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An Architecture for DNS-Bound Client and Sender Identities
draft-ietf-dance-architecture-04

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (dance WG)
Authors Ash Wilson , Shumon Huque , Olle E. Johansson , Michael Richardson
Last updated 2024-03-24
Replaces draft-wilson-dance-architecture
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draft-ietf-dance-architecture-04
DANCE                                                          A. Wilson
Internet-Draft                                                  Valimail
Intended status: Informational                                  S. Huque
Expires: 26 September 2024                                    Salesforce
                                                            O. Johansson
                                                              Edvina.net
                                                           M. Richardson
                                            Sandelman Software Works Inc
                                                           25 March 2024

       An Architecture for DNS-Bound Client and Sender Identities
                    draft-ietf-dance-architecture-04

Abstract

   This architecture document defines terminology, interaction, and
   authentication patterns, related to the use of DANE DNS records for
   TLS client and messaging peer identity, within the context of
   existing object security and TLS-based protocols.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the DANE Authentication
   for Network Clients Everywhere Working Group mailing list
   (dance@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/dance/.

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/ashdwilson/draft-dance-architecture.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 September 2024.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Communication Patterns  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Client/Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Peer2peer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.3.  Decoupled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   4.  Client authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Overview  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
       4.1.1.  Example 1: TLS authentication for HTTPS API
               interaction, DANE pattern assurance . . . . . . . . .   8
       4.1.2.  IoT: Device to cloud  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.3.  LoRaWAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       4.1.4.  Edge Computing  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.5.  Domain Users  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
       4.1.6.  SIP and WebRTC inter-domain privacy . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.1.7.  DNS over TLS client authentication  . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.1.8.  SMTP, STARTTLS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.1.9.  SSH client  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       4.1.10. Network Access  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     4.2.  Object Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.2.1.  Structured data messages: JOSE/COSE . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.3.  Operational anomaly reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.3.1.  MUD reporting for improper provisioning . . . . . . .  15
       4.3.2.  XARF for abuse reporting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     4.4.  Adjacent Ecosystem Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       4.4.1.  Certification Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.1.  Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.2.  Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     5.3.  Availability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16

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     5.4.  Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.4.1.  DNS Scalability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       5.4.2.  Change of ownership for IoT devices . . . . . . . . .  18
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21

1.  Introduction

   A digital identity, in an abstract sense, possesses at least two
   features: an identifier (or name), and a means of proving ownership
   of the identifier.  One of the most resilient mechanisms for tying an
   identifier to a method for proving ownership of the identifier is the
   digital certificate, issued by a well-run Certification Authority
   (CA).  The CA acts as a mutually trusted third party, a root of
   trust.

   Certificate-based identities are limited in scope by the issuing CA,
   or by the namespace of the application responsible for issuing or
   validating the identity.

   An example of this limitation is well-illustrated by organizational
   Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  Organizational PKI is very often
   coupled with email and LDAP systems, and can be used for associating
   a human or machine identity identifier with a public key.  Within the
   organization, authentication systems already agree on the roots of
   trust for validating entity certificates issued by organizational
   PKI.

   Attempting to use organizational PKI outside the organization can be
   challenging.  In order to authenticate a certificate, the
   certificate’s CA must be trusted.  CAs have no way of controlling
   identifiers in certificates issued by other CAs.  Consequently,
   trusting multiple CAs at the same time can enable entity identifier
   collisions.  Asking an entity to trust your CA implies trust in
   anything that your CA signs.  This is why many organizations operate
   a private CA, and require users and devices connecting to the
   organization’s networks or applications to possess certificates
   issued by the organization’s CA.

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   These limitations make the implementation and ongoing maintenance of
   a PKI costly, and have a chilling effect on the broader adoption of
   certificate-based IoT device identity and user identity.  If
   certificate-based device and user identity were easier to manage,
   more broadly trusted, and less operationally expensive, more
   organizations and applications would be able to use it.

   The lack of trust between PKI domains has lead to a lack of simple
   and globally scalable solutions for secure end-to-end inter-domain
   communication between entities, such as SIP phones, email and chat
   accounts and IoT devices belonging to different organizations.

   DANCE seeks to make PKI-based user and IoT device identity
   universally discoverable, more broadly recognized, and less expensive
   to maintain by using DNS as the constraining namespace and lookup
   mechanism.  DANCE builds on patterns established by the original DANE
   RFCs to enable client and sending entity certificate, public key, and
   trust anchor discovery.  DANCE allows entities to possess a first-
   class identity, which, thanks to DNSSEC, may be trusted by any
   application also trusting the DNS.  A first-class identity is an
   application-independent identity.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   *This section will be interesting to define.  We have great examples
   of identity terminology in the https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
   draft-sarikaya-t2trg-sbootstrapping-06 document, but this document
   also admits that there is semantic drift on terms like
   “bootstrapping”, depending on who’s talking.*

   *How to Dance with ENTITY:* This architecture document delegates many
   details of how DANCE can be used with some specific protocol to a
   document with the names "How to Dance with _entity_".

   *Identity provisioning:* This refers to the set of tasks required to
   securely provision an asymmetric key pair for the device, sign the
   certificate (if the public credential is not simply a raw public
   key), and publish the public key or certificate in DNS.  Under some
   circumstances, these steps are not all performed by the same party or
   organization.  A device manufacturer may instantiate the key pair,
   and a systems integrator may be responsible for issuing (and
   publishing) the device certificate in DNS.  In some circumstances, a

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   manufacturer may also publish device identity records in DNS.  In
   this case, the system integrator needs to perform network and
   application access configuration, since the identity already exists
   in DNS.  A user may instantiate a key pair, based upon which an
   organization's CA may produce a certificate after internally assuring
   the user identity, and the systems integrator may publish the CA root
   certificate in DNS.

   *DANCEr:* A DANCEr is the term which is used to describe a protocol
   that has been taught to use DANE, usually through a _How to Dance
   with_ document.

   *Security Domain:* DNS-bound client identity allows the device to
   establish secure communications with any server with a DNS-bound
   identity, as long as a network path exists, the entity is configured
   to trust its communicating peer by its DNS owner name, and agreement
   on protocols can be achieved.  The act of joining a security domain,
   in the past, may have involved certificate provisioning.  Now, it can
   be as simple as using a manufacturer-provisioned identity to join the
   device to the network and application.  [Is the security domain
   defined by how broadly the identity is recognized, or by the breadth
   of the application or network access policy?]

   *Client:* This architecture document adopts the definition of
   "Client" from RFC 8446: "The endpoint initiating the TLS connection"

   *User:* A client whose name consists of a user identity and a DNS
   owner name prefixed with a _user label.

   *Server:* This architecture document adopts the definition of
   "Server" from RFC 8446: "The endpoint that did not initiate the TLS
   connection"

   *Sending agent:* Software which encodes and transmits messages.  A
   sending agent may perform tasks related to generating cryptographic
   signatures and/or encrypting messages before transmission.

   *Receiving agent:* Software which interprets and processes messages.
   A receiving agent may perform tasks related to the decryption of
   messages, and verification of message signatures.

   *Store-and-forward system:* A message handling system in-path between
   the sending agent and the receiving agent.

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   *Hardware supplier role:* The entity which manufactures or assembles
   the physical device.  In many situations, multiple hardware suppliers
   are involved in producing a given device.  In some cases, the
   hardware supplier may provision an asymmetric key pair for the device
   and establish the device identity in DNS.  In some cases, the
   hardware supplier may ship a device with software pre-installed.

   *Systems integrator:* The party responsible for configuration and
   deployment of application components.  In some cases, the systems
   integrator also installs the software onto the device, and may
   provision the device identity in DNS.

   *Consumer:* The entity or organization which pays for the value
   provided by the application, and defines the success criteria for the
   output of the application.

3.  Communication Patterns

3.1.  Client/Server

   Client/server communication patterns imply a direct connection
   between an entity which provides a service (the server), and an
   entity which initiates a connection to the server, called a client.
   A secure implementation of this pattern includes a TLS-protected
   session directly between the client and the server.  A secure
   implementation may also include public key-based mutual
   authentication.

   Extending DANE to include client identity allows the server to
   authenticate clients independent of the private PKI used to issue the
   client certificate.  This reduces the complexity of managing the CA
   certificate collection, and mitigates the possibility of client
   identifier collision.  If the client is a user, the certificate holds
   an additional user identity supplied under the prerogative of a DNS
   owner name, which reduces the complexity of authenticating both
   internal and external users, through protocol mechanisms like SASL
   EXTERNAL [RFC4422].

3.2.  Peer2peer

   The extension also allows an application to find an application
   identity and set up a secure communication channel directly.  This
   pattern can be used in mesh networking, IoT and in many communication
   protocols for multimedia sessions, chat and messaging, where each
   endpoint may represent a device or a user.

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3.3.  Decoupled

   Decoupled architecture, frequently incorporating store-and-forward
   systems, provides no direct connection between the producer and
   consumer of information.  The producer (or sending agent) and
   consumer (or receiving agent) are typically separated by at least one
   host running messaging-oriented middleware.  The Messaging-oriented
   middleware components may act as a server for the purpose of
   establishing TLS sessions for the producer and consumer.  This allows
   the assertion of identity between the middleware and sending agent,
   and the middleware and receiving agent.  The trust relationship
   between the sending agent and receiving agent is based on the
   presumed trustworthiness of the middleware, unless an identity can be
   attached to the message itself, independent of transport and
   middleware components.

   Within many existing store-and-forward protocols, certificates may be
   transmitted within the signed message itself.  An example of this is
   S/MIME.  Within IoT applications, we find that networks may be more
   constrained.  Including certificates in message payloads can present
   an unnecessary overhead on constrained network links.  Decoupled
   applications benefit from an out-of-band public key discovery
   mechanism, which may enable the retrieval of certificates only when
   needed, and sometimes using a less expensive network connection.

4.  Client authentication

4.1.  Overview

   The client sets up a TLS connection to a server, attaches a client
   certificate with one subjectAltName element dNSName indicating the
   DNS onwer name of the client.  If the client is a user, their user
   identity is added in one subjectAltName element otherName holding
   their uid attribute [RFC4519].

   In the TLS connection the DANE-client-id extension is used to tell
   the server to use the certificate dNSName to find a DANE record
   including the public key of the certificate to be able to validate.
   If the server can validate the DNSSEC response, the server validates
   the certificate and completes the TLS connection setup.  (PKIX offers
   rfc822Name with userid@domain.name as alternative for a user's uid &
   dNSName, but it is limited to ASCII and suggests email only).

   Using DANE to convey certificate information for authenticating TLS
   clients gives a not-yet-authenticated client the ability to trigger a
   DNS lookup on the server side of the TLS connection.  An opportunity
   for DDOS may exist when malicious clients can trigger arbitrary DNS
   lookups.  For instance, an authoritative DNS server which has been

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   configured to respond slowly, may cause a high concurrency of in-
   flight TLS authentication processes as well as open connections to
   upstream resolvers.  This sort of attack (of type slowloris) could
   have a performance or availability impact on the TLS server.

4.1.1.  Example 1: TLS authentication for HTTPS API interaction, DANE
        pattern assurance

   *  The client initiates a TLS connection to the server.

   *  The TLS server compares the dane_clientid (conveyed via the DANE
      Client Identity extension) to a list of allowed client domains.

   *  If the dane_clientid is allowed, the TLS server then performs a
      DNS lookup for the client's TLSA record.  If the dane_clientid is
      not allowed, authentication fails.

   *  If the client's TLSA record matches the presented certificate or
      public key, the TLS handshake completes successfully and the
      authenticated dane_clientid is presented to the web application in
      the (TBD) header field.

   This pattern has the following advantages:

   *  This pattern translates well to TLS/TCP load balancers, by using a
      TCP TLV instead of an HTTP header.

   *  No traffic reaches the application behind the load balancer unless
      DANE client authentication is successful.

4.1.1.1.  Example 2: TLS authentication for HTTPS API interaction, DANE
          matching in web application

   *  The client initiates a TLS connection to the server.

   *  The TLS server accepts any certificate for which the client can
      prove possession of the corresponding private key.

   *  The TLS server passes the certificate to the web application in
      (TBD) header field.

   *  The HTTP request body contains the dane_clientid, and is passed to
      the web application.

   *  The web application compares the dane_clientid to a list of
      allowed clients or client domains.

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   *  If the dane_clientid is allowed, the web application makes the DNS
      query for the TLSA records for dane_clientid

   *  If the presented certificate (which was authenticated by the TLS
      server) matches at least one TLSA record for dane_clientid,
      authentication succeeds.

   This pattern has the following advantages:

   *  In a web application where a TLS-terminating load balancer sits in
      front of a web application, the authentication logic in the load
      balancer remains simple.

   *  The web application ultimately decides whether to make the DNS
      query to support DANE authentication.  This allows the web
      application to reject clients with identifiers which are not
      allowed, before making a DNS query for TLSA retrieval and
      comparison.  No need to manage an allow-list in the load balancer.

   *  This can be implemented with no changes to the TLS handshake.

4.1.1.2.  Example 3: TLS user authentication for an LDAP query

   *  The LDAP client initiates a TLS connection the the server,
      conveying the user's domain via the DANE Client Identity
      extension.

   *  If the dane_clientid is allowed and begins with a _user label, the
      TLS server then performs a DNS lookup for TLSA records holding the
      user's CA, and includes them when requesting a client certificate.

   *  If the client's certificate is signed by a CA found in the TLSA
      records and the certificate's dNSName prefixed with a _user label
      matches the dane_clientid then the client identity is
      authenticated to consist of the lowercase uid in the certificate,
      an "@" symbol and the lowercase UTF-8 representation of the
      certificate's dNSName (which lacks the "_user." prefix).

   *  The LDAP server responds to SASL EXTERNAL authentication by
      obtaining the authenticated user identity in userid@domain.name
      form and, if so requested, attempts to change to an authorization
      identity.

   This pattern has the following advantages:

   *  SASL authentication under TLS encryption is common to many
      protocols, including new ones.

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   *  This LDAP example demonstrates the potential of authentication
      with realm crossover support as a precursor to fine access control
      to possibly sensitive data.

   *  User identities cannot be iterated in DNS; TLS 1.3 conceals the
      client certificate; TLS in general conceals the user's choice of
      authorization identity during SASL EXTERNAL.

   *  This can be implemented with no changes to the TLS handshake.

4.1.2.  IoT: Device to cloud

   Direct device-to-cloud communication is common in simple IoT
   applications.  Authentication in these applications is usually
   accomplished using shared credentials like API keys, or using client
   certificates.  Client certificate authentication frequently requires
   the consumer to maintain a CA.  Before client DANE, the CA trust
   anchor certificate would be installed into the cloud application, and
   used in the TLS authentication process.

   Using client DANE for device identity can allow parties other than
   the implementer to operate the CA.  A hardware manufacturer can
   provide a pre-established identity, with the certificate or public
   key already published in DNS.  This makes PKI-based identity more
   approachable for small organizations which currently lack the
   resources to operate an organizational CA.

4.1.3.  LoRaWAN

   For the end-device onboarding in LoRaWAN, the "network server" and
   the "join server" [RFC8376] needs to establish mutual TLS
   authentication in order to exchange configuration parameters.
   Certificate Authority based mutual TLS authentication doesn't work in
   LoRaWAN due to the non availability of the CA trust store in the
   LoRaWAN network stack.  Self-signed certificate based mutual-TLS
   authentication method is the alternative solution.

   DANE based client identity allows the server to authenticate clients
   during the TLS handhsake.  Thus, independent of the private PKI used
   to issue the client's self-signed certificate, the "network server"
   and the "join server" could be mutually authenticated.

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4.1.4.  Edge Computing

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hong-t2trg-iot-edge-
   computing-01 (Edge Computing) may require devices to mutually
   authenticate in the field.  A practical example of this pattern is
   the edge computing in construction use case
   [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-hong-t2trg-iot-edge-
   computing-01#section-6.2.1].  Using traditional certificate-based
   identity, the sensor and the gateway may have certificates issued by
   the same organizational PKI.  By using DANE for client and sender
   identity, the sensor and the gateway may have identities represented
   by the equipment supplier, and still be able to mutually
   authenticate.  Important sensor measurements forwarded by the gateway
   to the cloud may bear the DNS owner name and signature of the
   originating sensor, and the cloud application may authenticate the
   measurement independent of the gateway which forwarded the
   information to the application.

4.1.5.  Domain Users

   The allocation of user identities is the prerogative of a domain, in
   line with the nesting suggested in URI notation.  Domains may even
   choose to assign domain user identities to services, possibly with
   easily recognised identities like +mail+archive@domain.name.  Domains
   who publish TLSA records for a CA under a _user name underneath their
   domain allow the validation of user identities as mentioned in a
   certificate as TLS client or peer identities.  This mechanism is not
   restricted to domain-internal users, but can be used to validate
   users under any domain.

   Since ENUM maps telephone numbers to DNS owner names, it is possible
   to employ these same mechanisms for telephone number users.  Any
   DANCEr may however define alternate derivation procedures to obtain
   the DNS owner name for a phone number from specialised PKIX or LDAP
   attributes such as telephoneNumber, telexNumber, homePhone, mobile
   and pager.

   There is no reason why other uses, such as store-and-forward with S/
   MIME, could not benefit from this DNS-based PKI, as long as they
   remain mindful that anything in the certificate is the prerogative of
   the domain publishing the TLSA record, and the only reliable identity
   statements are for resources underneath the domain -- notably, the
   assignment of uid names.

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4.1.6.  SIP and WebRTC inter-domain privacy

   End to end security in SIP is currently based on a classical S/MIME
   model which has not received much implementation.  There are also SIP
   standards that build upon a trust chained anchored on the HTTP trust
   chain (SIP identity, STIR).  WebRTC has a trust model between the web
   browser and the servers using TLS, but no inter-domain trust
   infrastructure.  WebRTC lacks a definition of namespace to map to
   DNS, where SIP is based on an email-style addressing scheme.  For
   WebRTC the application developer needs to define the name space and
   mapping to DNS.

   By using DNS as a shared root of trust SIP and WebRTC end points can
   anchor the keys used for DTLS/SRTP media channel setup.  In addition,
   SIP devices can establish security in the SIP messaging by using DNS
   to find the callee’s and the callers digital identity.

   [I-D.johansson-sipcore-dane-sip](SIPDANE)

4.1.7.  DNS over TLS client authentication

   Issue #7

4.1.8.  SMTP, STARTTLS

   Issue #8

4.1.9.  SSH client

   SSH servers have for some time been able to put their host keys into
   DNS using [RFC4255].

   In many SSH server implementations the list of users that is
   authorized to login to an account is given by listing their public
   keys in a per-user file ("authorized_keys").  The file provides both
   authorization (who may login), and authentication (how they prove
   their identity).  While this is an implementation detail, doing both
   in one place has been one of Secure Shell's major reason for success.

   However, there are downsides to this: a user can not easily replace
   their key without visiting every host they are authorized to access
   and update the key on that host.  Separation of authorization and
   authentication in this case would involve putting the key material in
   a third place, such as in a DANE record in DNS, and then listing only
   the DNS owner name in the authorization file:

   *  A user who wants to update their key need only update DNS in that
      case.

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   *  A user who has lost access to their key, but can still update DNS
      (or can have a colleague update it) would more easily be able to
      recover.

   *  An administrator who controls the domain would be able to remove a
      departing user's key from DNS, preventing the user from
      authenticating in the future.

   The DNS record used could be TLSA, but it is possible with some
   protocol work that it could instead be SSHFP.  Since SSH can trust CA
   certificates from X.509, those may be published for user
   authentication.

4.1.10.  Network Access

   Network access refers to an authentication process by which a node is
   admitted securely onto network infrastructure.  This is most common
   for wireless networks (wifi, 802.15.4), but has also routine been
   done for wired infrastructure using 802.1X mechanisms with EAPOL.

   While there are EAP protocols that do not involve certificates, such
   as EAPSIM ([RFC4186], the use of symmetric key mechanisms as the
   "network key" is common in many homes.  The use of certificate based
   mechanisms are expected to increase, due to challenges, such as
   Randomized and Changing MAC addresses (RCM), as described in
   [I-D.ietf-madinas-use-cases].

4.1.10.1.  EAP-TLS with RADIUS

   Enterprise EAP methods use a version of TLS to form a secure
   transport.  Client and server-side certificates are used as
   credentials.  EAP-TLS does not run over TCP, but rather over a
   reliable transport provided by EAP.  To keep it simple the EAP
   "window" is always one, and there are various amounts of overhead
   that needs to be accounted for, and the EAP segment size is often
   noticeably smaller than the normal ethernet 1500 bytes.  [RFC3748]
   does guarantee a minimum payload of 1020 bytes.

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   The client side certificates are often larger than 1500 bytes and can
   take two or three round trip times to transport from the supplicant
   to the authenticator.  In worst case scenarios, which are common with
   eduroam [RFC7593], the EAP packets are transported some distance,
   easily across the entire planet.  The authenticating system (the
   "authentication server" in EAP terms) is a system at the institute
   that issued the client side certificate, and so already has access to
   the entire client certificate.  Transferring the client certificate
   is redundant.  That is, the authenticator already has access to the
   entire certificate, but the client does not know this to tbe case, so
   it sends the entire certificate anyway.

   The use of DANE Client IDs in TLS as described in
   [I-D.ietf-dance-tls-clientid] reduces the redundant bytes of
   certificate sent.

4.1.10.1.1.  Terminology

   *Supplicant:* The entity which acts as the TLS client in the EAP-TLS
   authentication protocol.  This term is defined in IEEE 802.1x.  The
   suppliant acts as a client in the EAPOL (EAP over LAN) protocol,
   which is terminated at the authenticator (defined below).

   *Authentication server:* The entity which acts as the TLS server in
   the EAP-TLS protocol.  RADIUS (RFC 2865) is a frequently-used
   authentication server protocol.

   *Authenticator:* The authenticator is the device which acts as a
   server the EAPOL (EAP over LAN) protocol, and is a client of the
   authentication server.  The authenticator is responsible for passing
   EAP messages between the supplicant and the authentication server,
   and for ensuring that only authenticated supplicants gain access to
   the network.

   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5216 (EAP-TLS) is a mature
   and widely-used protocol for network authentication, for IoT and IT
   equipment.  IEEE 802.1x defines the encapsulation of EAP over LAN
   access technologies, like IEEE 802.11 wireless and IEEE 802.3
   ethernet.  RADIUS is a protocol and server technology frequently used
   for supporting the server side of EAP-TLS authentication.  Guidance
   for implementing RADIUS strongly encourages the use of a single
   common CA for all supplicants, to mitigate the possibility of
   identifier collisions across PKIs.  The use of DANE for client
   identity can allow the safe use of any number of CAs.  DNS acts as a
   constraining namespace, which prevents two unrelated CAs from issuing
   valid certificates bearing the same identifier.  Certificates
   represented in DNS are valid, and all others are un-trusted.

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4.1.10.2.  RADSEC

   The RADIUS protocol has a few recognized security problems.
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6614 (RADSEC) addresses the
   challenges related to the weakness of MD5-based authentication and
   confidentiality over untrusted networks by establishing a TLS session
   between the RADIUS protocol client and the RADIUS protocol server.
   RADIUS datagrams are then transmitted between the authenticator and
   authentication server within the TLS session.  Updating the RADSEC
   standard to include the use of DANE for client and server identity
   would allow a RADIUS server and client to mutually authenticate,
   independent of the client’s and server’s issuing CAs.  The benefit
   for this use case is that a hosted RADIUS service may mutually
   authenticate any client device, like a WiFi access point or ethernet
   switch, via RADSEC, without requiring the distribution of CA
   certificates.

4.2.  Object Security

   Issue #13

4.2.1.  Structured data messages: JOSE/COSE

   JOSE and COSE provide formats for exchanging authenticated and
   encrypted structured data.  JOSE defines the x5u field in [RFC7515],
   Section 4.1.5, and COSE defines a field of the same name in
   [I-D.ietf-cose-x509], Section 2.

   However, this URL field points to where the key can be found.  There
   is, as yet, no URI scheme which says that the key can be found via
   the DNS lookup itself.

   In order to make use of x5u, a DANCEr would have to define a new URI
   scheme that explained how to get the right key from DNS.  (Open Issue
   #22, about [RFC4501])

4.3.  Operational anomaly reporting

   Issue #14

4.3.1.  MUD reporting for improper provisioning

4.3.2.  XARF for abuse reporting

4.4.  Adjacent Ecosystem Components

4.4.1.  Certification Authority

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5.  Security Considerations

5.1.  Confidentiality

   DNS clients should use DNS over TLS with trusted DNS resolvers to
   protect the identity of authenticating peers.

5.2.  Integrity

   The integrity of public keys represented in DNS is most important.
   An altered public key can enable device impersonation, and the denial
   of existence for a valid identity can cause devices to become un-
   trusted by the network or the application.  DNS records should be
   validated by the DNS stub resolver, using the DNSSEC protocol.

   Compartmentalizing failure domains within an application is a well-
   known architectural best practice.  Within the context of protecting
   DNS-based identities, this compartmentalization may manifest by
   hosting an identity zone on a DNS server which only supports the
   resource record types essential for representing device identities.
   This can prevent a compromised identity zone DNS server from
   presenting records essential for impersonating web sites under the
   organization’s domain name.

   The naming pattern suggested in
   https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-huque-dane-client-cert
   (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-huque-dane-client-cert)
   includes an underscore label (_device) which also prevents the
   issuance of Web PKI-validating certificates in the event a DNS server
   hosting a client identity zone, which is capable of presenting A and
   AAAA records, is compromised.  An alternative underscore label _user
   separates the TLSA records with the domain CA from the TLSA records
   for devices.

5.3.  Availability

   One of the advantages of DNS is that it has more than fourty years of
   demonstrated scaling.  It is a distributed database with a caching
   mechanism, and properly configured, it has proven resilient to many
   kinds of outages and attacks.

   A key part of this availability is the proper use of Time To Live
   (TTL) values for resource records.  A cache is allowed to hang on to
   the data for a set time, the TTL, after which it must do a new query
   to find out if the data has changed, or perhaps been deleted.

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   There is therefore a tension between resilience (higher TTL values),
   and agility (lower TTL values).  A lower TTL value allows for
   revocation or replacement of a key to become known much faster.  This
   allows for a more agile security posture.

   On the other hand, lower TTLs cause the queries to occur more often,
   which may reveal more information to an observer about which devices
   are active.  Encrypted transports like DoT/DoH/DoQ make these queries
   far less visible.  In addition to the on-path observer being able to
   see more, the resolver logs also may be a source of information.  It
   also allows for more opportunities for an attacker to affect the
   response time of the queries.

5.4.  Privacy

   If the DNS owner name of the identity proven by a certificate is
   directly or indirectly relatable to a person, privacy needs to be
   considered when forming the name of the DNS resource record for the
   certificate.  This privacy is implied for domain users inasfar as the
   domain CA does not mention users.  When creating the DNS owner name,
   effects of DNS zone walking and possible harvesting of identities in
   the DNS zone will have to be considered.  The DNS owner name may not
   have to have a direct relation to the name of the subject or the
   subjectAltName of the certificate.  If there is such a relation, a
   DANCEr may specify support for CA certificates, stored under a
   wildcard in DNS.

   Further work has do be done in this area.

   AW: Consider if an approach like the email local-part hashing used in
   SMIMEA https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8162
   (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8162) might work for this.
   If the identifier/local-part is hashed and the certificate
   association is a SHA256 or SHA512 hash, the effort required to walk a
   zone would not produce much useful information.

5.4.1.  DNS Scalability

   In the use case for IoT an implementation must be scalable to a large
   amount of devices.  In many cases, identities may also be very short
   lived as revocation is performed by simply removing a DNS record.  A
   zone will have to manage a large amount of changes as devices are
   constantly added and de-activated.

   In these cases it is important to consider the architecture of the
   DNS zone and when possible use a tree-like structure with many
   subdomain parts, much like reverse DNS records or how telephone
   numbers are represented in the ENUM standard (RFC 6116).

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   If an authoritative resolver were configured to respond quite slowly
   (think slow loris [XXXrefereceXXX]), is it possible to cause a DoS on
   the TLS server via complete exhaustion of TCP connections?

   The availability of a client identity zone is essential to permitting
   clients to authenticate.  If the DNS infrastructure hosting client
   identities becomes unavailable, then the clients represented by that
   zone cannot be authenticated.

   *OEJ: We may want to have a discussion with the IETF DNS directorate.
   The scalability section above is from a discussion with one of the
   members...*

5.4.2.  Change of ownership for IoT devices

   One of the significant use cases is where the devices are identified
   by their manufacturer assigned identities.  A significant savings was
   that enterprises would not have to run their own (private) PKI
   systems, sometimes even one system per device type.  But, with this
   usage style for DANCE there is no private PKI to run, and as a result
   there is no change of ownership required.  The device continues to
   use the manufacturer assigned identity.

   The device OwnerOperator is therefore at risk if the device's
   manufacturer goes out of business, or decides that they no longer
   wish to manufacturer that device.  Should that happen then the
   OwnerOperator of the device may be in trouble, and may find
   themselves having to replace the devices.

   [RFC8995], Section 10.4 (BRSKI) deals with concerns about
   manufacturers influence on devices.  In the case of BRSKI, the
   concern was limited to when the device ownership transfer was
   performed (the BRSKI transaction itself).  There was no concern once
   the OwnerOperator had taken control over the device through an
   [RFC8366] voucher.

   In the case of DANCE, the manufacturer is continuously involved with
   the day to day operation of the device.

   If this is of concern, then the OwnerOperator should perform some
   kind of transfer of ownership, such as using DPP, [RFC8995](BRSKI),
   [RFC9140](EAP-NOOB), and others yet to come.

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   The DANCE method of using manufacturer assigned identities would
   therefore seem to be best used for devices which have a short
   lifetime: one much smaller than the uncertainty about the anticipated
   lifespan of the manufacturer.  For instance, some kind of battery
   operated sensor which might be used in a large quantity at a
   construction site, and which can not be recharged.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-cose-x509]
              Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
              Header Parameters for Carrying and Referencing X.509
              Certificates", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-cose-x509-09, 13 October 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-
              x509-09>.

   [I-D.ietf-dance-tls-clientid]
              Huque, S. and V. Dukhovni, "TLS Extension for DANE Client
              Identity", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              dance-tls-clientid-03, 8 January 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dance-
              tls-clientid-03>.

   [I-D.ietf-madinas-use-cases]
              Henry, J. and Y. Lee, "Randomized and Changing MAC Address
              Use Cases", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              madinas-use-cases-09, 29 February 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-madinas-
              use-cases-09>.

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   [I-D.johansson-sipcore-dane-sip]
              Johansson, O. E., "TLS sessions in SIP using DNS-based
              Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA records",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-johansson-sipcore-
              dane-sip-00, 6 October 2014,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-johansson-
              sipcore-dane-sip-00>.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
              (EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3748>.

   [RFC4186]  Haverinen, H., Ed. and J. Salowey, Ed., "Extensible
              Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for
              Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules
              (EAP-SIM)", RFC 4186, DOI 10.17487/RFC4186, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4186>.

   [RFC4255]  Schlyter, J. and W. Griffin, "Using DNS to Securely
              Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints", RFC 4255,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4255, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4255>.

   [RFC4422]  Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
              Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4422, June 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4422>.

   [RFC4501]  Josefsson, S., "Domain Name System Uniform Resource
              Identifiers", RFC 4501, DOI 10.17487/RFC4501, May 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4501>.

   [RFC4519]  Sciberras, A., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
              (LDAP): Schema for User Applications", RFC 4519,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4519, June 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4519>.

   [RFC7515]  Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
              Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7515>.

   [RFC7593]  Wierenga, K., Winter, S., and T. Wolniewicz, "The eduroam
              Architecture for Network Roaming", RFC 7593,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7593, September 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7593>.

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   [RFC8366]  Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
              "A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
              RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8366>.

   [RFC8376]  Farrell, S., Ed., "Low-Power Wide Area Network (LPWAN)
              Overview", RFC 8376, DOI 10.17487/RFC8376, May 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8376>.

   [RFC8995]  Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
              and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
              Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
              May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8995>.

   [RFC9140]  Aura, T., Sethi, M., and A. Peltonen, "Nimble Out-of-Band
              Authentication for EAP (EAP-NOOB)", RFC 9140,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9140, December 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9140>.

Acknowledgments

   TODO acknowledge.

Authors' Addresses

   Ash Wilson
   Valimail
   Email: ash.d.wilson@gmail.com

   Shumon Huque
   Salesforce
   Email: shuque@gmail.com

   Olle Johansson
   Edvina.net
   Email: oej@edvina.net

   Michael Richardson
   Sandelman Software Works Inc
   Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca

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