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Cryptographic Execution-Trace Verification, JCS Canonicalization, and Fail-Closed Delegation Attestation for Autonomous AI Agents
draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Raghuvar Karthik Durga
Last updated 2026-10-29
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draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification-00
Network Working Group                                        R. K. Durga
Internet-Draft                                     Microsoft Corporation
Intended status: Informational                           29 October 2026
Expires: 2 May 2027

 Cryptographic Execution-Trace Verification, JCS Canonicalization, and
      Fail-Closed Delegation Attestation for Autonomous AI Agents
              draft-durga-agenttrust-trace-verification-00

Abstract

   This document specifies a deterministic cryptographic verification
   profile for execution traces, delegation chains, and weight-custody
   manifests generated by autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents
   operating across Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent-to-Agent (A2A),
   and enterprise system-of-record boundaries.  The profile binds JSON
   Canonicalization Scheme (JCS, RFC 8785) pre-image serialization,
   Ed25519 (RFC 8032) and ECDSA P-256/P-384 signatures, JSON Web Key
   (JWK, RFC 7517) thumbprint pinning, and fail-closed revocation and
   freshness checks so that relying parties can independently verify
   whether an agent action was authorized prior to commit.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Deterministic Pre-Image Canonicalization (RFC 8785 JCS) . . .   3
   4.  Strict Base64url and JWK Public-Key Hygiene . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Parent-Linked Delegation Chain Verification . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Introduction

   Autonomous AI agents increasingly invoke external tools, modify
   enterprise state, and delegate subtasks across multi-agent boundaries
   using protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and Agent-
   to-Agent (A2A) transport envelopes.  Without a deterministic,
   cryptographically verifiable execution receipt, a relying party
   cannot distinguish between a self-reported agent log and an
   independently verifiable commitment record.

   This specification formalizes the fail-closed verification invariants
   implemented in the open-source AgentTrust ("agentrust-io/trace-spec",
   "agentrust-io/agent-manifest", and "agentrust-io/weight-custody-
   manifest") conformance suites and empirically evaluated in
   [TR-2026-01], [TR-2026-02], and [TR-2026-03].

2.  Conventions and Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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3.  Deterministic Pre-Image Canonicalization (RFC 8785 JCS)

   To prevent cross-language signature verification drift between
   Python, TypeScript/JavaScript, and Rust verifiers, every execution
   trace envelope MUST be serialized according to the JSON
   Canonicalization Scheme [RFC8785] prior to digest calculation or
   signature verification:

   *  Non-string dictionary keys MUST be rejected with a deterministic
      type error rather than silently coerced.

   *  Lone UTF-16 surrogates (U+D800 through U+DFFF) and non-finite IEEE
      754 floating-point values (NaN, +Infinity, -Infinity) MUST cause
      canonicalization to fail closed.

   *  Duplicate JSON object member names within signed payloads MUST be
      rejected during parsing before signature appraisal.

4.  Strict Base64url and JWK Public-Key Hygiene

   Verifiers evaluating detached signatures, witness receipts, or JWK
   bundles [RFC7517] MUST enforce canonical unpadded base64url encoding
   (Section 5 of [RFC4648]):

   *  Padding characters ("="), non-alphabet whitespace, or non-zero
      trailing pad bits MUST be rejected.

   *  Verification bundles MUST NOT contain private JWK parameters ("d",
      "p", "q", "dp", "dq", "qi", "oth").  Any trust bundle containing a
      private key parameter MUST be rejected immediately.

   *  JWK thumbprints [RFC7638] and confirmation claims ("cnf.jwk") MUST
      be validated against the pinned trust store prior to revocation
      list evaluation.

5.  Parent-Linked Delegation Chain Verification

   When an orchestrator agent delegates authority to a sub-agent, each
   hop record MUST include a "parent_record_hash" field containing the
   lowercase hexadecimal SHA-256 digest of the canonicalized parent
   record.  A verifier evaluating an N-hop delegation chain MUST verify:

   1.  Cryptographic signature validity of every hop i in 0..N-1.

   2.  Hash continuity: hop[i].parent_record_hash ==
       SHA256(JCS(hop[i-1])).

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   3.  Scope attenuation: hop[i].granted_scopes is a strict subset of or
       equal to hop[i-1].granted_scopes.

   4.  Temporal monotonicity: hop[i].issued_at >= hop[i-1].issued_at and
       hop[i].expires_at <= hop[i-1].expires_at.

6.  Security Considerations

   Verifiers that accept boolean literals as integer timestamps (for
   example, in runtimes where boolean is a subclass of integer) or that
   silently truncate recursive argument walks without flagging depth
   exhaustion introduce fail-open bypass vectors.  Implementations MUST
   validate exact integer types for sequence numbers, epochs, and clock-
   skew bounds, and MUST fail closed when structural nesting bounds are
   exceeded.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC7517]  Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.

   [RFC7638]  Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
              Thumbprint", RFC 7638, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.

   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, May 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

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   [RFC8785]  Rundgren, A., Jordan, B., and S. Erdtman, "JSON
              Canonicalization Scheme (JCS)", RFC 8785, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8785>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [TR-2026-01]
              Durga, R. K., "Deterministic Control-Plane Governance and
              Lease-Bounded Recovery for Enterprise Agentic AI Systems",
              DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23735274, October 2026,
              <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23735274>.

   [TR-2026-02]
              Durga, R. K., "Adversarial Regression Benchmarking for
              Agentic AI Security Controls Across OWASP ASI01-ASI10",
              DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23735497, October 2026,
              <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23735497>.

   [TR-2026-03]
              Durga, R. K., "Cryptographic Weight-Custody Manifests, JCS
              Canonicalization, and Two-Plane Edge Fleet Verification
              for Autonomous AI Systems", DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23775009,
              October 2026, <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23775009>.

Author's Address

   Raghuvar Karthik Durga
   Microsoft Corporation
   Chicago, IL
   United States of America
   Email: rdurga@microsoft.com
   URI:   https://orcid.org/0009-0003-7014-355X

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