Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
draft-ietf-detnet-security-10
Internet Engineering Task Force T. Mizrahi
Internet-Draft HUAWEI
Intended status: Informational E. Grossman, Ed.
Expires: December 1, 2020 DOLBY
May 30, 2020
Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security Considerations
draft-ietf-detnet-security-10
Abstract
A DetNet (deterministic network) provides specific performance
guarantees to its data flows, such as extremely low data loss rates
and bounded latency. As a result, securing a DetNet implies that in
addition to the best practice security measures taken for any
mission-critical network, additional security measures may be needed
whose purpose is exclusively to secure the intended operation of
these novel service properties.
Designers of DetNet components (such as routers) that provide these
unique DetNet properties have the responsibility to uphold certain
security-related properties that can be assumed by DetNet system-
level designers. For example, the assumption that network traffic
associated with a given flow can never affect traffic associated with
a different flow is only true if the underlying components make it
so.
This document addresses DetNet-specific security considerations from
the perspective of both the DetNet component designer and the DetNet
system-level designer. It is assumed that both classes of reader are
already familiar with network security best practices for the data
plane technologies underlying a given DetNet implementation.
Component-level considerations include isolation of data flows from
each other, ingress filtering, and detection and reporting of packet
arrival time violations. System-level considerations include a
threat model and a taxonomy of relevant attacks, including their
potential impacts and mitigations.
A given DetNet may require securing only certain aspects of DetNet
performance, for example extremely low data loss rates but not
necessarily bounded latency. Therefore this document provides an
association of threats against various use cases by industry, and
also against the individual service properties as defined in the
DetNet Use Cases.
This document also addresses common DetNet security considerations
related to the IP and MPLS data plane technologies (the first to be
Mizrahi & Grossman Expires December 1, 2020 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft DetNet Security May 2020
identified as supported by DetNet), thereby complementing the
Security Considerations sections of the various DetNet Data Plane
(and other) DetNet documents.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on December 1, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Security Considerations for DetNet Component Design . . . . . 7
3.1. Resource Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Explicit Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Redundant Path Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Timing Violation Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. DetNet Security Considerations Compared With DiffServ
Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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