BGPsec Validation State Unverified
draft-borchert-sidrops-bgpsec-state-unverified-02

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Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                       O. Borchert
Internet-Draft                                             D. Montgomery
Updates: 8205 (if approved)                                     USA NIST
Intended status: Standards Track                                        
Expires: February 27, 2020                               August 26, 2019

                   BGPsec Validation State Unverified
           draft-borchert-sidrops-bgpsec-state-unverified-02

Abstract

   In case operators decide to delay BGPsec path validation, none of the
   available states do properly represent this decision. This document
   introduces "Unverified" as a well-defined validation state which
   allows to properly identify a non-evaluated BGPsec routes as not
   verified.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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Borchert & Montgomery  Expires February 27, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet Draft     BGPsec Validation State Unverified    August 26, 2019

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors. All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Suggested Reading  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Initializing BGPsec route  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     3.1. Changes to RFC 8205 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   6.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     6.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6

 

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Internet Draft     BGPsec Validation State Unverified    August 26, 2019

1.  Introduction

   BGPsec path validation [RFC8205] provides well defined validation
   states. Though, there are instances in which BGPsec routes are not
   immediately validated upon receiving them. This could be due to
   configuration where the operator chose to perform "Lazy Evaluation"
   or due to instances where router configuration could enable the
   operator to delay route validation during situations of unexpectedly
   high loads such as DDOS attacks or others. Here, the absence of a
   well-defined initialization state requires to use a validation state,
   that is otherwise well-defined and therefore "waters" down the
   meaning of that state. 

   Hence, this document updates the RFC 8205 by adding the proposed
   validation state "Unverified".

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Suggested Reading

   It is assumed that the reader understands BGP [RFC4271] and BGPsec
   Protocol Specification [RFC8205]

3.  Initializing BGPsec route