Mutual X.509 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication for OAuth Clients
draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00

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Last updated 2016-10-10
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OAuth Working Group                                          B. Campbell
Internet-Draft                                                J. Bradley
Intended status: Standards Track                           Ping Identity
Expires: April 13, 2017                                 October 10, 2016

  Mutual X.509 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication for OAuth
                                Clients
                draft-campbell-oauth-tls-client-auth-00

Abstract

   This document describes X.509 certificates as OAuth client
   credentials using Transport Layer Security (TLS) mutual
   authentication as a mechanism for client authentication to the
   authorization server's token endpoint.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 13, 2017.

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   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Campbell & Bradley       Expires April 13, 2017                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft       OAuth TLS Client Authentication        October 2016

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Mutual TLS for Client Authentication  . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Metadata  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     4.1.  Token Endpoint Authentication Method Registration . . . .   3
       4.1.1.  Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     5.1.  TLS Versions and Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     5.2.  Client Identity Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Appendix B.  Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] defines a shared
   secret method of client authentication but also allows for the
   definition and use of additional client authentication mechanisms
   when interacting with the authorization server's token endpoint.
   This document describes an additional mechanism of client
   authentication utilizing mutual TLS [RFC5246] certificate-based
   authentication.

1.1.  Requirements Notation and Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
   2119 [RFC2119].

2.  Mutual TLS for Client Authentication

   The following section defines, as an extension of OAuth 2.0,
   Section 2.3 [RFC6749], the use of mutual TLS as client credentials.
   OAuth 2.0 requires that access token requests by the client to the
   token endpoint use TLS.  In order to utilize TLS for client
   authentication, the TLS connection MUST have been established or
   reestablished with mutual X.509 certificate authentication (i.e. the
   Client Certificate and Certificate Verify messages are sent during
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