Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (6tisch WG)
Last updated 2017-03-12
Replaces draft-vucinic-6tisch-minimal-security
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6TiSCH Working Group                                          M. Vucinic
Internet-Draft                                                     Inria
Intended status: Standards Track                                J. Simon
Expires: September 13, 2017                            Linear Technology
                                                               K. Pister
                                       University of California Berkeley
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                          March 12, 2017

                 Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
                 draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-02

Abstract

   This document describes the minimal mechanisms required to support
   secure enrollment of a pledge, a device being added to an IPv6 over
   the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e (6TiSCH) network.  It assumes that
   the pledge has been provisioned with a credential that is relevant to
   the deployment - the "one-touch" scenario.  The goal of this
   configuration is to set link-layer keys, and to establish a secure
   end-to-end session between each pledge and the join registrar who may
   use that to further configure the pledge.  Additional security
   behaviors and mechanisms may be added on top of this minimal
   framework.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 13, 2017.

Vucinic, et al.        Expires September 13, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH       March 2017

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  One-Touch Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Join Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Step 3 - Security Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.4.  Step 4 - Simple Join Protocol - Join Request  . . . . . .   8
     4.5.  Step 5 - Simple Join Protocol - Join Response . . . . . .   8
   5.  Architectural Overview and Communication through Join Proxy .   8
     5.1.  Stateless-Proxy CoAP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Handshake  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  Discovery Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Simple Join Protocol Specification  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.1.  OSCOAP Security Context Instantiation . . . . . . . . . .  12
     7.2.  Specification of Join Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.3.  Specification of Join Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  Link-layer Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   9.  Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   10. Rekeying and Rejoin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   11. Key Derivations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   13. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
   14. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     14.1.  CoAP Option Numbers Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
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