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OAuth Subject Signing Key Binding for Resource Servers
draft-chu-oauth-subject-key-binding-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Cheng-Kang Chu , Li Ruochen , Haiguang Wang , Tieyan Li
Last updated 2026-09-01
Replaces draft-chu-oauth-as-attested-user-cert
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draft-chu-oauth-subject-key-binding-00
Web Authorization Protocol                                     C.-K. Chu
Internet-Draft                                                     R. Li
Intended status: Standards Track                                 H. Wang
Expires: 5 March 2027                                              T. Li
                                          Huawei International Pte. Ltd.
                                                        1 September 2026

         OAuth Subject Signing Key Binding for Resource Servers
                 draft-chu-oauth-subject-key-binding-00

Abstract

   Resource servers in OAuth deployments sometimes receive application-
   layer authorization evidence that is digitally signed by the subject
   represented by an access token.  Verification of such evidence
   requires the resource server to obtain a trusted public signing key
   that is bound to that subject.

   This specification defines the subject_keys parameter, by which an
   OAuth authorization server conveys one or more subject public signing
   keys to a resource server.  The parameter can be carried as a claim
   in a JWT access token or as a member of a token introspection
   response.  The resulting key binding is scoped to the authorization
   server, token subject, resource server audience, and token validity
   context.

   This specification does not define a public-key enrollment protocol
   or the syntax and semantics of the application-layer authorization
   evidence.  It also does not use the OAuth cnf claim, which identifies
   a proof-of-possession key held by the presenter of a token.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 March 2027.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Applicability and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  The subject_keys Parameter  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Parameter Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  JWK Set Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Example Parameter Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  Conveying Subject Keys  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  JWT Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.2.  Token Introspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     6.3.  Use of Multiple Conveyance Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.4.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  Authorization Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.1.  Establishing a Subject Key Binding  . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     7.2.  Selecting Keys for an Access Token  . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.3.  Rotation, Revocation, and Freshness . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   8.  Resource Server Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.1.  Access Token and Key-Binding Validation . . . . . . . . .  17
     8.2.  Key Selection and Signature Verification  . . . . . . . .  18
     8.3.  Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence Profile
           Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     8.4.  Authorization Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     8.5.  Client and Presenter Binding  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     8.6.  Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
   9.  Relationship to Existing OAuth and JWT Parameters . . . . . .  21
     9.1.  The cnf Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     9.2.  Rich Authorization Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     9.3.  The sub_jwk Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   10. Error Handling  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21

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   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     11.1.  Key Substitution During Enrollment . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     11.2.  Issuer, Subject, Audience, and Key-Identifier
             Confusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     11.3.  Algorithm and JWK Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     11.4.  Stale and Revoked Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     11.5.  Replay of Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence  . . . .  24
     11.6.  Token Theft and Client Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     11.7.  Authorization Inflation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
     11.8.  Key Separation and Cross-Protocol Use  . . . . . . . . .  24
     11.9.  Authorization Server Compromise  . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
     11.10. Resource Exhaustion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   12. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     13.1.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . .  26
     13.2.  OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration  . . . .  26
   14. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
   15. Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  28
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  29

1.  Introduction

   The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] enables a Client to
   obtain limited access to a protected resource.  The Authorization
   Server establishes the authorization context and issues an Access
   Token, and the Resource Server makes an authorization decision based
   on that token and its local policy.

   Some deployments require the Resource Server to process an additional
   authorization artifact that is signed directly by the Subject
   represented by the Access Token.  Examples include a signed
   transaction instruction, a signed delegation constraint, or another
   application-layer statement that restricts what the Client may do on
   the Subject's behalf.  Such an artifact can express authorization
   semantics that are more specific than the permissions represented by
   the Access Token.

   A Resource Server can verify such an artifact only when it has a
   trusted binding between the Access Token subject and the public key
   corresponding to the signing private key.  The OAuth authorization
   framework does not define a general-purpose mechanism by which an
   Authorization Server conveys this distinct subject-to-key binding to
   a Resource Server.  Existing proof-of-possession mechanisms, such as
   DPoP [RFC9449], bind an Access Token to a key held by the Client
   presenting the token; they do not convey a separate key used by the
   Subject to sign application-layer authorization evidence.

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   This specification defines a subject_keys parameter.  Its value is a
   JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) [RFC7517] containing public signing keys
   that the Authorization Server has associated with the Subject
   identified by the token's sub value.  The parameter can be conveyed
   in either of the following ways:

   *  as a top-level claim in a JWT Access Token conforming to
      [RFC9068]; or

   *  as a top-level member of a Token Introspection response conforming
      to [RFC7662].

   The Authorization Server's protection of the JWT Access Token, or the
   authenticated and protected introspection exchange, provides
   integrity and authenticity for the Subject Key Binding.  A separately
   signed certificate containing the same key binding is therefore not
   required by this specification.

   The subject_keys parameter does not grant access.  Subject-Signed
   Authorization Evidence verified with a conveyed key can only further
   constrain the authority represented by the Access Token.  It cannot
   expand that authority.

   This specification defines no new authorization request parameter,
   token request parameter, grant type, or Rich Authorization Requests
   authorization-details type.  How a Subject registers or provisions a
   public key at the Authorization Server, and the syntax and semantics
   of Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence, are outside the scope of
   this specification.

   The mechanism defined by this specification extends the information
   associated with an OAuth Access Token.  It does not define or depend
   on a particular authorization grant, response type, Client type, or
   authorization endpoint interaction.  It can therefore be used by an
   OAuth deployment in which an Authorization Server issues an Access
   Token for a Subject and conveys token information to a Resource
   Server using a JWT Access Token or Token Introspection.

   This document replaces draft-chu-oauth-as-attested-user-cert.  The
   previous document defined a mechanism for requesting an Authorization
   Server-attested user public-key certificate using Rich Authorization
   Requests.  This document removes that certificate request model and
   instead defines an Authorization Server-protected binding between an
   OAuth Subject and one or more public signing keys conveyed to a
   Resource Server.

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2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
   SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, NOT RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
   [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
   here.

   JSON member names and string values defined by this specification are
   case-sensitive.

   This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization
   Server", "Client", "Resource Owner", and "Resource Server" as defined
   by [RFC6749].

   Subject  The Resource Owner or other authorization subject identified
      by the sub value associated with an Access Token.  The sub value
      is interpreted within the namespace of the Authorization Server
      and the audience of the Access Token.  It is not necessarily a
      global identifier or a representation of a civil identity.

   Subject Signing Key  An asymmetric public key that the Authorization
      Server has associated with the Subject and approved for
      verification of Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence by an
      intended Resource Server.

   Subject Key Binding  The assertion, protected by the Authorization
      Server, that a Subject Signing Key is associated with the Subject
      identified by an Access Token for the audience and validity
      context of that token.

   Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence  An application-layer object
      that is digitally signed using the private key corresponding to a
      Subject Signing Key and that expresses authorization constraints
      used by the Resource Server.  Its syntax and application-specific
      semantics are outside the scope of this specification.

   Token Authority  The maximum authority represented by a validated
      Access Token, including its scopes, authorization details,
      audience, subject, Client binding, and any other authorization-
      relevant claims.

   Evidence Authority  The maximum authority permitted by validated
      Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence under the applicable
      evidence profile.

3.  Applicability and Scope

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3.1.  Applicability

   This specification is applicable when all of the following conditions
   hold:

   *  an Authorization Server can establish a trusted binding between a
      Subject and a public signing key;

   *  an Access Token identifies that Subject to an intended Resource
      Server;

   *  the Resource Server receives Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence
      through an application-specific mechanism; and

   *  the Resource Server needs the Subject Signing Key in order to
      verify that evidence.

   This specification is not needed when the only required key is held
   by the Client presenting the Access Token.  In that case, a proof-of-
   possession mechanism such as DPoP [RFC9449] or mutual-TLS
   certificate-bound Access Tokens [RFC8705] is appropriate.

   This specification does not establish the real-world identity of the
   Subject.  The confidence that a Resource Server can place in a
   Subject Key Binding is limited by the Authorization Server's Subject
   authentication, key enrollment, account recovery, and key-management
   processes.

3.2.  Scope

   This specification standardizes only the conveyance and processing of
   a Subject Key Binding between an Authorization Server and a Resource
   Server.

   This specification does not define:

   *  how a Subject generates, stores, or protects a signing key;

   *  a wire protocol for key enrollment, update, recovery, suspension,
      or revocation;

   *  the syntax of Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence;

   *  how a Client obtains Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence;

   *  a new source of OAuth authority;

   *  a replacement for Access Token validation;

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   *  a mechanism for Client authentication; or

   *  a mechanism for sender-constraining an Access Token.

   A specification or deployment profile that uses this specification
   MUST define the syntax and validation rules for its Subject-Signed
   Authorization Evidence, including the requirements in Section 8.3.

4.  Protocol Overview

   A typical deployment consists of the following steps:

 Subject             Client              AS                 RS
    |                  |                  |                  |
    | (1) Establish Subject Key Binding   |                  |
    |------------------------------------>|                  |
    |                  |                  |                  |
    |                  | (2) OAuth Token Request             |
    |                  |----------------->|                  |
    |                  | (3) Access Token |                  |
    |                  |<-----------------|                  |
    |                  |                  |                  |
    | (4) Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence              |
    |----------------->|                  |                  |
    |                  |                  |                  |
    |                  | (5) Access Token + Evidence         |
    |                  |------------------------------------>|
    |                  |                  |                  |
    |                  |                  | (6) Introspection|
    |                  |                  |<-----------------|
    |                  |                  | subject_keys     |
    |                  |                  |----------------->|
    |                  |                  |                  |
    |                  |                  |                  | (7) Validate,
    |                  |                  |                  |     verify, and
    |                  |                  |                  |     authorize

   1.  The Subject and the Authorization Server establish a Subject Key
       Binding.  The wire protocol for this step is out of scope, but
       the requirements in Section 7.1 apply.

   2.  The Client requests an Access Token using an OAuth grant
       applicable to the deployment.

   3.  The Authorization Server issues an Access Token.  It either
       includes subject_keys in a JWT Access Token or associates
       subject_keys with the Access Token for later return through Token
       Introspection.

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   4.  The Subject provides Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence to the
       Client through an application-specific mechanism.

   5.  The Client presents the Access Token and the Subject-Signed
       Authorization Evidence to the Resource Server.

   6.  When the Subject Key Binding is not carried in the Access Token,
       the Resource Server obtains it through Token Introspection.  A
       Resource Server MAY also introspect a JWT Access Token when
       fresher token or key-binding status is required.

   7.  The Resource Server validates the Access Token, obtains and
       validates subject_keys, verifies the Subject-Signed Authorization
       Evidence, and applies the authorization-composition rules in
       Section 8.4.

   Steps 1 and 4 are shown only to explain the provenance and use of the
   key.  This specification defines no messages for either step.

5.  The subject_keys Parameter

5.1.  Parameter Definition

   The subject_keys parameter conveys a Subject Key Binding.  Its value
   MUST be a JWK Set as defined in Section 5 of [RFC7517].

   When an Authorization Server includes subject_keys in a JWT Access
   Token or an active Token Introspection response, it asserts all of
   the following within the context of that Access Token:

   1.  Each public key in the JWK Set is associated with the Subject
       identified by sub.

   2.  The Authorization Server permits the Resource Server identified
       by aud to use the key to verify Subject-Signed Authorization
       Evidence.

   3.  The binding is valid only within the validity context of the
       Access Token.

   4.  The Authorization Server selected the key from authenticated and
       integrity-protected state, rather than accepting it as an
       untrusted value supplied in the current resource request.

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   The assertion is scoped by the tuple consisting of the Authorization
   Server issuer, the sub value, the Access Token audience, and the
   Access Token validity period.  A Resource Server MUST NOT interpret
   the binding as a universal statement that the key identifies the same
   Subject at another issuer, for another audience, or outside that
   validity period.

   The presence of subject_keys does not assert that:

   *  the Subject has a particular civil, legal, or organizational
      identity;

   *  the Client possesses the corresponding private key;

   *  the Subject is currently present;

   *  a particular item of Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence is
      fresh or non-replayed;

   *  the key is suitable for authentication or signing in another
      protocol; or

   *  the Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence grants authority beyond
      the Access Token.

   The iss, sub, aud, and exp claim names are defined by [RFC7519].  The
   subject_keys parameter MUST NOT be present unless the token
   information also contains all four values.  When nbf or iat is
   present, it also constrains the validity context of the binding.

   An Authorization Server MUST NOT include subject_keys in an Access
   Token that represents only a Client unless the sub value
   unambiguously identifies the same entity to which the conveyed key is
   bound and a deployment profile explicitly defines that use.  In
   ordinary Client Credentials Grant deployments, subject_keys MUST be
   omitted.

5.2.  JWK Set Requirements

   The subject_keys JWK Set MUST contain at least one key.  The JWK Set
   object and each JWK MUST NOT contain duplicate JSON member names.
   Each JWK in the set MUST satisfy all of the following requirements:

   *  It MUST represent an asymmetric public key.

   *  It MUST contain all public-key parameters required for local
      signature verification.

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   *  It MUST NOT contain a symmetric key or any private-key parameter.

   *  It MUST contain a kid member.  The kid value MUST be unique within
      the JWK Set.

   *  The Authorization Server MUST NOT reassign a kid value to
      different key material within the same issuer, sub, and audience
      context.

   *  The kid value SHOULD be the base64url-encoded SHA-256 JWK
      Thumbprint of the public key computed according to [RFC7638].
      When another identifier is used, the Authorization Server MUST
      ensure that it is collision resistant within its key-binding
      namespace.

   *  If the use member is present, its value MUST be sig.

   *  If the key_ops member is present, its value MUST be an array
      containing exactly the single value verify.

   *  If the alg member is present, it MUST identify an asymmetric
      digital-signature algorithm registered in [IANA.JOSE.ALGS].  The
      value none and algorithms based on a shared secret MUST NOT be
      used.

   *  The x5u member MUST NOT be present.  A Resource Server MUST NOT
      dereference any URI found in a JWK in order to obtain key
      material.

   An Authorization Server SHOULD include only the key or keys needed by
   the intended Resource Server.  It SHOULD NOT include every key
   associated with the Subject.  Multiple keys are permitted to support
   controlled rotation or multiple evidence-signature algorithms, but
   excessive key sets increase token size, processing cost, and
   linkability.

   An Authorization Server SHOULD NOT include an x5c certificate chain.
   If x5c is included, the Resource Server MUST verify that the
   certificate public key is identical to the public key represented
   directly by the JWK.  The Resource Server MUST NOT infer Subject
   identity, key purpose, or additional authority from the certificate
   unless a separate profile explicitly defines those semantics and its
   validation rules.

   The trust in a key conveyed by this specification derives from the
   Authorization Server's protection of the Subject Key Binding, not
   merely from possession of the public key or from metadata contained
   in the JWK.

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5.3.  Example Parameter Value

   The following is a non-normative example of a subject_keys value.
   The kid is the SHA-256 JWK Thumbprint of the illustrated public key.

   {
     "keys": [
       {
         "kty": "EC",
         "crv": "P-256",
         "x": "_08TJUimHSY1JnPxVMUZrGJKYczKhlpE7B8OPa7dUrI",
         "y": "_uep1jw-96U_vuqidgynBdM1I0p2GyflCIcoTH2xw6w",
         "kid": "W2SzHiKALVGwe34ECUSz3kGWHpFCWMt1Z8k_pFuk3TI",
         "use": "sig",
         "key_ops": ["verify"],
         "alg": "ES256"
       }
     ]
   }

6.  Conveying Subject Keys

6.1.  JWT Access Tokens

   When a Subject Key Binding is conveyed in a JWT Access Token, the
   Authorization Server MUST include subject_keys as a top-level claim
   in a JWT Access Token conforming to [RFC9068].

   The Resource Server MUST validate the JWT Access Token in accordance
   with [RFC9068], [RFC8725], and the security requirements applicable
   to its deployment before trusting subject_keys.  In particular, it
   MUST validate the token type, signature, issuer, audience, and time-
   based claims using keys and algorithms configured for the
   Authorization Server.

   The following is a non-normative example of a decoded JWT Access
   Token claims set:

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   {
     "iss": "https://as.example.com",
     "sub": "8f7d3b1e-4c02-4fa7-a4e8-53a58f8e6729",
     "aud": "https://rs.example.com",
     "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
     "iat": 1785283200,
     "exp": 1785283500,
     "scope": "orders:create orders:read",
     "subject_keys": {
       "keys": [
         {
           "kty": "EC",
           "crv": "P-256",
           "x": "_08TJUimHSY1JnPxVMUZrGJKYczKhlpE7B8OPa7dUrI",
           "y": "_uep1jw-96U_vuqidgynBdM1I0p2GyflCIcoTH2xw6w",
           "kid": "W2SzHiKALVGwe34ECUSz3kGWHpFCWMt1Z8k_pFuk3TI",
           "use": "sig",
           "key_ops": ["verify"],
           "alg": "ES256"
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   When a JWT Access Token has more than one audience, the Authorization
   Server MUST NOT include a Subject Signing Key unless every audience
   receiving the token is authorized to receive the same Subject Key
   Binding.  Authorization Servers SHOULD issue audience-restricted
   Access Tokens and SHOULD use Resource Indicators [RFC8707] or an
   equivalent mechanism to identify the intended Resource Server.

6.2.  Token Introspection

   When a Subject Key Binding is conveyed through Token Introspection,
   the Authorization Server MUST include subject_keys as a top-level
   member of an active introspection response as defined by [RFC7662].

   An introspection response containing subject_keys MUST also contain
   iss, sub, aud, and exp.  The iss value MUST identify the
   Authorization Server responsible for the Access Token.  The aud value
   MUST identify the Resource Server or Resource Servers for which the
   Access Token was issued.

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   The Authorization Server MUST authenticate and authorize the
   introspection caller before returning subject_keys.  It MUST NOT
   include subject_keys in a response where active is false.  It MUST
   NOT disclose the Subject Key Binding to an introspection caller that
   is not authorized to receive token information for an intended
   audience of the Access Token.

   The following is a non-normative example:

   {
     "active": true,
     "iss": "https://as.example.com",
     "sub": "8f7d3b1e-4c02-4fa7-a4e8-53a58f8e6729",
     "aud": "https://rs.example.com",
     "client_id": "s6BhdRkqt3",
     "iat": 1785283200,
     "exp": 1785283500,
     "scope": "orders:create orders:read",
     "subject_keys": {
       "keys": [
         {
           "kty": "EC",
           "crv": "P-256",
           "x": "_08TJUimHSY1JnPxVMUZrGJKYczKhlpE7B8OPa7dUrI",
           "y": "_uep1jw-96U_vuqidgynBdM1I0p2GyflCIcoTH2xw6w",
           "kid": "W2SzHiKALVGwe34ECUSz3kGWHpFCWMt1Z8k_pFuk3TI",
           "use": "sig",
           "key_ops": ["verify"],
           "alg": "ES256"
         }
       ]
     }
   }

   An Authorization Server and Resource Server MAY use a JWT-secured
   introspection response as defined by [RFC9701].  Whether a plain JSON
   response protected by the requirements of [RFC7662] or a JWT-secured
   response is used, the Resource Server MUST establish that the
   response came from the Authorization Server responsible for the
   Access Token.

6.3.  Use of Multiple Conveyance Mechanisms

   An Authorization Server MAY convey subject_keys in a JWT Access
   Token, through Token Introspection, or through both mechanisms.

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   When a Resource Server introspects a JWT Access Token for current
   status, the active introspection response is authoritative for that
   request.  The Resource Server MUST NOT combine the subject_keys JWK
   Set from the JWT Access Token with a JWK Set returned by
   introspection.  If the operation requires a Subject Key Binding and
   the active introspection response omits subject_keys, the Resource
   Server MUST treat no current Subject Key Binding as available, even
   if the JWT Access Token contains the claim.

   If both sources contain a key with the same kid but different
   cryptographic key material, the Resource Server MUST reject the
   request and SHOULD record a security event.  Comparison MUST be based
   on the cryptographic key material, such as an RFC 7638 JWK
   Thumbprint, and not on JSON serialization or member order.

6.4.  Confidentiality

   A signed but unencrypted JWT Access Token can expose subject_keys to
   the Client and to any party that obtains the token.  When that
   disclosure is undesirable, the Authorization Server SHOULD use an
   opaque Access Token with protected Token Introspection, an encrypted
   JWT Access Token, or another deployment-specific confidentiality
   mechanism.

   The selected conveyance mechanism MUST preserve the integrity and the
   issuer, subject, audience, and validity semantics defined by this
   specification.

7.  Authorization Server Processing

7.1.  Establishing a Subject Key Binding

   The wire protocol by which a Subject Signing Key is enrolled or
   provisioned is out of scope.  Before conveying a key under this
   specification, however, the Authorization Server MUST establish an
   authenticated binding between the key and the Subject.

   The binding process MUST satisfy the following requirements:

   1.  The Authorization Server MUST authenticate the Subject, or rely
       on an equivalent trusted administrative provisioning process, at
       an assurance level appropriate for the protected resource.

   2.  The Authorization Server MUST verify control of the private key
       corresponding to the enrolled public key, unless an equivalent
       trusted provisioning process has already established that
       control.  Merely receiving a public key is not proof of private-
       key control.

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   3.  A proof-of-control ceremony SHOULD use a fresh challenge bound to
       the Authorization Server, the authenticated Subject account, and
       the intended key purpose, so that a proof generated for another
       account or protocol cannot be replayed to establish the binding.

   4.  The Authorization Server MUST protect key enrollment,
       replacement, recovery, suspension, and revocation operations
       against unauthorized Clients, session compromise, and account-
       recovery abuse.

   5.  Possession of an ordinary Access Token or Refresh Token by a
       Client MUST NOT, by itself, authorize creation, replacement, or
       reactivation of a Subject Signing Key.  A key-management
       operation requires separate authorization appropriate to its
       security impact.

   6.  The Authorization Server MUST maintain the lifecycle state of the
       binding, including whether the key is active, replaced, expired,
       suspended, or revoked.

   7.  The Authorization Server MUST associate the binding with the
       Resource Server audiences and key purposes for which disclosure
       and use are permitted.

   8.  The Authorization Server MUST apply its disclosure policy before
       releasing the key to a Resource Server and, where required by the
       deployment, obtain Subject consent for that disclosure.

   An Authorization Server SHOULD support audience-specific or pairwise
   Subject Signing Keys.  A key enrolled for one Resource Server SHOULD
   NOT be disclosed to another Resource Server unless the Subject and
   Authorization Server have authorized that reuse.

7.2.  Selecting Keys for an Access Token

   When issuing or introspecting an Access Token, the Authorization
   Server MUST perform the following processing before including
   subject_keys:

   1.  Determine the Subject represented by the grant and the sub value
       that will be exposed to the intended Resource Server.

   2.  Determine the intended Resource Server audience.

   3.  Retrieve only active Subject Signing Keys bound to that Subject
       and authorized for that audience and intended use.

   4.  Confirm that each key satisfies Section 5.2.

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   5.  Ensure that the Access Token expiration time does not exceed any
       internal expiration or authorization limit on the selected
       Subject Key Binding.

   6.  Construct subject_keys only from trusted Authorization Server
       state.

   The Authorization Server MUST NOT copy a public key supplied by the
   Client in the current authorization request, token request, or
   resource request into subject_keys without independently establishing
   that key through the binding process described in Section 7.1.

   This specification defines no Client parameter for requesting a
   particular subject_keys value.  Inclusion of the parameter is
   determined by Authorization Server policy, the intended Resource
   Server, the grant, and any applicable Subject authorization.  A
   deployment MAY use scopes, Resource Indicators, Rich Authorization
   Requests, or other policy inputs to determine that a Resource Server
   requires a Subject Key Binding, but those inputs do not change the
   syntax or semantics of subject_keys.

   If no valid Subject Signing Key is available, the Authorization
   Server MUST omit subject_keys or fail Access Token issuance according
   to deployment policy.  It MUST NOT emit an empty JWK Set or an
   unverified key.

7.3.  Rotation, Revocation, and Freshness

   The Authorization Server MUST re-evaluate the Subject Key Binding
   whenever it issues a new Access Token or produces an active
   introspection response.

   The Authorization Server MUST stop including a revoked, suspended, or
   expired key in newly issued Access Tokens and active introspection
   responses.

   Revoking a key does not modify a previously issued self-contained JWT
   Access Token.  Deployments requiring prompt revocation SHOULD use
   short-lived JWT Access Tokens, Token Introspection, or both.  A
   Resource Server MAY introspect a JWT Access Token before a high-risk
   operation to obtain fresher status information.

   During controlled rotation, the Authorization Server MAY include both
   an old and a new public key for a limited overlap period.  Each key
   MUST have a distinct kid.  The overlap period SHOULD be no longer
   than required to process in-flight Subject-Signed Authorization
   Evidence and complete deployment migration.

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   Whether evidence signed before key revocation or rotation remains
   acceptable is an application-specific decision.  An evidence profile
   that permits such evidence MUST define how the Resource Server
   establishes the signing time and the key status applicable at that
   time.

8.  Resource Server Processing

8.1.  Access Token and Key-Binding Validation

   Before using subject_keys, the Resource Server MUST validate the
   Access Token using the rules applicable to its token format and
   deployment.  Validation of a JWT Access Token MUST include the
   processing required by [RFC9068] and [RFC8725].  Validation of an
   opaque Access Token MUST use an authorized Token Introspection
   exchange or another method agreed with the Authorization Server.

   The Resource Server MUST perform at least the following checks:

   1.  Establish the Authorization Server responsible for the Access
       Token.

   2.  Verify that the Access Token is active, has not expired, and,
       when an nbf value is present, is not used before that time.

   3.  Verify that the Resource Server is an intended audience of the
       Access Token.

   4.  Verify that sub is present and interpret it only within the
       validated issuer and audience context.  When the operation
       targets a Subject-specific resource, verify that sub is
       consistent with that resource.

   5.  Obtain subject_keys from the validated JWT Access Token or from
       an active introspection response.

   6.  Validate the JWK Set and each candidate JWK according to
       Section 5.2.

   7.  Apply local limits on the encoded size of subject_keys, the
       number of keys, accepted key types, and accepted algorithms.

   If Resource Server policy requires a Subject Key Binding for an
   operation and no valid subject_keys value is available, the Resource
   Server MUST NOT perform that operation.

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   The Resource Server MUST NOT accept a Subject Signing Key received
   from the Client, from the Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence
   itself, or from another untrusted application-layer field as a
   substitute for subject_keys.  An evidence object MAY carry a kid or
   thumbprint for selection, but the selected public key MUST come from
   the Authorization Server-protected binding.

8.2.  Key Selection and Signature Verification

   The applicable evidence profile MUST provide an integrity-protected
   key identifier or an otherwise unambiguous rule for selecting a
   Subject Signing Key.

   When subject_keys contains more than one key, the Resource Server
   MUST select exactly one key before verifying the evidence.  It MUST
   NOT try every key until a signature succeeds unless the evidence
   profile explicitly defines that behavior and bounds its resource
   cost.

   The Resource Server MUST reject the evidence if:

   *  the evidence identifies a kid that is absent from subject_keys;

   *  more than one key matches the selection rule;

   *  the selected key is not permitted by the evidence profile or local
      policy;

   *  the evidence algorithm is not permitted by the evidence profile or
      local policy;

   *  an alg value in the JWK is inconsistent with the evidence
      signature algorithm; or

   *  signature verification fails.

   A valid signature proves only that the evidence was produced using
   the private key corresponding to a Subject Signing Key.  It does not,
   by itself, establish that the request is fresh, that the Client is an
   authorized delegate, or that the requested operation is authorized.

8.3.  Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence Profile Requirements

   A specification or deployment profile using Subject-Signed
   Authorization Evidence MUST define all of the following:

   *  the evidence syntax, media type or equivalent format identifier,
      and digital-signature structure;

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   *  the cryptographic algorithms and key types that Resource Servers
      accept;

   *  how an integrity-protected key identifier selects a key from
      subject_keys;

   *  how the evidence is restricted to an intended Resource Server,
      resource, or operation;

   *  how the evidence identifies or is bound to the intended Client,
      delegate, or presenter when such a binding is required;

   *  how the evidence is bound to the relevant request parameters or
      transaction data;

   *  its issuance time, expiration, and acceptable clock skew;

   *  nonce, unique identifier, or other replay-prevention requirements;

   *  canonicalization and comparison rules for authorization values;

   *  how Evidence Authority is derived from the evidence;

   *  how unknown, omitted, duplicate, or conflicting fields are
      handled; and

   *  the application error returned when evidence validation fails.

   A profile MUST use fail-closed processing.  An omitted or
   unrecognized authorization constraint MUST NOT be interpreted as
   granting additional authority unless the profile explicitly and
   unambiguously defines that interpretation.

8.4.  Authorization Composition

   The Resource Server MUST determine the effective authority of a
   request by applying all applicable authorization constraints.  At a
   minimum:

   Effective Authority =
       Token Authority
     INTERSECT Evidence Authority
     INTERSECT Resource Server Local Policy

   The Resource Server MUST perform the requested operation only when
   the complete operation, including all security-relevant parameters,
   is permitted by each of these three inputs.

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   Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence MUST NOT be treated as an
   independent grant that can add a scope, resource, action, amount,
   recipient, time period, delegation right, or other permission absent
   from the validated Token Authority.  Likewise, the Access Token does
   not override a narrower constraint in valid Subject-Signed
   Authorization Evidence.

   When constraints are expressed using different vocabularies or data
   models, the Resource Server or an explicitly trusted policy component
   MUST perform a deterministic, fail-closed mapping.  If the mapping is
   ambiguous, incomplete, or unsupported, the Resource Server MUST
   reject the operation.

8.5.  Client and Presenter Binding

   The Subject Signing Key is distinct from a Client proof-of-possession
   key.  If the Access Token is sender-constrained, the Resource Server
   MUST validate the applicable sender-constraining mechanism
   independently of the Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence.

   When the Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence identifies an intended
   Client, delegate, or presenter, the Resource Server MUST compare that
   identifier with the validated Access Token and request context.  For
   example, a profile can require a value in the evidence to match
   client_id, an actor claim, or a proof-of-possession key thumbprint
   associated with the Access Token.

   The Resource Server MUST reject a request when a required Client or
   presenter binding does not match.  Successful verification of the
   Subject's signature does not repair or replace a failed Client
   authentication or sender-constraining check.

8.6.  Caching

   A Resource Server MAY cache public key material obtained through this
   specification, but it MUST NOT treat a cached key as a current
   Subject Key Binding for a new Access Token unless that new token
   independently conveys, or its introspection response independently
   returns, the same binding.

   A cached binding MUST be scoped at least by Authorization Server
   issuer, sub, audience, and kid.  Its use MUST be bounded by the
   expiration of the Access Token or introspection result from which it
   was obtained and by any shorter local freshness limit.

   A Resource Server MUST NOT use a key cached for one issuer, Subject,
   or audience to verify evidence in another context merely because the
   kid or public key material is the same.

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9.  Relationship to Existing OAuth and JWT Parameters

9.1.  The cnf Claim

   The cnf claim defined by [RFC7800] identifies a proof-of-possession
   key held by the presenter of a JWT.  In OAuth deployments, it is
   commonly used to sender-constrain an Access Token to the Client
   presenting that token.

   The subject_keys parameter has different semantics.  It identifies a
   public signing key associated with the Subject for verification of a
   separate application-layer authorization artifact.  The Client is not
   assumed to possess the corresponding private key.

   An Access Token MAY contain both cnf and subject_keys.  A Resource
   Server MUST process each according to its own semantics and MUST NOT
   infer one binding from the other.  The use of the same key for both
   purposes is NOT RECOMMENDED because it weakens key separation and can
   create cross-protocol confusion.

9.2.  Rich Authorization Requests

   Rich Authorization Requests [RFC9396] allow a Client to express fine-
   grained authorization requirements using the authorization_details
   parameter.  Such authorization details describe requested or granted
   authorization.  They are not a container for Subject public-key
   metadata.

   A deployment MAY use authorization_details to express Token Authority
   and MAY use subject_keys in the resulting Access Token or
   introspection response.  The Resource Server MUST process the two
   independently and apply Section 8.4.  The subject_keys parameter
   defined by this specification MUST NOT be nested in
   authorization_details; it is conveyed only as the top-level JWT claim
   or introspection response member defined in Section 6.1 and
   Section 6.2.

9.3.  The sub_jwk Claim

   The sub_jwk claim is registered in [IANA.JWT.Claims] for the public
   key used to verify the signature of a particular form of ID Token.
   This specification does not change those semantics and does not
   repurpose sub_jwk for Access Tokens or Token Introspection responses.

10.  Error Handling

   This specification defines no new OAuth error code.

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   A malformed or invalid subject_keys value in a JWT Access Token makes
   the token unusable for an operation that relies on this
   specification.  When the Bearer authentication scheme is used, the
   Resource Server SHOULD use the invalid_token error defined by
   [RFC6750] if the token cannot be accepted.

   When an otherwise valid Access Token lacks a Subject Key Binding
   required by a particular resource operation, the Resource Server MAY
   use insufficient_scope as defined by [RFC6750] when that error
   accurately describes the failure.  Otherwise, it SHOULD use an
   application-specific error that does not incorrectly imply that the
   Access Token itself is malformed.

   Failure to validate Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence SHOULD be
   reported using an application-specific error defined by the evidence
   profile.  Error responses SHOULD avoid revealing whether a particular
   Subject has an enrolled key or which keys are associated with that
   Subject, except when such disclosure is authorized and operationally
   necessary.

11.  Security Considerations

   OAuth deployments implementing this specification MUST follow the
   security guidance in [RFC9700] in addition to the requirements below.

11.1.  Key Substitution During Enrollment

   The primary threat to a Subject Key Binding is substitution of an
   attacker's public key for the Subject's key.  If an attacker can
   create or replace the binding, the attacker can produce evidence that
   appears to have been signed by the Subject.

   Authorization Servers MUST apply the authenticated binding and proof-
   of-control requirements in Section 7.1.  Account recovery and key
   recovery are security-critical operations and MUST receive
   protections comparable to, or stronger than, initial enrollment.
   Implementations SHOULD notify the Subject when a Subject Signing Key
   is added, replaced, suspended, reactivated, or revoked.

11.2.  Issuer, Subject, Audience, and Key-Identifier Confusion

   A Subject Signing Key is not identified by kid alone.  Different
   Authorization Servers, Subjects, or audiences can legitimately use
   the same kid.  A Resource Server MUST namespace a Subject Key Binding
   by the Authorization Server issuer, sub, audience, and kid.

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   The Resource Server MUST validate that it is an intended audience of
   the Access Token before using subject_keys.  Failure to validate the
   audience can disclose a key to an unintended Resource Server or allow
   evidence created for one service to be accepted by another.

   Subject identifiers can be pairwise, sector-specific, or otherwise
   audience-dependent.  A Resource Server MUST NOT equate Subjects
   across issuers or audiences solely because the same public key or kid
   appears in multiple tokens.

11.3.  Algorithm and JWK Validation

   A malicious or malformed JWK can trigger algorithm confusion, parser
   inconsistencies, remote retrieval, or excessive resource consumption.
   Resource Servers MUST enforce Section 5.2, maintain an explicit
   allowlist of acceptable signature algorithms and key types, and
   follow the JWT and JOSE validation guidance in [RFC8725] where
   applicable.

   The algorithm declared by Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence is
   attacker-controlled input until the evidence is verified.  A Resource
   Server MUST NOT accept an algorithm merely because it appears in the
   evidence or the JWK.  The algorithm MUST also be permitted by the
   evidence profile and local policy.

   A Resource Server MUST NOT dereference x5u or another URI obtained
   from an untrusted key object.  This avoids server-side request
   forgery and key substitution through attacker-controlled locations.

11.4.  Stale and Revoked Keys

   A self-contained JWT Access Token can continue to carry a Subject
   Signing Key that was revoked after token issuance.  The maximum
   stale-key window is therefore bounded by the Access Token lifetime
   unless the Resource Server performs Token Introspection or another
   current-status check.

   High-risk deployments SHOULD use short-lived Access Tokens and SHOULD
   introspect before irreversible or high-value operations.
   Authorization Servers SHOULD make revocation effective immediately in
   active introspection responses.

   A Resource Server that performs introspection MUST use the current
   introspection result as specified in Section 6.3 and MUST NOT restore
   a revoked key by merging it from the JWT Access Token.

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11.5.  Replay of Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence

   A valid signature does not prevent replay.  An attacker who obtains a
   valid Access Token and previously signed evidence might replay both
   unless the evidence is bound to a specific audience, request,
   operation, parameter set, nonce, unique identifier, or time window.

   Every evidence profile using this specification MUST define replay
   protections appropriate to its operation.  Resource Servers MUST
   enforce those protections.  Irreversible and high-value operations
   SHOULD use a fresh server-provided nonce or a cryptographic binding
   to the exact request.

11.6.  Token Theft and Client Binding

   The Subject Key Binding does not sender-constrain the Access Token
   and does not authenticate the Client presenting it.  Bearer-token
   theft remains possible when bearer Access Tokens are used.
   Deployments SHOULD use DPoP [RFC9449], mutual-TLS certificate-bound
   Access Tokens [RFC8705], or another sender-constraining mechanism
   where appropriate.

   When Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence identifies an intended
   Client, delegate, or proof-of-possession key, the Resource Server
   MUST compare that identity or key with the validated Access Token and
   request context.  Otherwise, a different Client that obtains both
   artifacts might be able to replay them.

11.7.  Authorization Inflation

   Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence can contain permissions or
   parameters that are broader than those in the Access Token.
   Accepting that evidence as an independent grant would allow it to
   inflate the Client's OAuth authority.

   Resource Servers MUST apply Section 8.4.  Subject-Signed
   Authorization Evidence can narrow, but cannot enlarge, the Token
   Authority or bypass Resource Server policy.

11.8.  Key Separation and Cross-Protocol Use

   Reusing one Subject key for account authentication, Subject-Signed
   Authorization Evidence, Client proof of possession, and unrelated
   protocols increases the impact of compromise and creates cross-
   protocol risks.

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   Subjects and Authorization Servers SHOULD use a dedicated key for
   Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence.  Evidence profiles SHOULD
   define a distinct media type, signature context, or domain-separation
   value so that a signature created for one protocol cannot be
   interpreted as valid evidence in another.

   A Resource Server MUST NOT use a Subject Signing Key for another
   purpose unless a separate specification explicitly authorizes that
   use.

11.9.  Authorization Server Compromise

   The Resource Server trusts the Authorization Server to establish the
   correct Subject Key Binding.  Compromise of the Authorization Server
   or its key-binding database can cause arbitrary keys to be associated
   with Subjects.  This specification does not reduce that trust
   dependency.

   Authorization Servers SHOULD protect key-binding records with strong
   access controls, integrity protection, change monitoring, and
   recovery procedures.  Resource Servers SHOULD monitor unexpected key
   changes for high-value Subjects or operations when deployment policy
   permits.

11.10.  Resource Exhaustion

   Large JWK Sets and expensive signature algorithms can be used to
   consume Resource Server resources.  Authorization Servers SHOULD
   limit the number and encoded size of keys in subject_keys.  Resource
   Servers MUST enforce local size and key-count limits before
   performing cryptographic operations and SHOULD select a key by an
   integrity-protected identifier rather than attempting every key.

12.  Privacy Considerations

   A stable public key is a correlatable identifier even when no account
   name is disclosed.  Reusing the same Subject Signing Key at multiple
   Resource Servers can allow those Resource Servers, Clients, or token
   observers to correlate the Subject's activity.

   Authorization Servers SHOULD use audience-specific or pairwise
   Subject Signing Keys and SHOULD align them with pairwise sub values
   where possible.  They SHOULD disclose only the key needed by the
   intended Resource Server and SHOULD avoid multi-audience Access
   Tokens carrying Subject Key Bindings.

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   When subject_keys is included in a signed but unencrypted JWT Access
   Token, the Client can inspect the key and potentially correlate it
   with keys seen elsewhere.  Deployments that do not want the Client to
   observe the key SHOULD use opaque Access Tokens with protected Token
   Introspection or another confidentiality-preserving mechanism.

   A Subject Key Binding should contain only public key material and the
   minimum metadata needed for verification.  Authorization Servers
   SHOULD avoid embedding certificates or other structures containing
   names, email addresses, device identifiers, or unrelated personal
   data unless required by a separate deployment profile.

   Resource Servers and Authorization Servers SHOULD minimize logging of
   full public keys and Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence.  When
   operationally sufficient, logs SHOULD record a scoped kid or JWK
   Thumbprint together with the issuer and audience rather than the
   complete key or evidence payload.

13.  IANA Considerations

13.1.  JSON Web Token Claims Registration

   This specification requests registration of the following claim in
   the "JSON Web Token Claims" registry maintained in [IANA.JWT.Claims]:

   *  Claim Name: subject_keys

   *  Claim Description: JWK Set containing public signing keys
      associated by the issuer with the token subject for the token
      audience

   *  Change Controller: IETF

   *  Reference: Section 5 of this specification

13.2.  OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration

   This specification requests registration of the following member in
   the "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry maintained in
   [IANA.OAuth.Params]:

   *  Name: subject_keys

   *  Description: JWK Set containing public signing keys associated by
      the authorization server with the token subject for the token
      audience

   *  Change Controller: IETF

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   *  Reference: Section 6.2 of this specification

14.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
              RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.

   [RFC6750]  Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
              Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7519]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.

   [RFC7638]  Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
              Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.

   [RFC7662]  Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
              RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8725]  Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best
              Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8725>.

   [RFC9068]  Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
              Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October
              2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9068>.

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   [RFC9700]  Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
              "Best Current Practice for OAuth 2.0 Security", BCP 240,
              RFC 9700, DOI 10.17487/RFC9700, January 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9700>.

   [IANA.JOSE.ALGS]
              IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml#web-
              signature-encryption-algorithms>.

   [IANA.JWT.Claims]
              IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt/jwt.xhtml#claims>.

   [IANA.OAuth.Params]
              IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters/oauth-
              parameters.xhtml>.

15.  Informative References

   [RFC7800]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
              Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
              RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.

   [RFC8705]  Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Sakimura, N., and T.
              Lodderstedt, "OAuth 2.0 Mutual-TLS Client Authentication
              and Certificate-Bound Access Tokens", RFC 8705,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8705, February 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8705>.

   [RFC8707]  Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource
              Indicators for OAuth 2.0", RFC 8707, DOI 10.17487/RFC8707,
              February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8707>.

   [RFC9396]  Lodderstedt, T., Richer, J., and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0
              Rich Authorization Requests", RFC 9396,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9396, May 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9396>.

   [RFC9449]  Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
              Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
              Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
              September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.

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   [RFC9701]  Lodderstedt, T., Ed. and V. Dzhuvinov, "JSON Web Token
              (JWT) Response for OAuth Token Introspection", RFC 9701,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9701, January 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9701>.

Document History

   This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   -00

   *  Replaces draft-chu-oauth-as-attested-user-cert.

   *  Retitled and reframed the specification as "OAuth Subject Signing
      Key Binding for Resource Servers".

   *  Replaced the Authorization Server-attested user-certificate
      request model with an Authorization Server-protected Subject Key
      Binding conveyed in a JWT Access Token or Token Introspection
      response.

   *  Removed the Rich Authorization Requests authorization-details type
      and the requirement for a separately signed public-key
      certificate.

   *  Removed dependencies on a particular authorization grant, response
      type, Client type, and application-layer evidence format.

   *  Defined the subject_keys parameter as a JWK Set and distinguished
      Subject Signing Keys from Client proof-of-possession keys
      represented by cnf.

   *  Defined issuer, subject, audience, validity, key-enrollment,
      rotation, revocation, caching, Resource Server processing, and
      authorization-composition requirements.

   *  Clarified that Subject-Signed Authorization Evidence can only
      narrow, and cannot expand, the authority represented by an Access
      Token.

   *  Added detailed security, privacy, error-handling, and IANA
      considerations.

Authors' Addresses

   Cheng-Kang Chu
   Huawei International Pte. Ltd.
   Email: chu.cheng.kang@huawei.com

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   Ruochen Li
   Huawei International Pte. Ltd.
   Email: li.ruochen@h-partners.com

   Haiguang Wang
   Huawei International Pte. Ltd.
   Email: wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com

   Tieyan Li
   Huawei International Pte. Ltd.
   Email: Li.Tieyan@huawei.com

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