Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
draft-ietf-detnet-security-13
| Document | Type | Active Internet-Draft (detnet WG) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authors | Ethan Grossman , Tal Mizrahi , Andrew Hacker | ||
| Last updated | 2021-01-07 (latest revision 2020-12-11) | ||
| Replaces | draft-sdt-detnet-security | ||
| Stream | IETF | ||
| Intended RFC status | Informational | ||
| Formats | plain text xml pdf htmlized (tools) htmlized bibtex | ||
| Reviews | |||
| Stream | WG state | Submitted to IESG for Publication | |
| Document shepherd | Lou Berger | ||
| Shepherd write-up | Show (last changed 2020-06-07) | ||
| IESG | IESG state | IESG Evaluation::Revised I-D Needed | |
| Consensus Boilerplate | Yes | ||
| Telechat date |
Has 3 DISCUSSes. Has enough positions to pass once DISCUSS positions are resolved. |
||
| Responsible AD | Deborah Brungard | ||
| Send notices to | Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net> | ||
| IANA | IANA review state | IANA OK - No Actions Needed | |
Internet Engineering Task Force E. Grossman, Ed.
Internet-Draft DOLBY
Intended status: Informational T. Mizrahi
Expires: June 14, 2021 HUAWEI
A. Hacker
MISTIQ
December 11, 2020
Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
draft-ietf-detnet-security-13
Abstract
A DetNet (deterministic network) provides specific performance
guarantees to its data flows, such as extremely low data loss rates
and bounded latency (including bounded latency variation, i.e.
"jitter"). As a result, securing a DetNet requires that in addition
to the best practice security measures taken for any mission-critical
network, additional security measures may be needed to secure the
intended operation of these novel service properties.
This document addresses DetNet-specific security considerations from
the perspectives of both the DetNet system-level designer and
component designer. System considerations include a threat model,
taxonomy of relevant attacks, and associations of threats versus use
cases and service properties. Component-level considerations include
ingress filtering and packet arrival time violation detection.
This document also addresses security considerations specific to the
IP and MPLS data plane technologies, thereby complementing the
Security Considerations sections of those documents.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Grossman, et al. Expires June 14, 2021 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft DetNet Security December 2020
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 14, 2021.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Abbreviations and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Security Considerations for DetNet Component Design . . . . . 7
3.1. Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Explicit Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Redundant Path Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Timing (or other) Violation Reporting . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. DetNet Security Considerations Compared With DiffServ
Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.2. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.1. Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.2. DetNet Flow Modification or Spoofing . . . . . . . . 12
5.2.3. Resource Segmentation (Inter-segment Attack) . . . . 12
5.2.4. Packet Replication and Elimination . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.4.1. Replication: Increased Attack Surface . . . . . . 13
5.2.4.2. Replication-related Header Manipulation . . . . . 13
5.2.5. Controller Plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.5.1. Path Choice Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.5.2. Compromised Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.6. Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.7. Time Synchronization Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Threat Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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