Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
draft-ietf-detnet-security-10

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Last updated 2020-05-30
Replaces draft-sdt-detnet-security
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Internet Engineering Task Force                               T. Mizrahi
Internet-Draft                                                    HUAWEI
Intended status: Informational                          E. Grossman, Ed.
Expires: December 1, 2020                                          DOLBY
                                                            May 30, 2020

       Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
                     draft-ietf-detnet-security-10

Abstract

   A DetNet (deterministic network) provides specific performance
   guarantees to its data flows, such as extremely low data loss rates
   and bounded latency.  As a result, securing a DetNet implies that in
   addition to the best practice security measures taken for any
   mission-critical network, additional security measures may be needed
   whose purpose is exclusively to secure the intended operation of
   these novel service properties.

   Designers of DetNet components (such as routers) that provide these
   unique DetNet properties have the responsibility to uphold certain
   security-related properties that can be assumed by DetNet system-
   level designers.  For example, the assumption that network traffic
   associated with a given flow can never affect traffic associated with
   a different flow is only true if the underlying components make it
   so.

   This document addresses DetNet-specific security considerations from
   the perspective of both the DetNet component designer and the DetNet
   system-level designer.  It is assumed that both classes of reader are
   already familiar with network security best practices for the data
   plane technologies underlying a given DetNet implementation.
   Component-level considerations include isolation of data flows from
   each other, ingress filtering, and detection and reporting of packet
   arrival time violations.  System-level considerations include a
   threat model and a taxonomy of relevant attacks, including their
   potential impacts and mitigations.

   A given DetNet may require securing only certain aspects of DetNet
   performance, for example extremely low data loss rates but not
   necessarily bounded latency.  Therefore this document provides an
   association of threats against various use cases by industry, and
   also against the individual service properties as defined in the
   DetNet Use Cases.

   This document also addresses common DetNet security considerations
   related to the IP and MPLS data plane technologies (the first to be

Mizrahi & Grossman      Expires December 1, 2020                [Page 1]
Internet-Draft               DetNet Security                    May 2020

   identified as supported by DetNet), thereby complementing the
   Security Considerations sections of the various DetNet Data Plane
   (and other) DetNet documents.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 1, 2020.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   2.  Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   3.  Security Considerations for DetNet Component Design . . . . .   7
     3.1.  Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.2.  Explicit Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.3.  Redundant Path Support  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.4.  Timing Violation Reporting  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   4.  DetNet Security Considerations Compared With DiffServ
       Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  Security Threats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
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