TRILL: Link Security
draft-eastlake-trill-link-security-06

Document Type Expired Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2018-04-19 (latest revision 2017-09-24)
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This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft can be found at
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-eastlake-trill-link-security-06.txt

Abstract

The TRILL protocol supports arbitrary link technologies between TRILL switches, both point-to-point and broadcast links, and supports Ethernet links between edge TRILL switches and end stations. Communications links are constantly under attack by criminals and national intelligence agencies as discussed in RFC 7258. Link security is an important element of security in depth, particularly for links that are not entirely under the physical control of the TRILL network operator or that include device which may have been compromised. This document specifies link security recommendations for TRILL over Ethernet, PPP, and pseudowire links. It updates RFC 6325, RFC 6361, and RFC 7173. It requires that link encryption MUST be implemented and that all TRILL Data packets between TRILL switch ports capable of encryption at line speed MUST default to being encrypted. [This is a early partial draft.]

Authors

Donald Eastlake (d3e3e3@gmail.com)
Dacheng Zhang (dacheng.zhang@huawei.com)

(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)