Secure Key Integration Protocol (SKIP)
draft-cisco-skip-01
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
Expired & archived
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|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Rajiv Singh , Craig Hill , Scott Kawaguchi , Joey Lupo | ||
| Last updated | 2025-09-03 (Latest revision 2025-03-02) | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Expired | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document specifies the Secure Key Integration Protocol (SKIP), a two-party protocol that allows a client to securely obtain a key from an independent Key Provider. SKIP enables network and security operators to provide quantum-resistant keys suitable for use with quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms such as AES-256. It can also be used to provide an additional layer of security to an already quantum-resistant secure channel protocol for a defense-in-depth strategy, and/or enforce key management policies.
Authors
Rajiv Singh
Craig Hill
Scott Kawaguchi
Joey Lupo
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)