Adding Support for Salted Password Databases to EAP-pwd
draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-08

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Last updated 2017-03-02 (latest revision 2016-11-23)
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Send notices to "Stefan Winter" <stefan.winter@restena.lu>, dharkins@arubanetworks.com
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Internet Engineering Task Force                               D. Harkins
Internet-Draft                                             HP Enterprise
Updates: 5931 (if approved)                            November 23, 2016
Intended status: Informational
Expires: May 27, 2017

        Adding Support for Salted Password Databases to EAP-pwd
                    draft-harkins-salted-eap-pwd-08

Abstract

   EAP-pwd is an EAP method that uses a shared password for
   authentication using a technique that is resistant to dictionary
   attack.  It included support for raw keys and [RFC2759]-style double
   hashing of a password but did not include support for salted
   passwords.  There are many existing databases of salted passwords and
   it is desirable to allow their use with EAP-pwd.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 27, 2017.

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   Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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Harkins                   Expires May 27, 2017                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               NaCl'd EAP-pwd                November 2016

   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.2.  Keyword Definition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Salted Passwords in EAP-pwd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Password Pre-Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  The Salting of a Password . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Using UNIX crypt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Using scrypt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.5.  Using PBKDF2  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.6.  Protocol Modifications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     2.7.  Payload Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     6.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

1.1.  Background

   Databases of stored passwords present an attractive target for
   attack--get access to the database, learn the passwords.  To confound
   such attacks a random "salt" was hashed with the password and the
   resulting digest stored, along with the salt, instead of the raw
   password.  This has the effect of randomizing the password so if two
   distinct users have chosen the same password the stored, and salted,
   password will be different.  It also requires an adversary who has
   compromised the security of the stored database to launch a
   dictionary attack per entry to recover passwords.

   Dictionary attacks, especially using custom hardware, represent real-
   world attacks and merely salting a password is insufficient to
   protect a password database.  To address these attacks an sequential
   memory hard function such as described in [RFC7914] is used.

   While salting a password database is not sufficient to deal with many
   real-world attacks the historic popularity of password salting means
   there are a large number of such databases deployed and EAP-pwd needs
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