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Linked Attachments in Email Messages
draft-gondwana-email-big-files-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Authors Bron Gondwana , Alexey Melnikov
Last updated 2026-11-19
Replaces draft-melnikov-email-big-files
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Intended RFC status (None)
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On agenda sml at IETF-127
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draft-gondwana-email-big-files-01
Network Working Group                                        B. Gondwana
Internet-Draft                                                  Fastmail
Intended status: Standards Track                             A. Melnikov
Expires: 23 May 2027                                       Isode Limited
                                                        19 November 2026

                  Linked Attachments in Email Messages
                   draft-gondwana-email-big-files-01

Abstract

   Message size limits mean that large files are sent by email as links
   to a web server rather than as attachments.  A link loses the
   properties that make an attachment useful: it can stop working, the
   file behind it can change, it can't be scanned in transit, and it may
   need a separate login.

   This document defines the "Content-External" header field, which lets
   receiving systems fetch, verify and keep a linked file, and then
   treat it like any other attachment.  The field is on a body part with
   a fallback link, which aware clients hide.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.

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   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Content-External Header Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Key Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.3.  Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Fallback Body Part  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  CID URLs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Sending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Publishing the File . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Composing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Forwarding and Replying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Receiving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Fetching and Verifying  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Content Scanning  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.3.  Storage and Access  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.4.  Lifetime  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Requirements and Alternatives Not Taken . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Message Header Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Content-External Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   Changes from draft-gondwana-email-big-files-00  . . . . . . . . .  18
   Changes from draft-melnikov-email-big-files-00  . . . . . . . . .  18
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   Most SMTP systems limit the size of messages that can be sent, which
   can be as low as 10 megabytes.  Moreover, limits vary depending on
   the recipient's system.  End users want to send files to each other,
   and the files they create keep getting bigger.

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   The usual workaround is to upload the file to a web server and send a
   link.  Many clients and services do this, each in their own way.

   An attached file has properties that a link lacks:

   1.  A copy lasts as long as the message.

   2.  It can't be changed after sending.

   3.  Systems that handle the message can scan it.

   4.  Anyone who has the message has the file.

   A link can stop working, the file behind it can change, it can't be
   scanned in transit, and it may need a separate login.

   This document defines the "Content-External" header field
   (Section 3), which gives the URL, size and digest of a file and, if
   the file is encrypted, its key.  Receiving servers fetch, verify and
   scan the file when the message arrives (Section 6), and keep it as
   long as the message (Section 6.4), which restores those properties.
   The field is on a body part with an ordinary link to the file, which
   clients that support this document hide (Section 4).

   This document replaces [BIG-FILES-00]; see Appendix "Changes from
   draft-melnikov-email-big-files-00".

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   This document uses the terms MUA, MDA and message store from
   [MAIL-ARCH], and:

   sender:  The sending MUA, or a service acting for it.

   linked attachment:  A file described by a Content-External header
      field.

   attachment server:  The HTTP [HTTP] server that holds a linked
      attachment.

   receiving server:  Any system on the recipient's side that inspects

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      message content, such as an MDA, a content filter or a message
      store.

3.  Content-External Header Field

   The generic syntax of the Content-External header field is the same
   as that of the Content-Type header field (Section 5.1 of [MIME]), so
   the same generic parser can be used.  The media type is that of the
   linked attachment.  If a different media type is returned when the
   linked attachment is retrieved, the value in the header field
   overrides it.

   The Content-External header field appears in the header section of
   the body part that is used to display the message to a user of an MUA
   that doesn't support this document (Section 4).  Such body parts MUST
   have either the "text/plain" or the "text/html" media type.  A body
   part MUST NOT have more than one Content-External header field.  A
   Content-External header field in any other body part, or in a body
   part that has more than one, MUST be ignored.

   A linked attachment is treated as if an attached file had been placed
   where its body part is in the MIME structure.

   The body part's Content-ID (Section 7 of [MIME]), if any, identifies
   the linked attachment (Section 4.1).

3.1.  Parameters

   Parameter names are case-insensitive.  [MIME-PARAM] encoding can be
   used in parameter values, for long values and for non-ASCII names; it
   is decoded before the rules below apply.  Other parameters are
   parameters of the media type.

   Each parameter below can appear at most once.  A receiver MUST ignore
   a Content-External header field in which one appears more than once,
   a REQUIRED parameter is missing, or a value is invalid.

   URL:  REQUIRED.  An absolute "https" URI [URI] used to access the
      linked attachment (Section 6.1).

   SIZE:  REQUIRED.  The size of the data in octets, after any
      decryption.

   DIGEST-<digest-name>:  REQUIRED.  A digest of the data, after any

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      decryption.  The digest name is from the IANA "Hash Algorithms for
      HTTP Digest Fields" registry [DIGEST-FIELDS], and its value is
      base64 [BASE64].  "DIGEST-SHA-256" MUST be present; others MAY be.
      Deprecated algorithms MUST NOT be used.  Receivers MUST support
      SHA-256.

   STORED-DIGEST-<digest-name>:  OPTIONAL.  A digest of the data as
      stored at the URL, before decryption, with names and values as for
      "DIGEST-".  It lets a recipient check the downloaded data before
      decrypting it.  It is only useful with "KEY".

   NAME:  RECOMMENDED.  The recommended file name of the linked
      attachment.

   DESCRIPTION:  OPTIONAL.  A description of the linked attachment, as
      for Content-Description (Section 8 of [MIME]).

   LANGUAGE:  OPTIONAL.  The language of the linked attachment, as for
      Content-Language [CONTENT-LANG].

   CREATION-DATE, MODIFICATION-DATE, READ-DATE:  OPTIONAL.  As for
      Content-Disposition [CONTENT-DISP].

   KEY:  OPTIONAL.  The algorithm, key and nonce used to encrypt the
      stored data (Section 3.2).  If absent, the data is not encrypted.

   EXPIRATION:  OPTIONAL.  The date-time [MAIL] after which the
      existence of the linked attachment is not guaranteed, as for
      message/external-body (Section 5.2.3 of [MEDIA-TYPES]).

3.2.  Key Format

   A key is an algorithm name, the key, and the nonce, separated by
   colons.  The key and nonce are base64url [BASE64] without padding:

   key-value       = aead-name ":" key-material ":" nonce
   aead-name       = "AEAD_" 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" )
                     ; name from the AEAD Registry
   key-material    = b64url
   nonce           = b64url
   b64url          = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "_" )

   The algorithm is named in the IANA AEAD Registry (Section 6 of
   [AEAD]).  The stored file is the algorithm's ciphertext output, with
   empty associated data.  The nonce has the length the algorithm
   requires, 12 octets for "AEAD_AES_128_GCM".  Receivers MUST support
   "AEAD_AES_128_GCM".  Senders SHOULD use it unless they know every
   recipient supports another.

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   The sender MUST use a new random key for each file.  A file larger
   than the algorithm's P_MAX, about 64 GiB for "AEAD_AES_128_GCM",
   can't be encrypted this way.

   A receiver can't verify the file until it has all of it, and MUST NOT
   use any of the plaintext before then.  A receiver that doesn't
   support the algorithm treats the linked attachment as unavailable.

3.3.  Formal Syntax

   This uses ABNF [ABNF].  "type", "subtype", "attribute", "token" and
   "value" are from [MIME]; FWS, quoted-string and date-time are from
   [MAIL].

   content-external = "Content-External:" [FWS] type "/" subtype
                      *([FWS] ";" [FWS] ce-parameter) [FWS] CRLF

   ce-parameter    = url-param / size-param / digest-param /
                     stored-digest-param / name-param /
                     description-param / language-param /
                     date-param / key-param / expiration-param /
                     other-param ; other media type parameters

   url-param       = "URL" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                     ; absolute "https" URI
   size-param      = "SIZE" [FWS] "=" [FWS] 1*DIGIT
   digest-param    = "DIGEST-" token [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                     ; base64
   stored-digest-param = "STORED-DIGEST-" token [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                     ; base64
   name-param      = "NAME" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
   description-param = "DESCRIPTION" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
   language-param  = "LANGUAGE" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                     ; Content-Language value
   date-param      = ( "CREATION-DATE" / "MODIFICATION-DATE" /
                       "READ-DATE" ) [FWS] "=" [FWS] quoted-string
                     ; date-time
   key-param       = "KEY" [FWS] "=" [FWS] value
                     ; key-value
   expiration-param = "EXPIRATION" [FWS] "=" [FWS] quoted-string
                     ; date-time
   other-param     = attribute [FWS] "=" [FWS] value

   A URL can't contain whitespace, so whitespace in the value of "URL"
   is removed before it is used.  This lets a long URL be folded.
   Senders SHOULD fold a long URL this way rather than split it with
   [MIME-PARAM] continuations, which some receivers don't handle.

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3.4.  Example

   Content-External: video/mp4; name="site-survey.mp4"; size=734003200;
       description="Drone survey of the north site";
       modification-date="Mon, 16 Nov 2026 17:42:10 +0000";
       url="https://files.example.com/la/
            Hq3Ld9YtW2xKq8vZp0aN5uFbE7cJr1sM";
       digest-sha-256="X48E9qOokqqrvdts8nOJRJN3OWDUoyWxBf7kbu9DBPE=";
       key="AEAD_AES_128_GCM:9Mzuq2AvtfQJxwuIzYB4Gg:Xq3mC8vT0bLw5RzH";
       expiration="Thu, 17 Dec 2026 09:15:00 +0000"

4.  Fallback Body Part

   The body part with a Content-External header field contains a link
   from which the file can be downloaded with a web browser, with its
   file name and size.  It SHOULD be text/html [HTML], with "Content-
   Disposition: inline", where an attached file would go.  A sender that
   knows every recipient's MUA supports this document, for example
   because they all use the same service, MAY leave the body part empty.

   The download link is usually not the "URL" parameter, which gives the
   stored, possibly encrypted, data.  So that the attachment server can
   decrypt the file, the download link SHOULD include the key in the
   format of Section 3.2, for example as a query parameter.  The
   attachment server chooses the rest of the URL.  See Section 9.

   In a text/html body part, the link SHOULD be inside a "div" element
   with class "content-external", so that an MUA that shows several body
   parts as one can hide it.

   MUAs that support this document SHOULD hide body parts with a
   Content-External header field, and show the linked attachment
   instead.  They MUST NOT hide one unless they offer the user a way to
   download the file.  The file can be fetched and verified
   (Section 6.1) on arrival or when the user opens it.

   The example uses the line wrapping of [WRAP]:

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   =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================

   Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="b1"

   --b1
   Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8

   Here is the survey video.

   --b1
   Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
   Content-Disposition: inline
   Content-External: video/mp4; name="site-survey.mp4"; ...

   <div class="content-external">
   <a href="https://dl.example/pR7wQxV3mTz9KcLe2Hd8Fy?k=AEAD_AES_128_\
     GCM:9Mzuq2AvtfQJxwuIzYB4Gg:Xq3mC8vT0bLw5RzH">site-survey.mp4</a>
   (700 MiB)
   </div>
   --b1--

      |  Open issue: Six years ago, some MUAs showed a second text/html
      |  body part as an attachment rather than inline, so the user only
      |  saw the link after opening it.  Is this still the case?

4.1.  CID URLs

   A "cid" URL [CID] that refers to the Content-ID of a body part with a
   Content-External header field refers to the linked attachment.  For
   example, if that body part has "Content-ID:
   a2.20261117T091500Z@mail.example.com
   (mailto:a2.20261117T091500Z@mail.example.com)":

   <img src="cid:a2.20261117T091500Z@mail.example.com"
        alt="Site plan">

   An MUA resolves such a URL only to a verified copy of the file
   (Section 6.1).  An MUA that would have to fetch the file from the
   attachment server to display it SHOULD treat it as remote content,
   under the same policy as remote images (Section 10).

   MUAs that don't support this document resolve these URLs to the
   fallback body part, and will show, for example, a broken image.
   Senders SHOULD NOT use them unless they know that the recipients'
   MUAs support this document.

5.  Sending

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5.1.  Publishing the File

   The sender stores the file on an attachment server, and chooses its
   URL and key.  Unless the file is meant to be public, the sender
   SHOULD encrypt it (Section 3.2).

   The "URL" and the download link MUST NOT be guessable, unless the
   file is already public.  Each SHOULD contain at least 128 random
   bits, as a capability URL [CAPABILITY-URLS].

   The attachment server MUST serve GET requests for the "URL" without
   authentication, cookies or other state, and MUST always return the
   same content for it.  It SHOULD keep the file until "EXPIRATION", if
   given, and for at least several days in any case.  Its download pages
   SHOULD send "Referrer-Policy: no-referrer" [REFERRER-POLICY].

5.2.  Composing

   The MUA adds a body part with a Content-External header field for
   each linked attachment (Section 4).  The DKIM [DKIM] body hash covers
   these fields.

   A linked attachment can be kept in a draft, and is published once.

5.3.  Forwarding and Replying

   An MUA that forwards a message with linked attachments, or replies
   and keeps them, SHOULD publish its own copy of each file
   (Section 5.1) and give the new message body parts with Content-
   External header fields that point to that copy.  The Content-ID and
   the parameters other than "URL", "KEY", "STORED-DIGEST-" and
   "EXPIRATION" stay the same.  This keeps the file from depending on
   the original attachment server (Section 9).

   A message forwarded as a message/rfc822 body part keeps its linked
   attachments inside it, as it would attached files.

6.  Receiving

6.1.  Fetching and Verifying

   A receiving server or MUA fetches a linked attachment with a GET
   request to its "URL".  The client:

   *  MUST NOT send cookies, credentials or anything else that
      identifies the recipient;

   *  MUST verify the server's certificate (Section 4.3.4 of [HTTP]);

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   *  MAY follow redirects, only to "https" URIs, and SHOULD limit how
      many;

   *  treats any final status code other than 2xx as failure, and MAY
      retry after a 429 (Too Many Requests) [RATE-LIMIT], a 5xx or a
      network error; and

   *  SHOULD stop reading once the content is longer than "SIZE" plus
      the length of the algorithm's tag, if there is a "KEY".

   A client that retries MUST back off.  After a response with a Retry-
   After header field (Section 10.2.3 of [HTTP]), it MUST NOT send
   another request to that host before the time given.  Otherwise it
   MUST wait at least a minute before the first retry, at least double
   the wait after each further failure, and add random jitter.  The
   back-off applies to the host, not just the URL, so that a receiving
   server fetching many files from one attachment server slows down for
   all of them.  A client SHOULD give up after a day or so, and treat
   the linked attachment as unavailable.

   The client then checks each "STORED-DIGEST-" whose algorithm it
   supports, decrypts the file if there is a "KEY", and checks "SIZE"
   and each "DIGEST-" whose algorithm it supports.  If no "DIGEST-" is
   supported, or any check fails, the linked attachment is unavailable,
   and MUST NOT be shown as a verified attachment.

   A receiving server MAY decline to fetch a file, for example because
   it is too large.  The MUA or the user can then fetch it.

6.2.  Content Scanning

   A receiving server SHOULD fetch and scan each linked attachment that
   it would have scanned if the file had been attached, and apply the
   same policy to the result.  If fetching during the SMTP transaction
   would take too long, it MAY scan after accepting the message and
   before delivering it.

6.3.  Storage and Access

   A message store SHOULD fetch each linked attachment on delivery, if
   it wasn't fetched during scanning, and store it with the message.

   It SHOULD let the user's MUAs fetch the stored file the same way as
   an attached file, so the MUA needn't contact the attachment server.
   It MUST require the user to authenticate, and MUST NOT let a user
   fetch the file unless the user can read a message that refers to it.
   This applies to any lookup by digest, and to any proxy for remote
   content that the message store offers.

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      |  Open issue: This is specific to each access protocol.  In JMAP
      |  [JMAP-MAIL], the EmailBodyPart for the fallback body part could
      |  give the linked attachment's blobId, type, name and size, so it
      |  appears among the Email's attachments like an attached file.
      |  In IMAP, BODYSTRUCTURE shows the fallback body part, so an MUA
      |  would need a new FETCH data item to get the file.  These might
      |  be separate documents, along with a way for an MUA to get
      |  proxied remote images.

   An MUA whose message store doesn't do this MAY fetch the file itself,
   when the user opens it or in the background on arrival, but SHOULD
   NOT fetch it just because the message was displayed, except for an
   image that the user's remote image policy allows (Section 4.1).

6.4.  Lifetime

   A message store SHOULD keep a linked attachment as long as any
   message that refers to it, and SHOULD remove it once no message does,
   as it would an attached file, so that it doesn't keep data the user
   has deleted.  It can keep one copy for many messages, found by
   digest.

7.  Requirements and Alternatives Not Taken

   The design meets these requirements:

   *  MUAs that don't support this document can show links to the files.

   *  A message can have many linked attachments.

   *  Linked attachments can be kept in drafts, forwarded and replied
      to.

   *  Receiving systems can restore the properties in Section 1.

   The message/external-body media type [MEDIA-TYPES] also refers to
   external content, but many MUAs show it as an attachment with no
   link, and it has no digest or key.

   [BIG-FILES-00] asked whether the field should also be allowed in the
   header section of a message.  This document doesn't allow it, so that
   the field always has a fallback.  The field's name starts with
   "Content-" because only such fields have a defined meaning in body
   parts, and gateways may discard others (Section 5.1 of
   [MEDIA-TYPES]).

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   The ExternalPart of [MIMI-CONTENT] has much the same information for
   instant messaging.  This document uses the same encryption, AEAD
   algorithms from the AEAD Registry, and the same option of a digest of
   the stored file.  It also requires a digest of the plaintext, so that
   copies under different keys match.  It names digest algorithms from
   the HTTP Digest registry rather than the Named Information registry;
   both have SHA-256.

8.  IANA Considerations

8.1.  Message Header Field

   IANA is asked to add this entry to the "Permanent Message Header
   Field Names" registry [REG-PROC]:

   Header field name:  Content-External

   Applicable protocol:  mail

   Status:  standard

   Author/change controller:  IETF

   Specification document(s):  this document

8.2.  Content-External Parameters

   IANA is asked to create a "Content-External Parameters" registry,
   with the Specification Required policy.  Each entry has a name, a
   description and a reference.  The initial entries are:

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    +===================+===============================+=============+
    | Name              | Description                   | Reference   |
    +===================+===============================+=============+
    | URL               | URL of the data               | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | SIZE              | Size of the data in octets    | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | DIGEST-*          | Digest of the data            | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | STORED-DIGEST-*   | Digest of the stored data     | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | NAME              | Recommended file name         | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | DESCRIPTION       | Description of the data       | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | LANGUAGE          | Language of the data          | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | CREATION-DATE     | Creation date of the file     | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | MODIFICATION-DATE | Modification date of the file | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | READ-DATE         | Last read date of the file    | Section 3.1 |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | KEY               | Encryption algorithm, key and | Section 3.1 |
    |                   | nonce                         |             |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+
    | EXPIRATION        | Date after which the data may | Section 3.1 |
    |                   | be gone                       |             |
    +-------------------+-------------------------------+-------------+

                                  Table 1

9.  Security Considerations

   *Access.* Anyone with the message can fetch the file, as with an
   attachment.  But URLs leak more easily, through browser history, logs
   or Referer header fields, so encryption keeps a leaked "URL" alone
   from revealing the file.  The download link includes the key, so it
   is as sensitive as the message, and the attachment server sees the
   key when it is used.  An attachment server could instead put the key
   in the fragment and decrypt in the browser.

   *Guessable URLs.* Even if the file is encrypted, a guessable URL
   reveals that it exists and its size.

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   *Changed content.* Whoever controls the URL can change the file
   without changing the message, and the digest detects this.  The
   digest is required even with "KEY", because every recipient has the
   key, and so does the attachment server once the download link is
   used, so any of them can make a ciphertext that decrypts correctly.

   *Request forgery.* Receiving servers MUST NOT fetch from addresses
   that aren't publicly routable, such as loopback, link-local or
   private addresses, and MUST check again after each redirect.

   *Resource use.* Receiving servers SHOULD limit the number and total
   size of linked attachments they fetch per message.

   *Denial of service.* Someone who receives a message with linked
   attachments can resend it, or just its Content-External header
   fields, to millions of recipients, each of whose servers then fetches
   the file from the original attachment server.  The same works with a
   "URL" that points at any large file on any server.  Forwarding MUAs
   that publish their own copies (Section 5.3) avoid this for ordinary
   forwarding.  Receiving servers SHOULD fetch a URL only once, and
   reuse the result for every message that names the same URL and
   digest, and SHOULD limit how fast they fetch from any one host.
   Attachment servers MAY limit how often they serve a file, and
   receivers MUST back off when they do (Section 6.1).

   *Misleading links.* The fallback link might not match the header
   field.  An MUA that hides them and shows the verified file avoids
   this.

   *Scanning.* The key is in the message, so systems that handle the
   message can decrypt the file.  Encryption protects it only from the
   attachment server, unless the download link is used, and from anyone
   with the URL alone.

10.  Privacy Considerations

   The attachment server sees each fetch.  If an MUA fetches the file
   from it when the user views the message or opens the file, the sender
   learns when and from where, as with a remote image, and per-recipient
   URLs show who.  An image shown through a "cid" URL (Section 4.1) is
   then a "web bug" (Section 9.7.3 of [E2E-GUIDANCE]).  If the message
   store fetches it on arrival and MUAs get it from there (Section 6.3),
   the attachment server learns only that the message was delivered, and
   not the recipient's address.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

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   [ABNF]     Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5234>.

   [AEAD]     McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
              Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5116>.

   [BASE64]   Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648>.

   [CID]      Levinson, E., "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource
              Locators", RFC 2392, DOI 10.17487/RFC2392, August 1998,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2392>.

   [CONTENT-DISP]
              Troost, R., Dorner, S., and K. Moore, Ed., "Communicating
              Presentation Information in Internet Messages: The
              Content-Disposition Header Field", RFC 2183,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2183, August 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2183>.

   [CONTENT-LANG]
              Alvestrand, H., "Content Language Headers", RFC 3282,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3282, May 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3282>.

   [DIGEST-FIELDS]
              Polli, R. and L. Pardue, "Digest Fields", RFC 9530,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9530, February 2024,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9530>.

   [DKIM]     Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
              "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76,
              RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6376>.

   [HTML]     WHATWG, "HTML Living Standard",
              <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/>.

   [HTTP]     Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
              Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110>.

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   [MAIL]     Resnick, P., Ed., "Internet Message Format", RFC 5322,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5322, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5322>.

   [MEDIA-TYPES]
              Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046>.

   [MIME]     Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
              Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
              Bodies", RFC 2045, DOI 10.17487/RFC2045, November 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2045>.

   [MIME-PARAM]
              Freed, N. and K. Moore, "MIME Parameter Value and Encoded
              Word Extensions: Character Sets, Languages, and
              Continuations", RFC 2231, DOI 10.17487/RFC2231, November
              1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2231>.

   [RATE-LIMIT]
              Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
              Codes", RFC 6585, DOI 10.17487/RFC6585, April 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6585>.

   [REG-PROC] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
              Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3864>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [URI]      Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986>.

11.2.  Informative References

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   [BIG-FILES-00]
              Gondwana, B. and A. Melnikov, "Referencing big external
              files in email messages", Work in Progress, Internet-
              Draft, draft-melnikov-email-big-files-00, 6 November 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-melnikov-
              email-big-files-00>.

   [CAPABILITY-URLS]
              Tennison, J., "Good Practices for Capability URLs",
              W3C First Public Working Draft, 18 February 2014,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/capability-urls/>.

   [E2E-GUIDANCE]
              Gillmor, D. K., Ed., Melnikov, A., Ed., and B. Hoeneisen,
              Ed., "Guidance on End-to-End Email Security", RFC 9787,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9787, August 2025,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9787>.

   [JMAP-MAIL]
              Jenkins, N. and C. Newman, "The JSON Meta Application
              Protocol (JMAP) for Mail", RFC 8621, DOI 10.17487/RFC8621,
              August 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8621>.

   [MAIL-ARCH]
              Crocker, D., "Internet Mail Architecture", RFC 5598,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5598, July 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5598>.

   [MIMI-CONTENT]
              Mahy, R., "More Instant Messaging Interoperability (MIMI)
              message content", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-mimi-content-10, 2 November 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-mimi-
              content-10>.

   [REFERRER-POLICY]
              Eisinger, J. and E. Stark, "Referrer Policy",
              W3C Candidate Recommendation, 26 January 2017,
              <https://www.w3.org/TR/referrer-policy/>.

   [WRAP]     Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
              "Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
              RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8792>.

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Changes from draft-gondwana-email-big-files-00

   *  Used FWS instead of CFWS in the Content-External syntax, and
      allowed FWS around "=" in parameters.

   *  Let an MUA hide the fallback body part before verifying the file,
      if it offers a way to download it.

   *  Recommended folding a long URL at whitespace rather than with RFC
      2231 continuations.

Changes from draft-melnikov-email-big-files-00

   *  Allowed only one Content-External header field per body part, and
      used the body part's Content-ID to refer to the linked attachment.

   *  Added "KEY", "STORED-DIGEST-", "DESCRIPTION", "LANGUAGE" and the
      Content-Disposition date parameters.

   *  Made "SIZE" and "DIGEST-SHA-256" required, and required "https"
      URLs.

   *  Removed "PERMISSION": a linked attachment can't change.

   *  Added the "content-external" HTML class.

   *  Added requirements for attachment servers, receiving servers and
      message stores.

   *  Wrote the Security and Privacy Considerations.

Acknowledgments

   Thanks to the participants in the discussion of large file
   attachments at the IETF meeting where this design was sketched out.

Authors' Addresses

   Bron Gondwana
   Fastmail
   Email: brong@fastmailteam.com

   Alexey Melnikov
   Isode Limited
   Email: alexey.melnikov@isode.com

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