Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-05

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (6tisch WG)
Last updated 2018-03-05
Replaces draft-vucinic-6tisch-minimal-security
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6TiSCH Working Group                                     M. Vucinic, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                  University of Montenegro
Intended status: Standards Track                                J. Simon
Expires: September 6, 2018                                Analog Devices
                                                               K. Pister
                                       University of California Berkeley
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                          March 05, 2018

                 Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
                 draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-05

Abstract

   This document describes the minimal framework required for a new
   device, called "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the
   TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e) network.  The framework requires that
   the pledge and the JRC (join registrar/coordinator, a central
   entity), share a symmetric key.  How this key is provisioned is out
   of scope of this document.  Through a single CoAP (Constrained
   Application Protocol) request-response exchange secured by OSCORE
   (Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments), the pledge
   requests admission into the network and the JRC configures it with
   link-layer keying material and a short link-layer address.  This
   specification defines the message format, a new Stateless-Proxy CoAP
   option, and configures the rest of the 6TiSCH communication stack for
   this join process to occur in a secure manner.  Additional security
   mechanisms may be added on top of this minimal framework.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.

Vucinic, et al.         Expires September 6, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH       March 2018

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  One-Touch Assumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Join Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     5.1.  Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.3.  Step 3 - Join Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.4.  Step 4 - Join Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  Link-layer Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Network-layer Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     7.1.  Identification of Join Request Traffic  . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.2.  Identification of Join Response Traffic . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Application-level Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.1.  OSCORE Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  6TiSCH Join Protocol  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     9.1.  Specification of the Join Request . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     9.2.  Specification of the Join Response  . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     9.3.  Error Handling and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     9.4.  Rekeying and Rejoining  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.5.  Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.6.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
   10. Stateless-Proxy CoAP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
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