Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (6tisch WG)
Last updated 2017-10-30
Replaces draft-vucinic-6tisch-minimal-security
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6TiSCH Working Group                                     M. Vucinic, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                  University of Montenegro
Intended status: Standards Track                                J. Simon
Expires: May 3, 2018                                      Analog Devices
                                                               K. Pister
                                       University of California Berkeley
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                        October 30, 2017

                 Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
                 draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-04

Abstract

   This document describes the minimal configuration required for a new
   device, called "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the
   TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e) network.  The entities involved use CoAP
   (Constrained Application Protocol) and OSCORE (Object Security for
   Constrained RESTful Environments).  The configuration requires that
   the pledge and the JRC (join registrar/coordinator, a central
   entity), share a symmetric key.  How this key is provisioned is out
   of scope of this document.  The result of the joining process is that
   the JRC configures the pledge with link-layer keying material and a
   short link-layer address.  This specification also defines a new
   Stateless-Proxy CoAP option.  Additional security mechanisms may be
   added on top of this minimal framework.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2018.

Vucinic, et al.            Expires May 3, 2018                  [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH     October 2017

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  One-Touch Assumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Pre-Shared Key  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Join Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Step 3 - Join Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.4.  Step 4 - Join Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Architectural Overview and Communication through Join Proxy .   8
     5.1.  Stateless-Proxy CoAP Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  OSCORE Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     6.1.  Persistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Specification of Join Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Specification of Join Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     8.1.  Link-layer Keys Transported in COSE Key Set . . . . . . .  12
     8.2.  Short Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  Error Handling and Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   11. Mandatory to Implement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   12. Link-layer Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   13. Rekeying and Rejoin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   14. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
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