Key Blinding for Signature Schemes
draft-dew-cfrg-signature-key-blinding-02
Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Frank Denis , Edward Eaton , Christopher A. Wood | ||
Last updated | 2022-05-03 | ||
Replaced by | draft-irtf-cfrg-signature-key-blinding | ||
RFC stream | (None) | ||
Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
Formats | |||
Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-irtf-cfrg-signature-key-blinding | |
Telechat date | (None) | ||
Responsible AD | (None) | ||
Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document describes extensions to existing digital signature schemes for key blinding. The core property of signing with key blinding is that a blinded public key and all signatures produced using the blinded key pair are independent of the unblinded key pair. Moreover, signatures produced using blinded key pairs are indistinguishable from signatures produced using unblinded key pairs. This functionality has a variety of applications, including Tor onion services and privacy-preserving airdrop for bootstrapping cryptocurrency systems.
Authors
Frank Denis
Edward Eaton
Christopher A. Wood
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)