Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)
draft-ietf-core-object-security-02

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (core WG)
Last updated 2017-03-13
Replaces draft-selander-ace-object-security
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CoRE Working Group                                           G. Selander
Internet-Draft                                               J. Mattsson
Intended status: Standards Track                            F. Palombini
Expires: September 14, 2017                                  Ericsson AB
                                                                L. Seitz
                                                        SICS Swedish ICT
                                                          March 13, 2017

                    Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)
                   draft-ietf-core-object-security-02

Abstract

   This document defines Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP), a method for
   application layer protection of the Constrained Application Protocol
   (CoAP), using the CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE).  OSCOAP
   provides end-to-end encryption, integrity and replay protection to
   CoAP payload, options, and header fields, as well as a secure message
   binding.  OSCOAP is designed for constrained nodes and networks and
   can be used across intermediaries and over any layer.  The use of
   OSCOAP is signaled with the CoAP option Object-Security, also defined
   in this document.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on September 14, 2017.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents

Selander, et al.       Expires September 14, 2017               [Page 1]
Internet-Draft      Object Security of CoAP (OSCOAP)          March 2017

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  The Object-Security Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  The Security Context  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Security Context Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Derivation of Security Context Parameters . . . . . . . .   8
     3.3.  Requirements on the Security Context Parameters . . . . .  10
   4.  Protected CoAP Message Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.1.  CoAP Payload  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     4.2.  CoAP Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.3.  CoAP Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   5.  The COSE Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
     5.1.  Plaintext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
     5.2.  Additional Authenticated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   6.  Sequence Numbers, Replay, Message Binding, and Freshness  . .  20
     6.1.  AEAD Nonce Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     6.2.  Replay Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20
     6.3.  Sequence Number and Replay Window State . . . . . . . . .  20
     6.4.  Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     6.5.  Delay and Mismatch Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   7.  Processing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.1.  Protecting the Request  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.2.  Verifying the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.3.  Protecting the Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     7.4.  Verifying the Response  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   8.  Web Linking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   10. Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27
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