TLS Client Authentication via DANE TLSA records
draft-ietf-dance-client-auth-10

Internet Engineering Task Force                                 S. Huque
Internet-Draft                                                Salesforce
Updates: 6698, 7671 (if approved)                            V. Dukhovni
Intended status: Standards Track                     OpenSSL Corporation
Expires: 3 September 2026                                   2 March 2026

            TLS Client Authentication via DANE TLSA records
                    draft-ietf-dance-client-auth-10

Abstract

   The DANE TLSA protocol describes how to publish Transport Layer
   Security (TLS) server certificates or public keys in the DNS.  This
   document updates RFC 6698 and RFC 7671.  It describes how to use the
   TLSA record to publish client certificates or public keys, and also
   the rules and considerations for using them with TLS.  In addition,
   it defines a new TLS extension, DANE CLient Identity, to convey the
   client's domain name identity to the server.

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 September 2026.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2026 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Associating Client Identities in DNS TLSA Records . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Format 1: Service specific client identity  . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Format 2: IOT Device Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Example TLSA records for clients  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Format 1: Service Specific Client Identity  . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Format 2: DevID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Authentication Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Client Identifiers in X.509 certificates  . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Signaling the Client's DANE Identity in TLS . . . . . . . . .   5
   7.  TLS DANE Client Identity Extension  . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   8.  Changes to Client and Server behavior . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   9.  Raw Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   13. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     13.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     13.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction and Motivation

   The Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC8446] and DTLS [RFC9147]
   protocols optionally support the authentication of clients using
   X.509 certificates [RFC5280] or raw public keys [RFC7250].  TLS
   applications that perform DANE [RFC6698] [RFC7671] authentication of
   servers using TLSA records may also desire to authenticate clients
   using the same mechanism, especially if the client identity is in the
   form of or can be represented by a DNS domain name.  Some design
   patterns from the Internet of Things (IoT) plan to make use of this
   form of authentication, where large networks of physical objects
   identified by DNS names may authenticate themselves using TLS to
   centralized device management and control platforms.  Other potential
   applications include authenticating the client side of SMTP transport
   security.

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   In this document, the term TLS is used generically to describe both
   the TLS and DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) [RFC6347]
   protocols.  The protocol changes described can also be used with QUIC
   since QUIC re-uses the TLS handshake.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.  Associating Client Identities in DNS TLSA Records

   Different applications may have quite different conventions for
   naming clients via domain names.  This document thus does not
   proscribe a single format, but mentions a few that may have wide
   applicability.

2.1.  Format 1: Service specific client identity

   In this format, the owner name of the client TLSA record has the
   following structure:

   [_service].[client-domain-name]

   The first label identifies the application service name.  The
   remaining labels are composed of the client domain name.

   Encoding the application service name into the owner name allows the
   same client domain name to have different authentication credentials
   for different application services.  There is no need to encode the
   transport label - the same name form is usable with both TLS and
   DTLS.

   The _service label could be a custom string for an application, but
   more commonly is expected to be a service name registered in the IANA
   Service Name Registry [SRVREG].

   The RDATA or data field portion of the TLSA record is formed exactly
   as specified in [RFC6698] and [RFC7671], and carries the same
   meaning.

2.2.  Format 2: IOT Device Identity

   The Device Identity form of the TLSA record has the following
   structure:

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   [devicename]._device.[org-domain-name]

   The "_device" label interposed between the client device name labels
   and the organization domain labels allows management of all client
   identities to be delegated to a subzone or to another party.

3.  Example TLSA records for clients

   The following examples are provided in the textual presentation
   format of the DNS TLSA record.

3.1.  Format 1: Service Specific Client Identity

   An example TLSA record for the client "device1.example.com." and the
   application "smtp-client".  This record specifies the SHA-256 hash of
   the subject public key component of the end-entity certificate
   corresponding to the client.  The certificate usage for this record
   is 3 (DANE-EE) and thus is validated in accordance with section 5.1
   of RFC 7671.

   _smtp-client.device1.example.com. IN TLSA (
      3 1 1 d2abde240d7cd3ee6b4b28c54df034b9
            7983a1d16e8a410e4561cb106618e971 )

3.2.  Format 2: DevID

   An example TLSA record for the device named "sensor7" managed by the
   organization "example.com" This record specifies the SHA-512 hash of
   the subject public key component of an EE certificate corresponding
   to the client.

   sensor7._device.example.com. IN TLSA (
      3 1 2 0f8b48ff5fd94117f21b6550aaee89c8
            d8adbc3f433c8e587a85a14e54667b25
            f4dcd8c4ae6162121ea9166984831b57
            b408534451fd1b9702f8de0532ecd03c )

   The example below shows a wildcard TLSA record mapped to a TLSA
   record with a DANE-TA usage mode.  This allows all client identifiers
   matching the wildcard to be authenticated by client certificates
   issued by an organization managed Certification Authority.

   *._device.example.com. IN TLSA (
      2 0 1 20efa254ecd5b646e701211095bc3fe4
            423e21941b0b29efb21da57ec944a9b5 )

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4.  Authentication Model

   The authentication model assumed in this document is the following:

   The client is assigned an identity corresponding to a DNS domain
   name.

   The client has a private and public key pair.  Where client
   certificates are being used, the client also has a certificate
   binding the name to its public key.  The certificate or public key
   has a corresponding TLSA record published in the DNS, which allows it
   to be authenticated directly via the DNS (using the DANE-TA or DANE-
   EE certificate usage modes) or via a PKIX public CA system constraint
   if the client's certificate was issued by a public CA (using the
   PKIX-TA or PKIX-EE DANE usage modes).

5.  Client Identifiers in X.509 certificates

   If the TLS DANE Client Identity extension (see Section 6) is not
   being used, the client certificate MUST have the client's DNS name
   specified in the Subject Alternative Name extension's dNSName type,
   and only one instance of the dNSName type is permitted.

   If the client uses a non-empty TLS DANE Client Identity extension,
   then with DANE-EE(3), the subject name need not be present in the
   certificate.

6.  Signaling the Client's DANE Identity in TLS

   The client MUST explicitly signal that it has a DANE identity.  The
   most important reason is that the server needs an explicit indication
   from the client that it has a DANE record, so as to avoid unnecessary
   DNS queries in-band with the TLS handshake.

   The DANE Client Identity TLS extension is used for this purpose.
   This extension can also be used to convey the actual DANE client
   identity (i.e. domain name) that the TLS server should attempt to
   authenticate.  This is required when using TLS raw public key
   authentication, since there is no client certificate from which to
   extract the client's DNS identity.  It is also required when the
   client certificate contains multiple identities, and only a specific
   one has a DANE record.

7.  TLS DANE Client Identity Extension

   The DANE Client Identity Extension type, "dane_clientid", will have a
   value assigned and registered in the IANA TLS Extensions registry.
   Its extension data (if not has the following format:

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   opaque ClientName<0..2^8-1>;

   The ClientName field contains the single domain name of the client in
   textual presentation format, as described in RFC 1035 [RFC1035],
   omitting the trailing dot.  The lower bound length value of 0 octets
   indicates that no client name is present.

   The wire format of a domain name is limited to 255 octets.  In
   keeping with the practice of most TLS extensions, this extension
   specifies the use of the textual presentation format of domain names
   instead.  In theory, the presentation format can exceed 255
   characters because it allows the expression of any arbitrary octet
   with the "\DDD" sequence of characters (where DDD is the decimal
   value).  Applications using this extension (and the DANE TLSA Client
   Authentication protocol more generally) should ensure that client
   domain names being used do not need to resort to the \DDD syntax by
   limiting the alphabet suitably, such as only allowing letters,
   digits, hyphens, and underscores.  This ensures that the presentation
   format client domain name will comfortably fit within the 255 octet
   limit.

   A TLS server implementing this specification MUST send an empty
   extension of type "dane_clientid" in its CertificateRequest message,
   to indicate that it understands the extension and is capable of
   performing DANE client authentication.

   A TLS client implementing this specification and intending to use
   DANE client authentication the TLS server, MUST send an extension of
   type "dane_clientid" in its Certificate message.  Per the TLS
   protocol, the client is only permitted to send the extension if it
   sees the corresponding empty extension in the server's
   CertificateRequest message.  If the client only needs to indicate
   that it has a DANE record and that the client's domain name identity
   can be obtained unambiguously from its certificate, then the
   extension sent can be empty.  If the client needs to send its domain
   name identity, then the "extension_data" field of the extension MUST
   contain a "ClientName" data structure populated with the domain name.

8.  Changes to Client and Server behavior

   A TLS Client conforming to this specification MUST have a DNSSEC
   [RFC9364] signed TLSA record published corresponding to its DNS name
   and X.509 certificate or public key.  The client presents this
   certificate or public key in the TLS handshake with the server.

   A TLS Server implementing this specification performs the following
   steps:

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   1.  Request a client certificate in the TLS handshake's "Certificate
       Request" message, that includes an empty DANE Client Identity
       extension.

   2.  The TLS client supplies its certificate in its Certificate
       message, and if implementing this protocol, also includes the
       DANE Client Identity extension in the Certificate message.

   3.  If the client has sent a non-empty DANE Client Identity extension
       in its Certificate message, then extract the client's domain name
       from the extension.  Otherwise, extract the client identity from
       the Subject Alternative Name extension's dNSName type.

   4.  Construct the DNS query name for the corresponding TLSA record.
       If the TLS DANE client identity extension was present, then this
       name should be used.  Otherwise, the single identity from the
       client certificate is used.

   5.  Look up the TLSA record set in the DNS.  The response MUST be
       cryptographically validated using DNSSEC.  The server could
       perform DNSSEC validation itself, authenticating the full chain
       back to a configured trust anchor (normally the DNS root).
       Alternatively, it could also be configured to trust responses
       obtained via a validating resolver to which it has a secure
       connection, by requiring the Authenticated Data (AD) bit to be
       set in the responses.  If DNSSEC validation fails, the server
       MUST either abort the connection with a handshake_failure TLS
       alert, or treat the client as unauthenticated.  The option of
       treating the client as unauthenticated should typically be a
       configurable option designed to support the case where client
       authentication for the application in question is optional.

   6.  Extract the RDATA of the TLSA records and match them to the
       presented client certificate according to the rules specified in
       the DANE TLS protocol [RFC6698] [RFC7671].  If successfully
       matched, the client is authenticated and the TLS session
       proceeds.  If unsuccessful, the server MUST again either
       terminate the session with a handshake_failure TLS alert, or if
       configured to do so, treat the client as unauthenticated and
       proceed with the session.

   7.  If there are multiple records in the TLSA record set, then the
       client is authenticated as long as at least one of the TLSA
       records matches, subject to RFC7671 digest agility, which SHOULD
       be implemented.

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   If the DANE Client Identity extension is empty, and the presented
   client certificate has multiple distinct reference identifier types
   (e.g. a dNSName, and an rfc822Name) then TLS servers configured to
   perform DANE authentication according to this specification should
   only examine and authenticate the dNSName, and only one such dNSName
   identity should be present in the certificate, otherwise the server
   MUST abort the connection with a bad_certificate TLS alert.

   If the presented client certificate has multiple dNSName identities,
   then the client MUST use a non-empty TLS DANE client identity
   extension to unambiguously indicate one of these identities as its
   client name to the server.  If the name in the TLS DANE client
   identity extension does not match one of the dNSNames in the
   certificate, then the server MUST abort the connection with a
   bad_certificate TLS alert.

   Servers may have their own whitelisting and authorization rules for
   which certificates they accept.  For example a TLS server may be
   configured to only allow TLS sessions from clients with certificate
   identities within a specific domain or set of domains.  If such rules
   are not met, the TLS server again could terminate the connection with
   a handshake_failure TLS alert.

9.  Raw Public Keys

   When using raw public keys in TLS [RFC7250], this specification
   requires the use of a non-empty TLS DANE Client Identity extension.
   The associated DANE TLSA records employ only certificate usage 3
   (DANE-EE) and a selector value of 1 (SPKI), as described in
   [RFC7671].

10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors thank the many members of the IETF DANCE and TLS working
   groups for helpful comments and input.

11.  Security Considerations

   This document updates RFC 6698 by defining the use of the TLSA record
   for clients.  Placing client identities in the DNS may pose privacy
   issues for certain applications, depending on the nature of the
   clients, and the structure and content of the client names.
   Applications employing this protocol should carefully assess those
   potential issues.

   A design goal of TLS 1.3 is that the client identity is encrypted in
   the Certificate message, and thus protected from disclosure on the
   wire.  DANE authentication however relies on the peer (the TLS server

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   in this case) looking up the client's DANE record in the DNS.
   Although, protocol specifications and implementions to encrypt DNS
   transport exist, they are very far from ubiquitously deployed.
   Deployers of DANCE client authentication should thus evaluate the
   risks of the client name being leaked in this manner, until encrypted
   DNS transport becomes the norm.

   One possible way to address this is for the client to construct and
   send its DANE record and the corresponding full DNSSEC authentication
   chain to the TLS server in a new Certificate extension within the
   handshake.  A specification to do this in the other direction (from
   the server to the client) already exists: "TLS DNSSEC Chain
   Extension" [RFC9102].  However, there are several challenges when
   considering such an approach from the client end.  It is quite a
   heavy weight operation that some constrained clients may have
   challenges with.  In order to construct the DANE authentication
   chain, the client would need to perform DNS queries which would still
   leak its identity to the local network environment without encrypted
   DNS.  Lastly, there maybe client side network impediments to making
   this work, e.g. middleboxes that prevent DNSSEC enabled queries from
   succeeding - one of the original motivations for RFC 9102 in the
   first place.  Nevertheless, if appetite to implement this mechanism
   exists, a future version of this specification could define the
   details.

   The service specific client identity form lends itself to a structure
   that might make it easy for the same client to have multiple
   identities corresponding to different applications using the same
   public key (e.g. by using wildcards and DANE-EE mode), which could
   make this protocol susceptible to corss protocol attacks where
   traffic is redirected from one service to another.  Deployers of this
   protocol should avoid this by not sharing per client credentials
   across distinct applications.

12.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to create the following entry in the "TLS
   ExtensionTypes Values" registry:

   Extension Name "dane_clientid" with value TBD, "TLS 1.3" column
   values set to "CR, CT", "DTLS-Only" column set to "N", and
   "Recommended" column set to "N".

   The 'N' designation in the "Recommended" column is because this
   extension has very specific use cases.

13.  References

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13.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC6347]  Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
              Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
              January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.

   [RFC7250]  Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
              Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
              Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
              Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
              June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.

   [RFC7671]  Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based
              Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates
              and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671,
              October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7671>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

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   [RFC9147]  Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
              Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
              1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.

   [RFC9364]  Hoffman, P., "DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)", BCP 237,
              RFC 9364, DOI 10.17487/RFC9364, February 2023,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9364>.

13.2.  Informative References

   [RFC9102]  Dukhovni, V., Huque, S., Toorop, W., Wouters, P., and M.
              Shore, "TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension", RFC 9102,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9102, August 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9102>.

   [SRVREG]   IANA, "Service Name and Transport Protocol Port Number
              Registry", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/service-
              names-port-numbers/service-names-port-numbers.txt>.

Authors' Addresses

   Shumon Huque
   Salesforce
   Email: shuque@gmail.com

   Viktor Dukhovni
   OpenSSL Corporation
   Email: ietf-dane@dukhovni.org

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