Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-11
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Active Internet-Draft (6tisch WG)
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2019-06-21
(latest revision 2019-06-13)
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draft-vucinic-6tisch-minimal-security
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IETF
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Proposed Standard
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Submitted to IESG for Publication
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Document shepherd |
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Pascal Thubert
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(last changed 2019-06-21)
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Yes
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Responsible AD |
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Suresh Krishnan
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Pascal Thubert <pthubert@cisco.com>
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6TiSCH Working Group M. Vucinic, Ed.
Internet-Draft Inria
Intended status: Standards Track J. Simon
Expires: December 15, 2019 Analog Devices
K. Pister
University of California Berkeley
M. Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
June 13, 2019
Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-11
Abstract
This document describes the minimal framework required for a new
device, called "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the
TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e) network. The framework requires that
the pledge and the JRC (join registrar/coordinator, a central
entity), share a symmetric key. How this key is provisioned is out
of scope of this document. Through a single CoAP (Constrained
Application Protocol) request-response exchange secured by OSCORE
(Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments), the pledge
requests admission into the network and the JRC configures it with
link-layer keying material and other parameters. The JRC may at any
time update the parameters through another request-response exchange
secured by OSCORE. This specification defines the Constrained Join
Protocol and its CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation) data
structures, and configures the rest of the 6TiSCH communication stack
for this join process to occur in a secure manner. Additional
security mechanisms may be added on top of this minimal framework.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Vucinic, et al. Expires December 15, 2019 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH June 2019
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 15, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Provisioning Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Join Process Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. Step 3 - Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) Execution . . . 9
4.4. The Special Case of the 6LBR Pledge Joining . . . . . . . 10
5. Link-layer Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Network-layer Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Identification of Unauthenticated Traffic . . . . . . . . 12
7. Application-level Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Statelessness of the JP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Recommended Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.3. OSCORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.1. Join Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Parameter Update Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.3. Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.4. CoJP Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8.5. Recommended Settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
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