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Aether: A Next-Generation L4 Transport
draft-fomicheva-aether-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Veronika Fomicheva
Last updated 2026-07-27
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draft-fomicheva-aether-00
Independent Submission                                      V. Fomicheva
Internet-Draft                             Aether Protocol Working Group
Intended status: Informational                              27 July 2026
Expires: 28 January 2027

                 Aether: A Next-Generation L4 Transport
                       draft-fomicheva-aether-00

Abstract

   This document specifies Aether, a transport-layer protocol (L4)
   designed for modern network environments requiring multiplexed
   streams without head-of-line blocking, mandatory encryption with
   post-quantum resistance, multi-path routing, and self-sovereign
   identity at the protocol layer.  Aether operates entirely in
   userspace without kernel modifications.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 January 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Motivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Design Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Wire Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Base Header (16 bytes)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Long Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Packet Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.4.  Extension Chain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Handshake Phases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  ClientHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  ServerHello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Key Derivation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   4.  Streams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   5.  Multi-Path  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Congestion Control  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  Identity Layer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   9.  Connection Close  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   11. Constants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   12. Comparison with Existing Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   13. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   14. Reference Implementation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   15. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     15.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     15.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Motivation

   Transport-layer protocols have evolved slowly.  TCP [RFC9293]
   provides reliable, ordered delivery but suffers from head-of-line
   blocking and requires separate TLS for encryption.  UDP [RFC768] is
   lightweight but unreliable.  QUIC [RFC9000] addresses many of TCP's
   shortcomings but is tightly coupled to HTTP/3.

   Aether is a general-purpose L4 transport protocol designed for:

   *  Stream multiplexing without head-of-line blocking

   *  Mandatory encryption with post-quantum resistance

   *  Multi-path connections (seamless network switching)

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   *  Self-sovereign identity at the protocol layer

   *  Userspace operation (no kernel modifications required)

1.2.  Design Philosophy

             +=================+============================+
             | Principle       | Application in Aether      |
             +=================+============================+
             | Simple core     | Fixed 16-byte base header; |
             |                 | features via extensions    |
             +-----------------+----------------------------+
             | Security non-   | AEAD encryption from first |
             | optional        | packet; no plaintext mode  |
             +-----------------+----------------------------+
             | Versioning      | First packet declares      |
             |                 | version and capabilities   |
             +-----------------+----------------------------+
             | Self-describing | Protocol metadata embedded |
             |                 | in handshake               |
             +-----------------+----------------------------+
             | Userspace-first | No OS kernel modifications |
             |                 | required                   |
             +-----------------+----------------------------+

                Table 1: Design Principles and Application
                                in Aether

2.  Wire Format

2.1.  Base Header (16 bytes)

    0                   1                   2                   3
    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   | Ver |  Type   |H|E|R|         Stream ID                       |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Offset (32 bits)                     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |                           Length (32 bits)                     |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
   |              Connection ID (32 bits, short header)             |
   |         or Destination Connection ID (long header)             |
   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                                  Figure 1

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         +===========+=======+===================================+
         | Field     | Bits  | Description                       |
         +===========+=======+===================================+
         | Ver       | 4     | Protocol version.  Starts at 0.   |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+
         | Type      | 6     | Packet type (see Section 2.3)     |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+
         | H         | 1     | 0 = Short header, 1 = Long header |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+
         | E         | 1     | Extensions present                |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+
         | R         | 2     | Reserved (MUST be 0)              |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+
         | Stream ID | 18    | Stream identifier (0..262143)     |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+
         | Offset    | 32    | Byte offset in stream             |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+
         | Length    | 32    | Payload length (bytes)            |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+
         | Cnx ID    | 32/64 | Short: 32-bit truncated CID.      |
         |           |       | Long: 64-bit full Dest CID.       |
         +-----------+-------+-----------------------------------+

                           Table 2: Header Fields

2.2.  Long Header

   Long header adds 8 additional bytes after the base header containing
   the Source Connection ID (64 bits).  Total: Long Header = 24 bytes,
   Short Header = 16 bytes.

2.3.  Packet Types

    +===========+===============+===========================+========+
    | Code      | Name          | Purpose                   | Header |
    +===========+===============+===========================+========+
    | 0x00      | Initial       | First packet, ClientHello | Long   |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x01      | Handshake     | Crypto handshake          | Long   |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x02      | Data          | User stream data          | Short  |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x03      | Ack           | Packet acknowledgement    | Short  |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x04      | Close         | Connection close + code   | Short  |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x05      | Ping          | Keep-alive                | Short  |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+

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    | 0x06      | PathChallenge | Validate new path         | Short  |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x07      | PathResponse  | Confirm path              | Short  |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x08      | StreamOpen    | Open new stream           | Short  |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x09      | StreamClose   | Close stream (FIN)        | Short  |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+
    | 0x0A-0x3F | Reserved      | For future use            | -      |
    +-----------+---------------+---------------------------+--------+

                 Table 3: Packet Types (6-bit Type field)

2.4.  Extension Chain

   When bit E is set, a TLV extension chain follows the header.  Chain
   terminates with Ext Type 0x00.

     +======+=============+=========================================+
     | Code | Name        | Description                             |
     +======+=============+=========================================+
     | 0x01 | Timestamp   | Sender timestamp (64-bit, microseconds) |
     +------+-------------+-----------------------------------------+
     | 0x02 | Priority    | Stream priority (8 bits)                |
     +------+-------------+-----------------------------------------+
     | 0x03 | Padding     | Anti-traffic-analysis padding           |
     +------+-------------+-----------------------------------------+
     | 0x04 | PathId      | Multi-path identifier                   |
     +------+-------------+-----------------------------------------+
     | 0x05 | FlowControl | Window update                           |
     +------+-------------+-----------------------------------------+

                         Table 4: Extension Types

3.  Handshake

3.1.  Handshake Phases

   The handshake completes in 1-RTT:

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   Client                                  Server
     |                                       |
     |--- Initial (ClientHello) ------------>|
     |                                       |
     |<-- Initial (ServerHello) -------------|
     |                                       |
     |--- Handshake (ClientFinished) ------->|  Client can now send Data
     |                                       |
     |<-- Handshake (ServerFinished) --------|  Server can now send Data
     |                                       |
     |<======= Data (Encrypted) ===========>|

                                  Figure 2

3.2.  ClientHello

   CBOR-encoded, inside AEAD-encrypted Initial packet payload.
   Contains: protocol version (0), 64-bit random client CID, supported
   version list, crypto parameters (Kyber768 + X25519, AES-256-GCM, SHA-
   256), capabilities (multipath, max_streams, max_stream_data,
   ack_frequency, idle_timeout_ms), and an Ed25519 identity public key.

3.3.  ServerHello

   CBOR-encoded response containing: echoed client CID, server CID,
   Kyber768 ciphertext, X25519 ephemeral public key, server
   capabilities, and server Ed25519 identity with proof (signature of
   transcript).

3.4.  Key Derivation

   After ClientHello and ServerHello exchange:

   shared_secret = Kyber768.Decapsulate(kem_ciphertext)
                   || X25519.DH(client_ephemeral, server_classical_pk)

   transcript = ClientHello || ServerHello

   session_key = HKDF-Expand(
       HKDF-Extract("AETHER-v0", shared_secret),
       transcript,
       256 bits
   )

   client_tx_key = HKDF-Expand(session_key, "client-tx", key_len)
   server_tx_key = HKDF-Expand(session_key, "server-tx", key_len)

                                  Figure 3

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   ClientFinished and ServerFinished carry HMAC-SHA256(session_key,
   transcript).  Symmetric keys are destroyed after 3x PTO following
   connection close, providing Perfect Forward Secrecy.

4.  Streams

   Each stream identified by 18-bit Stream ID (0..262143).  Stream ID 0
   reserved for control.  Client opens streams with EVEN IDs; server
   with ODD IDs.  Streams are independent: loss in one stream does not
   block others.

   Stream lifecycle: IDLE -> (StreamOpen) -> OPEN -> (StreamClose FIN)
   -> HALF-CLOSED -> (StreamClose ACK) -> CLOSED.

   Flow control operates at two levels: Connection-level (total in-
   flight data) and Stream-level (in-flight data per stream).  Initial
   windows: Stream = 1 MiB, Connection = 16 MiB.  Each Data packet
   carries an Offset (byte position).  Receivers send Ack frames with
   received offset ranges.  Unacknowledged packets are retransmitted
   with exponential back-off up to MAX_RETRANSMISSIONS (10).

5.  Multi-Path

   Connections are identified by Connection ID, not IP address.  This
   enables path migration:

   1.  Client detects a new network interface (e.g., 5G after Wi-Fi).

   2.  Client sends PathChallenge from new IP to server.

   3.  Server responds with PathResponse, confirming the new path
       belongs to the same connection.

   4.  Server begins sending data on both paths.

   5.  Client may duplicate data on both paths for reliability.

   Each path has a unique Path ID (Extension Type 0x04).  Packets from
   different paths are multiplexed onto common streams; the receiver
   reassembles by Offset.  When one path is lost, data automatically
   flows through remaining paths without connection interruption.

6.  Congestion Control

   The default congestion control algorithm is Aether-CC, a hybrid of
   BBRv3 [BBR] and NewReno [RFC6582], optimized for high-latency
   satellite links, variable-bandwidth mobile networks, and noisy
   channels (distinguishing loss from congestion).

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   Bandwidth estimation: delivery_rate = bytes_acked / time_delta;
   max_bw = max(max_bw, delivery_rate).  RTT estimation: min_rtt =
   min(min_rtt, latest_rtt) over 10-second window.  Congestion window:
   cwnd = max_bw * min_rtt * gain (gain: 1.25 during probing, 0.75
   during drain).

   Loss classification: loss with low RTT and rising delivery_rate
   indicates congestion; loss with high RTT and stable delivery_rate
   indicates channel noise (window not reduced).  Pluggable algorithms:
   "aether-cc" (default), "bbrv3", "cubic", "none" (testing).

7.  Security Considerations

   Aether has no plaintext mode.  All packets are encrypted: Initial
   packets with AEAD key derived from initial salt, Handshake packets
   with AEAD keys derived from shared_secret, Data packets with AEAD
   session_key.

   The handshake uses Kyber-768 [FIPS203] as primary KEM with X25519
   [RFC7748] as classical fallback, providing post-quantum resistance as
   long as at least one algorithm remains secure.

   Metadata protection: Connection ID in short header is a 32-bit
   truncated value; Padding extension (0x03) allows random bytes for
   packet size obfuscation; Multipath data streams complicate passive
   traffic analysis.

   Each connection generates ephemeral keys.  Compromise of an identity
   key does not reveal past sessions (Perfect Forward Secrecy).

8.  Identity Layer

   Aether introduces cryptographic identity at the transport layer.
   Each node has an Ed25519 [RFC8032] key pair.  Identity is: identity =
   SHA-256("AETHER-ID-" || Ed25519_public_key).  During handshake, the
   node proves key ownership by signing the transcript.

   Advantages: DNS/CA/PKI independent (self-sovereign identity), IP
   mobility (IP changes do not affect identity), decentralized (no
   central registry required), W3C DID compatible (identity
   representable as a DID).

9.  Connection Close

   Graceful close: Sender -> Close (NO_ERROR), Receiver -> Close
   (NO_ERROR).  Keys destroyed after 3x PTO.

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       +======+=====================+=============================+
       | Code | Name                | Description                 |
       +======+=====================+=============================+
       | 0x00 | NO_ERROR            | Normal closure              |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
       | 0x01 | INTERNAL_ERROR      | Internal error              |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
       | 0x02 | PROTOCOL_VIOLATION  | Protocol violation          |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
       | 0x03 | CRYPTO_ERROR        | Cryptographic error         |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
       | 0x04 | FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR  | Flow control limit exceeded |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
       | 0x05 | TIMEOUT             | Idle timeout                |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
       | 0x06 | VERSION_NEGOTIATION | Incompatible version        |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
       | 0x07 | REFUSED             | Connection refused          |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+
       | 0x08 | IDENTITY_REJECTED   | Identity not accepted       |
       +------+---------------------+-----------------------------+

                           Table 5: Error Codes

10.  Discovery

   *Local discovery (LAN):* Multicast group 224.0.0.251:9000 (IPv4),
   ff02::fb:9000 (IPv6).  Periodic announcements every 30 seconds.
   Announcement format: Initial packet with type "Announce" in
   extensions.

   *Global discovery (WAN):* Kademlia-based DHT (as in libp2p).  DHT key
   = peer identity.  DHT value = set of (IP, port, Connection ID)
   tuples.  Enables peer location by identity without a centralized
   server.

11.  Constants

   +===========================+==========+============================+
   | Constant                  | Value    | Description                |
   +===========================+==========+============================+
   | AETHER_DEFAULT_PORT       | 9000     | Default port               |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | AETHER_VERSION            | 0        | Current protocol version   |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | MAX_PACKET_SIZE           | 1400     | Max packet size (MTU       |
   |                           |          | safe)                      |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+

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   | MAX_STREAM_ID             | 262143   | Max Stream ID (18 bits)    |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS           | 30000    | Connection idle timeout    |
   |                           |          | (ms)                       |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | PTO_BASE_MS               | 100      | Base Probe Timeout (ms)    |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | MAX_RETRANSMISSIONS       | 10       | Max retransmit attempts    |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | INITIAL_CWND              | 10 * MSS | Initial congestion         |
   |                           |          | window                     |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | INITIAL_STREAM_WINDOW     | 1048576  | Initial stream window      |
   |                           |          | (bytes)                    |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+
   | INITIAL_CONNECTION_WINDOW | 16777216 | Initial connection         |
   |                           |          | window (bytes)             |
   +---------------------------+----------+----------------------------+

                        Table 6: Protocol Constants

12.  Comparison with Existing Protocols

       +================+======+=====+============+======+========+
       | Feature        | TCP  | UDP | QUIC       | SCTP | Aether |
       +================+======+=====+============+======+========+
       | Reliable       | Yes  | No  | Yes        | Yes  | Yes    |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+
       | Multiplexing   | No   | No  | Yes*       | Yes  | Yes    |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+
       | Encryption     | No** | No  | Yes        | No** | Yes    |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+
       | Multi-path     | No   | No  | v2         | Yes  | Yes    |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+
       | Userspace      | No   | Yes | Yes        | No   | Yes    |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+
       | Identity layer | No   | No  | No         | No   | Yes    |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+
       | PQC-ready      | No   | No  | WIP        | No   | Yes    |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+
       | NAT friendly   | Yes  | No  | Yes        | No   | Yes    |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+
       | HOL blocking   | Yes  | No  | Per stream | No   | No     |
       +----------------+------+-----+------------+------+--------+

                       Table 7: Protocol Comparison

   * HTTP-tied. ** Requires separate TLS/DTLS layer.

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13.  IANA Considerations

   This document requires no IANA actions.  Future revisions may request
   a well-known port assignment for port 9000.

14.  Reference Implementation

   A reference implementation of Aether Protocol v0.1 is available in
   the Rust programming language at https://github.com/nikaafo/aether-
   protocol.

   Components:

   *  aether-core: Protocol library (framing, handshake, crypto,
      multipath, congestion control, identity, discovery).

   *  aether-sdk: Enterprise SDK (identity vault, monitoring, SLA).

   *  aether-gateway: L4 proxy for Aether-to-TCP bridging.

   *  demo: Example application.

   License: MIT OR Apache-2.0.

15.  References

15.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5869]  Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
              Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5869>.

   [RFC7748]  Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
              for Security", RFC 7748, January 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748>.

   [RFC8032]  Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
              Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, January 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.

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   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
              and Secure Transport", RFC 9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9000>.

   [FIPS203]  NIST, "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism
              Standard", FIPS 203, August 2024.

15.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6582]  Henderson, T., Floyd, S., Gurtov, A., and Y. Nishida, "The
              NewReno Modification to TCP's Fast Recovery Algorithm",
              RFC 6582, April 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6582>.

   [RFC768]   Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
              August 1980, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc768>.

   [RFC9293]  Eddy, W., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)", STD 7,
              RFC 9293, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293>.

   [BBR]      Cardwell, N. and , "BBR: Congestion-Based Congestion
              Control", ACM Queue , 2016.

Author's Address

   Veronika Fomicheva
   Aether Protocol Working Group
   Email: veronikafomich@yandex.ru
   URI:   https://github.com/nikaafo/aether-protocol

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