Bootstrapped TLS Authentication
draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-05
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(emu WG)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Owen Friel , Dan Harkins | ||
| Last updated | 2022-09-26 (Latest revision 2022-05-26) | ||
| Replaced by | draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls | ||
| RFC stream | Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Additional resources | Mailing list discussion | ||
| Stream | WG state | Adopted by a WG | |
| Document shepherd | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
This document defines a TLS extension that enables a server to prove to a client that it has knowledge of the public key of a key pair where the client has knowledge of the private key of the key pair. Unlike standard TLS key exchanges, the public key is never exchanged in TLS protocol messages. Proof of knowledge of the public key is used by the client to bootstrap trust in the server. The use case outlined in this document is to establish trust in an EAP server.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)