AGTP Agent Identity Document
draft-hood-agtp-identity-document-00
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| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (individual) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Author | Chris Hood | ||
| Last updated | 2026-10-30 | ||
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| Intended RFC status | (None) | ||
| Formats | |||
| Stream | Stream state | (No stream defined) | |
| Consensus boilerplate | Unknown | ||
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draft-hood-agtp-identity-document-00
Independent Submission C. Hood
Internet-Draft Nomotic, Inc.
Intended status: Informational 30 October 2026
Expires: 3 May 2027
AGTP Agent Identity Document
draft-hood-agtp-identity-document-00
Abstract
This document specifies the Agent Identity Document of the Agent
Transfer Protocol (AGTP) [AGTP]: the signed document every canonical
Agent-ID resolves to, carrying the agent's owner, declared authority
scope, trust posture, supported methods, and issuer binding. It also
specifies the Agent Namespace Document, the .agtp package format and
its integrity rules, the human-readable identity view served to
browsers, and the status sub-resource. The material was carried in
the base AGTP specification through version 09 and is extracted here,
unchanged in substance, so that the base specification carries the
transfer protocol and this document carries the identity document
format, in the way HTTP and HTML are specified separately.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 May 2027.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Agent Namespace Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Document Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3. Integrity and Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Agent Identity Document and the .agtp Format . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Purpose and Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. The Three Document Formats and Their Relationship . . . . 5
3.3. Agent Identity Document Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. What the Identity Document Exposes and Does Not Expose . 12
3.5. Identity Document Tamper-Proofing . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Browser and Human-Facing Interaction Model . . . . . . . . . 14
4.1. The Separation of Discovery and Execution . . . . . . . . 14
4.2. Browser Behavior for agtp:// URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3. Human-Readable Identity Document View . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.4. AGTP Status Sub-Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Changes from AGTP v09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1. Introduction
AGTP [AGTP] identifies every agent by a canonical Agent-ID, the
SHA-256 hash of the agent's Agent Genesis. The Agent-ID is permanent
and content-addressed; everything mutable about the agent (where it
is hosted, what it is currently permitted to do, what it currently
supports, how it is currently trusted) lives in the Agent Identity
Document the Agent-ID resolves to. The base specification states
what the protocol depends on in that document; this document
specifies the document itself.
The Agent Identity Document is a credential, and the distinction from
a description matters. A description of an agent, of the kind the
A2A Agent Card provides at a well-known HTTPS path, is self-asserted,
unsigned, and trusted through the domain that serves it. The Agent
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Identity Document is derived from a signed Agent Genesis, carries an
issuer binding, holds the lifecycle state and the scope set the
protocol enforces on every request, and is refused by a conformant
recipient unless its signature verifies. A description can be mapped
out of an Identity Document for interchange; an Identity Document
cannot be constructed from a description without an issuer. The
document taxonomy in [AGTP] places the two.
The split follows the HTTP precedent. HTTP specifies the exchange
and names the media types it carries; HTML is specified elsewhere.
AGTP specifies the exchange and names application/
vnd.agtp.identity+json; this document specifies it.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119]
[RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
here.
Terms defined in [AGTP] carry their definitions here.
2. Agent Namespace Document
2.1. Purpose and Scope
The Agent Namespace Document is the index of all Active agents
registered under an organization's governance zone. It is returned
in response to a request targeting the /agents path:
agtp://acme.tld/agents
agtp://agtp.acme.tld/agents
The Agent Namespace Document is generated and cryptographically
signed by the governance platform each time the registry changes.
Any Namespace Document that fails signature verification *MUST* be
rejected by the requesting party.
2.2. Document Schema
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{
"document_type": "agtp-namespace",
"schema_version": "1.0",
"org_domain": "acme.tld",
"governance_zone": "zone:acme-internal",
"generated_at": "2026-03-20T14:00:00Z",
"signature": {
"algorithm": "ES256",
"key_id": "agtp-gov-key-acme-01",
"value": "[base64-encoded-signature]"
},
"agents": [
{
"agent_label": "customer-service",
"canonical_id": "3a9f2c1d8b7e4a6f...",
"lifecycle_state": "Active",
"trust_tier": 1,
"cert_status": "Active",
"manifest_uri": "agtp://agtp.acme.tld/agents/customer-service",
"activated_at": "2026-01-15T09:00:00Z",
"last_updated": "2026-03-01T11:30:00Z"
}
],
"total_active": 1,
"namespace_cert_fingerprint": "b2c4d6e8..."
}
Figure 1: Agent Namespace Document Schema
The agents array *MUST* include only agents in Active lifecycle
state. Suspended, Revoked, and Deprecated agents *MUST NOT* appear
in the Namespace Document.
2.3. Integrity and Freshness
The Namespace Document *MUST* include a generated_at timestamp.
Implementations *SHOULD* treat Namespace Documents older than a
configurable freshness threshold (default: 300 seconds) as stale and
re-request. The governance platform *MUST* re-sign the Namespace
Document within 60 seconds of any registry change.
The signature covers the entire document including generated_at.
Replaying an older signed Namespace Document to conceal a revocation
event is a known attack vector; implementations *MUST* reject
Namespace Documents with a generated_at timestamp older than the
freshness threshold.
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3. Agent Identity Document and the .agtp Format
3.1. Purpose and Scope
The Agent Identity Document is the protocol's canonical
representation of a specific agent's identity, status, and behavioral
scope. Prior versions of this specification referred to this
artifact as the Agent Manifest Document; v07 renames it to the Agent
Identity Document to reflect its IANA-registered media type
(application/vnd.agtp.identity+json) and to clarify its role as the
identity primitive of the protocol. The Identity Document is
returned in response to any AGTP URI resolution request targeting a
specific agent:
agtp://[canonical-agent-id]
agtp://acme.tld/agents/customer-service
agtp://acme.tld/agents/customer-service?format=json
The Identity Document is derived from the embedded manifest inside
the agent's .agent or .nomo package; no separately modifiable file
exists. The governance platform *MUST* verify the package integrity
hash before extracting and serving the Identity Document.
3.2. The Three Document Formats and Their Relationship
.agent ──── open packaging format (patent pending, Chris Hood)
│ Contains: manifest + integrity hash + behavioral
│ trust score + executable content
│
.nomo ──── governed packaging format (patent pending, Chris Hood)
│ Contains: .agent contents + CA-signed cert chain
│ + governance zone binding
│
Both produce ↓ when queried via agtp:// URI
│
.agtp ──── wire-level Identity Document (this spec)
Contains: identity fields, lifecycle state, trust
tier, trust score, behavioral scope, methods,
capabilities, verification anchors
Open format defined by AGTP specification
Content-Type: application/vnd.agtp.identity+json
Figure 2: Relationship Between AGTP File Formats
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The .agtp format is the protocol's own document type and the one
transmitted over the wire. The .agent and .nomo formats are
deployment artifacts. An AGTP implementation has no need to
understand .agent or .nomo packaging internals; it is only required
to produce and consume .agtp Identity Documents.
Additional packaging formats *MAY* be defined by third parties,
provided they can produce conformant .agtp Identity Documents when
queried. Such formats *MUST* implement the integrity verification
requirement: the Identity Document *MUST* be derived from a verified
package, never from an independently stored or editable file.
3.3. Agent Identity Document Schema
The Agent Identity Document carries three categories of fields:
*REQUIRED* fields that every Identity Document *MUST* contain;
*RECOMMENDED* fields that *SHOULD* be present when the corresponding
information is available; and *CONDITIONAL* fields that *MUST* be
present when the conditions described later in this section are met.
The following fields are *REQUIRED* in all Agent Identity Documents:
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{
"agtp_version": "0.7",
"document_type": "agtp-identity",
"document_version": "1.0",
"agent_id": "3a9f2c1d8b7e4a6f0c2d5e9b1a3f7c0d...",
"name": "customer-service",
"description": "Handles customer service requests.",
"principal": "Acme Corporation",
"principal_id": "acme.tld",
"issuer": "https://ca.acme.tld",
"agent_public_key": "<base64url-encoded 32 bytes, Ed25519>",
"issued_at": "2026-01-15T09:00:00Z",
"updated_at": "2026-03-01T11:30:00Z",
"status": "Active",
"methods": [
"QUERY", "DESCRIBE", "SUMMARIZE",
"EXECUTE", "ESCALATE", "CONFIRM", "NOTIFY"
],
"capabilities": [
"customer-service:tier-1",
"knowledge-base:read",
"ticket-system:create"
],
"scopes_accepted": [
"documents:query",
"knowledge:query",
"calendar:book",
"escalation:route"
],
"trust_score": 0.94,
"trust_score_computed_at": "2026-03-01T11:30:00Z"
}
Figure 3: Agent Identity Document - Required Fields
Field semantics:
agtp_version: The version of the AGTP protocol the agent speaks.
SemVer string.
document_type: Self-identification of the document. *MUST* be agtp-
identity for documents conforming to this specification.
document_version: The schema version of the Identity Document
itself. SemVer string. Distinct from agtp_version. Permits the
document schema to evolve independently of the protocol.
agent_id: The 256-bit canonical Agent-ID, hex-encoded, derived from
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the agent's Agent Genesis hash. Authoritative in every AGTP
protocol operation.
name: A human-readable label for the agent. Not unique across the
AGTP ecosystem; uniqueness is provided by agent_id.
description: Short prose describing what the agent does.
principal: The human-readable name of the organization or individual
that governs the agent.
principal_id: A stable, machine-readable identifier for the
principal (typically the principal's primary DNS domain, or a
canonical organization identifier).
agent_public_key: The agent's current Ed25519 signing key, 32 raw
bytes base64url encoded. Every non-anonymous request the agent
sends carries a Request-Signature verifiable under this key, and
every delegation token the agent mints is signed with it ([AGTP]).
The private half is held by the agent and never by the issuer.
Rotation is a re-issuance of this document with a new value; the
Agent-ID is unchanged. REQUIRED for documents issued under AGTP
version 10 or later; a document without it is verifiable at Level
1 only, and requests from its agent are recorded as possession-
unproven.
issuer: The URL of the issuer that signed the Identity Document.
The issuer's public key is published at a well-known location
under this URL; signature verification details are specified in
[AGTP-CERT].
issued_at: ISO 8601 timestamp at which the Identity Document was
first issued (typically the moment of ACTIVATE).
updated_at: ISO 8601 timestamp at which the Identity Document was
last updated. Promotes freshness checks. *MUST* be greater than
or equal to issued_at.
status: The lifecycle state of the agent. One of: active,
suspended, retired, deprecated. The state is mutated by the
Lifecycle methods on the protocol floor (the method definitions in
[AGTP]): ACTIVATE sets active, DEACTIVATE sets suspended,
REINSTATE returns a suspended agent to active, REVOKE sets retired
(permanent), DEPRECATE sets deprecated. Semantics:
* active: accepts AGTP traffic normally.
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* suspended: refuses AGTP traffic with 503 Service Unavailable;
recoverable via REINSTATE.
* retired: refuses AGTP traffic with 410 Gone; permanent;
canonical Agent-ID is never reissued.
* deprecated: continues to accept AGTP traffic but signals
planned end-of-life; clients *SHOULD* migrate.
methods: The set of AGTP methods the agent's server speaks. *MUST*
include every method the server is prepared to accept. The
protocol-defined eighteen-method floor (see the method definitions
in [AGTP]) *MUST* be represented if the server claims AGTP
conformance.
capabilities: Higher-level service descriptors of what the agent can
do. Distinct from methods: methods are the protocol verbs the
server speaks; capabilities are the application-level competencies
the agent exposes through those methods.
scopes_accepted: The Authority-Scope tokens the agent will accept on
inbound requests. Format and semantics defined in the Authority-
Scope format in [AGTP].
trust_score: A scalar value on the closed interval [0.0, 1.0]
expressing behavioral trust assessed by the agent's principal or
governance platform. Computation methodology, freshness
requirements, and signature binding are specified in [AGTP-TRUST].
The base AGTP specification carries the field; AGTP-TRUST
specifies how the value is produced and verified.
trust_score_computed_at: ISO 8601 UTC timestamp at which the issuer
computed trust_score. *REQUIRED* whenever trust_score is present;
a trust_score without it is treated as absent per [AGTP-TRUST].
The following fields are *RECOMMENDED*:
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{
"trust_tier": 1,
"verification_path": "dns-anchored",
"owner_id": "nomotic.inc",
"role": "agent",
"org_domain": "acme.tld",
"governance_zone": "zone:acme-internal",
"cert_fingerprint": "b2c4d6e8...",
"cert_status": "Active",
"dns_anchor_record": "_agtp.acme.tld TXT agtp-zone=...",
"log_inclusion_proof": null,
"log_uri": null,
"package_format": "nomo",
"package_integrity_hash": "sha256:[hash]",
"audit_log_uri": "agtp://agtp.acme.tld/audit/customer-service",
"escalation_policy": "route-to-human-on-scope-limit",
"delegation_permitted": false,
"max_delegation_depth": 0,
"manifest_issuer": "registrar.acme.tld",
"manifest_issuer_public_key": "<base64url-encoded 32 bytes>",
"manifest_signature": "<base64url-encoded Ed25519 signature>"
}
Figure 4: Agent Identity Document - Recommended Fields
trust_tier: Tier classification per [AGTP-TRUST]. One of 1, 2, or
3. Resolved at server load time per the precedence rule in
[AGTP-TRUST]: explicit declaration in the Identity Document beats
Genesis-derived fallback, which beats a conservative Tier 2
default.
verification_path: Verification path used at ACTIVATE time. One of
dns-anchored, log-anchored, hybrid, or org-asserted. Resolved per
the precedence rule in [AGTP-TRUST] alongside trust_tier. The
first three values are Tier 1 paths; org-asserted is the Tier 2
value. *MUST* match the verification_path field of the underlying
Agent Genesis when one is loaded. Detailed semantics specified in
[AGTP-CERT].
owner_id: Identifier of the human or organizational principal
accountable for this agent. Resolved per the precedence rule in
[AGTP-TRUST]: explicit declaration beats Genesis-derived fallback.
Omitted when no Agent Genesis is loaded and the operator set no
explicit value. Semantics specified in [AGTP-IDENTIFIERS];
stamped on responses as the Owner-ID response header per the
response headers in [AGTP].
role: Capability role declared for this agent. One of agent
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(default) or merchant. The merchant value signals that the agent
is a transactional counterparty addressable by PURCHASE and
verified per [AGTP-MERCHANT]; agent is the default capability
posture for all other agents. role is a capability attribute
carried on the Agent Identity Document and absent from the Agent
Genesis: capability may change over an agent's lifetime without
changing identity. Operators *MAY* add or remove the merchant
role without re-issuing the Agent Genesis or rotating the
canonical Agent-ID. Future revisions *MAY* define additional role
values. Implementations encountering an unknown role value *MUST*
treat the agent as role: agent (the default) and log the unknown
value for operator review.
org_domain: The DNS domain under which the agent is registered, when
applicable.
governance_zone: The governance zone identifier for the agent's
deployment context.
cert_fingerprint, cert_status: AGTP Agent Certificate metadata.
Specified in [AGTP-CERT].
dns_anchor_record: Populated when verification_path is dns-anchored
or hybrid.
log_inclusion_proof: Populated when verification_path is log-
anchored. Carries the transparency log inclusion proof per
[RFC9162] or the COSE_Sign1 receipt per [RFC9943]. Detailed
semantics specified in [AGTP-LOG].
log_uri: Populated when verification_path is log-anchored. Mirrors
the Agent Genesis field of the same name: the absolute HTTPS URI
of the transparency log at which log_inclusion_proof is verifiable
per [AGTP-LOG], carried here so that a verifier holding only the
Identity Document can reach the log.
package_format, package_integrity_hash: Deployment-layer metadata
identifying the package format and the hash that the Identity
Document was extracted from.
audit_log_uri: AGTP URI of the agent's audit log resource.
pricing_manifest_uri: *OPTIONAL*. URI of the agent's signed pricing
manifest per the AGTP commerce companion, for agents that sell
services; the Agent Name Service may index it for price-bounded
search.
escalation_policy, delegation_permitted, max_delegation_depth: Policy
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fields governing the agent's escalation and delegation behavior.
The following fields are *CONDITIONAL* and *MUST* be present when the
conditions described below are met:
trust_warning: *REQUIRED* when trust_tier is 2, or when trust_score
is below the threshold configured by the issuer. Value is a short
string identifying the warning class (e.g., verification-
incomplete, trust-score-degraded).
trust_explanation: *REQUIRED* when trust_warning is present. Value
is a prose description suitable for surfacing to a human operator
or in audit logs.
manifest_issuer, manifest_issuer_public_key, manifest_signature: Inline
signature fields that bind the served Identity Document to a
recognized issuing registrar. When all three are present, the
document is a signed manifest; a conforming AGTP server *MUST*
verify the signature before serving the document. The three
fields and their verification semantics are defined in
Section 3.5. Operators *MUST NOT* populate these fields directly;
they are written by the registrar's signing process.
The Identity Document *MAY* be served unsigned in development
deployments and in deployments that rely on the transport-layer cert
binding defined in [AGTP-CERT] as the sole attestation path.
Production deployments *SHOULD* sign the manifest and *SHOULD* verify
the signature on every loaded document.
3.4. What the Identity Document Exposes and Does Not Expose
The Agent Identity Document *MUST* expose:
* The agent's identity (canonical Agent-ID, name, principal,
governance zone)
* The agent's current operational status
* The agent's authority scopes accepted
* The agent's supported method vocabulary
* The agent's capability descriptors
* The agent's trust score and trust tier
* The agent's verification anchors and certificate metadata
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* The agent's freshness metadata (issued_at, updated_at)
The Agent Identity Document *MUST NOT* expose:
* Executable code, scripts, or logic
* Model weights or configurations
* Internal API keys or credentials
* Specific authority scope grant tokens
* Session history or prior action logs
No AGTP URI resolution path, including any query parameter
combination, *MUST* return package contents beyond the Identity
Document schema defined in this section.
3.5. Identity Document Tamper-Proofing
Tamper evidence is provided when both of the following mechanisms are
present; when the issuer fields of the second are absent, the
document is verifiable at Level 1 only (see the three-level
verification model in [AGTP]):
1. *Package integrity hash:* Any modification to the package or its
embedded manifest invalidates the hash. The governance platform
*MUST* verify this hash before extracting the Identity Document.
2. *Inline issuer signature on the Identity Document:* The Identity
Document carries three optional but RECOMMENDED fields that bind
the served document to a recognized issuing registrar:
* manifest_issuer: a string identifier of the registrar that
issued the signed manifest. Operator-defined format
(typically a domain name or registrar identifier).
* manifest_issuer_public_key: the registrar's Ed25519 public
key, 32 raw bytes encoded as base64url. The signature is
verified against this key.
* manifest_signature: a detached Ed25519 signature over the
canonical-form serialization of the Identity Document with the
manifest_signature field excluded (and the manifest_issuer and
manifest_issuer_public_key fields included). Base64url-
encoded.
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When all three fields are present, the Identity Document is a
*signed manifest*. A conforming AGTP server *MUST* verify
manifest_signature against manifest_issuer_public_key before
serving the document; a document that fails this check *MUST NOT*
be served and the failure *MUST* be logged.
Verification confirms the bytes of the document match what the
recorded issuer signed. Verification does *NOT* confirm that
manifest_issuer_public_key belongs to a trusted registrar; that
determination is a deployment-policy concern (trust anchors,
allowlists, or out-of-band attestation). Relying parties
*SHOULD* maintain a trusted-registrars list per governance zone
and *MUST NOT* treat a structurally valid signature as sufficient
evidence of trustworthy issuance on its own.
An Identity Document that omits all three fields is an *unsigned
manifest* and is permitted in development and in deployments that
use other attestation paths (e.g., the transport-layer cert
binding in [AGTP-CERT]). Production deployments *SHOULD* sign
the manifest.
Operators *MUST NOT* forge issuance: the registrar's signing
process *MUST* strip any caller-supplied manifest_issuer,
manifest_issuer_public_key, or manifest_signature fields from the
input before signing with its own key, so a relying party can
rely on the recorded issuer being the actual signer.
The mechanisms are complementary: the package integrity hash protects
against post-extraction modification of bundled assets; the inline
signature protects against in-flight modification of the served
document. An Identity Document that fails either verification step
*MUST* be rejected, *MUST NOT* be served, and the failure *MUST* be
logged.
Issuers *MUST* retain every prior version of an Identity Document
they have signed, keyed by Agent-ID and updated_at, for as long as
attribution records that reference the agent may be verified, so that
a signature made under a since-rotated agent_public_key can be
checked against the document that was current when the action was
recorded ([AGTP-IDENTIFIERS]).
4. Browser and Human-Facing Interaction Model
4.1. The Separation of Discovery and Execution
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agtp:// URI in a browser
│
└─→ Returns Agent Identity Document
Human-readable view of identity and status
Read-only. No execution. No code exposed.
agtp:// session initiated by an agent or AGTP client
│
└─→ Establishes authenticated AGTP session
Method invocations (QUERY, EXECUTE, ESCALATE, etc.)
Full protocol operation, invisible to browsers
Figure 5: AGTP URI Use by Audience
The analogy to existing protocol conventions is direct. A mailto:
URI surfaces an address and hands off to a mail client; SMTP carries
the actual messages. Similarly, an agtp:// URI surfaces identity and
status; AGTP carries agent traffic. Browsers never become AGTP
clients by following an agtp:// link.
4.2. Browser Behavior for agtp:// URIs
Browsers that encounter an agtp:// URI *SHOULD* behave as follows:
1. If a registered AGTP client is present (OS protocol handler),
hand off the URI to that client.
2. If the browser supports agtp:// natively or via extension, render
the returned Agent Identity Document as a structured human-
readable page. The rendered view *MUST* surface the trust tier
indicator prominently, following the visual convention
established for TLS trust in the browser chrome.
3. If neither condition applies, the browser *MAY* fall back to a
gateway that translates between https:// and agtp://. The gateway
*MUST* preserve all signature and trust tier fields.
4.3. Human-Readable Identity Document View
When an Agent Identity Document is rendered for human consumption,
the following fields *MUST* be prominently displayed:
* Agent label and org domain
* Trust tier indicator (visual distinction between Tier 1, 2, and 3)
* Lifecycle state (Active / Suspended / Revoked / Deprecated)
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* Job description
* Principal organization
* Activation date
* Behavioral trust score
* Authority scope categories (in human-readable form)
4.4. AGTP Status Sub-Resource
Implementations *SHOULD* support a status sub-path:
agtp://acme.tld/agents/customer-service/status
{
"document_type": "agtp-status",
"canonical_id": "3a9f2c1d8b7e4a6f...",
"agent_label": "customer-service",
"org_domain": "acme.tld",
"lifecycle_state": "Active",
"cert_status": "Active",
"last_action_method": "QUERY",
"last_action_timestamp": "2026-03-20T13:58:22Z",
"active_session_count": 3,
"pending_escalations": 0,
"generated_at": "2026-03-20T14:00:00Z"
}
Figure 6: AGTP Status Sub-Resource Response
The active_session_count field *SHOULD* only be included if the
requester has appropriate observability permissions for the
governance zone.
5. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [AGTP] apply. The identity document
is the authority for Owner-ID and the Authority-Scope set, so its
integrity is the integrity of every authorization decision made from
it. The tamper-evidence section above states the two mechanisms and
the condition under which each applies; deployments that omit the
issuer fields accept Level 1 verification for every request the
document governs.
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6. IANA Considerations
This document is the authoritative reference for the application/
vnd.agtp.identity+json and application/vnd.agtp.identity+yaml media
types registered through [AGTP]. It requests no further allocations.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[AGTP] Hood, C., "Agent Transfer Protocol (AGTP)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-independent-agtp-10,
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-
independent-agtp-10>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9162] Laurie, B., Messeri, E., and R. Stradling, "Certificate
Transparency Version 2.0", RFC 9162, DOI 10.17487/RFC9162,
December 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9162>.
[RFC9943] Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande,
Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and
Transparent Digital Supply Chains", RFC 9943,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9943, June 2026,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9943>.
7.2. Informative References
[AGTP-CERT]
Hood, C., "AGTP Agent Certificate Extension", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-agtp-agent-cert-04,
2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-
agtp-agent-cert-04>.
[AGTP-IDENTIFIERS]
Hood, C., "AGTP Identifier Chain", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-hood-agtp-identifiers-03, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-agtp-
identifiers-03>.
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[AGTP-LOG] Hood, C., "AGTP Transparency Log Protocol", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-agtp-log-03, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-agtp-
log-03>.
[AGTP-MERCHANT]
Hood, C., "AGTP Merchant Identity and Agentic Commerce
Binding", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-
agtp-merchant-identity-03, 2026,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hood-agtp-
merchant-identity-03>.
[AGTP-TRUST]
Hood, C., "AGTP Trust and Verification Specification",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-hood-agtp-trust-
03, 2026, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
hood-agtp-trust-03>.
Appendix A. Changes from AGTP v09
First revision under this name. The agent_public_key field is new,
carrying the key that the base specification's per-request proof of
possession and delegation tokens verify against, and issuers are now
required to retain prior document versions so attribution chains
verify across key rotation ([AGTP-IDENTIFIERS]); log_uri is mirrored
from the Genesis ([AGTP-LOG]) and trust_score_computed_at is listed
as required beside trust_score ([AGTP-TRUST]). The text is otherwise
extracted from draft-hood-independent-agtp-09, sections Agent
Namespace Document, Agent Identity Document and the .agtp Format, and
Browser and Human-Facing Interaction Model, with these edits: cross-
references into the base document are expressed as citations; the
tamper-proof "guarantee" is restated as tamper evidence conditional
on the optional issuer fields, with the Level 1 fallback named;
headings are promoted one level. No wire-visible change.
Author's Address
Chris Hood
Nomotic, Inc.
Email: chris@nomotic.ai
URI: https://agtp.io
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