Forwarded HTTP Extension

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Network Working Group                                       A. Petersson
Internet-Draft                                                M. Nilsson
Intended status: Standards Track                          Opera Software
Expires: March 9, 2013                                 September 5, 2012

                        Forwarded HTTP Extension


   This document defines an HTTP extension header field that allows
   proxy components to disclose information lost in the proxying
   process, for example, the originating IP address of a request or IP
   address of the proxy on the user-agent-facing interface.  Given a
   trusted path of proxying components, this makes it possible to
   arrange it so that each subsequent component will have access to, for
   example, all IP addresses used in the chain of proxied HTTP requests.

   This document also specifies guidelines for a proxy administrator to
   anonymize the origin of a request.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 9, 2013.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   ( in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents

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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Syntax Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Forwarded HTTP Header Field  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   5.  Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.1.  Forwarded By . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     5.2.  Forwarded For  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.3.  Forwarded Host . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.4.  Forwarded Proto  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     5.5.  Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Node Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     6.1.  IPv4 and IPv6 Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.2.  The "unknown" Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     6.3.  Obfuscated Identifier  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Implementation Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.1.  HTTP Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.2.  Header Field Preservation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.3.  Relation to Via  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     7.4.  Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     7.5.  Example Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     8.1.  Header Validity and Integrity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     8.2.  Information Leak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     8.3.  Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
     10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
   Appendix A.  Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before
                publication)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
     A.1.  Since draft-petersson-forwarded-for-00 . . . . . . . . . . 16
     A.2.  Since draft-petersson-forwarded-for-01 . . . . . . . . . . 16
     A.3.  Since draft-petersson-forwarded-for-02 . . . . . . . . . . 16
     A.4.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-00 . . . . . . . . 16
     A.5.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-01 . . . . . . . . 16
     A.6.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-02 . . . . . . . . 17
     A.7.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-03 . . . . . . . . 17
     A.8.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-04 . . . . . . . . 17
     A.9.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-05 . . . . . . . . 17
     A.10. Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-06 . . . . . . . . 18
   Appendix B.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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1.  Introduction

   In today's HTTP landscape, there are a multitude of different
   applications that act as proxies for the user agents.  In many cases,
   these proxies exists without the action or knowledge from the end
   user.  These cases occurs for example when the proxy exists as a part
   of the infrastructure within the organization running the web server.
   Such proxies may be used for features such as loadbalancing or crypto
   offload.  Another example is when the proxy is used within the same
   organization as the user.  The proxy may be used for example to cache
   resources.  However, these proxies make the requests appear as if
   they originated from the proxy's IP address or in other ways change
   the information in the original request.

   This unintended loss of information can cause problems since the
   clients IP address may be wanted by the web server.  The main uses of
   this information is for logging, trouble shouting, access control,
   statistics, and to handle abuse cases.

   As most of the time this loss of information is not the primary
   purpose, or even a desired effect, a way of disclosing the original
   information at the HTTP level is needed, instead of relying on the
   transport layer for this functionality.  However, proxies that wish
   to provide client anonymity MUST NOT use the feature defined in this

   In addition to the aforementioned problems, there may also be issues
   due to the use of NAT.  This is further discussed in [RFC6269].

   A common way to disclose this information is by using the non-
   standard header fields such as X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-By, and
   X-Forwarded-Proto.  This document standardizes a header field,
   "Forwarded" and provides the syntax and semantics for disclosing such
   information.  "Forwarded" also combines all the information within
   one single header field, making it possible to correlate that
   information.  With the header field format described in this
   document, it is possible to know what information belongs together,
   as long as the proxies are trusted.  Such conclusions are not
   possible to make with the X-Forwarded class of header fields.  This
   also adds new features for which real life deployments have shown a

2.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

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3.  Syntax Notations

   This specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)
   notation of [RFC5234] with the list rule extension defined in Section
   3.2.5 of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging].

4.  Forwarded HTTP Header Field

   The "Forwarded" HTTP header field is an OPTIONAL header field that,
   when used, contains a list of parameter-identifier pairs that
   disclose information that is altered or lost when a proxy is involved
   in the path of the request.  "Forwarded" is only for use in HTTP
   requests and is not to be used in HTTP responses.  This applies to
   forwarding proxies, as well as reverse proxies.  Information passed
   in this header can be, for example, the source IP address of the
   request, the IP address of the incoming interface on the proxy, or
   whether HTTP or HTTPS was used.  If the request is passing through
   several proxies, each proxy can add a set of parameters; it can also
   remove earlier added Forwarded-header fields.

   The top-level list is represented as a list of HTTP header field-
   values as defined in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging].
   The first element in this list holds information added by the first
   proxy that implements and uses this header field, and each subsequent
   element holds information added by each subsequent proxy.  Because
   this header field is optional, any proxy in the chain may choose not
   to update this header field.  Each field-value is a semicolon-
   separated list; this sub-list consists of parameter-identifier pairs.
   Parameter-identifier pairs are grouped together by an equals sign.
   Each parameter MUST NOT occur more than once per field-value.  The
   parameter names are case-insensitive.  The header field value can be
   defined in augmented BNF syntax as:

       Forwarded   = 1#forwarded-element

       forwarded-element =
           [ forwarded-pair ] *( ";" [ forwarded-pair ] )

       forwarded-pair = token "=" value
       value          = token / quoted-string

       token = <Defined in
           [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging], Section 3.2.4>
       quoted-string = <Defined in
           [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging], Section 3.2.4>

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       Forwarded: For="[2001:db8:cafe::17]:4711"
       Forwarded: for=;proto=http;by=
       Forwarded: for=, for=

   Note that as ":" and "[]" are not valid characters in "token", IPv6
   addresses are written as "quoted-string".

   A proxy server that wants to add a new "Forwarded" header field value
   can either append it to the last existing "Forwarded" header field
   after a comma separator or add a new field at the end of the header
   block.  A proxy MAY remove all "Forwarded" header fields from a
   request.  It MUST, however, ensure that the correct header field is
   updated in case of multiple "Forwarded" header fields.

5.  Parameters

   This document specifies a number of parameters and valid values for
   each of them:

   o  "by" identifies the user-agent facing interface of the proxy.

   o  "for" identifies the node making the request to the proxy.

   o  "host" is the host request header-field as received by the proxy.

   o  "proto" indicates what protocol was used to make the request.

5.1.  Forwarded By

   The "by" parameter is used to disclose the interface where the
   request came in to the proxy server.  Typically, the value of this
   parameter is an IP address and optionally a port number; however, it
   can also be some other kind of identifier (see Section 6.2 and
   Section 6.3, below).

   The syntax of a "by" value, after potential quoted-string unescaping,
   conforms to the "node" ABNF described in Section 6.

   This is primarily added by reverse proxies that wish to forward this
   information to the backend server.  It can also be interesting in a
   multi-homed environment to signal to backend servers where the
   request came from.

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5.2.  Forwarded For

   The "for" parameter is used to disclose information about the client
   that initiated the request and following proxies in a chain of
   proxies.  Typically, the value of this parameter is an IP address,
   but it can also be some other kind of identifier (see Section 6.2 and
   Section 6.3, below).

   The syntax of a "for" value, after potential quoted-string
   unescaping, conforms to the "node" ABNF described in Section 6.

   In a chain of proxy servers where this is fully utilized, the first
   for-parameter will disclose the client where the request was first
   made, followed by any subsequent proxy identifiers.  The last proxy
   in the chain is not part of the list of for-parameters.  The last
   proxy's IP address, and optionally a port number, are, however,
   readily available as the remote IP address at the transport layer.
   It can, however, be more relevant to read information about the last
   proxy from preceding "Forwarded" header field's by-parameter, if

5.3.  Forwarded Host

   The "host" parameter is used to forward the original value of the
   "Host" header field.  This can be used, for example, by the origin
   server if a reverse proxy is rewriting the "Host" header field to
   some internal host name.

   The syntax for a "host" value, after potential quoted-string
   unescaping, MUST conform to the Host ABNF described in Section 5.4 of

5.4.  Forwarded Proto

   The "proto" parameter has the value of the used protocol type.  The
   syntax of a "proto" value, after potential quoted-string unescaping,
   MUST conform to the URI scheme name as defined in Section 3.1 in
   [RFC3986] and registered to IANA according to [RFC4395].  Typical
   values are "http" or "https".

   For example, in an environment where a reverse proxy is also used as
   a crypto offloader, this allows the origin server to rewrite URLs in
   a document to match the type of connection as the user agent
   requested, even though all connections to the origin server are
   unencrypted HTTP.

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5.5.  Extensions

   Extensions allow for additional parameters and values.  Extensions
   can be particularly useful in reverse proxy environments.  All
   extension parameters SHOULD be registered in the "HTTP Forwarded
   Parameter" registry.  If certain extensions are expected to have
   widespread deployment, they SHOULD also be standardized.  This is
   further discussed in Section 9.

6.  Node Identifiers

   The node identifier is one of the following:

   o  The client's IP address, with an optional port number

   o  A token indicating that the IP address of the client is not known
      to the proxy server

   o  A generated token, allowing for tracing and debugging, while
      allowing the internal structure or sensitive information to be

   The node identifier is defined by the augmented BNF syntax as:

       node     = nodename [ ":" node-port ]
       nodename = IPv4address / "[" IPv6address "]" /
                   "unknown" / obfnode

       IPv4address = <Defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.2>
       IPv6address = <Defined in [RFC3986], Section 3.2.2>
       obfnode = "_" 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "_" / "-")

       node-port     = port / obfport
       port          = 1*5DIGIT
       obfport       = "_" 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "_" / "-")

       DIGIT = <Defined in [RFC5234], Section 3.4>
       ALPHA = <Defined in [RFC5234], Section B.1>

   Each of the identifiers may optionally have the port identifier, for
   example, allowing the identification of the end point in a NATted
   environment.  The "node-port" can be identified either by its port
   number or by a generated token obfuscating the real port number.  An
   obfuscated port may be used in situations where the possessor of the
   proxy wants the ability to trace requests -- for example, in debug
   purposes -- but does not want to reveal internal information.

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   Note that the ABNF above also allows port numbers to be appended to
   the the "unknown" identifier.  Interpretation of such notation is,
   however, left to the possessor of a proxy adding such a value to the
   header field.  To distinguish an "obfport" from a port, the "obfport"
   MUST have a leading underscore.  Further, it MUST also consist of
   only "ALPHA", "DIGIT", and the characters ".", "_" and "-".

   It is important to note that an IPv6 address and any nodename with
   node-port specified MUST be quoted, since ":" is not an allowed
   character in "token".



6.1.  IPv4 and IPv6 Identifiers

   The ABNF rules for "IPv6address" and "IPv4address" are defined in
   [RFC3986] The "IPv6address" SHOULD comply with textual representation
   recommendations [RFC5952] (for example, lowercase, compression of

   Note that the IP address may be one from the internal nets, as
   defined in [RFC1918] and [RFC4193].  Also, note that an IPv6 address
   is always enclosed in square brackets.

6.2.  The "unknown" Identifier

   The "unknown" identifier is used when the identity of the preceding
   entity is not known, but the proxy server still wants to signal that
   a forwarding of the request was made.  One example would be a proxy
   server process generating an outgoing request without direct access
   to the incoming request TCP socket.

6.3.  Obfuscated Identifier

   A generated identifier may be used where there is a wish to keep the
   internal IP addresses secret, while still allowing the "Forwarded"
   header field to be used for tracing and debugging.  This can also be
   useful if the proxy uses some sort of interface labels and it is
   desired to pass them rather than an IP address.  The identifiers can
   be randomly generated for each request and do not need to be
   statically assigned to resources.  To distinguish the obfuscated
   identifier from other identifiers, it MUST have a leading underscore
   "_".  Furthermore, it MUST also consist of only "ALPHA", "DIGIT" and
   the characters ".", "_" and "-".  Example:

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       Forwarded: for=_hidden, for=_SEVKISEK

7.  Implementation Considerations

7.1.  HTTP Lists

   Note that an HTTP list allows white spaces to occur between the
   identifiers, and the list may be split over multiple header fields.
   As an example, the header field

       Forwarded: for=,for="[2001:db8:cafe::17]",for=unknown

   is equivalent to the header field

       Forwarded: for=, for="[2001:db8:cafe::17]", for=unknown

   which is equivalent to the header fields

       Forwarded: for=
       Forwarded: for="[2001:db8:cafe::17]", for=unknown

7.2.  Header Field Preservation

   There are some cases when this header field should be kept and some
   cases where it should not be kept.  A directly forwarded request
   should preserve and possibly extend it.  If a single incoming request
   causes the proxy to make multiple outbound requests, special care
   must be taken to decide whether the header field should be preserved
   or not.  In many cases the header field should be preserved, but if
   the outbound request is not a direct consequence of the incoming
   request, the header field should not be preserved.  Consider also the
   case when a proxy has detected a content mismatch in a 304 response
   and is following the instructions in
   [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional] Section 4.1 to repeat the request
   unconditionally, in which case the new request is still basically a
   direct consequence of the origin request, and the header should
   probably be kept.

7.3.  Relation to Via

   The "Via" header field [I-D.ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional] Section 6.2
   is a header field with similar use case as this header field.  The
   "Via" header field, however, only provides information about the
   proxy itself, and is thereby leaving out the information about the
   client connecting to the proxy server.  The "Forwarded" header field,
   on the other hand, has relaying information from the client facing
   side of the proxy server as its main purpose.  As "Via" is already

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   widely deployed, its format can not be changed to address the
   problems that "Forwarded" addresses.

   Note that it is not possible to combine information from this header
   field with the information from the Via header field.  Some proxies
   will not update the "Forwarded" header field, some proxies will not
   update the Via header field, and some proxies will update both.

7.4.  Transition

   If a proxy gets incoming requests with X-Forwarded-* header fields
   present, it is encouraged to convert these into the header field
   described in this document, if it can be done in a sensible way.  If
   the request only contains one type -- for example, X-Forwarded-For --
   this can be translated to "Forwarded", by prepending each element
   with "for=".  Note that IPv6 addresses may not be quoted in
   X-Forwarded-For, but they are quoted in "Forwarded".

       X-Forwarded-For:, [2001:db8:cafe::17]


       Forwarded: for=, for="[2001:db8:cafe::17]"

   Special care must, however, be taken if, for example, both
   X-Forwarded-For and X-Forwarded-By exist.  In such cases, it may not
   be possible to do a conversion, since it is not possible to know in
   which order the already existing fields were added.  Also, note that
   removing the X-Forwarded-For header field may cause issues for
   parties that have not yet implemented support for this new header

7.5.  Example Usage

   A request from a client with IP address passes through a
   proxy with IP address, then through another proxy with
   IP address before reaching a origin server.  This could,
   for example, be an office client behind a corporate malware filter
   talking to a origin server through a reverse proxy.

   o  The HTTP request between the client and the first proxy has no
      "Forwarded" header field.

   o  The HTTP request between the first and second proxy has a
      "Forwarded: for=" header field.

   o  The HTTP request between the second proxy and the origin server
      has a "Forwarded: for=,

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      header field.

   Note that, at some points in a connection chain, the information
   might not be updated in the "Forwarded" header field, either because
   of lack of support of this HTTP extension or because of a policy
   decision not to disclose information about this network component.

8.  Security Considerations

8.1.  Header Validity and Integrity

   The "Forwarded" HTTP header field cannot be relied upon to be
   correct, as it may be modified, whether mistakenly or for malicious
   reasons, by every node on the way to the server, including the client
   making the request.

   One approach is to verify the correctness of proxies and to whitelist
   them as trusted.  This approach has at least two weaknesses.  First,
   the chain of IP addresses listed before the request came to the proxy
   cannot be trusted.  Second, unless the communication between proxies
   and the end point is secured, the data can be modified by an attacker
   with access to the network.

8.2.  Information Leak

   The "Forwarded" HTTP header field can reveal internal structures of
   the network setup behind the NAT or proxy setup, which may be
   undesired.  This can be addressed either by using obfuscated
   elements, preventing the internal nodes from updating the HTTP header
   field, or by having an egress proxy removing entries that reveals
   internal network information.

   This header field should never be copied into response messages by
   origin servers or intermediaries, as it can reveal the whole proxy
   chain to the client.  As a side effect, special care must be taken in
   hosting environments not to allow the TRACE request where the
   "Forwarded" field is used, as it would appear in the body of the
   response message.

8.3.  Privacy Considerations

   In recent years, there have been growing concerns about privacy.
   There is a trade-off between ensuring privacy for users versus
   disclosing information that is useful, for example for debugging,
   statistics and generating location-dependent content.  A proxy that
   intends to anonymize the user should not use the header field

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   described in this document.

   The "Forwarded" HTTP header field, by design, exposes information
   that some users consider privacy sensitive, in order to allow for
   such uses.

   The clients IP address, that may be forwarded in the "for" parameter
   of this header field, is considered to be privacy sensitive by many
   people, as the IP address may be able to uniquely identify a client,
   what operator the user is using, and possibly a rough estimation of
   where the user is geographically located.

   Proxies using this extension will preserve the information of a
   direct connection.  This has an end-user privacy impact regardless of
   whether the end-user or deployer knows or expects that this is the

   Implementers and deployers of such proxies need to consider whether,
   and how, deploying this extension affects user privacy.

   Note that users' IP addresses may already be forwarded by proxies
   using the header field X-Forwarded-For, which is widely used.  It
   should also be noted that if the user where doing the connection
   directly without passing the proxy, the clients IP address would be
   sent to the web server.  Users that do not actively choose a
   anonymizing proxy can not rely on having their IP address shielded.
   These users who wants to minimize the risk of being tracked must also
   note that there are other ways information may leak, for example by
   browser header field fingerprinting.

   A proxy that needs the ability to trace the source of requests, but
   does not want to leak the information further, should obfuscate the
   client address.  When generating such tokens, care must be taken not
   to include potentially sensitive information in the token.  When
   using such tokens, a static token per user would increase the
   possibility for external organizations to track separate users.  It
   is therefore recommended to limit the lifetime of a token.

9.  IANA Considerations

   This document specifies the HTTP header listed below, which should be
   added to the permanent HTTP header registry defined in [RFC3864].

   Header field: Forwarded
   Applicable protocol: http
   Status: standard
   Author/Change controller:

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       IETF (
       Internet Engineering Task Force
   Specification document(s): this specification (Section 4)
   Related information: None

   The "Forwarded" header field contains parameters for which IANA is to
   create and maintain a new registry entitled "HTTP Forwarded
   parameters".  Initial registrations are given below; for future
   assignments, specification is required [RFC5226].  The author should
   consider security- and privacy aspects and, if there are any, include
   such sections in the specification.  New parameters and their values
   MUST conform the forwarded-pair as defined in ABNF in Section 4.
   Further, a short description should be provided in the registration.

   To keep the registration process uncomplicated and to encourage
   parameters that are in use to be registered, the designated expert
   should set a low bar for new registrations, confirming mostly that
   the specification is reasonably stable, readily available, and
   sufficient to create interoperable implementations.  The parameter
   name ought to make sense for the requested usage, being short but
   sufficiently specific.  The specification needs to comply with this
   document and the general HTTP specifications, and should address
   security and privacy implications of the requested parameter.

   | Parameter   | Description                           | Definition  |
   | name        |                                       |             |
   | by          | IP-address of incoming interface of a | Section 5.1 |
   |             | proxy                                 |             |
   | for         | IP-address of client making a request | Section 5.2 |
   |             | through a proxy                       |             |
   | host        | Host header field of the incoming     | Section 5.3 |
   |             | request                               |             |
   | proto       | Application protocol used for         | Section 5.4 |
   |             | incoming request                      |             |

                       Table 1: Initial assignments

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

              Fielding, R., Lafon, Y., and J. Reschke, "HTTP/1.1, part
              1: URIs, Connections, and Message Parsing",

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              draft-ietf-httpbis-p1-messaging-19 (work in progress),
              March 2012.

              Fielding, R., Lafon, Y., and J. Reschke, "HTTP/1.1, part
              4: Conditional Requests",
              draft-ietf-httpbis-p4-conditional-19 (work in progress),
              March 2012.

   [RFC1918]  Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and
              E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
              BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3864]  Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
              Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
              September 2004.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, January 2005.

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, October 2005.

   [RFC4395]  Hansen, T., Hardie, T., and L. Masinter, "Guidelines and
              Registration Procedures for New URI Schemes", BCP 35,
              RFC 4395, February 2006.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
              May 2008.

   [RFC5234]  Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
              Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.

   [RFC5952]  Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
              Address Text Representation", RFC 5952, August 2010.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6269]  Ford, M., Boucadair, M., Durand, A., Levis, P., and P.
              Roberts, "Issues with IP Address Sharing", RFC 6269,
              June 2011.

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Appendix A.  Change Log (to be removed by RFC Editor before publication)

A.1.  Since draft-petersson-forwarded-for-00

   Added IANA considerations.

   Expanded scope and add parameterized list.

A.2.  Since draft-petersson-forwarded-for-01

   Removed "x-" from private extensions.

   Allow for any protocol name.

   Rename kv-v to forwarded-element and kv to forwarded-value.

   Add informative reference RFC6269.

A.3.  Since draft-petersson-forwarded-for-02

   Name change to draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-00.

   Updated proto in list under section 5 Parameters.

   Remove "hidden" but mention _hidden as an example in 6.3 Obfuscated

   Clarify that IPv6-addresses must be enclosed by square brackets.

   Restrict ext-value: do not allow "," or ";".

A.4.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-00

   Write IP address instead of IP number.

   Remove BNF for IP addresses.

A.5.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-01

   Refer to httpbis instead of RFC2616.  Thereby also change to RFC5234

   Split up ABNF to be more general on top level.

   Add some comments on draft-ietf-httpbis-p2-semantics-19#section-3.1
   to "Implementation Considerations"

   Removal of ABNF appendix.

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   Merging of the sections "Private extensions" and "Future extensions".

A.6.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-02

   Require obfport to start with an underscore.

   Include "._-" as valid characters in obfnode.

   Remove MAY-references from section 5.

   Add a section about the relation to the via-header field.

   Add some privacy considerations.

   Encourage proxies to convert X-Forwarded-* to this format, when

   Mention and demonstrate that IPv6-addresses must be quoted.

   Add motivation for the obfnode.

   Add some notes on when this header field should be preserved or not.

   Fix some typos and make some clarifications.

A.7.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-03

   Require that each parameter only occur once per instance.

   Request for a new registry at IANA.

A.8.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-04

   Add ABNF references for token, quoted-string, IPv4address,
   IPv6address, DIGIT and ALPHA.

   Only define the content of the Forwarded header field.

   Remove https from "applicable protocol" in Section 9, as this is

A.9.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-05

   Grouped all ABNF.

   Change registration from "RFC required" to "Specification required".

   Extended the section describing the relation to Via.

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   Extended Privacy Considerations.

   Made some clarifications and language fixes.

A.10.  Since draft-ietf-appsawg-http-forwarded-06

   Break up the ABNF again.

   Update the Privacy Considerations section.

   Update the IANA registration policy.

   Change back to *( ";" [ forwarded-pair ] ) .

   Some minor clarifications.

   Constistently quote "Forwarded".

Appendix B.  Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Per Cederqvist, Alissa Cooper, Stephen Farrell, Ned Freed,
   Per Hedbor, Amos Jeffries, Poul-Henning Kamp, Murray S. Kucherawy,
   Barry Leiba, Salvatore Loreto, Alexey Melnikov, S. Moonesamy, Susan
   Nichols, Mark Nottingham, Julian Reschke, John Sullivan, Willy
   Tarreau and Dan Wing for their feedback.

Authors' Addresses

   Andreas Petersson
   Opera Software
   S:t Larsgatan 12
   Linkoping  SE-582 24


   Martin Nilsson
   Opera Software
   S:t Larsgatan 12
   Linkoping  SE-582 24


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