented
   as specified is NOT an instance of this class.  Its MAC is symmetric,
   truncated, and carried inside the PDU, which places it within the

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 7]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

   region a gateway parses and re-emits; it therefore fails precondition
   C2.  The exposure is a SecOC-unaware gateway on the path, or an
   authenticator placed outside the PDU because it no longer fits inside
   one.

   One negative result belongs here because it constrains the post-
   quantum argument of Section 9 rather than supporting it.  A classical
   ISO-TP FirstFrame carries a 12-bit length, so 4095 octets is the
   largest transmission a sender can declare.  An ML-DSA-87 signature of
   4627 octets appended to a 27-octet PDU cannot be carried by a
   classical ISO-TP transmission at all.  That is an impossibility, not
   a strip, and it is reported as one.

   The architectural root cause is identical to the MAVLink and DDS
   cases: re-serialization at a declared boundary drops any out-of-band
   authentication.  This is relevant to vehicle OEMs conducting TARA
   under UNECE WP.29 R155 [R155]: the relay-transparency attack class
   should be assessed under the Tampering category for any gateway that
   handles safety-critical PDUs.

5.  Impact and Severity

   The relay-transparency vulnerability affects any deployment where:

   *  Authentication is appended after the protocol frame boundary
      (rather than carried in a separate, first-class protocol unit),
      AND

   *  At least one protocol-aware relay is on the sender-receiver path.

   Impact:

   Authentication Bypass:  The receiver accepts frames with no
      authentication material, having no way to distinguish them from
      legitimately authenticated frames (since both arrive stripped of
      auth bytes after relay transit).

   Command Injection:  An attacker controlling a relay can substitute
      payloads after stripping, injecting arbitrary commands that the
      receiver treats as legitimate.

   Denial of Service (FastDDS case):  Appending auth bytes causes the
      entire message to be dropped at the receiver, preventing
      legitimate communication.

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 8]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

   The vulnerability is analogous to CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification
   of Data Authenticity), but the root cause is architectural rather
   than implementation-level: correct implementations of the protocol
   specification cause the stripping.

6.  Design Principle: Authentication-Transparent Extensions

   Authentication material MUST be carried as a first-class,
   independently addressed protocol unit.  The DDS middleware, MAVLink
   relay, or CAN gateway MUST forward this unit as an independent
   message -- whose byte boundary is defined by its own schema or frame
   header, not by its position relative to another message's boundary.

6.1.  The CLEITONQ_CHUNK Pattern (MAVLink)

   CleitonQ [CLEITONQ] implements relay-transparent post-quantum
   authentication for MAVLink v2 via the CLEITONQ_CHUNK encoding:

   *  Authentication material (ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext, ML-DSA-87
      signature, HMAC-SHA3-256 tag) is fragmented into 245-byte chunks.

   *  Each chunk is encapsulated as a valid MAVLink v2 frame with its
      own MSG_ID (50000), LEN, and CRC.

   *  INCOMPAT_FLAGS is set to 0.  Any relay that does not know MSG_ID
      50000 forwards it as a valid but opaque message.  Any relay that
      knows the CleitonQ dialect forwards it with full understanding.

   *  No relay has reason to discard the chunk: it is a well-formed
      MAVLink frame passing CRC validation.

   This approach requires no relay software changes and no
   INCOMPAT_FLAGS negotiation.  Authentication material arrives intact
   at any receiver connected through any standard MAVLink relay.

6.2.  The DDS Parallel-Topic Pattern (ROS2)

   For ROS2/DDS deployments, authentication material MUST be published
   as a separate typed message on a parallel topic:

     /cmd_vel      geometry_msgs/Twist     (command payload)
     /cmd_vel/auth cleitonq_msgs/Auth      (ML-DSA-87 sig + nonce)

   The cleitonq_msgs/Auth type is defined in IDL.  DDS middleware
   forwards it as any other typed message, with its byte boundary
   defined by its own schema.  The receiving node:

   1.  Subscribes to both topics.

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027                [Page 9]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

   2.  Buffers /cmd_vel messages pending auth verification.

   3.  On receipt of /cmd_vel/auth, verifies the signature over the
       corresponding /cmd_vel payload.

   4.  Applies the command only after verification succeeds.

6.3.  General Principle

   For any protocol where the frame boundary is defined by a length
   field, a type schema, or a hardware-imposed maximum:

   Authentication material SHOULD be carried in a protocol unit with its
   own independent framing -- its own length field, schema, or CAN
   arbitration ID -- so that any protocol-aware relay can identify,
   forward, or route it independently of the message being
   authenticated.

   Authentication material SHOULD NOT be appended to an existing message
   frame beyond its protocol-defined boundary, regardless of whether the
   existing protocol version, receiver, or endpoint supports the
   authentication extension.

7.  Guidance for Protocol Designers

   When designing an authentication extension for an existing embedded
   or cyber-physical protocol:

   1.  If the protocol has a first-class extension mechanism that is
       supported by all deployed relays (e.g., INCOMPAT_FLAGS bit 0x01
       in MAVLink when all relay software is updated), use it.

   2.  If relay software cannot be universally updated, define the
       authentication material as a new message type with its own
       message ID (or topic, or PDU ID) within the protocol's normal
       addressing space.

   3.  Test authentication survival by routing through a conformant
       relay that does not have any special support for the
       authentication extension.  Measure bytes received at the far end.
       They MUST equal bytes sent.

   4.  Document whether relays that do not understand the authentication
       extension will forward or drop the authentication message.
       "Forward as opaque" (unknown MSG_ID with INCOMPAT=0 in MAVLink)
       is preferable to "must discard" (unknown INCOMPAT_FLAGS bit).

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027               [Page 10]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

8.  Guidance for Application Developers

   When adding authentication to an existing embedded protocol
   deployment without the ability to change relay software:

   1.  If relay software cannot be changed: use a transport-layer
       security mechanism (DTLS, TLS, WireGuard) on the links between
       endpoints, bypassing the relay's protocol parsing entirely.  Note
       that this requires the relay to forward raw UDP/TCP datagrams
       without parsing the payload.

   2.  If transport-layer security is unavailable: carry authentication
       as a separate, independently addressed protocol message (see
       Section 6).

   3.  Verify by measurement: route through all relay types present in
       the deployment and confirm auth bytes arrive at the receiver.

9.  Post-Quantum Considerations

   Post-quantum signature schemes defined in FIPS 204 [FIPS204] (ML-DSA,
   formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium) produce signatures of 2420 to 4627 bytes
   (ML-DSA-44 to ML-DSA-87), compared to 64 bytes for Ed25519.  Post-
   quantum key encapsulation (FIPS 203 [FIPS203], ML-KEM-1024) produces
   a ciphertext of 1568 bytes.

   These sizes make the relay-transparency vulnerability more
   consequential for PQC deployments than for classical ones, wherever
   the transport will carry the oversized unit at all:

   *  Appending 64 bytes after a frame is plausible as a deployment
      workaround in some environments.  Appending 4627 bytes is not.

   *  Fragmentation of PQC material into multiple frames (as in the
      CLEITONQ_CHUNK pattern) is required for all current embedded
      protocols with payload size limits.

   *  Any PQC authentication extension for an embedded protocol MUST be
      designed with relay transparency as a primary requirement, not an
      afterthought.

   That qualification is not rhetorical, and this revision adds it
   because measurement required it.  In three of the stacks examined, a
   post-quantum-sized authenticator appended outside the boundary does
   not produce a silent strip:

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027               [Page 11]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

   *  A classical ISO-TP FirstFrame carries a 12-bit length.  A
      4627-octet signature appended to a 27-octet PDU cannot be
      declared, so the transmission cannot be formed.

   *  On a SOME/IP routing manager, a datagram carrying the same
      appended signature exceeds the implementation's maximum unreliable
      message size and is discarded before the application sees it.
      Segmentation does not help: the final segment meets the same
      ceiling.

   *  On MQTT over TCP, octets past the declared Remaining Length
      desynchronize the stream rather than being absorbed by it.

   None of these deliver the authenticator, so none of them is safe.
   But the failure they produce is a loss of availability or a broken
   connection, which is visible, rather than a command that arrives
   looking authentic.  A designer choosing between transports has reason
   to prefer one that refuses the malformed unit, and a document that
   claimed post-quantum sizes uniformly worsen this class would be
   overstating what its own measurements support.

   The CNSA 2.0 suite [CNSA20] requires ML-KEM and ML-DSA for all
   National Security Systems after 2030.  Defense and aerospace
   deployments transitioning to PQC should assume relay-aware
   authentication transport is mandatory, not optional.

10.  Security Considerations

   This document describes a vulnerability class.  The mitigations in
   Section 6, Section 7, and Section 8 address the class.

   Implementations following the parallel-message pattern (Section 6.2,
   Section 6.3) MUST ensure that:

   *  The authentication message and the authenticated payload message
      are correlated by a sequence number, timestamp, or cryptographic
      binding, to prevent replay of authentication messages for
      previously authenticated payloads.

   *  The receiver enforces a maximum time window between receipt of the
      payload and its corresponding authentication message, to limit the
      window for desynchronization attacks.

   *  The authentication message itself cannot be used as a relay for
      oracle attacks (e.g., chosen-ciphertext attacks on the KEM
      ciphertext carried in an authentication message).

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027               [Page 12]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

11.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

12.  References

12.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

12.2.  Informative References

   [CLEITONQ] Bezerra, C., "CleitonQ: Relay-Transparent Post-Quantum
              Authentication for MAVLink v2 UAS Command and Control",
              DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20776349,
              GitHub cleitonaugusto/CleitonQ, 2026,
              <https://github.com/cleitonaugusto/CleitonQ>.

   [CNSA20]   NSA, "Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0",
              September 2022, <https://media.defense.gov/2022/
              Sep/07/2003071834/-1/-1/0/CSA_CNSA_2.0_ALGORITHMS_.PDF>.

   [DDS]      Object Management Group, "Data Distribution Service (DDS)
              Specification, Version 1.4", April 2015,
              <https://www.omg.org/spec/DDS/1.4>.

   [FIPS203]  NIST, "FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation
              Mechanism Standard (ML-KEM)", August 2024,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.

   [FIPS204]  NIST, "FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature
              Standard (ML-DSA)", August 2024,
              <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.

   [ISOTP]    ISO, "Road vehicles -- Diagnostic communication over
              Controller Area Network (DoCAN) -- Part 2: Transport
              protocol and network layer services", ISO 15765-2:2016,
              2016, <https://www.iso.org/standard/66574.html>.

   [MAVLINK]  Meier, L., "MAVLink Micro Air Vehicle Message Marshalling
              Library", 2009, <https://mavlink.io/en/>.

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027               [Page 13]
Internet-Draft           Relay Auth Transparency             August 2026

   [R155]     UNECE WP.29, "UN Regulation No. 155 on Cybersecurity and
              Cybersecurity Management Systems", 2021,
              <https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/
              un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security>.

   [SECOCASR] AUTOSAR, "Specification of Secure Onboard Communication
              (SecOC), Version 5.0.0", November 2021,
              <https://www.autosar.org/standards/classic-platform>.

Author's Address

   Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra
   Independent Researcher
   Brazil
   Email: augusto.cleiton@gmail.com
   URI:   https://github.com/cleitonaugusto/CleitonQ

Bezerra                  Expires 7 February 2027               [Page 14]