Use Identity as Raw Public Key in EAP-TLS
draft-chen-emu-eap-tls-ibs-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors chenmeiling  , Li Su  , HAIGUANG Wang 
Last updated 2020-05-12
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EMU                                                              M. Chen
Internet-Draft                                                    Li. Su
Intended status: Standards Track                            China Mobile
Expires: November 13, 2020                                  H. Wang, Ed.
                                          Huawei International Pte. Ltd.
                                                            May 12, 2020

               Use Identity as Raw Public Key in EAP-TLS
                     draft-chen-emu-eap-tls-ibs-00

Abstract

   This document specifies the use of identity as a raw public key in
   EAP-TLS and EAP-TLS13, EAP-TLS defined in RFC 5216.  The protocol
   procedures of EAP-TLS-IBS will comply with EAP-TLS and EAP-TLS13,
   Identity-based signature will be extended to support EAP-TLS's
   signature algorithms.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 13, 2020.

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Chen, et al.            Expires November 13, 2020               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 EAP TLS IBS                      May 2020

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Structure of the Raw Public Key Extension . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  EAP-TLS using raw public keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.1.  EAP TLS1.2 Client and Server Handshake Behavior . . . . .   6
       4.1.1.  raw public keys TLS exchange  . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
       4.1.2.  EAP-TLS handshake in TLS1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.3.  raw public keys EAP-TLS exchange  . . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.4.  EAP-TLS1.2-IBS example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     4.2.  EAP TLS1.3 Client and Server Handshake Behavior . . . . .  12
       4.2.1.  TLS1.3 handshake  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.2.2.  EAP-TLS1.3 handshake procedure  . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       4.2.3.  raw public keys EAP-TLS1.3 exchange . . . . . . . . .  14
       4.2.4.  EAP-TLS1.3-IBS example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   7.  Acknowledgement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.2.  Informative references  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19

1.  Introduction

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol(EAP) defined in RFC
   3748[RFC3748] can provide support for multiple authentication
   methods.  Transport Layer Security(TLS) provides for mutual
   authentication, integrity-protected ciphersuite negotiation, and
   exchange between two endpoints.  The EAP-TLS defined in RFC 5216
   [RFC5216] which combines EAP and TLS that apply EAP method to load
   TLS procedures.

   Traditionally, TLS client and server public keys are obtained in PKIX
   containers in-band as part of the TLS handshake procedure and are
   validated using trust anchors based on a PKIX certification authority
   (CA).  But there is another method, Using Raw Public Keys in
   Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
   (DTLS) are defined in RFC 7250[RFC7250], the document defines two TLS
   extensions client_certificate_type and server_certificate_type, which
   can be used as part of an extended TLS handshake when raw public keys
   are used.
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