AAuth Protocol
draft-hardt-aauth-protocol-00
This document is an Internet-Draft (I-D).
Anyone may submit an I-D to the IETF.
This I-D is not endorsed by the IETF and has no formal standing in the
IETF standards process.
The information below is for an old version of the document.
| Document | Type |
This is an older version of an Internet-Draft whose latest revision state is "Replaced".
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Dick Hardt | ||
| Last updated | 2026-04-02 | ||
| Replaced by | draft-hardt-oauth-aauth-protocol | ||
| RFC stream | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
| RFC Editor Note | (None) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | I-D Exists | |
| Telechat date | (None) | ||
| Responsible AD | (None) | ||
| Send notices to | (None) |
draft-hardt-aauth-protocol-00
TBD D. Hardt
Internet-Draft Hellō
Intended status: Standards Track 2 April 2026
Expires: 4 October 2026
AAuth Protocol
draft-hardt-aauth-protocol-00
Abstract
This document defines the AAuth authorization protocol, in which
agents obtain proof-of-possession tokens from auth servers to access
resources on behalf of users and organizations. It specifies three
token types (agent, resource, and auth), a unified token endpoint
with deferred response support, and cross-domain federation between
auth servers. It builds on the AAuth Headers specification
([I-D.hardt-aauth-headers]), which defines the AAuth-Requirement
response header and HTTP Message Signatures profile.
Discussion Venues
_Note: This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC._
This document is part of the AAuth specification family. Source for
this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/dickhardt/AAuth (https://github.com/dickhardt/
AAuth).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 October 2026.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Trust Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Bootstrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Entity Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Agent Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. Auth Server Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. Person-Agent Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. Agent Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3. Scopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.4. Protocol Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4.1. Obtaining a Resource Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4.2. Obtaining an Auth Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4.3. Obtaining Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.4.4. Cross-Domain Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. AAuth-Requirement Requirement Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Auth Token Required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Identifier and URL Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.1. Server Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Agent Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.3. Endpoint URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.4. Other URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Agent Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9.1. Agent Token Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Agent Token Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Resource Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.1. Resource Token Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.2. Resource Token Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.3. Resource Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
10.4. Resource Token Endpoint Error Responses . . . . . . . . 17
11. Auth Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.1. Auth Token Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11.2. Auth Token Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. Deferred Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12.1. Initial Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12.2. Pending Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
12.3. Polling with GET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
12.4. Terminal Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.5. Deferred Response State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
13. Token Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
13.1. Token Endpoint Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
13.2. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
13.3. Auth Server Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
13.4. Clarification Chat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
13.4.1. Clarification Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
13.4.2. Agent Response to Clarification . . . . . . . . . . 24
13.4.3. Clarification Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
13.5. User Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
13.6. Third-Party Initiated Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
13.7. Token Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
14. Metadata Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
14.1. Agent Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
14.2. Auth Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
14.3. Resource Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
15. Request Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
15.1. JWT Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
15.1.1. Agent Token Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
15.1.2. Auth Token Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
15.1.3. Resource Token Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
15.1.4. JWKS Discovery and Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
15.1.5. Upstream Token Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
16. Response Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
16.1. Auth Token Response Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
16.2. Resource Challenge Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
17. Error Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
17.1. Authentication Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
17.2. Token Endpoint Error Response Format . . . . . . . . . . 32
17.3. Token Endpoint Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
17.4. Polling Error Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
18. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
18.1. Proof-of-Possession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
18.2. Token Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
18.3. Pending URL Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
18.4. Clarification Chat Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
18.5. Auth Server Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
18.6. Call Chaining Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
18.7. Token Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
18.8. Third-Party Initiated Login Security . . . . . . . . . . 34
18.9. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
19. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
19.1. Well-Known URI Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
19.2. Media Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
19.2.1. application/agent+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
19.2.2. application/auth+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
19.2.3. application/resource+jwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
19.3. JWT Type Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
19.4. JWT Claims Registrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
19.5. AAuth Requirement Level Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
20. Design Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
20.1. Why Standard HTTP Async Pattern . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
20.2. Why No Authorization Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
20.3. Why Every Agent Has a Legal Person . . . . . . . . . . . 38
20.4. Why HTTPS-Based Agent Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
20.5. Why No Refresh Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
20.6. Why JSON Instead of Form-Encoded . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
20.7. Why Callback URL Has No Security Role . . . . . . . . . 38
20.8. Why Reuse OpenID Connect Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . 38
20.9. Why Not mTLS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
20.10. Why Not DPoP? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
20.11. Why Not Extend GNAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
21. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
22. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
23. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
24. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
24.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
24.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix A. Agent Token Acquisition Patterns . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.1. Server Workloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.2. Mobile Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
A.3. Desktop and CLI Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.3.1. User Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.3.2. Managed Desktops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
A.3.3. Self-Hosted Agent Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.4. Browser-Based Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix B. Detailed Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
B.1. Autonomous Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.1.1. Resource Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.1.2. Proactive Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.2. Agent as Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
B.3. Third-Party Initiated Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
B.4. User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
B.5. Direct Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B.6. Call Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
B.6.1. Same Auth Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
B.6.2. Interaction Chaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
B.7. Cross-Domain Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
B.7.1. AS-to-AS Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
B.7.2. Organization Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
B.7.3. Token Endpoint Parameters for Federation . . . . . . 59
B.7.4. Relationship to AAuth Mission Protocol . . . . . . . 60
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
1. Introduction
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] was created to solve a security problem: users
were sharing their passwords with third-party web applications so
those applications could access their data at other sites. OAuth
replaced this anti-pattern with a delegation model — the user's
browser redirects to the authorization server, the user consents, and
the application receives an access token without ever seeing the
user's credentials. OpenID Connect extended this to federated login.
But the landscape has changed. New use cases have emerged that OAuth
and OIDC were not designed to address:
* *On-demand authorization* where agents do not know what resources
they will require until runtime. Long-running agents may execute
tasks over hours or days and discover new authorization needs as
they progress.
* *Multi-hop resource access* where a resource needs to obtain
authorization to access a downstream resource to fulfill a
request, with interaction requirements bubbling back to the user
through the chain.
* *Cross-domain trust* where agents and resources have different
auth servers. In OAuth, the client and resource share the same
authorization server. In dynamic ecosystems, agents routinely
access resources governed by a different auth server.
* *Authorization negotiation* where the user and agent engage in a
back-and-forth during consent — the user asks why access is
needed, the agent explains or adjusts its request — rather than a
binary approve/deny decision.
AAuth introduces the following features to address these use cases:
* *Agent identity without pre-registration*: HTTPS URLs with self-
published metadata and JWKS enable agents to establish identity
without registering credentials at each authorization server.
* *Per-instance agent identity*: Each agent instance has its own
identifier (local@domain) and signing key. Authorization grants
are per-instance, not per-application.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
* *Resource identity and resource-defined authorization*: Resources
issue signed challenges binding the request to the resource's
identity and the agent's key, defining authorization requirements
at request time. This decouples resources from auth servers, and
prevents MITM and confused deputy attacks.
* *Multi-hop resource access*: A resource acts as an agent to access
downstream resources, with interaction requirements bubbling back
to the user.
* *AS-to-AS federation*: An agent's auth server can call a
resource's auth server to obtain an auth token on behalf of its
agent, enabling cross-domain access without the agent or resource
being aware of the federation.
* *Deferred responses*: 202 Accepted with polling is a first-class
primitive across all endpoints, supporting headless agents, long-
running consent, and clarification chat.
* *Clarification chat with justification*: Agents declare why access
is needed, and users can ask questions during consent. The agent
can explain or adjust its request.
AAuth also provides enhancements over OAuth:
* *Proof-of-possession by default*: OAuth bearer tokens can be
stolen and replayed by any holder. AAuth binds every token to a
signing key via HTTP Message Signatures.
* *Unified authentication and authorization*: OAuth and OIDC are
separate protocols with separate flows and token types. AAuth
uses a single auth token that carries both identity claims and
authorized scopes.
* *No protocol artifacts in browser redirects*: Unlike OAuth, where
browser redirects carry authorization codes that are vulnerable to
interception, AAuth uses browser redirects only to transition the
user between parties.
* *Reuse of OpenID Connect vocabulary*: AAuth reuses OpenID Connect
scope values, identity claims, and enterprise extensions, lowering
the adoption barrier.
AAuth complements OAuth and OIDC rather than replacing them — where
pre-registered clients, browser redirects, bearer tokens, and static
scopes work well, they remain the right choice. The AAuth Header
specification ([I-D.hardt-aauth-headers]) defines how resources
communicate authentication requirements via the AAuth-Requirement
header and how agents present cryptographic identity using HTTP
Message Signatures. This specification builds on that foundation to
define the authorization protocol — how agents obtain auth tokens
from auth servers to access protected resources.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
2. Conventions and Definitions
{::boilerplate bcp14-tagged}
3. Terminology
* *Agent*: An HTTP client ([RFC9110], Section 3.5) acting on behalf
of a legal person (user or organization). Identified by an agent
identifier of the form local@domain Section 8.2. An agent has
exactly one auth server that it sends all token requests to.
* *Agent Server*: A server that manages agent identity and issues
agent tokens to agents. Identified by an HTTPS URL Section 8.1
and publishes metadata at /.well-known/aauth-agent.json.
* *Agent Token*: A JWT issued by an agent server to an agent,
binding the agent's signing key to the agent's identity Section 9.
* *Auth Server*: A server that authenticates users, obtains consent,
evaluates authorization policies, and issues auth tokens. The
auth server maintains the association between agents and their
legal persons. Identified by an HTTPS URL Section 8.1 and
publishes metadata at /.well-known/aauth-issuer.json.
* *Auth Token*: A JWT issued by an auth server that grants an agent
access to a resource, containing user identity and/or authorized
scopes Section 11.
* *Resource*: A server that requires authentication and/or
authorization to protect access to its APIs and data. Identified
by an HTTPS URL Section 8.1 and publishes metadata at /.well-
known/aauth-resource.json. A resource has exactly one auth server
that it accepts auth tokens from.
* *Resource Token*: A JWT issued by a resource binding the agent's
identifier (sub) and key thumbprint to the resource's auth server
(aud) Section 10.
* *Interaction*: User authentication, consent, or other action at an
interaction endpoint. Triggered when a server returns 202
Accepted with requirement=interaction.
* *Markdown String*: A human-readable text value formatted as
Markdown (CommonMark). Fields of this type MAY define recommended
sections. Implementations MUST sanitize Markdown before rendering
to users.
* *Justification*: A Markdown string provided by the agent declaring
why access is needed, presented to the user by the auth server
during consent. *TODO:* Define recommended sections.
* *Clarification*: A Markdown string containing a question posed to
the agent by the user during consent via the auth server. The
agent may respond with an explanation or an updated request.
* *Assessment*: A Markdown string containing an auth server's
evaluation of a request during cross-domain federation, conveyed
from AS2 to AS1. *TODO:* Define recommended sections.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
4. Trust Model
Agents trust their auth server. Resources trust their auth server.
When they are in different trust domains, their auth servers
federate.
Single Domain Cross Domain
┌────┐ ┌─────┐ ┌─────┐
│ AS │ │ AS1 │◄────►│ AS2 │
└┬──┬┘ └──┬──┘ └──┬──┘
▲ ▲ ▲ ▲
│ │ │ │
Agent Resource Agent Resource
5. Bootstrapping
Before protocol flows begin, each entity must be established with its
identity, keys, and relationships.
5.1. Entity Metadata
Each entity publishes metadata at a well-known URL:
* Agent servers publish at /.well-known/aauth-agent.json — including
JWKS URI, display name, and capabilities Section 14.1.
* Auth servers publish at /.well-known/aauth-issuer.json — including
token endpoint and supported scopes Section 14.2.
* Resources publish at /.well-known/aauth-resource.json — including
auth server, required scopes, and resource token endpoint
Section 14.3.
5.2. Agent Identity
An agent obtains an agent token from its agent server. The agent
token binds the agent's signing key to its agent identifier
(local@domain). See Appendix A for common provisioning patterns.
5.3. Auth Server Association
An agent has exactly one auth server that it sends all token requests
to. How the agent learns its auth server is out of scope — this is
determined by configuration during agent setup (e.g., set by the
agent server or chosen by the person deploying the agent).
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
5.4. Person-Agent Association
The auth server maintains the association between an agent and its
legal person (user or organization). This association is typically
established when the person first authorizes the agent at the auth
server via the interaction flow. An organization administrator may
also pre-authorize agents for the organization.
The auth server MAY establish a direct communication channel with the
user (e.g., email, push notification, or messaging) to support out-
of-band authorization, approval notifications, and revocation alerts.
6. Protocol Overview
6.1. Tokens
AAuth defines three proof-of-possession token types, all JWTs bound
to a specific signing key:
* *Agent Token* (agent+jwt): Issued by an agent server to an agent,
binding the agent's key to its identity Section 9.
* *Resource Token* (resource+jwt): Issued by a resource in response
to a request, binding the access challenge to the resource's
identity Section 10.
* *Auth Token* (auth+jwt): Issued by an auth server, granting an
agent access to a specific audience Section 11.
6.2. Agent Identity
Every agent holds an agent token issued by its agent server. The
agent token binds the agent's signing key to its agent identifier.
The agent's auth server maintains the association between the agent
and its legal person.
The agent always presents its agent token via the Signature-Key
header when calling its auth server's token endpoint.
6.3. Scopes
AAuth reuses the scope and claims vocabulary defined by OpenID
Connect. Scopes may request identity claims (using OpenID Connect
Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core] scope values such as openid, profile, email)
or resource authorization (using scopes defined by the resource, such
as data.read or calendar.write as defined in the resource's
scope_descriptions metadata), or both.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
6.4. Protocol Steps
This section describes the fundamental protocol steps. Detailed end-
to-end flows combining these steps are in Appendix B.
6.4.1. Obtaining a Resource Token
When the agent knows the resource's requirements (from metadata or a
previous request), it requests a resource token directly from the
resource's resource_token_endpoint:
Agent Resource
| |
| POST resource_token_endpoint |
|-------------------------------------------->|
| |
| resource_token |
|<--------------------------------------------|
Alternatively, a resource MAY respond to any request with 401 and an
AAuth-Requirement containing a resource token, indicating what
authorization is required. This is the discovery path when the agent
does not know the resource's requirements in advance.
A resource MAY also return 401 with a new resource token to a request
that includes an auth token — for example, when the request requires
a higher level of authorization than the current token provides.
Agents MUST be prepared for this step-up authorization at any time.
6.4.2. Obtaining an Auth Token
The agent presents a resource token (or scope for agent-as-audience)
to its auth server's token endpoint. The auth server evaluates
policy and returns an auth token immediately, or a 202 if user
authorization is required.
Agent Auth Server
| |
| POST token_endpoint |
| (resource_token or scope) |
|-------------------------------------------->|
| |
| 200 OK + auth_token |
| — or — |
| 202 Accepted |
| (requirement=interaction / approval) |
|<--------------------------------------------|
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
6.4.3. Obtaining Authorization
When the auth server requires user consent or authentication, it
returns a 202 with an interaction url and code. The agent directs
the user to {url}?code={code}. After the user completes the action,
the agent polls for the result.
Agent User Auth Server
| | |
| direct to | |
| {url}?code={code} | |
|------------------------->| |
| | |
| | authenticate |
| | and consent |
| |---------------------------->|
| | |
| | redirect to |
| | callback_url |
| |<----------------------------|
| | |
| GET pending URL |
|------------------------------------------------------->|
| | |
| 200 OK + auth_token |
|<-------------------------------------------------------|
When the auth server can obtain authorization directly from the user
without the agent's involvement Section 5.4, it returns
requirement=approval and the agent simply polls.
6.4.4. Cross-Domain Federation
When the resource's auth server differs from the agent's, the agent's
auth server (AS1) federates with the resource's auth server (AS2).
The agent is unaware of the federation.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
Agent AS1 AS2
| | |
| POST /token | |
| resource_token | |
| (aud=AS2) | |
|------------------------->| |
| | |
| | POST /token |
| | resource_token |
| | agent_token |
| |------------------------->|
| | |
| | auth_token |
| |<-------------------------|
| | |
| auth_token | |
|<-------------------------| |
7. AAuth-Requirement Requirement Levels
This document defines the following requirement level for the AAuth-
Requirement response header ([I-D.hardt-aauth-headers]). These
levels extend the pseudonym and identity levels defined by the header
specification.
7.1. Auth Token Required
When a resource requires an auth token, it responds with 401
Unauthorized and includes the AAuth-Requirement header with a
resource token:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
AAuth-Requirement: requirement=auth-token; resource-token="eyJ..."
The agent presents the resource token to its auth server's token
endpoint to obtain an auth token. See Section 10 and Section 13 for
details. A resource MAY also use 402 Payment Required with the same
AAuth-Requirement header when payment is additionally required (see
draft-hardt-aauth-headers).
When the auth server requires user interaction to complete an
authorization request (e.g., authentication, consent), it returns 202
Accepted with requirement=interaction, a url, and a code
([I-D.hardt-aauth-headers]). The agent directs the user to the
interaction URL with the code. See Section 13.5 for details.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
When the auth server can obtain approval without the agent directing
a user — for example, by contacting the user directly (push
notification, email), or obtaining administrator approval — it
returns 202 Accepted with requirement=approval. This is the
recommended flow once the auth server has established a direct
communication channel with the user Section 5.4. The agent polls the
pending URL until a terminal response is received. See Section 12
for details.
8. Identifier and URL Requirements
8.1. Server Identifiers
The agent, resource, and issuer values that identify agents,
resources, and auth servers MUST conform to the following:
* MUST use the https scheme
* MUST contain only scheme and host (no port, path, query, or
fragment)
* MUST NOT include a trailing slash
* MUST be lowercase
* Internationalized domain names MUST use the ASCII-Compatible
Encoding (ACE) form (A-labels) as defined in [RFC5890]
Valid identifiers:
* https://agent.example
* https://xn--nxasmq6b.example (internationalized domain in ACE
form)
Invalid identifiers:
* http://agent.example (not HTTPS)
* https://Agent.Example (not lowercase)
* https://agent.example:8443 (contains port)
* https://agent.example/v1 (contains path)
* https://agent.example/ (trailing slash)
Implementations MUST perform exact string comparison on server
identifiers.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
8.2. Agent Identifiers
Agent identifiers are of the form local@domain where domain is the
agent server's domain. The local part MUST consist of lowercase
ASCII letters (a-z), digits (0-9), hyphen (-), underscore (_), plus
(+), and period (.). The local part MUST NOT be empty and MUST NOT
exceed 255 characters. The domain part MUST be a valid domain name
conforming to the server identifier requirements above (without
scheme).
Valid agent identifiers:
* assistant-v2@agent.example
* cli+instance.1@tools.example
Invalid agent identifiers:
* My Agent@agent.example (uppercase letters and space in local part)
* @agent.example (empty local part)
* agent@http://agent.example (domain includes scheme)
Implementations MUST perform exact string comparison on agent
identifiers (case-sensitive).
8.3. Endpoint URLs
The token_endpoint, resource_token_endpoint, and callback_endpoint
values MUST conform to the following:
* MUST use the https scheme
* MUST NOT contain a fragment
* MUST NOT contain a query string
When localhost_callback_allowed is true in the agent's metadata, the
agent MAY use a localhost callback URL as the callback parameter to
the interaction endpoint.
8.4. Other URLs
The jwks_uri, tos_uri, policy_uri, logo_uri, and logo_dark_uri values
MUST use the https scheme.
9. Agent Tokens
Agent tokens bind an agent's signing key to its identity.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
9.1. Agent Token Structure
An agent token is a JWT with typ: agent+jwt containing:
Header: - alg: Signing algorithm. EdDSA is RECOMMENDED.
Implementations MUST NOT accept none. - typ: agent+jwt - kid: Key
identifier
Required payload claims: - iss: Agent server URL - dwk: aauth-
agent.json — the well-known metadata document name for key discovery
([I-D.hardt-httpbis-signature-key]) - sub: Agent identifier (stable
across key rotations) - jti: Unique token identifier for replay
detection and audit - cnf: Confirmation claim ([RFC7800]) with jwk
containing the agent's public key - iat: Issued at timestamp - exp:
Expiration timestamp. Agent tokens SHOULD NOT have a lifetime
exceeding 24 hours.
Optional payload claims: - aud: Audience restriction. When present,
the agent MUST only present this agent token to the specified
server(s). - aud_sub: The user identifier (sub value) from a previous
auth token issued by the auth server in aud. This is a hint to the
auth server to identify which user the agent is associated with. The
auth server MUST NOT treat this claim as authoritative — the auth
server maintains its own person-agent associations and uses aud_sub
only to optimize lookup.
Agent servers MAY include additional claims in the agent token.
Companion specifications may define additional claims for use by auth
servers in policy evaluation — for example, software attestation,
platform integrity, secure enclave status, workload identity
assertions, or software publisher identity. Auth servers MUST ignore
unrecognized claims.
9.2. Agent Token Usage
Agents present agent tokens via the Signature-Key header
([I-D.hardt-httpbis-signature-key]) using scheme=jwt:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt; jwt="eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsInR5cCI6ImFnZW50K2p3dCJ9..."
10. Resource Tokens
Resource tokens provide cryptographic proof of resource identity,
preventing confused deputy and MITM attacks.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
10.1. Resource Token Structure
A resource token is a JWT with typ: resource+jwt containing:
Header: - alg: Signing algorithm. EdDSA is RECOMMENDED.
Implementations MUST NOT accept none. - typ: resource+jwt - kid: Key
identifier
Payload: - iss: Resource URL - dwk: aauth-resource.json — the well-
known metadata document name for key discovery
([I-D.hardt-httpbis-signature-key]) - aud: Auth server URL - jti:
Unique token identifier for replay detection and audit - agent: Agent
identifier - agent_jkt: JWK Thumbprint ([RFC7638]) of the agent's
current signing key - iat: Issued at timestamp - exp: Expiration
timestamp - scope: Requested scopes (optional), as a space-separated
string of scope values
Resource tokens SHOULD NOT have a lifetime exceeding 5 minutes.
Resource tokens are single-use; the auth server MUST reject a
resource token whose jti has been seen before.
10.2. Resource Token Usage
Resources include resource tokens in the AAuth-Requirement header
when requiring authorization:
AAuth-Requirement: requirement=auth-token; resource-token="eyJ..."
10.3. Resource Token Endpoint
When a resource publishes a resource_token_endpoint in its metadata,
agents MAY request a resource token proactively — without first
making an API call and receiving a 401 challenge.
*Request:*
POST /resource-token HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "signature-key");created=1730217600
Signature: sig=:...signature bytes...:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt;jwt="eyJhbGc..."
{
"scope": "data.read data.write"
}
*Response:*
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
{
"resource_token": "eyJhbGc...",
"scope": "data.read data.write"
}
The resource's auth server is identified by the aud claim in the
resource token. The agent sends the resource token to its own auth
server's token endpoint.
10.4. Resource Token Endpoint Error Responses
+===================+========+====================================+
| Error | Status | Meaning |
+===================+========+====================================+
| invalid_request | 400 | Missing or invalid parameters |
+-------------------+--------+------------------------------------+
| invalid_signature | 401 | HTTP signature verification failed |
+-------------------+--------+------------------------------------+
| invalid_scope | 400 | Requested scope not recognized by |
| | | the resource |
+-------------------+--------+------------------------------------+
| server_error | 500 | Internal error |
+-------------------+--------+------------------------------------+
Table 1
Error responses use the same format as the token endpoint
Section 17.2.
11. Auth Tokens
Auth tokens grant agents access to resources after authentication and
authorization.
11.1. Auth Token Structure
An auth token is a JWT with typ: auth+jwt containing:
Header: - alg: Signing algorithm. EdDSA is RECOMMENDED.
Implementations MUST NOT accept none. - typ: auth+jwt - kid: Key
identifier
Required payload claims: - iss: Auth server URL - dwk: aauth-
issuer.json — the well-known metadata document name for key discovery
([I-D.hardt-httpbis-signature-key]) - aud: The URL of the resource
the agent is authorized to access. When the agent is accessing its
own resources (SSO or first-party use), the aud is the agent server's
URL. - jti: Unique token identifier for replay detection and audit -
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
agent: Agent identifier - cnf: Confirmation claim with jwk containing
the agent's public key - iat: Issued at timestamp - exp: Expiration
timestamp. Auth tokens SHOULD NOT have a lifetime exceeding 1 hour
and MUST NOT have a lifetime exceeding 24 hours.
Conditional payload claims (at least one MUST be present): - sub:
User identifier - scope: Authorized scopes, as a space-separated
string of scope values consistent with [RFC9068] Section 2.2.3
At least one of sub or scope MUST be present.
The auth token MAY include additional claims registered in the IANA
JSON Web Token Claims Registry [RFC7519] or defined in OpenID Connect
Core 1.0 [OpenID.Core] Section 5.1.
11.2. Auth Token Usage
Agents present auth tokens via the Signature-Key header
([I-D.hardt-httpbis-signature-key]) using scheme=jwt:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt; jwt="eyJhbGciOiJFZERTQSIsInR5cCI6ImF1dGgrand0In0..."
12. Deferred Responses
Any endpoint in AAuth — whether an auth server token endpoint or a
resource endpoint — MAY return a 202 Accepted response ([RFC9110])
when it cannot immediately resolve a request. This is a first-class
protocol primitive, not a special case. Agents MUST handle 202
responses regardless of the nature of the original request.
12.1. Initial Request
The agent makes a request and signals its willingness to wait using
the Prefer header ([RFC7240]):
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: auth.example
Content-Type: application/json
Prefer: wait=45
Signature-Input: sig=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "signature-key");created=1730217600
Signature: sig=:...signature bytes...:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt;jwt="eyJhbGc..."
{
"resource_token": "eyJhbGc..."
}
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
12.2. Pending Response
When the server cannot resolve the request within the wait period:
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
Location: /pending/f7a3b9c
Retry-After: 0
Cache-Control: no-store
Content-Type: application/json
{
"status": "pending",
"location": "/pending/f7a3b9c"
}
Headers:
* Location (REQUIRED): The pending URL. The Location URL MUST be on
the same origin as the responding server.
* Retry-After (REQUIRED): Seconds the agent SHOULD wait before
polling. 0 means retry immediately.
* Cache-Control: no-store (REQUIRED): Prevents caching of pending
responses.
Body fields:
* status (REQUIRED): "pending" while the request is waiting.
"interacting" when the user has arrived at the interaction
endpoint. Agents MUST treat unrecognized status values as
"pending" and continue polling.
* location (REQUIRED): The pending URL (echoes the Location header).
* requirement (OPTIONAL): "interaction" when the agent must direct
the user to an interaction endpoint (with code). "approval" when
the auth server is obtaining approval directly.
* code (OPTIONAL): The interaction code. Present only with
requirement: "interaction".
* clarification (OPTIONAL): A question from the user during consent.
12.3. Polling with GET
After receiving a 202, the agent switches to GET for all subsequent
requests to the Location URL. The agent does NOT resend the original
request body. *Exception*: During clarification chat, the agent uses
POST to deliver a clarification response.
The agent MUST respect Retry-After values. If a Retry-After header
is not present, the default polling interval is 5 seconds. If the
server responds with 429 Too Many Requests, the agent MUST increase
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
its polling interval by 5 seconds (linear backoff, following the
pattern in [RFC8628], Section 3.5). The Prefer: wait=N header
([RFC7240]) MAY be included on polling requests to signal the agent's
willingness to wait for a long-poll response.
12.4. Terminal Responses
A non-202 response terminates polling. The following table covers
responses to both the initial request and subsequent GET polling
requests at any AAuth endpoint:
+========+=====================+==================================+
| Status | Meaning | Agent Behavior |
+========+=====================+==================================+
| 200 | Success | Process response body |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 400 | Invalid request | Check error field; fix and retry |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 401 | Invalid signature / | Check credentials; obtain auth |
| | auth token required | token if resource challenge |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 402 | Auth token + | Obtain auth token and satisfy |
| | payment required | payment requirement |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 403 | Denied or abandoned | Surface to user; check error |
| | | field |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 408 | Expired | MAY initiate a fresh request |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 410 | Gone — permanently | MUST NOT retry |
| | invalid | |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 429 | Too many requests | Increase polling interval by 5 |
| | | seconds |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 500 | Internal server | Start over |
| | error | |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
| 503 | Temporarily | Back off per Retry-After, retry |
| | unavailable | |
+--------+---------------------+----------------------------------+
Table 2
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
12.5. Deferred Response State Machine
The following state machine applies to any AAuth endpoint that
returns a 202 Accepted response — including auth server token
endpoints and resource endpoints during call chaining.
Initial request (with Prefer: wait=N)
|
+-- 200 --> done (process response)
+-- 202 --> note Location URL, check require/code
+-- 400 --> invalid request — check error field, fix and retry
+-- 401 --> invalid signature — check credentials
+-- 402 --> auth token + payment required (resource only)
+-- 500 --> server error — start over
+-- 503 --> back off (Retry-After), retry
|
GET Location (with Prefer: wait=N)
|
+-- 200 --> done (process response)
+-- 202 --> continue polling (check status and clarification)
| status=interacting → stop prompting user
+-- 403 --> denied or abandoned — surface to user
+-- 408 --> expired — MAY retry with fresh request
+-- 410 --> invalid_code — do not retry
+-- 429 --> slow_down — increase interval by 5s
+-- 500 --> server_error — start over
+-- 503 --> temporarily_unavailable — back off (Retry-After)
13. Token Endpoint
The auth server's token_endpoint issues auth tokens to agents and to
other auth servers during cross-domain federation.
13.1. Token Endpoint Modes
+=============+========================+===========================+
| Mode | Key Parameters | Use Case |
+=============+========================+===========================+
| Resource | resource_token | Agent needs auth token |
| access | | for a resource |
+-------------+------------------------+---------------------------+
| Self-access | scope (no | Agent needs auth token |
| (SSO/1P) | resource_token) | for itself |
+-------------+------------------------+---------------------------+
| Call | resource_token + | Resource acting as agent |
| chaining | upstream_token | |
+-------------+------------------------+---------------------------+
| AS-to-AS | resource_token + | Auth server federating on |
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
| federation | agent_token + optional | behalf of agent (includes |
| | upstream_token | upstream_token when call |
| | | chaining cross-domain) |
+-------------+------------------------+---------------------------+
| Token | auth_token (expired) | Renew expired token |
| refresh | | |
+-------------+------------------------+---------------------------+
Table 3
13.2. Authorization Request
The agent MUST make a signed POST to the token_endpoint. The request
MUST include HTTP Message Signatures and the agent MUST present its
agent token via the Signature-Key header using scheme=jwt.
*Request parameters:*
* resource_token (CONDITIONAL): The resource token. Required when
requesting access to another resource.
* scope (CONDITIONAL): Space-separated scope values. Used when the
agent requests authorization to itself.
* upstream_token (OPTIONAL): An auth token from an upstream
authorization, used in call chaining.
* agent_token (OPTIONAL): The agent's agent token. Used in AS-to-AS
federation.
* justification (OPTIONAL): A Markdown string declaring why access
is being requested. The auth server SHOULD present this value to
the user during consent. The auth server MUST sanitize the
Markdown before rendering to users. The auth server MAY log the
justification for audit and monitoring purposes. *TODO:* Define
recommended sections.
* login_hint (OPTIONAL): Hint about who to authorize, per
[OpenID.Core] Section 3.1.2.1.
* tenant (OPTIONAL): Tenant identifier, per OpenID Connect
Enterprise Extensions 1.0 [OpenID.Enterprise].
* domain_hint (OPTIONAL): Domain hint, per OpenID Connect Enterprise
Extensions 1.0 [OpenID.Enterprise].
*Example request:*
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: auth.example
Content-Type: application/json
Prefer: wait=45
Signature-Input: sig=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "signature-key");created=1730217600
Signature: sig=:...signature bytes...:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt;jwt="eyJhbGc..."
{
"resource_token": "eyJhbGc...",
"justification": "Find available meeting times"
}
13.3. Auth Server Response
*Direct grant response* (200):
{
"auth_token": "eyJhbGc...",
"expires_in": 3600
}
*User interaction required response* (202):
HTTP/1.1 202 Accepted
Location: /pending/abc123
Retry-After: 0
Cache-Control: no-store
AAuth-Requirement: requirement=interaction; code="ABCD1234"
Content-Type: application/json
{
"status": "pending",
"location": "/pending/abc123",
"require": "interaction",
"code": "ABCD1234"
}
13.4. Clarification Chat
During user consent, the user may ask questions about the agent's
stated justification. The auth server delivers these questions to
the agent, and the agent responds. This enables a consent dialog
without requiring the agent to have a direct channel to the user.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
Agents that support clarification chat SHOULD declare
"clarification_supported": true in their agent server metadata.
Individual requests MAY indicate clarification support by including
"clarification_supported": true in the token endpoint request body.
13.4.1. Clarification Flow
When the user asks a question during consent, the auth server
includes a clarification field in the next polling response:
{
"status": "pending",
"clarification": "Why do you need write access to my calendar?",
"timeout": 120
}
* clarification (String): The user's question.
* timeout (Integer, OPTIONAL): Seconds until the auth server times
out the user interaction. The agent MUST respond before this
deadline.
13.4.2. Agent Response to Clarification
The agent MUST respond to a clarification with one of:
1. *Clarification response*: POST a clarification_response to the
pending URL.
2. *Updated request*: POST a new resource_token to the pending URL,
replacing the original request with updated scope or parameters.
3. *Cancel request*: DELETE the pending URL to withdraw the request.
13.4.2.1. Clarification Response
The agent responds by POSTing JSON with clarification_response to the
pending URL:
POST /pending/abc123 HTTP/1.1
Host: auth.example
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "signature-key");created=1730217600
Signature: sig=:...signature bytes...:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt;jwt="eyJhbGc..."
{
"clarification_response": "I need to create a meeting invite for the participants you listed."
}
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
The clarification_response value is a Markdown string. *TODO:* Define
recommended sections. After posting, the agent resumes polling with
GET.
13.4.2.2. Updated Request
The agent MAY obtain a new resource token from the resource (e.g.,
with reduced scope) and POST it to the pending URL:
POST /pending/abc123 HTTP/1.1
Host: auth.example
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "signature-key");created=1730217600
Signature: sig=:...signature bytes...:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt;jwt="eyJhbGc..."
{
"resource_token": "eyJ...",
"justification": "I've reduced my request to read-only access."
}
The new resource token MUST have the same iss, agent, and agent_jkt
as the original. The auth server presents the updated request to the
user. A justification is OPTIONAL but RECOMMENDED to explain the
change to the user.
13.4.2.3. Cancel Request
The agent MAY cancel the request by sending DELETE to the pending
URL:
DELETE /pending/abc123 HTTP/1.1
Host: auth.example
Signature-Input: sig=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "signature-key");created=1730217600
Signature: sig=:...signature bytes...:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt;jwt="eyJhbGc..."
The auth server terminates the consent session and informs the user
that the agent withdrew its request. Subsequent requests to the
pending URL return 410 Gone.
13.4.3. Clarification Limits
Auth servers SHOULD enforce limits on clarification rounds
(recommended: 5 rounds maximum). Clarification responses from agents
are untrusted input and MUST be sanitized before display to the user.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
13.5. User Interaction
When a server responds with 202 and AAuth-Requirement:
requirement=interaction, the url and code parameters in the header
tell the agent where to send the user ([I-D.hardt-aauth-headers]).
The agent constructs the user-facing URL as {url}?code={code} and
directs the user using one of the methods defined in the header
specification (browser redirect, QR code, or display code).
When the agent has a browser, it MAY append a callback parameter:
{url}?code={code}&callback={callback_url}
The callback URL is constructed from the agent's callback_endpoint
metadata. When present, the server redirects the user's browser to
the callback URL after the user completes the action. If no callback
parameter is provided, the server displays a completion page and the
agent relies on polling to detect completion.
The code parameter is single-use: once the user arrives at the URL
with a valid code, the code is consumed and cannot be reused.
13.6. Third-Party Initiated Login
When a third party directs a user to the agent's login_endpoint, the
agent initiates a standard "agent as audience" login flow.
*Login endpoint parameters:*
* issuer (REQUIRED): The auth server URL.
* domain_hint (OPTIONAL): Domain hint.
* tenant (OPTIONAL): Tenant identifier.
* start_path (OPTIONAL): Path on the agent's origin where the user
should be directed after login completes.
13.7. Token Refresh
When an auth token expires, the agent requests a new one by
presenting the expired auth token:
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
POST /token HTTP/1.1
Host: auth.example
Content-Type: application/json
Signature-Input: sig=("@method" "@authority" "@path" "signature-key");created=1730217600
Signature: sig=:...signature bytes...:
Signature-Key: sig=jwt;jwt="eyJhbGc..."
{
"auth_token": "eyJhbGc..."
}
The auth server verifies the agent's HTTP signature, validates the
expired auth token, and issues a new auth token. The refreshed auth
token MUST have the same aud, scope, and sub claims as the original.
The agent's signing key MAY have rotated since the original auth
token was issued. The auth server identifies the agent by the agent
identifier in the agent token presented via Signature-Key on the
refresh request.
The auth server determines the maximum time after expiration that a
token may be refreshed. The refresh request MAY return a 202
deferred response if user interaction or approval is required to
reauthorize.
14. Metadata Documents
Participants publish metadata at well-known URLs ([RFC8615]) to
enable discovery.
14.1. Agent Server Metadata
Published at /.well-known/aauth-agent.json:
{
"agent": "https://agent.example",
"jwks_uri": "https://agent.example/.well-known/jwks.json",
"client_name": "Example AI Assistant",
"logo_uri": "https://agent.example/logo.png",
"logo_dark_uri": "https://agent.example/logo-dark.png",
"login_endpoint": "https://agent.example/login",
"callback_endpoint": "https://agent.example/callback",
"localhost_callback_allowed": true,
"clarification_supported": true,
"tos_uri": "https://agent.example/tos",
"policy_uri": "https://agent.example/privacy"
}
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
Fields:
* agent (REQUIRED): The agent server's HTTPS URL (the domain in
agent identifiers it issues)
* jwks_uri (REQUIRED): URL to the agent server's JSON Web Key Set
* client_name (OPTIONAL): Human-readable agent name (per [RFC7591])
* logo_uri (OPTIONAL): URL to agent logo (per [RFC7591])
* logo_dark_uri (OPTIONAL): URL to agent logo for dark backgrounds
* login_endpoint (OPTIONAL): URL where third parties direct users to
initiate a login flow
* callback_endpoint (OPTIONAL): The agent's HTTPS callback endpoint
URL
* localhost_callback_allowed (OPTIONAL): Boolean. Default: false.
* clarification_supported (OPTIONAL): Boolean. Default: false.
* tos_uri (OPTIONAL): URL to terms of service (per [RFC7591])
* policy_uri (OPTIONAL): URL to privacy policy (per [RFC7591])
14.2. Auth Server Metadata
Published at /.well-known/aauth-issuer.json:
{
"issuer": "https://auth.example",
"token_endpoint": "https://auth.example/token",
"jwks_uri": "https://auth.example/.well-known/jwks.json"
}
Fields:
* issuer (REQUIRED): The auth server's HTTPS URL
* token_endpoint (REQUIRED): Single endpoint for all agent-to-auth-
server communication
* jwks_uri (REQUIRED): URL to the auth server's JSON Web Key Set
14.3. Resource Metadata
Published at /.well-known/aauth-resource.json:
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
{
"resource": "https://resource.example",
"jwks_uri": "https://resource.example/.well-known/jwks.json",
"client_name": "Example Data Service",
"logo_uri": "https://resource.example/logo.png",
"logo_dark_uri": "https://resource.example/logo-dark.png",
"resource_token_endpoint": "https://resource.example/resource-token",
"scope_descriptions": {
"data.read": "Read access to your data and documents",
"data.write": "Create and update your data and documents",
"data.delete": "Permanently delete your data and documents"
},
"additional_signature_components": ["content-type", "content-digest"]
}
Fields:
* resource (REQUIRED): The resource's HTTPS URL
* jwks_uri (REQUIRED): URL to the resource's JSON Web Key Set
* client_name (OPTIONAL): Human-readable resource name (per
[RFC7591])
* logo_uri (OPTIONAL): URL to resource logo (per [RFC7591])
* logo_dark_uri (OPTIONAL): URL to resource logo for dark
backgrounds
* resource_token_endpoint (OPTIONAL): URL where agents can
proactively request resource tokens Section 10.3
* scope_descriptions (OPTIONAL): Object mapping scope values to
Markdown strings for consent display
* additional_signature_components (OPTIONAL): Array of HTTP message
component identifiers ([RFC9421]) that agents MUST include in the
Signature-Input covered components when signing requests to this
resource, in addition to the base components required by the AAuth
HTTP Message Signatures profile ([I-D.hardt-aauth-headers])
15. Request Verification
15.1. JWT Verification
When a request includes a JWT (agent token or auth token) via
scheme=jwt, the server MUST verify the JWT per [RFC7515], [RFC7519],
and the Signature-Key specification
([I-D.hardt-httpbis-signature-key]):
1. Decode the JWT header. Verify typ matches the expected token
type (agent+jwt, auth+jwt, or resource+jwt).
2. Extract the iss and dwk claims from the JWT payload. Fetch
{iss}/.well-known/{dwk}, parse as JSON, and extract the jwks_uri.
Fetch the JWKS and locate the key matching the JWT header kid.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
3. Verify the JWT signature using the discovered issuer key.
4. Verify exp is in the future. Verify iat is not in the future.
5. *Key binding*: Verify that the public key in the JWT's cnf claim
matches the key used to sign the HTTP request.
15.1.1. Agent Token Verification
1. Perform JWT Verification. Verify dwk is aauth-agent.json.
2. Verify iss is a valid HTTPS URL conforming to the Server
Identifier requirements.
3. Verify cnf.jwk matches the key used to sign the HTTP request.
4. If aud is present, verify that the server's own identifier is
listed.
15.1.2. Auth Token Verification
1. Perform JWT Verification. Verify dwk is aauth-issuer.json.
2. Verify iss is a valid HTTPS URL.
3. Verify aud matches the resource's own identifier.
4. Verify agent matches the agent identifier from the request's
signing context.
5. Verify cnf.jwk matches the key used to sign the HTTP request.
6. Verify that at least one of sub or scope is present.
15.1.3. Resource Token Verification
1. Perform JWT Verification. Verify dwk is aauth-resource.json.
2. Verify aud matches the auth server's own identifier.
3. Verify agent matches the requesting agent's identifier.
4. Verify agent_jkt matches the JWK Thumbprint of the key used to
sign the HTTP request.
5. Verify exp is in the future.
6. Verify jti has not been seen before (replay detection).
15.1.4. JWKS Discovery and Caching
Implementations MUST cache JWKS responses and SHOULD respect HTTP
cache headers (Cache-Control, Expires) returned by the JWKS endpoint.
When an implementation encounters an unknown kid in a JWT header, it
SHOULD refresh the cached JWKS for that issuer to support key
rotation. To prevent abuse, implementations MUST NOT fetch a given
issuer's JWKS more frequently than once per minute. If a JWKS fetch
fails, implementations SHOULD use the cached JWKS if available and
SHOULD retry with exponential backoff. Cached JWKS entries SHOULD be
discarded after a maximum of 24 hours regardless of cache headers, to
ensure removed keys are no longer trusted.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
15.1.5. Upstream Token Verification
When the auth server receives an upstream_token parameter in a call
chaining request:
1. Perform Auth Token Verification on the upstream token.
2. Verify iss is a trusted auth server (the auth server's own
identifier, or a federated auth server).
3. Verify the aud in the upstream token matches the resource that is
now acting as an agent (i.e., the upstream token was issued for
the intermediary resource).
4. The auth server evaluates its own policy based on the upstream
token's claims. The resulting downstream authorization is not
required to be a subset of the upstream scopes.
16. Response Verification
16.1. Auth Token Response Verification
When an agent receives an auth token:
1. Verify the auth token JWT using the auth server's JWKS.
2. Verify iss matches the auth server the agent sent the token
request to.
3. Verify aud matches the resource the agent intends to access.
4. Verify cnf.jwk matches the agent's own signing key.
5. Verify agent matches the agent's own identifier.
16.2. Resource Challenge Verification
When an agent receives a 401 response with AAuth-Requirement:
requirement=auth-token:
1. Extract the resource-token parameter.
2. Decode and verify the resource token JWT.
3. Verify iss matches the resource the agent sent the request to.
4. Send the resource token to the agent's own auth server's token
endpoint.
5. Verify agent matches the agent's own identifier.
6. Verify agent_jkt matches the JWK Thumbprint of the agent's
signing key.
7. Verify exp is in the future.
17. Error Responses
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
17.1. Authentication Errors
A 401 response from any AAuth endpoint uses the AAuth-Error header as
defined in ([I-D.hardt-aauth-headers]).
17.2. Token Endpoint Error Response Format
Token endpoint errors use Content-Type: application/json ([RFC8259])
with the following members:
* error (REQUIRED): String. A single error code.
* error_description (OPTIONAL): String. A human-readable
description.
17.3. Token Endpoint Error Codes
+========================+========+=========================+
| Error | Status | Meaning |
+========================+========+=========================+
| invalid_request | 400 | Malformed JSON, missing |
| | | required fields |
+------------------------+--------+-------------------------+
| invalid_agent_token | 400 | Agent token malformed |
| | | or signature |
| | | verification failed |
+------------------------+--------+-------------------------+
| expired_agent_token | 400 | Agent token has expired |
+------------------------+--------+-------------------------+
| invalid_resource_token | 400 | Resource token |
| | | malformed or signature |
| | | verification failed |
+------------------------+--------+-------------------------+
| expired_resource_token | 400 | Resource token has |
| | | expired |
+------------------------+--------+-------------------------+
| invalid_auth_token | 400 | Auth token for refresh |
| | | is malformed, signature |
| | | verification failed, or |
| | | beyond refresh window |
+------------------------+--------+-------------------------+
| server_error | 500 | Internal error |
+------------------------+--------+-------------------------+
Table 4
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
17.4. Polling Error Codes
+==============+========+================================+
| Error | Status | Meaning |
+==============+========+================================+
| denied | 403 | User or approver explicitly |
| | | denied the request |
+--------------+--------+--------------------------------+
| abandoned | 403 | Interaction code was used but |
| | | user did not complete |
+--------------+--------+--------------------------------+
| expired | 408 | Timed out |
+--------------+--------+--------------------------------+
| invalid_code | 410 | Interaction code not |
| | | recognized or already consumed |
+--------------+--------+--------------------------------+
| slow_down | 429 | Polling too frequently — |
| | | increase interval by 5 seconds |
+--------------+--------+--------------------------------+
| server_error | 500 | Internal error |
+--------------+--------+--------------------------------+
Table 5
18. Security Considerations
18.1. Proof-of-Possession
All AAuth tokens are proof-of-possession tokens. The holder must
prove possession of the private key corresponding to the public key
in the token's cnf claim.
18.2. Token Security
* Agent tokens bind agent keys to agent identity
* Resource tokens bind access requests to resource identity,
preventing confused deputy attacks
* Auth tokens bind authorization grants to agent keys
18.3. Pending URL Security
* Pending URLs MUST be unguessable and SHOULD have limited lifetime
* Pending URLs MUST be on the same origin as the server that issued
them
* Servers MUST verify the agent's identity on every poll
* Once a terminal response is returned, the pending URL MUST return
404
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
18.4. Clarification Chat Security
* Auth servers MUST enforce a maximum number of clarification rounds
* Clarification responses from agents are untrusted input and MUST
be sanitized before display
18.5. Auth Server Discovery
The resource's auth server is identified by the aud claim in the
resource token. Federation mechanics are described in Appendix B.7.
18.6. Call Chaining Identity
When a resource acts as an agent in call chaining, it uses its own
signing key and presents its own credentials. The resource MUST
publish agent metadata so downstream parties can verify its identity.
18.7. Token Revocation
This specification does not define a token revocation mechanism.
Auth tokens are short-lived and bound to specific signing keys.
18.8. Third-Party Initiated Login Security
Agents MUST treat all login endpoint parameters as untrusted input.
The agent MUST verify the issuer and MUST validate that start_path is
a relative path on its own origin.
18.9. TLS Requirements
All HTTPS connections MUST use TLS 1.2 or later, following the
recommendations in BCP 195 [RFC9325].
19. IANA Considerations
19.1. Well-Known URI Registrations
This specification registers the following well-known URIs per
[RFC8615]:
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
+=====================+===================+================+
| URI Suffix | Change Controller | Reference |
+=====================+===================+================+
| aauth-agent.json | IETF | This document, |
| | | Section 14.1 |
+---------------------+-------------------+----------------+
| aauth-issuer.json | IETF | This document, |
| | | Section 14.2 |
+---------------------+-------------------+----------------+
| aauth-resource.json | IETF | This document, |
| | | Section 14.3 |
+---------------------+-------------------+----------------+
Table 6
19.2. Media Type Registrations
This specification registers the following media types:
19.2.1. application/agent+jwt
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: agent+jwt
* Required parameters: N/A
* Optional parameters: N/A
* Encoding considerations: binary; a JWT is a sequence of Base64url-
encoded parts separated by period characters
* Security considerations: See Section 18
* Interoperability considerations: N/A
* Published specification: This document, Section 9
* Applications that use this media type: AAuth agents and auth
servers
* Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
19.2.2. application/auth+jwt
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: auth+jwt
* Required parameters: N/A
* Optional parameters: N/A
* Encoding considerations: binary; a JWT is a sequence of Base64url-
encoded parts separated by period characters
* Security considerations: See Section 18
* Interoperability considerations: N/A
* Published specification: This document, Section 11
* Applications that use this media type: AAuth auth servers, agents,
and resources
* Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
19.2.3. application/resource+jwt
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: resource+jwt
* Required parameters: N/A
* Optional parameters: N/A
* Encoding considerations: binary; a JWT is a sequence of Base64url-
encoded parts separated by period characters
* Security considerations: See Section 18
* Interoperability considerations: N/A
* Published specification: This document, Section 10
* Applications that use this media type: AAuth resources and auth
servers
* Fragment identifier considerations: N/A
19.3. JWT Type Registrations
This specification registers the following JWT typ header parameter
values in the "JSON Web Token Types" sub-registry:
+==============+===========================+
| Type Value | Reference |
+==============+===========================+
| agent+jwt | This document, Section 9 |
+--------------+---------------------------+
| auth+jwt | This document, Section 11 |
+--------------+---------------------------+
| resource+jwt | This document, Section 10 |
+--------------+---------------------------+
Table 7
19.4. JWT Claims Registrations
This specification registers the following claims in the IANA "JSON
Web Token Claims" registry established by [RFC7519]:
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
+============+=======================+============+===========+
| Claim Name | Claim Description | Change | Reference |
| | | Controller | |
+============+=======================+============+===========+
| dwk | Discovery Well-Known | IETF | This |
| | document name | | document |
+------------+-----------------------+------------+-----------+
| agent | Agent identifier | IETF | This |
| | | | document |
+------------+-----------------------+------------+-----------+
| agent_jkt | JWK Thumbprint of the | IETF | This |
| | agent's signing key | | document |
+------------+-----------------------+------------+-----------+
Table 8
19.5. AAuth Requirement Level Registry
This specification registers the following additional entry in the
AAuth Requirement Level Registry established by the AAuth-Requirement
specification ([I-D.hardt-aauth-headers]):
+============+===============+
| Value | Reference |
+============+===============+
| auth-token | This document |
+------------+---------------+
Table 9
20. Design Rationale
20.1. Why Standard HTTP Async Pattern
AAuth uses standard HTTP async semantics (202 Accepted, Location,
Prefer: wait, Retry-After). This applies uniformly to all endpoints,
aligns with RFC 7240, replaces OAuth device flow, supports headless
agents, and enables clarification chat.
20.2. Why No Authorization Code
AAuth eliminates authorization codes entirely. The user redirect
carries only the callback URL, which has no security value to an
attacker. The auth token is delivered exclusively via polling,
authenticated by the agent's HTTP Message Signature.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
20.3. Why Every Agent Has a Legal Person
AAuth requires every agent to be associated with a legal person — a
user or an organization. There are no truly autonomous agents. The
auth server maintains this association. This ensures there is always
an accountable party for an agent's actions, which is essential for
authorization decisions, audit, and liability.
20.4. Why HTTPS-Based Agent Identity
HTTPS URLs as agent identifiers enable dynamic ecosystems without
pre-registration.
20.5. Why No Refresh Token
Every AAuth request includes an HTTP Message Signature that proves
the agent holds the private key. The expired auth token provides
authorization context. A separate refresh token would be redundant.
20.6. Why JSON Instead of Form-Encoded
JSON is the standard format for modern APIs. AAuth uses JSON for
both request and response bodies.
20.7. Why Callback URL Has No Security Role
Tokens never pass through the user's browser. The callback URL is
purely a UX optimization.
20.8. Why Reuse OpenID Connect Vocabulary
AAuth reuses OpenID Connect scope values, identity claims, and
enterprise parameters. This lowers the adoption barrier.
20.9. Why Not mTLS?
Mutual TLS (mTLS) authenticates the TLS connection, not individual
HTTP requests. Different paths on the same resource may have
different requirements — some paths may require no signature, others
pseudonymous access, others verified identity, and others an auth
token. AAuth's per-request signatures allow resources to vary
requirements by path. Additionally, mTLS requires PKI infrastructure
(CA, certificate provisioning, revocation), cannot express
progressive requirements, and is stripped by TLS-terminating proxies
and CDNs. mTLS remains the right choice for infrastructure-level
mutual authentication (e.g., service mesh). AAuth addresses
application-level identity where progressive requirements and
intermediary compatibility are needed.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
20.10. Why Not DPoP?
DPoP ([RFC9449]) binds an existing OAuth access token to a key,
preventing token theft. AAuth differs in that agents can establish
identity from zero — no pre-existing token, no pre-registration. At
the pseudonym and identity levels, AAuth requires no tokens at all,
only a signed request. DPoP has a single mode (prove you hold the
key bound to this token), while AAuth supports progressive
requirements from pseudonymous access through verified identity to
authorized access with interactive consent. DPoP is the right choice
for adding proof-of-possession to existing OAuth deployments.
20.11. Why Not Extend GNAP
GNAP (RFC 9635) shares several motivations with AAuth — proof-of-
possession by default, client identity without pre-registration, and
async authorization. A natural question is whether AAuth's
capabilities could be achieved as GNAP extensions rather than a new
protocol. There are several reasons they cannot.
*Resource tokens require an architectural change, not an extension.*
In GNAP, as in OAuth, the resource server is a passive consumer of
tokens — it verifies them but never produces signed artifacts that
the authorization server consumes. AAuth's resource tokens invert
this: the resource cryptographically asserts what is being requested,
binding its own identity, the agent's key thumbprint, and the
requested scope into a signed JWT. Adding this to GNAP would require
changing its core architectural assumption about the role of the
resource server.
*Interaction chaining requires a different continuation model.*
GNAP's continuation mechanism operates between a single client and a
single authorization server. When a resource needs to access a
downstream resource that requires user consent, GNAP has no mechanism
for that consent requirement to propagate back through the call chain
to the original user. Supporting this would require rethinking
GNAP's continuation model to support multi-party propagation through
intermediaries.
*The federation model is fundamentally different.* In GNAP, the
client must discover and interact with each authorization server
directly. AAuth's "agents always go up" principle — where the agent
only ever talks to its own auth server, and auth servers federate
horizontally — is a different trust topology, not a configuration
option. Retrofitting this into GNAP would produce a profile so
constrained that it would be a distinct protocol in practice.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
*GNAP's generality is a liability for this use case.* GNAP is
designed to be maximally flexible — interaction modes, key proofing
methods, token formats, and access structures are all pluggable.
This means implementers must make dozens of profiling decisions
before arriving at an interoperable system. AAuth makes these
decisions prescriptively: one token format (JWT), one key proofing
method (HTTP Message Signatures), one interaction pattern
(interaction codes with polling), and one identity model
(local@domain with HTTPS metadata). For the agent-to-resource
ecosystem, this prescriptiveness is a feature — it enables
interoperability without bilateral agreements.
In summary, AAuth's core innovations — resource-signed challenges,
interaction chaining through multi-hop calls, AS-to-AS federation,
and clarification chat during consent — are architectural choices
that would require changing GNAP's foundations rather than extending
them. The result would be a heavily constrained GNAP profile that
shares little with other GNAP deployments.
21. Implementation Status
_Note: This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC._
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs.
The following implementations are known at the time of writing:
* *Hellō* (https://hello.coop): (https://hello.coop):) Auth server
implementation of the AAuth protocol, including token endpoint,
and deferred responses.
* *@aauth npm packages* (https://www.npmjs.com/org/aauth):
(https://www.npmjs.com/org/aauth):) JavaScript/TypeScript
libraries for AAuth agents and resources.
* *aauth-implementation* (https://github.com/christian-posta/aauth-
implementation): (https://github.com/christian-posta/aauth-
implementation):) Python library implementing key pair generation
(Ed25519), HTTP Message Signatures, AAuth request signing, and
Signature-Key header support. Author: Christian Posta.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
* *keycloak-aauth-extension* (https://github.com/christian-posta/
keycloak-aauth-extension): (https://github.com/christian-posta/
keycloak-aauth-extension):) Java Keycloak SPI extension
implementing the auth server role — HTTP Message Signature
verification, AAuth token issuance with agent identity binding,
consent flows, token refresh, token exchange for delegation
chains, and /.well-known/aauth-issuer metadata. Author: Christian
Posta.
* *aauth-full-demo* (https://github.com/christian-posta/aauth-full-
demo): (https://github.com/christian-posta/aauth-full-demo):) End-
to-end Python/JavaScript demo with multiple agents communicating
via A2A protocol with AAuth authentication, including autonomous
authorization, user-delegated consent via Keycloak, multi-hop
token exchange, and JWKS discovery. Author: Christian Posta.
22. Document History
_Note: This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC._
* draft-hardt-aauth-protocol-00
- Initial submission
23. Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank reviewers for their feedback on
concepts and earlier drafts: Aaron Pareki, Christian Posta, Frederik
Krogsdal Jacobsen, Jared Hanson, Karl McGuinness, Nate Barbettini,
Wils Dawson.
24. References
24.1. Normative References
[I-D.hardt-aauth-headers]
Hardt, D., "HTTP AAuth Headers", 2026,
<https://github.com/dickhardt/AAuth>.
[I-D.hardt-httpbis-signature-key]
Hardt, D. and T. Meunier, "HTTP Signature-Key Header",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hardt-httpbis-
signature-key-02, 2 March 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hardt-
httpbis-signature-key-02>.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7240] Snell, J., "Prefer Header for HTTP", RFC 7240,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7240, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7240>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
[RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of-
Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)",
RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7800>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8615] Nottingham, M., "Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs)", RFC 8615, DOI 10.17487/RFC8615, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615>.
[RFC9068] Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9068>.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
[RFC9421] Backman, A., Ed., Richer, J., Ed., and M. Sporny, "HTTP
Message Signatures", RFC 9421, DOI 10.17487/RFC9421,
February 2024, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9421>.
24.2. Informative References
[OpenID.Enterprise]
Hardt, D. and K. McGuinness, "OpenID Connect Enterprise
Extensions 1.0", 2025, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-
connect-enterprise-extensions-1_0.html>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.
[RFC9449] Fett, D., Campbell, B., Bradley, J., Lodderstedt, T.,
Jones, M., and D. Waite, "OAuth 2.0 Demonstrating Proof of
Possession (DPoP)", RFC 9449, DOI 10.17487/RFC9449,
September 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9449>.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
Appendix A. Agent Token Acquisition Patterns
This appendix describes common patterns for how agents obtain agent
tokens from their agent server. In all patterns, the agent generates
an ephemeral signing key pair, proves its identity to the agent
server, and receives an agent token binding the ephemeral key to an
agent identifier. Each pattern differs in how the agent proves its
identity and what trust assumption the agent server relies on.
A.1. Server Workloads
1. The agent generates an ephemeral signing key pair (e.g.,
Ed25519).
2. The agent obtains a platform attestation from its runtime
environment — such as a SPIFFE SVID from a SPIRE agent, a WIMSE
workload identity token, or a cloud provider instance identity
document (AWS IMDSv2, GCP metadata, Azure IMDS).
3. The agent presents the attestation and its ephemeral public key
to the agent server.
4. The agent server verifies the attestation against the platform's
trust root and issues an agent token with the ephemeral key in
the cnf claim.
On managed infrastructure, the platform may additionally attest the
software identity (container image hash, binary signature) alongside
the workload identity, allowing the agent server to restrict tokens
to known software.
*Trust assumption:* The agent server trusts the platform's
attestation that the workload is what it claims to be.
A.2. Mobile Applications
1. The app generates an ephemeral signing key pair, optionally
backed by the device's secure enclave (iOS Secure Enclave,
Android StrongBox).
2. The app obtains a platform attestation — iOS App Attest assertion
or Android Play Integrity verdict — binding the app identity and
the ephemeral public key.
3. The app sends the attestation and public key to the agent server.
4. The agent server verifies the attestation against Apple's or
Google's attestation service and issues an agent token.
The platform attestation proves the app is a genuine installation
from the app store, running on a real device, and has not been
tampered with. If the key is hardware-backed, the attestation also
proves the key cannot be exported.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
*Trust assumption:* The agent server trusts the platform's
attestation that the app is a genuine, untampered installation
running on a real device.
A.3. Desktop and CLI Applications
Desktop platforms generally do not provide application-level
attestation comparable to mobile platforms. Several patterns are
available depending on the deployment context:
A.3.1. User Login
1. The agent opens a browser and redirects the user to the agent
server's web interface.
2. The user authenticates at the agent server.
3. The agent generates an ephemeral signing key pair, stores the
private key in a platform vault (macOS Keychain, Windows TPM,
Linux Secret Service), and sends the public key to the agent
server.
4. The agent server issues an agent token binding the ephemeral key
to an agent identifier and returns it to the agent (e.g., via
localhost callback).
This is the most common pattern for user-facing desktop and CLI
tools.
The agent may also hold a stable key in hardware (TPM, secure
enclave) or a platform keychain. During the initial user login flow,
the agent server records the stable public key alongside the agent
identity. When the agent token expires, the agent can renew it by
sending its new ephemeral public key in a scheme=jkt-jwt request
signed by the stable key, without requiring the user to log in again.
*Trust assumption:* The agent server trusts the user's authentication
but cannot verify which software is running — only that the user
authorized the agent. For renewal via stable key, the agent server
trusts that the key registered at enrollment continues to represent
the same agent.
A.3.2. Managed Desktops
On managed desktops (e.g., corporate MDM-enrolled devices), the
management platform may provide device and software attestation
similar to server workloads. The agent presents the platform
attestation alongside its ephemeral key, and the agent server
verifies the device is managed and the software is approved.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
*Trust assumption:* The agent server trusts the management platform's
attestation that the device is managed and the software is approved.
A.3.3. Self-Hosted Agent Metadata
A user publishes agent metadata and a JWKS at a domain they control
(e.g., username.github.io/.well-known/aauth-agent.json) — no active
server is required, only static files. The agent's public key is
included in the published JWKS. The corresponding private key is
held on the user's machine — potentially in a secure enclave or
hardware token. Agents generate ephemeral signing keys and use
scheme=jwt to obtain agent tokens signed by the private key. Auth
servers verify agent tokens against the published JWKS.
*Trust assumption:* The trust anchor is the published JWKS and the
private key held by the user. No server-side logic is involved —
verification relies entirely on the static metadata and key material.
A.4. Browser-Based Applications
1. The web server — which acts as the agent server — authenticates
the user. The recommended mechanism is WebAuthn, which binds
authentication to the device and origin, preventing scripts or
headless browsers from impersonating the web page to obtain an
agent token.
2. The web app generates an ephemeral signing key pair using the Web
Crypto API (non-extractable if supported) and sends it to the web
server.
3. The web server issues an agent token binding the web app's
ephemeral public key to an agent identifier and returns it.
The key pair and agent token exist only for the lifetime of the
browser session. The web server controls both the agent identity and
the issuance.
*Trust assumption:* The web server is the agent server and controls
the entire lifecycle. The agent token lifetime is tied to the
browser session. When WebAuthn is used, authentication is bound to
the device and origin rather than relying solely on session
credentials.
Appendix B. Detailed Flows
This appendix provides complete end-to-end flows combining the key
interactions defined in the Protocol Overview.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
B.1. Autonomous Agent
A machine-to-machine agent obtains authorization directly without
user interaction.
B.1.1. Resource Challenge
The resource challenges the agent with a 401 response containing a
resource token:
Agent Resource Auth Server
| | |
| HTTPSig request | |
|--------------------------->| |
| | |
| 401 + resource_token | |
|<---------------------------| |
| | |
| POST token_endpoint with resource_token |
|-------------------------------------------------------->|
| | |
| | validate resource_token |
| | evaluate policy |
| | |
| auth_token |
|<--------------------------------------------------------|
| | |
| HTTPSig request | |
| (with auth-token) | |
|--------------------------->| |
| | |
| | verify auth_token |
| | |
| 200 OK | |
|<---------------------------| |
| | |
B.1.2. Proactive Token Request
When the agent knows the resource's requirements from metadata, it
can request a resource token proactively via the
resource_token_endpoint:
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
Agent Resource Auth Server
| | |
| POST | |
| resource_token_endpoint | |
|--------------------------->| |
| | |
| resource_token | |
|<---------------------------| |
| | |
| POST token_endpoint with resource_token |
|-------------------------------------------------------->|
| | |
| | validate resource_token |
| | evaluate policy |
| | |
| auth_token |
|<--------------------------------------------------------|
| | |
| HTTPSig request | |
| (with auth-token) | |
|--------------------------->| |
| | |
| | verify auth_token |
| | |
| 200 OK | |
|<---------------------------| |
| | |
*Use cases:* Machine-to-machine API calls, automated pipelines, cron
jobs, service-to-service communication where no user is involved.
B.2. Agent as Audience
An agent requests an auth token where it is the audience — either for
SSO (obtaining user identity) or for first-party resource access.
The agent calls the token endpoint with scope (and no
resource_token), since the agent itself is the resource.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 48]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
User Agent Auth Server
| | |
| | POST token_endpoint |
| | scope (no resource_token) |
| | Prefer: wait=45 |
| |----------------------------------->|
| | |
| | 202 Accepted |
| | Location: /pending/def |
| | AAuth-Requirement: |
| | requirement=interaction; |
| | code="EFGH5678" |
| |<-----------------------------------|
| | |
| direct to | |
| {url}?code={code} |
|<---------------| |
| | |
| authenticate and consent |
|---------------------------------------------------->|
| | |
| redirect to callback_url |
|<----------------------------------------------------|
| | |
| | GET /pending/def |
| |----------------------------------->|
| | 200 OK, auth_token |
| |<-----------------------------------|
| | |
*Use cases:* Single sign-on, user login, enabling agent to access
protected resources at the agent on behalf of the user.
B.3. Third-Party Initiated Login
A third party — such as an auth server, organization portal, app
marketplace, or partner site — directs the user to the agent's
login_endpoint with enough context to start a login flow. The agent
then initiates a standard "agent as audience" flow.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 49]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
User Third Party Agent Auth Server
| | | |
| select agent | | |
|-------------->| | |
| | | |
| redirect to login_endpoint | |
| (issuer, tenant, start_path) | |
|<--------------| | |
| | | |
| login_endpoint | |
|------------------------------>| |
| | | |
| | | POST token_endpoint |
| | | scope, tenant |
| | | Prefer: wait=45 |
| | |----------------------->|
| | | |
| | | 202 Accepted |
| | | Location: /pending/ghi|
| | | AAuth-Requirement: |
| | | requirement=interaction;|
| | | code="JKLM9012" |
| | |<-----------------------|
| | | |
| direct to {url}?code={code} |
|<------------------------------| |
| | | |
| auth server recognizes user |
| (existing session), auto-approves |
|------------------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| redirect to callback_url |
|<-------------------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| callback | | |
|------------------------------>| |
| | | |
| | | GET /pending/ghi |
| | |----------------------->|
| | | 200 OK, auth_token |
| | |<-----------------------|
| | | |
| redirect to start_path | |
|<------------------------------| |
| | | |
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 50]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
*Use cases:* Organization portal SSO, app marketplace "connect"
buttons, partner site deep links, auth server dashboard launching an
agent.
B.4. User Authorization
Full flow with user-authorized access. The agent obtains a resource
token from the resource's resource_token_endpoint, then requests
authorization from the auth server.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 51]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
User Agent Resource Auth Server
| | | |
| | POST | |
| | resource_token_endpoint |
| |-------------------->| |
| | | |
| | resource_token | |
| |<--------------------| |
| | | |
| | POST token_endpoint |
| | resource_token, scope |
| | Prefer: wait=45 |
| |------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| | 202 Accepted |
| | Location: /pending/abc |
| | AAuth-Requirement: |
| | requirement=interaction; |
| | code="ABCD1234" |
| |<-------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| direct to | | |
| {url}?code={code} | |
|<-------------| | |
| | | |
| authenticate and consent |
|---------------------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| redirect to callback_url |
|<----------------------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| callback | | |
|------------->| | |
| | | |
| | GET /pending/abc | |
| |------------------------------------------->|
| | 200 OK, auth_token | |
| |<-------------------------------------------|
| | | |
| | HTTPSig request | |
| | (with auth-token) | |
| |-------------------->| |
| | | |
| | 200 OK | |
| |<--------------------| |
| | | |
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 52]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
B.5. Direct Approval
The auth server obtains approval directly — from a user (e.g., push
notification, existing session, email) — without the agent
facilitating a redirect.
Agent Resource Auth Server User
| | | |
| POST | | |
| resource_token_endpoint | |
|------------------->| | |
| | | |
| resource_token | | |
|<-------------------| | |
| | | |
| POST token_endpoint | |
| resource_token, scope | |
| Prefer: wait=45 | |
|--------------------------------------->| |
| | | |
| 202 Accepted | |
| Location: /pending/jkl | |
| AAuth-Requirement: requirement=approval | |
|<---------------------------------------| |
| | | |
| | | push / email / |
| | | existing session |
| | |------------------->|
| | | |
| | | approve |
| | |<-------------------|
| | | |
| GET /pending/jkl | | |
| Prefer: wait=45 | | |
|--------------------------------------->| |
| | | |
| 200 OK, auth_token | |
|<---------------------------------------| |
| | | |
| HTTPSig request | | |
| (with auth-token) | | |
|------------------->| | |
| | | |
| 200 OK | | |
|<-------------------| | |
| | | |
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 53]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
B.6. Call Chaining
When a resource needs to access a downstream resource on behalf of
the caller, it acts as an agent. Like any agent, it sends the
downstream resource token to its own auth server along with the auth
token it received from the original caller as the upstream_token.
The auth server evaluates its own policy based on both the upstream
auth token and the downstream resource token. The resulting
authorization is not necessarily a subset of the upstream scopes.
Because the resource acts as an agent, it MUST publish agent metadata
at /.well-known/aauth-agent.json so that downstream resources and
auth servers can verify its identity.
B.6.1. Same Auth Server
When both resources share the same auth server:
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 54]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
Agent Resource 1 Resource 2 AS
| | | |
| HTTPSig req | | |
| (auth_token) | | |
|--------------->| | |
| | | |
| | verify | |
| | auth_token | |
| | | |
| | HTTPSig req | |
| | (as agent) | |
| |---------------->| |
| | | |
| | 401 + resource_token |
| |<----------------| |
| | | |
| | POST token_endpoint |
| | resource_token from R2 |
| | upstream_token |
| |----------------------------------->|
| | | |
| | | verify |
| | | upstream_token |
| | | evaluate policy |
| | | |
| | auth_token for R2 |
| |<-----------------------------------|
| | | |
| | HTTPSig req | |
| | (auth_token) | |
| |---------------->| |
| | | |
| | 200 OK | |
| |<----------------| |
| | | |
| 200 OK | | |
|<---------------| | |
| | | |
B.6.2. Interaction Chaining
When the auth server requires user interaction for the downstream
access, it returns a 202 with requirement=interaction. Resource 1
chains the interaction back to the original agent by returning its
own 202.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 55]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
User Agent Resource 1 Resource 2 AS
| | | | |
| | HTTPSig req | | |
| |---------------->| | |
| | | | |
| | | HTTPSig req | |
| | | (as agent) | |
| | |---------------->| |
| | | | |
| | | 401 + resource_token |
| | |<----------------| |
| | | | |
| | | POST token_endpoint |
| | | resource_token, |
| | | upstream_token |
| | |------------------------------>|
| | | | |
| | | 202 Accepted |
| | | requirement=interaction; |
| | | code=WXYZ |
| | |<------------------------------|
| | | | |
| | 202 Accepted | | |
| | Location: /pending/xyz | |
| | AAuth-Requirement: | |
| | requirement=interaction; | |
| | code="MNOP" | | |
| |<----------------| | |
| | | | |
| direct to R1 | | |
| {url}?code={code} | | |
|<-----------| | | |
| | | | |
| {url}?code={code} | | |
|----------------------------->| | |
| | | | |
| redirect to AS {url} | | |
|<-----------------------------| | |
| | | | |
| authenticate and consent | | |
|------------------------------------------------------------->|
| | | | |
| redirect to R1 callback | | |
|<-------------------------------------------------------------|
| | | | |
| | [R1 polls AS pending URL, |
| | receives auth_token for R2] |
| | | | |
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 56]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
| | | HTTPSig req | |
| | | (auth_token) | |
| | |---------------->| |
| | | | |
| | | 200 OK | |
| | |<----------------| |
| | | | |
| redirect to agent callback_url | |
|<-----------------------------| | |
| | | | |
| callback | | | |
|----------->| | | |
| | | | |
| | GET /pending/xyz | |
| |---------------->| | |
| | | | |
| | 200 OK | | |
| |<----------------| | |
| | | | |
When a resource acting as an agent receives a 202 Accepted response
with AAuth-Requirement: requirement=interaction from its auth server,
and the resource needs to propagate this interaction requirement to
its caller, it MUST return a 202 Accepted response to the original
agent with its own AAuth-Requirement header containing
requirement=interaction and its own interaction code. The resource
MUST provide its own Location URL for the original agent to poll.
When the user completes interaction and the resource obtains the
downstream auth token, the resource completes the original request
and returns the result at its pending URL.
When call chaining crosses auth server domains, the agent's auth
server (or the intermediary resource's auth server) federates with
the downstream resource's auth server. See Appendix B.7.
B.7. Cross-Domain Trust
When an agent's auth server (AS1) receives a resource token whose aud
identifies a different auth server (AS2), AS1 federates with AS2 to
obtain the auth token. This enables agents and resources that
operate within different trust domains to work together — the
federation effort is at the auth server level, not at every agent and
resource.
Cross-domain federation is required when the agent's AS and the
resource's AS differ. Within a single AS domain, no federation is
needed.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 57]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
B.7.1. AS-to-AS Federation
AS1 calls AS2's token endpoint with the resource token and the
agent's agent token. AS2 uses the agent token to verify agent
identity, confirm the agent's key matches the agent_jkt in the
resource token, and include agent claims in the auth token it issues.
AS2 returns the auth token to AS1. AS1 passes the auth token through
to the agent unchanged — AS1 MUST NOT re-sign or modify the auth
token. The auth token's iss is AS2 and aud is the resource. The
agent forwards it to the resource, which verifies the auth token
against AS2's JWKS (its own auth server). The agent's response
verification Section 16.1 is limited to checking that aud, cnf, and
agent match its own values — the agent does not need to verify the
auth token's signature.
AS2 MAY also return an assessment, a Markdown string describing AS2's
evaluation of the request for AS1 to consider in its authorization
decision. *TODO:* Define recommended sections. Any step may return a
202 deferred response — the standard AAuth deferred response protocol
applies to AS-to-AS calls.
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 58]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
Agent AS1 AS2 Resource
| | | |
| POST /token | | |
| resource_token | | |
| (aud=AS2) | | |
|---------------->| | |
| | | |
| | aud≠self, | |
| | federate | |
| | | |
| | POST /token | |
| | resource_token | |
| | agent_token | |
| |---------------->| |
| | | |
| | | verify resource_token,
| | | verify agent_token,
| | | evaluate policy
| | | |
| | auth_token | |
| |<----------------| |
| | | |
| auth_token | | |
|<----------------| | |
| | | |
| HTTPSig req | | |
| (auth_token) | | |
|--------------------------------------------------->|
| | | |
| 200 OK | | |
|<---------------------------------------------------|
| | | |
B.7.2. Organization Visibility
Organizations benefit from the trust model Section 4: internal agents
and resources share a single AS with zero federation overhead.
Federation is only incurred at the boundary, when an internal agent
accesses an external resource or vice versa.
B.7.3. Token Endpoint Parameters for Federation
When an auth server calls another auth server's token endpoint for
federation, the following additional parameter is used:
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 59]
Internet-Draft AAuth-Protocol April 2026
* agent_token (OPTIONAL): The agent's agent token. Sent by AS1 to
AS2 so that AS2 can verify the agent's identity and signing key,
and include agent claims in the issued auth token. AS2 verifies
that the cnf claim in the agent token matches the agent_jkt in the
resource token.
The upstream_token parameter (used in call chaining) may also be
present in federated calls to provide authorization chain provenance.
B.7.4. Relationship to AAuth Mission Protocol
AAuth Mission extends cross-domain federation with mission-scoped
authorization, centralized audit, and MA countersignatures. When a
mission is active, the agent's auth server acts as the Mission
Authority and adds mission context to federation calls. See the
AAuth Mission specification for details.
Author's Address
Dick Hardt
Hellō
Email: dick.hardt@gmail.com
Hardt Expires 4 October 2026 [Page 60]