Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
draft-ietf-detnet-security-12

Document Type Active Internet-Draft (detnet WG)
Authors Ethan Grossman  , Tal Mizrahi  , Andrew Hacker 
Last updated 2020-10-27 (latest revision 2020-10-02)
Replaces draft-sdt-detnet-security
Stream IETF
Intended RFC status Informational
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Stream WG state Submitted to IESG for Publication
Document shepherd Lou Berger
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IANA IANA review state IANA OK - No Actions Needed
Internet Engineering Task Force                         E. Grossman, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                     DOLBY
Intended status: Informational                                T. Mizrahi
Expires: April 5, 2021                                            HUAWEI
                                                               A. Hacker
                                                                  MISTIQ
                                                         October 2, 2020

       Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
                     draft-ietf-detnet-security-12

Abstract

   A DetNet (deterministic network) provides specific performance
   guarantees to its data flows, such as extremely low data loss rates
   and bounded latency.  As a result, securing a DetNet requires that in
   addition to the best practice security measures taken for any
   mission-critical network, additional security measures may be needed
   to secure the intended operation of these novel service properties.

   This document addresses DetNet-specific security considerations from
   the perspectives of both the DetNet system-level designer and
   component designer.  System considerations include a threat model,
   taxonomy of relevant attacks, and associations of threats versus use
   cases and service properties.  Component-level considerations include
   ingress filtering and packet arrival time violation detection.  This
   document also addresses DetNet security considerations specific to
   the IP and MPLS data plane technologies thereby complementing the
   Security Considerations sections of the various DetNet Data Plane
   (and other) DetNet documents.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 5, 2021.

Grossman, et al.          Expires April 5, 2021                 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               DetNet Security                October 2020

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Abbreviations and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Security Considerations for DetNet Component Design . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Explicit Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Redundant Path Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Timing (or other) Violation Reporting . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  DetNet Security Considerations Compared With DiffServ
       Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Security Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
     5.1.  Threat Model  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.1.  Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.2.  DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing  . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.3.  Resource Segmentation (Inter-segment Attack)  . . . .  12
       5.2.4.  Packet Replication and Elimination  . . . . . . . . .  12
         5.2.4.1.  Replication: Increased Attack Surface . . . . . .  12
         5.2.4.2.  Replication-related Header Manipulation . . . . .  12
       5.2.5.  Controller Plane  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
         5.2.5.1.  Path Choice Manipulation  . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
         5.2.5.2.  Compromised Controller  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.2.6.  Reconnaissance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
       5.2.7.  Time Synchronization Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     5.3.  Threat Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
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