Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)
draft-gont-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation-01
| Document | Type |
Replaced Internet-Draft
(individual)
Expired & archived
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Fernando Gont | ||
| Last updated | 2012-02-14 (Latest revision 2012-02-02) | ||
| Replaced by | RFC 7113 | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | Replaced by draft-ietf-v6ops-ra-guard-implementation | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
This Internet-Draft is no longer active. A copy of the expired Internet-Draft is available in these formats:
Abstract
The IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard) mechanism is commonly employed to mitigate attack vectors based on forged ICMPv6 Router Advertisement messages. Many existing IPv6 deployments rely on RA- Guard as the first line of defense against the aforementioned attack vectors. However, some implementations of RA-Guard have been found to be prone to circumvention by employing IPv6 Extension Headers. This document describes the evasion techniques that affect the aforementioned implementations, and provides advice on the implementation of RA-Guard, such that the RA-Guard evasion vectors are eliminated.
Authors
(Note: The e-mail addresses provided for the authors of this Internet-Draft may no longer be valid.)