Private Discovery with TLS-ESNI
draft-huitema-dnssd-tls-privacy-01

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (individual)
Last updated 2019-03-11
Stream (None)
Intended RFC status (None)
Formats plain text xml pdf html bibtex
Stream Stream state (No stream defined)
Consensus Boilerplate Unknown
RFC Editor Note (None)
IESG IESG state I-D Exists
Telechat date
Responsible AD (None)
Send notices to (None)
Network Working Group                                         C. Huitema
Internet-Draft                                      Private Octopus Inc.
Intended status: Standards Track                               D. Kaiser
Expires: September 12, 2019                     University of Luxembourg
                                                          March 11, 2019

                    Private Discovery with TLS-ESNI
                   draft-huitema-dnssd-tls-privacy-01

Abstract

   DNS-SD (DNS Service Discovery) normally discloses information about
   both the devices offering services and the devices requesting
   services.  This information includes host names, network parameters,
   and possibly a further description of the corresponding service
   instance.  Especially when mobile devices engage in DNS Service
   Discovery over Multicast DNS at a public hotspot, a serious privacy
   problem arises.

   We propose to solve this problem by developing a private discovery
   profile for UDP based transports using TLS, such as DTLS and QUIC.
   The profile is based on using the Encrypted SNI extension.  We also
   define a standalone private discovery service, that can be combined
   with arbitrary applications in the same way as DNS-SD.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Huitema & Kaiser       Expires September 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft      TLS/ESNI Based Private Discovery          March 2019

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Discovery Service Using TLS and ESNI  . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Discovery Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  ESNI Extension for Discovery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.3.  Integration with DTLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     2.4.  Integration with QUIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   3.  Private Discovery DNS Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Optional Server Arrival Announce  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.1.  Server Arrival Announce Specification . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.1.  Denial of Service by Spoofed Response . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.2.  Discovery Key Compromise  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.3.  Private Discovery Key Compromise  . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.4.  Tracking by Replay  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     6.1.  Experimental use  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   DNS-SD [RFC6763] over mDNS [RFC6762] enables configurationless
   service discovery in local networks.  It is very convenient for
   users, but it requires the public exposure of the offering and
   requesting identities along with information about the offered and
   requested services.  Parts of the published information can seriously
   breach the user's privacy.  These privacy issues and potential
   solutions are discussed in [KW14a] and [KW14b].

   When analyzing these scenarios in [I-D.ietf-dnssd-prireq], we find
Show full document text