A Profile for Autonomous System Relationship Authorization (ASRA)
draft-geng-sidrops-asra-profile-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Nan Geng , Kotikalapudi Sriram , Mingqing(Michael) Huang | ||
| Last updated | 2024-10-13 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
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draft-geng-sidrops-asra-profile-00
Network Working Group N. Geng
Internet-Draft Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track K. Sriram
Expires: 16 April 2025 NIST
M. Huang
Zhongguancun Laboratory
13 October 2024
A Profile for Autonomous System Relationship Authorization (ASRA)
draft-geng-sidrops-asra-profile-00
Abstract
This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected
content type for Autonomous System Relationship Authorization (ASRA)
objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
An ASRA is a digitally signed object through which the issuer (the
holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize one or more
other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its customers and lateral peers.
When validated, an ASRA's eContent can be used for detection and
mitigation of BGP AS path manipulation attacks together with
Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA). ASRA is
complementary to ASPA.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 April 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. ASRA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. ASRA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. SignerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. ASRAsubcategory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. ASRA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry . . . 7
5.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry . . . . 7
5.3. RPKI Signed Object registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.5. Media Type registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction
This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected
content type for Autonomous System Relationship Authorization (ASRA)
objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
[RFC6480]. An ASRA is a digitally signed object through which the
issuer (the holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize
one or more other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its customers and
lateral peers. When validated, an ASRA's eContent can be used for
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detection and mitigation of BGP AS path manipulation attacks together
with Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile] [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification].
ASRA-based verification is complementary to ASPA-based verification.
BGP relationships that an Autonomous System (AS) may have with eBGP
neighbors are discussed in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification].
ASPA object is used to register the set of provider ASes that the
subject (signing) AS has. ASRA object is used to register the set of
ASes with which the subject AS has customer and/or lateral peering
relationships.
There are three subcategories of ASRAs defined: ASRA1, ASRA2, and
ASRA3. They are distinguished by a subcategory field by setting its
value to 1, 2, or 3, respectively. ASRA1 and ASRA2 are used to
register the lists of customers and lateral peers, respectively.
Alternatively, if the subject AS does not wish to separately disclose
customers and lateral peers, it has the option to register an ASRA3
to register the combined list of customers and lateral peers. The
details of ASRA registration requirements for ASes in different
scenarios are specified in Section 3 of
[I-D.sriram-sidrops-asra-verification]. In addition, the procedures
for verifying AS_PATHs in BGP UPDATE messages using validated ASRA
objects (in conjunction with the ASPA objects) are described in that
document.
This CMS [RFC5652] protected content type definition conforms to the
[RFC6488] template for RPKI signed objects. In accordance with
Section 4 of [RFC6488], this document defines:
1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASRA signed
object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the
encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed
attribute within the signerInfo structure.
2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASRA content, which is the payload
signed by the signer (subject) AS. The ASRA content is encoded
using the ASN.1 [X.680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)
[X.690].
3. The steps required to validate an ASRA beyond the validation
steps specified in [RFC6488].
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2. ASRA Content Type
The content-type for an ASRA is defined as id-ct-ASRA, which has the
numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD. This OID MUST appear
both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as
well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
structure (see [RFC6488]).
3. ASRA eContent
The content of an ASRA identifies the signer (subject) AS as well as
the Set of ASes that are authorized by the signer AS to be its
customers and/or lateral peers.
A user registering ASRA(s) must be cognizant of Section 3 of
[I-D.sriram-sidrops-asra-verification] and the user (or their
software tool) must comply with the ASRA registration recommendations
in that section. In the case of the transition process between
different CA registries, the ASRA records SHOULD be kept identical in
all registries in terms of their authorization contents.
The eContent of an ASRA is an instance of ASRelationshipAttestation,
formally defined by the following ASN.1 [X.680] module:
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RPKI-ASRA-2024
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-rpki-asra-2024(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
id-ct-ASRA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) asra(TBD) }
ct-ASRA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE ASRelationshipAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASRA }
ASRelationshipAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
SignerASID ASID,
ASRAsubcategory subcategory,
Relationships RelationshipASSet }
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
subcategory ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE (1))
RelationshipASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID
END
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].
3.1. Version
The version number of the ASRelationshipAttestation that complies
with this specification MUST be 0 and MUST be explicitly encoded.
3.2. SignerASID
The SignerASID field contains the AS number of the Autonomous System
that is the authorizing entity (Signer AS).
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3.3. ASRAsubcategory
ASRAsubcategory can have values 0 to 255. The values 1, 2, and 3 are
assigned to represent ASRA1, ASRA2, and ASRA3, respectively. As
explained in Section 1, ASRA1 means that the Relationships (see
Section 3.4) field contains ASIDs of only the customer ASes of the
Signer AS; ASRA2 means that the Relationships field contains ASIDs of
only the lateral peer ASes; ASRA3 means that the Relationships field
contains the combined list of ASIDs of customer and lateral peer
ASes. Section 3 of [I-D.sriram-sidrops-asra-verification] for
details of registration requirements for ASRA1, ASRA2, and ASRA3.
3.4. Relationships
Each element contained in the Relationships field is an instance of
ASID. The Relationships field contains the listing of ASIDs of ASes
that are authorized as customers and/or lateral peers (per ASRA1,
ASRA2, and ASRA3 subcategory definitions).
In addition to the constraints described by the formal ASN.1
definition, the contents of the Relationships field MUST satisfy the
following constraints:
* The SignerASID value MUST NOT appear in any ASID in the
Relationships field.
* The elements of Relationships MUST be ordered in ascending
numerical order (ASIDs).
* Each value of ASID MUST be unique (with respect to the other
elements of Relationships).
4. ASRA Validation
Before a relying party can use an ASRA to validate a routing
announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASRA object
itself. To validate an ASRA, the relying party MUST perform all the
validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
additional ASRA-specific validation steps.
* The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension [RFC3779]
MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained
within the ASRA), and the SignerASID in the ASRA eContent MUST be
contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE
certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension.
* The EE certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation
Extension MUST NOT contain any "inherit" elements.
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* The IP Address Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be absent.
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry
Please add the id-mod-rpki-asra-2024 to the SMI Security for S/MIME
Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:
Decimal | Description | Specification
----------------------------------------------------------
TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-asra-2024 | [RFC-to-be]
5.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry
Please add the ASRA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows:
Decimal | Description | Specification
----------------------------------------------------------
TBD | id-ct-ASRA | [RFC-to-be]
5.3. RPKI Signed Object registry
Please add Autonomous System Relationship Authorization to the RPKI
Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/
rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows:
Name | OID | Specification
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous System | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.TBD | [RFC-to-be]
Relationship Authorization | |
------------------------------------------------------------------------
5.4. RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry
Please add an item for the Autonomous System Relationship
Authorization file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme"
registry created by [RFC6481] as follows:
Filename |
Extension | RPKI Object | Reference
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
.asa | Autonomous System Relationship Authorization | [RFC-to-be]
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5.5. Media Type registry
The IANA is requested to register the media type application/rpki-
asra in the "Media Type" registry as follows:
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-asra
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ASRA [RFC-to-be].
This media type contains no active content. See
Section xxx of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
AS identifiers (ASIDs) as defined in [RFC-to-be].
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .asa
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Nan Geng <gengnan@huawei.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC6481], [RFC6485], and [RFC6488]
also apply to ASRAs.
7. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank the authors of
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile] since that document was used as a
template.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Snijders, J., Housley,
R., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for Autonomous System
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Provider Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-18, 25 June 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
aspa-profile-18>.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders,
J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
verification-19, 27 September 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
aspa-verification-19>.
[I-D.sriram-sidrops-asra-verification]
Sriram, K., Geng, N., and A. Herzberg, "Autonomous System
Relationship Authorization (ASRA) as an Extension to ASPA
for Enhanced AS Path Verification", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-sriram-sidrops-asra-verification-00,
13 October 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/api/v1/doc/document/draft-
sriram-sidrops-asra-verification/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.
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[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2021.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2021.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.
Authors' Addresses
Nan Geng
Huawei
Beijing
China
Email: gengnan@huawei.com
Kotikalapudi Sriram
NIST
Gaithersburg, MD 20899,
United States of America
Email: ksriram@nist.gov
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Mingqing Huang
Zhongguancun Laboratory
Beijing
China
Email: huangmq@mail.zgclab.edu.cn
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