Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture
draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-02
Network Working Group H. Birkholz
Internet-Draft Fraunhofer SIT
Intended status: Standards Track M. Wiseman
Expires: March 15, 2020 GE Global Research
H. Tschofenig
ARM Ltd.
N. Smith
Intel
September 12, 2019
Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture
draft-birkholz-rats-architecture-02
Abstract
The Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture facilitates
interoperability of attestation mechanisms by defining a set of
participant roles and interactions that reveal information about the
trustworthiness attributes of an attester's computing environment.
By making trustworthiness attributes explicit, they can be evaluated
dynamically and within an operational context where risk mitigation
depends on having a more complete understanding of the possible
vulnerabilities germane to the attester's environment.
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document authors. All rights reserved.
Birkholz, et al. Expires March 15, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft RATS Arch & Terms September 2019
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. RATS in a Nutshell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Conceptual Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Computing Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Trustworthiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. RATS Workflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Interoperability between RATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. RATS Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Attestation Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. RATS Roles and Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.1. Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.2. Role Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. RATS Principals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The long-standing Internet Threat Model [RFC3552] focuses on threats
to the communication channel, as pioneered by Dolev and Yao
[DOLEV-YAO] in 1983. However, threats to the endpoint [RFC5209] and
system components [RFC4949] of transited communication gear (i.e.
hosts) are increasingly relevant for assessing the trustworthiness
properties of a communication channel. Beyond the collection and
conveyance of security posture [RFC5209] about an endpoint (host),
remote attestation provides believable trustworthiness claims
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