Privacy Pass with Token Binding Extension
draft-guo-privacypass-token-binding-02

Abstract

This document provides a token binding extension for the Privacy Pass protocol. This extension allows a Client to cryptographically bind a Privacy Pass token to its own generated one-time public key during the issuance flow, without exposing the public key to the Issuer. Later, when spending the token during the redemption flow, the Client must use the corresponding private key to generate a binding proof that the Origin needs to additionally verify except the token itself, where the proof generation can optionally support channel binding. This proof constrains the legitimate presenter of the token to be only the Client who holds the private key and further constrains the legitimate usage of the token to be only the Client's specific channel when channel binding is used in the proof generation, and thus can prevent token export and replay attacks. In addition, the token binding extension does not introduce additional cryptographic primitives, and only uses the primitives currently utilized in the issuance protocol to generate the one-time public-private keypair as well as generate and verify the binding proof.

Authors

Wei Guo
Liang Xia
Ji Li
Yong Li

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