Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-06

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6TiSCH Working Group                                     M. Vucinic, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                  University of Montenegro
Intended status: Standards Track                                J. Simon
Expires: November 26, 2018                                Analog Devices
                                                               K. Pister
                                       University of California Berkeley
                                                           M. Richardson
                                                Sandelman Software Works
                                                            May 25, 2018

                 Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH
                 draft-ietf-6tisch-minimal-security-06

Abstract

   This document describes the minimal framework required for a new
   device, called "pledge", to securely join a 6TiSCH (IPv6 over the
   TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e) network.  The framework requires that
   the pledge and the JRC (join registrar/coordinator, a central
   entity), share a symmetric key.  How this key is provisioned is out
   of scope of this document.  Through a single CoAP (Constrained
   Application Protocol) request-response exchange secured by OSCORE
   (Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments), the pledge
   requests admission into the network and the JRC configures it with
   link-layer keying material and other parameters.  The JRC may at any
   time update the parameters through another request-response exchange
   secured by OSCORE.  This specification defines the Constrained Join
   Protocol and its CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation) data
   structures, a new Stateless-Proxy CoAP option, and configures the
   rest of the 6TiSCH communication stack for this join process to occur
   in a secure manner.  Additional security mechanisms may be added on
   top of this minimal framework.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Vucinic, et al.         Expires November 26, 2018               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft    Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH         May 2018

   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  One-Touch Assumption  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Join Process Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.1.  Step 1 - Enhanced Beacon  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  Step 2 - Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  Step 3 - Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) Execution . . .   9
     5.4.  The Special Case of the 6LBR Pledge Joining . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Link-layer Configuration  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Network-layer Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     7.1.  Identification of Join Request Traffic  . . . . . . . . .  11
     7.2.  Identification of Join Response Traffic . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Application-level Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     8.1.  OSCORE Security Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   9.  Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     9.1.  Join Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.2.  Parameter Update Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     9.3.  CoJP Objects  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     9.4.  Parameters  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
     9.5.  Mandatory to Implement Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . .  28