Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
draft-ietf-detnet-security-13
Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (detnet WG) | |
---|---|---|---|
Authors | Ethan Grossman , Tal Mizrahi , Andrew Hacker | ||
Last updated | 2021-01-07 (latest revision 2020-12-11) | ||
Replaces | draft-sdt-detnet-security | ||
Stream | IETF | ||
Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
Formats | plain text xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
Reviews | |||
Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
Document shepherd | Lou Berger | ||
Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2020-06-07) | ||
IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed | |
Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
Telechat date |
Has 3 DISCUSSes. Has enough positions to pass once DISCUSS positions are resolved. |
||
Responsible AD | Deborah Brungard | ||
Send notices to | Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net> | ||
IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed |
Internet Engineering Task Force E. Grossman, Ed. Internet-Draft DOLBY Intended status: Informational T. Mizrahi Expires: June 14, 2021 HUAWEI A. Hacker MISTIQ December 11, 2020 Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations draft-ietf-detnet-security-13 Abstract A DetNet (deterministic network) provides specific performance guarantees to its data flows, such as extremely low data loss rates and bounded latency (including bounded latency variation, i.e. "jitter"). As a result, securing a DetNet requires that in addition to the best practice security measures taken for any mission-critical network, additional security measures may be needed to secure the intended operation of these novel service properties. This document addresses DetNet-specific security considerations from the perspectives of both the DetNet system-level designer and component designer. System considerations include a threat model, taxonomy of relevant attacks, and associations of threats versus use cases and service properties. Component-level considerations include ingress filtering and packet arrival time violation detection. This document also addresses security considerations specific to the IP and MPLS data plane technologies, thereby complementing the Security Considerations sections of those documents. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Grossman, et al. Expires June 14, 2021 [Page 1] Internet-Draft DetNet Security December 2020 This Internet-Draft will expire on June 14, 2021. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Abbreviations and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3. Security Considerations for DetNet Component Design . . . . . 7 3.1. Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. Explicit Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Redundant Path Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.4. Timing (or other) Violation Reporting . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. DetNet Security Considerations Compared With DiffServ Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.2. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.1. Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.2. DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.3. Resource Segmentation (Inter-segment Attack) . . . . 12 5.2.4. Packet Replication and Elimination . . . . . . . . . 13 5.2.4.1. Replication: Increased Attack Surface . . . . . . 13 5.2.4.2. Replication-related Header Manipulation . . . . . 13 5.2.5. Controller Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2.5.1. Path Choice Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2.5.2. Compromised Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2.6. Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2.7. Time Synchronization Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.3. Threat Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Show full document text