Skip to main content

AGTP Agent Identity Document
draft-hood-agtp-identity-document-00

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Author Chris Hood
Last updated 2026-10-30
RFC stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date (None)
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
draft-hood-agtp-identity-document-00
Independent Submission                                           C. Hood
Internet-Draft                                             Nomotic, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                           30 October 2026
Expires: 3 May 2027

                      AGTP Agent Identity Document
                  draft-hood-agtp-identity-document-00

Abstract

   This document specifies the Agent Identity Document of the Agent
   Transfer Protocol (AGTP) [AGTP]: the signed document every canonical
   Agent-ID resolves to, carrying the agent's owner, declared authority
   scope, trust posture, supported methods, and issuer binding.  It also
   specifies the Agent Namespace Document, the .agtp package format and
   its integrity rules, the human-readable identity view served to
   browsers, and the status sub-resource.  The material was carried in
   the base AGTP specification through version 09 and is extracted here,
   unchanged in substance, so that the base specification carries the
   transfer protocol and this document carries the identity document
   format, in the way HTTP and HTML are specified separately.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 May 2027.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Agent Namespace Document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Document Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.3.  Integrity and Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Agent Identity Document and the .agtp Format  . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  The Three Document Formats and Their Relationship . . . .   5
     3.3.  Agent Identity Document Schema  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.4.  What the Identity Document Exposes and Does Not Expose  .  12
     3.5.  Identity Document Tamper-Proofing . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   4.  Browser and Human-Facing Interaction Model  . . . . . . . . .  14
     4.1.  The Separation of Discovery and Execution . . . . . . . .  14
     4.2.  Browser Behavior for agtp:// URIs . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  Human-Readable Identity Document View . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.4.  AGTP Status Sub-Resource  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   Appendix A.  Changes from AGTP v09  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18

1.  Introduction

   AGTP [AGTP] identifies every agent by a canonical Agent-ID, the
   SHA-256 hash of the agent's Agent Genesis.  The Agent-ID is permanent
   and content-addressed; everything mutable about the agent (where it
   is hosted, what it is currently permitted to do, what it currently
   supports, how it is currently trusted) lives in the Agent Identity
   Document the Agent-ID resolves to.  The base specification states
   what the protocol depends on in that document; this document
   specifies the document itself.

   The Agent Identity Document is a credential, and the distinction from
   a description matters.  A description of an agent, of the kind the
   A2A Agent Card provides at a well-known HTTPS path, is self-asserted,
   unsigned, and trusted through the domain that serves it.  The Agent

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 2]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   Identity Document is derived from a signed Agent Genesis, carries an
   issuer binding, holds the lifecycle state and the scope set the
   protocol enforces on every request, and is refused by a conformant
   recipient unless its signature verifies.  A description can be mapped
   out of an Identity Document for interchange; an Identity Document
   cannot be constructed from a description without an issuer.  The
   document taxonomy in [AGTP] places the two.

   The split follows the HTTP precedent.  HTTP specifies the exchange
   and names the media types it carries; HTML is specified elsewhere.
   AGTP specifies the exchange and names application/
   vnd.agtp.identity+json; this document specifies it.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
   [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
   here.

   Terms defined in [AGTP] carry their definitions here.

2.  Agent Namespace Document

2.1.  Purpose and Scope

   The Agent Namespace Document is the index of all Active agents
   registered under an organization's governance zone.  It is returned
   in response to a request targeting the /agents path:

   agtp://acme.tld/agents
   agtp://agtp.acme.tld/agents

   The Agent Namespace Document is generated and cryptographically
   signed by the governance platform each time the registry changes.
   Any Namespace Document that fails signature verification *MUST* be
   rejected by the requesting party.

2.2.  Document Schema

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 3]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   {
     "document_type": "agtp-namespace",
     "schema_version": "1.0",
     "org_domain": "acme.tld",
     "governance_zone": "zone:acme-internal",
     "generated_at": "2026-03-20T14:00:00Z",
     "signature": {
       "algorithm": "ES256",
       "key_id": "agtp-gov-key-acme-01",
       "value": "[base64-encoded-signature]"
     },
     "agents": [
       {
         "agent_label": "customer-service",
         "canonical_id": "3a9f2c1d8b7e4a6f...",
         "lifecycle_state": "Active",
         "trust_tier": 1,
         "cert_status": "Active",
         "manifest_uri": "agtp://agtp.acme.tld/agents/customer-service",
         "activated_at": "2026-01-15T09:00:00Z",
         "last_updated": "2026-03-01T11:30:00Z"
       }
     ],
     "total_active": 1,
     "namespace_cert_fingerprint": "b2c4d6e8..."
   }

                 Figure 1: Agent Namespace Document Schema

   The agents array *MUST* include only agents in Active lifecycle
   state.  Suspended, Revoked, and Deprecated agents *MUST NOT* appear
   in the Namespace Document.

2.3.  Integrity and Freshness

   The Namespace Document *MUST* include a generated_at timestamp.
   Implementations *SHOULD* treat Namespace Documents older than a
   configurable freshness threshold (default: 300 seconds) as stale and
   re-request.  The governance platform *MUST* re-sign the Namespace
   Document within 60 seconds of any registry change.

   The signature covers the entire document including generated_at.
   Replaying an older signed Namespace Document to conceal a revocation
   event is a known attack vector; implementations *MUST* reject
   Namespace Documents with a generated_at timestamp older than the
   freshness threshold.

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 4]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

3.  Agent Identity Document and the .agtp Format

3.1.  Purpose and Scope

   The Agent Identity Document is the protocol's canonical
   representation of a specific agent's identity, status, and behavioral
   scope.  Prior versions of this specification referred to this
   artifact as the Agent Manifest Document; v07 renames it to the Agent
   Identity Document to reflect its IANA-registered media type
   (application/vnd.agtp.identity+json) and to clarify its role as the
   identity primitive of the protocol.  The Identity Document is
   returned in response to any AGTP URI resolution request targeting a
   specific agent:

   agtp://[canonical-agent-id]
   agtp://acme.tld/agents/customer-service
   agtp://acme.tld/agents/customer-service?format=json

   The Identity Document is derived from the embedded manifest inside
   the agent's .agent or .nomo package; no separately modifiable file
   exists.  The governance platform *MUST* verify the package integrity
   hash before extracting and serving the Identity Document.

3.2.  The Three Document Formats and Their Relationship

   .agent   ──── open packaging format (patent pending, Chris Hood)
     │           Contains: manifest + integrity hash + behavioral
     │           trust score + executable content
     │
   .nomo    ──── governed packaging format (patent pending, Chris Hood)
     │           Contains: .agent contents + CA-signed cert chain
     │           + governance zone binding
     │
     Both produce ↓ when queried via agtp:// URI
     │
   .agtp    ──── wire-level Identity Document (this spec)
                 Contains: identity fields, lifecycle state, trust
                 tier, trust score, behavioral scope, methods,
                 capabilities, verification anchors
                 Open format defined by AGTP specification
                 Content-Type: application/vnd.agtp.identity+json

              Figure 2: Relationship Between AGTP File Formats

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 5]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   The .agtp format is the protocol's own document type and the one
   transmitted over the wire.  The .agent and .nomo formats are
   deployment artifacts.  An AGTP implementation has no need to
   understand .agent or .nomo packaging internals; it is only required
   to produce and consume .agtp Identity Documents.

   Additional packaging formats *MAY* be defined by third parties,
   provided they can produce conformant .agtp Identity Documents when
   queried.  Such formats *MUST* implement the integrity verification
   requirement: the Identity Document *MUST* be derived from a verified
   package, never from an independently stored or editable file.

3.3.  Agent Identity Document Schema

   The Agent Identity Document carries three categories of fields:
   *REQUIRED* fields that every Identity Document *MUST* contain;
   *RECOMMENDED* fields that *SHOULD* be present when the corresponding
   information is available; and *CONDITIONAL* fields that *MUST* be
   present when the conditions described later in this section are met.

   The following fields are *REQUIRED* in all Agent Identity Documents:

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 6]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   {
     "agtp_version": "0.7",
     "document_type": "agtp-identity",
     "document_version": "1.0",
     "agent_id": "3a9f2c1d8b7e4a6f0c2d5e9b1a3f7c0d...",
     "name": "customer-service",
     "description": "Handles customer service requests.",
     "principal": "Acme Corporation",
     "principal_id": "acme.tld",
     "issuer": "https://ca.acme.tld",
     "agent_public_key": "<base64url-encoded 32 bytes, Ed25519>",
     "issued_at": "2026-01-15T09:00:00Z",
     "updated_at": "2026-03-01T11:30:00Z",
     "status": "Active",
     "methods": [
       "QUERY", "DESCRIBE", "SUMMARIZE",
       "EXECUTE", "ESCALATE", "CONFIRM", "NOTIFY"
     ],
     "capabilities": [
       "customer-service:tier-1",
       "knowledge-base:read",
       "ticket-system:create"
     ],
     "scopes_accepted": [
       "documents:query",
       "knowledge:query",
       "calendar:book",
       "escalation:route"
     ],
     "trust_score": 0.94,
     "trust_score_computed_at": "2026-03-01T11:30:00Z"
   }

            Figure 3: Agent Identity Document - Required Fields

   Field semantics:

   agtp_version:  The version of the AGTP protocol the agent speaks.
      SemVer string.

   document_type:  Self-identification of the document. *MUST* be agtp-
      identity for documents conforming to this specification.

   document_version:  The schema version of the Identity Document
      itself.  SemVer string.  Distinct from agtp_version.  Permits the
      document schema to evolve independently of the protocol.

   agent_id:  The 256-bit canonical Agent-ID, hex-encoded, derived from

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 7]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

      the agent's Agent Genesis hash.  Authoritative in every AGTP
      protocol operation.

   name:  A human-readable label for the agent.  Not unique across the
      AGTP ecosystem; uniqueness is provided by agent_id.

   description:  Short prose describing what the agent does.

   principal:  The human-readable name of the organization or individual
      that governs the agent.

   principal_id:  A stable, machine-readable identifier for the
      principal (typically the principal's primary DNS domain, or a
      canonical organization identifier).

   agent_public_key:  The agent's current Ed25519 signing key, 32 raw
      bytes base64url encoded.  Every non-anonymous request the agent
      sends carries a Request-Signature verifiable under this key, and
      every delegation token the agent mints is signed with it ([AGTP]).
      The private half is held by the agent and never by the issuer.
      Rotation is a re-issuance of this document with a new value; the
      Agent-ID is unchanged.  REQUIRED for documents issued under AGTP
      version 10 or later; a document without it is verifiable at Level
      1 only, and requests from its agent are recorded as possession-
      unproven.

   issuer:  The URL of the issuer that signed the Identity Document.
      The issuer's public key is published at a well-known location
      under this URL; signature verification details are specified in
      [AGTP-CERT].

   issued_at:  ISO 8601 timestamp at which the Identity Document was
      first issued (typically the moment of ACTIVATE).

   updated_at:  ISO 8601 timestamp at which the Identity Document was
      last updated.  Promotes freshness checks. *MUST* be greater than
      or equal to issued_at.

   status:  The lifecycle state of the agent.  One of: active,
      suspended, retired, deprecated.  The state is mutated by the
      Lifecycle methods on the protocol floor (the method definitions in
      [AGTP]): ACTIVATE sets active, DEACTIVATE sets suspended,
      REINSTATE returns a suspended agent to active, REVOKE sets retired
      (permanent), DEPRECATE sets deprecated.  Semantics:

      *  active: accepts AGTP traffic normally.

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 8]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

      *  suspended: refuses AGTP traffic with 503 Service Unavailable;
         recoverable via REINSTATE.

      *  retired: refuses AGTP traffic with 410 Gone; permanent;
         canonical Agent-ID is never reissued.

      *  deprecated: continues to accept AGTP traffic but signals
         planned end-of-life; clients *SHOULD* migrate.

   methods:  The set of AGTP methods the agent's server speaks. *MUST*
      include every method the server is prepared to accept.  The
      protocol-defined eighteen-method floor (see the method definitions
      in [AGTP]) *MUST* be represented if the server claims AGTP
      conformance.

   capabilities:  Higher-level service descriptors of what the agent can
      do.  Distinct from methods: methods are the protocol verbs the
      server speaks; capabilities are the application-level competencies
      the agent exposes through those methods.

   scopes_accepted:  The Authority-Scope tokens the agent will accept on
      inbound requests.  Format and semantics defined in the Authority-
      Scope format in [AGTP].

   trust_score:  A scalar value on the closed interval [0.0, 1.0]
      expressing behavioral trust assessed by the agent's principal or
      governance platform.  Computation methodology, freshness
      requirements, and signature binding are specified in [AGTP-TRUST].
      The base AGTP specification carries the field; AGTP-TRUST
      specifies how the value is produced and verified.

   trust_score_computed_at:  ISO 8601 UTC timestamp at which the issuer
      computed trust_score. *REQUIRED* whenever trust_score is present;
      a trust_score without it is treated as absent per [AGTP-TRUST].

   The following fields are *RECOMMENDED*:

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                   [Page 9]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   {
     "trust_tier": 1,
     "verification_path": "dns-anchored",
     "owner_id": "nomotic.inc",
     "role": "agent",
     "org_domain": "acme.tld",
     "governance_zone": "zone:acme-internal",
     "cert_fingerprint": "b2c4d6e8...",
     "cert_status": "Active",
     "dns_anchor_record": "_agtp.acme.tld TXT agtp-zone=...",
     "log_inclusion_proof": null,
     "log_uri": null,
     "package_format": "nomo",
     "package_integrity_hash": "sha256:[hash]",
     "audit_log_uri": "agtp://agtp.acme.tld/audit/customer-service",
     "escalation_policy": "route-to-human-on-scope-limit",
     "delegation_permitted": false,
     "max_delegation_depth": 0,
     "manifest_issuer": "registrar.acme.tld",
     "manifest_issuer_public_key": "<base64url-encoded 32 bytes>",
     "manifest_signature": "<base64url-encoded Ed25519 signature>"
   }

           Figure 4: Agent Identity Document - Recommended Fields

   trust_tier:  Tier classification per [AGTP-TRUST].  One of 1, 2, or
      3.  Resolved at server load time per the precedence rule in
      [AGTP-TRUST]: explicit declaration in the Identity Document beats
      Genesis-derived fallback, which beats a conservative Tier 2
      default.

   verification_path:  Verification path used at ACTIVATE time.  One of
      dns-anchored, log-anchored, hybrid, or org-asserted.  Resolved per
      the precedence rule in [AGTP-TRUST] alongside trust_tier.  The
      first three values are Tier 1 paths; org-asserted is the Tier 2
      value. *MUST* match the verification_path field of the underlying
      Agent Genesis when one is loaded.  Detailed semantics specified in
      [AGTP-CERT].

   owner_id:  Identifier of the human or organizational principal
      accountable for this agent.  Resolved per the precedence rule in
      [AGTP-TRUST]: explicit declaration beats Genesis-derived fallback.
      Omitted when no Agent Genesis is loaded and the operator set no
      explicit value.  Semantics specified in [AGTP-IDENTIFIERS];
      stamped on responses as the Owner-ID response header per the
      response headers in [AGTP].

   role:  Capability role declared for this agent.  One of agent

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 10]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

      (default) or merchant.  The merchant value signals that the agent
      is a transactional counterparty addressable by PURCHASE and
      verified per [AGTP-MERCHANT]; agent is the default capability
      posture for all other agents. role is a capability attribute
      carried on the Agent Identity Document and absent from the Agent
      Genesis: capability may change over an agent's lifetime without
      changing identity.  Operators *MAY* add or remove the merchant
      role without re-issuing the Agent Genesis or rotating the
      canonical Agent-ID.  Future revisions *MAY* define additional role
      values.  Implementations encountering an unknown role value *MUST*
      treat the agent as role: agent (the default) and log the unknown
      value for operator review.

   org_domain:  The DNS domain under which the agent is registered, when
      applicable.

   governance_zone:  The governance zone identifier for the agent's
      deployment context.

   cert_fingerprint, cert_status:  AGTP Agent Certificate metadata.
      Specified in [AGTP-CERT].

   dns_anchor_record:  Populated when verification_path is dns-anchored
      or hybrid.

   log_inclusion_proof:  Populated when verification_path is log-
      anchored.  Carries the transparency log inclusion proof per
      [RFC9162] or the COSE_Sign1 receipt per [RFC9943].  Detailed
      semantics specified in [AGTP-LOG].

   log_uri:  Populated when verification_path is log-anchored.  Mirrors
      the Agent Genesis field of the same name: the absolute HTTPS URI
      of the transparency log at which log_inclusion_proof is verifiable
      per [AGTP-LOG], carried here so that a verifier holding only the
      Identity Document can reach the log.

   package_format, package_integrity_hash:  Deployment-layer metadata
      identifying the package format and the hash that the Identity
      Document was extracted from.

   audit_log_uri:  AGTP URI of the agent's audit log resource.

   pricing_manifest_uri:  *OPTIONAL*. URI of the agent's signed pricing
      manifest per the AGTP commerce companion, for agents that sell
      services; the Agent Name Service may index it for price-bounded
      search.

   escalation_policy, delegation_permitted, max_delegation_depth:  Policy

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 11]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

      fields governing the agent's escalation and delegation behavior.

   The following fields are *CONDITIONAL* and *MUST* be present when the
   conditions described below are met:

   trust_warning:  *REQUIRED* when trust_tier is 2, or when trust_score
      is below the threshold configured by the issuer.  Value is a short
      string identifying the warning class (e.g., verification-
      incomplete, trust-score-degraded).

   trust_explanation:  *REQUIRED* when trust_warning is present.  Value
      is a prose description suitable for surfacing to a human operator
      or in audit logs.

   manifest_issuer, manifest_issuer_public_key, manifest_signature:  Inline
      signature fields that bind the served Identity Document to a
      recognized issuing registrar.  When all three are present, the
      document is a signed manifest; a conforming AGTP server *MUST*
      verify the signature before serving the document.  The three
      fields and their verification semantics are defined in
      Section 3.5.  Operators *MUST NOT* populate these fields directly;
      they are written by the registrar's signing process.

   The Identity Document *MAY* be served unsigned in development
   deployments and in deployments that rely on the transport-layer cert
   binding defined in [AGTP-CERT] as the sole attestation path.
   Production deployments *SHOULD* sign the manifest and *SHOULD* verify
   the signature on every loaded document.

3.4.  What the Identity Document Exposes and Does Not Expose

   The Agent Identity Document *MUST* expose:

   *  The agent's identity (canonical Agent-ID, name, principal,
      governance zone)

   *  The agent's current operational status

   *  The agent's authority scopes accepted

   *  The agent's supported method vocabulary

   *  The agent's capability descriptors

   *  The agent's trust score and trust tier

   *  The agent's verification anchors and certificate metadata

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 12]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   *  The agent's freshness metadata (issued_at, updated_at)

   The Agent Identity Document *MUST NOT* expose:

   *  Executable code, scripts, or logic

   *  Model weights or configurations

   *  Internal API keys or credentials

   *  Specific authority scope grant tokens

   *  Session history or prior action logs

   No AGTP URI resolution path, including any query parameter
   combination, *MUST* return package contents beyond the Identity
   Document schema defined in this section.

3.5.  Identity Document Tamper-Proofing

   Tamper evidence is provided when both of the following mechanisms are
   present; when the issuer fields of the second are absent, the
   document is verifiable at Level 1 only (see the three-level
   verification model in [AGTP]):

   1.  *Package integrity hash:* Any modification to the package or its
       embedded manifest invalidates the hash.  The governance platform
       *MUST* verify this hash before extracting the Identity Document.

   2.  *Inline issuer signature on the Identity Document:* The Identity
       Document carries three optional but RECOMMENDED fields that bind
       the served document to a recognized issuing registrar:

       *  manifest_issuer: a string identifier of the registrar that
          issued the signed manifest.  Operator-defined format
          (typically a domain name or registrar identifier).

       *  manifest_issuer_public_key: the registrar's Ed25519 public
          key, 32 raw bytes encoded as base64url.  The signature is
          verified against this key.

       *  manifest_signature: a detached Ed25519 signature over the
          canonical-form serialization of the Identity Document with the
          manifest_signature field excluded (and the manifest_issuer and
          manifest_issuer_public_key fields included).  Base64url-
          encoded.

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 13]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

       When all three fields are present, the Identity Document is a
       *signed manifest*. A conforming AGTP server *MUST* verify
       manifest_signature against manifest_issuer_public_key before
       serving the document; a document that fails this check *MUST NOT*
       be served and the failure *MUST* be logged.

       Verification confirms the bytes of the document match what the
       recorded issuer signed.  Verification does *NOT* confirm that
       manifest_issuer_public_key belongs to a trusted registrar; that
       determination is a deployment-policy concern (trust anchors,
       allowlists, or out-of-band attestation).  Relying parties
       *SHOULD* maintain a trusted-registrars list per governance zone
       and *MUST NOT* treat a structurally valid signature as sufficient
       evidence of trustworthy issuance on its own.

       An Identity Document that omits all three fields is an *unsigned
       manifest* and is permitted in development and in deployments that
       use other attestation paths (e.g., the transport-layer cert
       binding in [AGTP-CERT]).  Production deployments *SHOULD* sign
       the manifest.

       Operators *MUST NOT* forge issuance: the registrar's signing
       process *MUST* strip any caller-supplied manifest_issuer,
       manifest_issuer_public_key, or manifest_signature fields from the
       input before signing with its own key, so a relying party can
       rely on the recorded issuer being the actual signer.

   The mechanisms are complementary: the package integrity hash protects
   against post-extraction modification of bundled assets; the inline
   signature protects against in-flight modification of the served
   document.  An Identity Document that fails either verification step
   *MUST* be rejected, *MUST NOT* be served, and the failure *MUST* be
   logged.

   Issuers *MUST* retain every prior version of an Identity Document
   they have signed, keyed by Agent-ID and updated_at, for as long as
   attribution records that reference the agent may be verified, so that
   a signature made under a since-rotated agent_public_key can be
   checked against the document that was current when the action was
   recorded ([AGTP-IDENTIFIERS]).

4.  Browser and Human-Facing Interaction Model

4.1.  The Separation of Discovery and Execution

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 14]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   agtp:// URI in a browser
     │
     └─→ Returns Agent Identity Document
           Human-readable view of identity and status
           Read-only. No execution. No code exposed.

   agtp:// session initiated by an agent or AGTP client
     │
     └─→ Establishes authenticated AGTP session
           Method invocations (QUERY, EXECUTE, ESCALATE, etc.)
           Full protocol operation, invisible to browsers

                     Figure 5: AGTP URI Use by Audience

   The analogy to existing protocol conventions is direct.  A mailto:
   URI surfaces an address and hands off to a mail client; SMTP carries
   the actual messages.  Similarly, an agtp:// URI surfaces identity and
   status; AGTP carries agent traffic.  Browsers never become AGTP
   clients by following an agtp:// link.

4.2.  Browser Behavior for agtp:// URIs

   Browsers that encounter an agtp:// URI *SHOULD* behave as follows:

   1.  If a registered AGTP client is present (OS protocol handler),
       hand off the URI to that client.

   2.  If the browser supports agtp:// natively or via extension, render
       the returned Agent Identity Document as a structured human-
       readable page.  The rendered view *MUST* surface the trust tier
       indicator prominently, following the visual convention
       established for TLS trust in the browser chrome.

   3.  If neither condition applies, the browser *MAY* fall back to a
       gateway that translates between https:// and agtp://. The gateway
       *MUST* preserve all signature and trust tier fields.

4.3.  Human-Readable Identity Document View

   When an Agent Identity Document is rendered for human consumption,
   the following fields *MUST* be prominently displayed:

   *  Agent label and org domain

   *  Trust tier indicator (visual distinction between Tier 1, 2, and 3)

   *  Lifecycle state (Active / Suspended / Revoked / Deprecated)

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 15]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   *  Job description

   *  Principal organization

   *  Activation date

   *  Behavioral trust score

   *  Authority scope categories (in human-readable form)

4.4.  AGTP Status Sub-Resource

   Implementations *SHOULD* support a status sub-path:

   agtp://acme.tld/agents/customer-service/status

   {
     "document_type": "agtp-status",
     "canonical_id": "3a9f2c1d8b7e4a6f...",
     "agent_label": "customer-service",
     "org_domain": "acme.tld",
     "lifecycle_state": "Active",
     "cert_status": "Active",
     "last_action_method": "QUERY",
     "last_action_timestamp": "2026-03-20T13:58:22Z",
     "active_session_count": 3,
     "pending_escalations": 0,
     "generated_at": "2026-03-20T14:00:00Z"
   }

                Figure 6: AGTP Status Sub-Resource Response

   The active_session_count field *SHOULD* only be included if the
   requester has appropriate observability permissions for the
   governance zone.

5.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of [AGTP] apply.  The identity document
   is the authority for Owner-ID and the Authority-Scope set, so its
   integrity is the integrity of every authorization decision made from
   it.  The tamper-evidence section above states the two mechanisms and
   the condition under which each applies; deployments that omit the
   issuer fields accept Level 1 verification for every request the
   document governs.

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 16]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document is the authoritative reference for the application/
   vnd.agtp.identity+json and application/vnd.agtp.identity+yaml media
   types registered through [AGTP].  It requests no further allocations.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [AGTP]     Hood, C., "Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP)", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-independent-agtp-10,
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-
              independent-agtp-10>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

   [RFC9162]  Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
              Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
              December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.

   [RFC9943]  Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande,
              Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and
              Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, June 2026,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9943>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [AGTP-CERT]
              Hood, C., "AGTP Agent Certificate Extension", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-agtp-agent-cert-04,
              2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-
              agtp-agent-cert-04>.

   [AGTP-IDENTIFIERS]
              Hood, C., "AGTP Identifier Chain", Work in Progress,
              Internet-Draft, draft-hood-agtp-identifiers-03, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-agtp-
              identifiers-03>.

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 17]
Internet-Draft                 AGTP-IDDOC                   October 2026

   [AGTP-LOG] Hood, C., "AGTP Transparency Log Protocol", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-agtp-log-03, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-agtp-
              log-03>.

   [AGTP-MERCHANT]
              Hood, C., "AGTP Merchant Identity and Agentic Commerce
              Binding", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-
              agtp-merchant-identity-03, 2026,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-agtp-
              merchant-identity-03>.

   [AGTP-TRUST]
              Hood, C., "AGTP Trust and Verification Specification",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-agtp-trust-
              03, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
              hood-agtp-trust-03>.

Appendix A.  Changes from AGTP v09

   First revision under this name.  The agent_public_key field is new,
   carrying the key that the base specification's per-request proof of
   possession and delegation tokens verify against, and issuers are now
   required to retain prior document versions so attribution chains
   verify across key rotation ([AGTP-IDENTIFIERS]); log_uri is mirrored
   from the Genesis ([AGTP-LOG]) and trust_score_computed_at is listed
   as required beside trust_score ([AGTP-TRUST]).  The text is otherwise
   extracted from draft-hood-independent-agtp-09, sections Agent
   Namespace Document, Agent Identity Document and the .agtp Format, and
   Browser and Human-Facing Interaction Model, with these edits: cross-
   references into the base document are expressed as citations; the
   tamper-proof "guarantee" is restated as tamper evidence conditional
   on the optional issuer fields, with the Level 1 fallback named;
   headings are promoted one level.  No wire-visible change.

Author's Address

   Chris Hood
   Nomotic, Inc.
   Email: chris@nomotic.ai
   URI:   https://agtp.io

Hood                       Expires 3 May 2027                  [Page 18]