DNS Zone Transfer over TLS
draft-hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls-01

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dprive                                                          H. Zhang
Internet-Draft                                                   P. Aras
Intended status: Standards Track                              Salesforce
Expires: September 12, 2019                                    W. Toorop
                                                              NLnet Labs
                                                            S. Dickinson
                                                              Sinodun IT
                                                               A. Mankin
                                                              Salesforce
                                                          March 11, 2019

                       DNS Zone Transfer over TLS
                   draft-hzpa-dprive-xfr-over-tls-01

Abstract

   DNS zone transfers are transmitted in clear text, which gives
   attackers the opportunity to collect the content of a zone by
   eavesdropping on network connections.  The DNS Transaction Signature
   (TSIG) mechanism is specified to restrict direct zone transfer to
   authorized clients only, but it does not add confidentiality.  This
   document specifies use of DNS-over-TLS to prevent zone contents
   collection via passive monitoring of zone transfers.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 12, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

Zhang, et al.          Expires September 12, 2019               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft                XFR over TLS                    March 2019

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Zone Transfer Confidentiality Overview  . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Zone Transfer with DoT - Authentication . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  TSIG  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Mutual TLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Session Establishment and Closing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.1.  AXFR Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.2.  IXFR Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     5.3.  Policies for Both AXFR and IXFR . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.4.  Next Steps  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   11. Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   12. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   13. Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7

1.  Introduction

   DNS has a number of privacy vulnerabilities, as discussed in detail
   in [I-D.bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis].  Stub client to recursive
   resolver query privacy has received the most attention to date.
   There are now standards track documents for three encryption
   capabilities for stub to recursive queries and more work going on to
   guide deployment of specifically DNS-over-TLS (DoT) [RFC7858] and
   DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) [RFC8484].

   [I-D.bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis] established that stub client DNS
   query transactions are not public and needed protection, but on zone
   transfer [RFC1995] [RFC5936] it says only: